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Here is a reproduction of the article I wrote for the NB list:
Peikoff's article about the analytic-synthetic dichotomy (ASD) has repeatedly been used on this list to refute Mike's arguments without any further explanation. Let's therefore have a look at what Peikoff really says in that article.
He starts with an exposé of the ASD with some examples of true statements in pairs, with the first statement of each pair being an example of an analytic truth and the second statement an example of a synthetic truth. I'll use one of his examples:
i) Ice is a solid
ii) Ice floats on water
His example is incomplete, as he doesn't give the definition of "ice", but I think we may assume that the implied definition is "ice is the solid form of water". With that definition the first statement is obviously true, as Mike said: you don't have to leave your armchair to know it's true, it's an analytical truth which follows logically from the definition of ice. The second statement doesn't follow from the definition of "ice" however, it is an empirical fact, which you can only discover by leaving your armchair. This is called a "synthetic truth", in Peikoff's words: "A 'synthetic' proposition is defined as one which cannot be validated merely by an analysis of the meanings or definitions of its constituent concepts.
In the second part of the article Peikoff starts his attack on this distinction by elaborating on the concept of "a concept". His position is that a concept of a thing (for example "ice") contains all the characteristics of that thing, in the case of ice all the physical and chemical properties of ice, even those that are still unknown. Peikoff: "Thus, a concept subsumes and includes all the characteristics of its referents, known and not-yet-known." He emphasizes the latter: "It is crucially important to grasp the fact that a concept is an 'open-end' classification which includes the yet-to-be-discovered characteristics of a given group of existents."
Peikoffs conclusion is then that it isn't possible to distinguish between analytical and synthetic statements, as any characteristic that is deemed a synthetic truth (like: "ice floats on water"), is already part of the concept itself, so it follows logically from the definition of ice.
This conclusion is fallacious, however. You may define concept to imply all the characteristics, known and yet-to-be-discovered, but a definition necessarily gives only a few essential characteristics. Peikoff silently assumes however that a limited definition of a concept automatically implies all the characteristics of that concept, even those that are still unknown. But a definition isn't the same as the concept, it's only a label on a box, it doesn't tell us what is in that box. If you want to equate the definition with the concept, you'll have to state all the properties of that concept explicitly in your definition. In that case you could say that any characteristic follows logically from the definition. But it is of course impossible to give such a complete definition, therefore the characteristics don't follow logically from that definition. You have to determine empirically what those characteristics are (get out of your armchair!).
Even if we assume for the sake of argument that the definition of a concept does imply all the characteristics of that concept, Peikoff's argument fails. He emphatically states that not only all known characteristics belong to the concept, but also all the characteristics that still have to be discovered. This is indeed a crucial part of his argument, as there otherwise would be always room for doubt, which is incompatible with an analytic deduction. Now this is a good example of what you may call a giant floating abstraction bearing no relationship to reality, a kind of Platonic construction. We can't derive anything from this Platonic concept, as it is in principle unknowable, man isn't omniscient, there ain't no such thing as perfect complete knowledge. We can only derive conclusions from a concept that subsumes all the current knowledge about the subject. This may be largely correct, but we can't be sure and it's always possible that what is now accepted as a correct description of characteristics may ultimately turn out to be wrong or may even be wrong while we'll never know it's wrong. We can of course live very well with the fact that 100% certainty can't be attained in real life, but it's fatal to Peikoff's argument. All the statements derived from a certain definition are synthetic statements if they are not derived from the explicit definition but from the implied characteristics of the defined concept. We can't make deductions from a Platonic unrealizable concept, only from a concept that we use in real life, including all the errors and omissions.
Let us illustrate this with the ice example. Suppose you define ice as the solid form of water. A logical deduction from that definition would be "ice is a solid". But you can't logically deduce from that definition that ice floats on water. If that would be possible, one logically deduction would be that the statement "ice sinks in water" is wrong, right? Wrong! Ice can have 13 different types of crystal structure. One of them, very high density amorphous ice, in fact sinks in water. This shows the fallacy in Peikoff's reasoning: we can't deduce a synthetic truth logically from a definition while man isn't omniscient. In this example the synthetic truth is only known to a limited number of people, so most people would incorrectly deduce that the statement "ice sinks in water" is wrong. This shows that there is a sharp division between an analytic statement that logically follows from the definition like "ice is a solid", this can never be proved wrong, and a synthetic statement that can only be verified empirically, like "ice floats on water" (which is only strictly true when a necessary condition is added to the statement, like "ice with a hexagonal crystal structure").
Now we could of course adapt our definition like this: ice is the solid form of water that floats on water. In this case the statement "ice floats on water" would follow logically from the definition. The kind of "ice" that sinks in water would according to that definition not be ice. How you exactly define "ice" is in fact arbitrary - with a minimal definition (solid form of water) the concept includes more than with a more specified definition (solid form of water that floats on water). There is no exact criterion for that, it is a matter of convenience and here is room for fuzziness (classification and separation of concepts). This is in itself no problem as long as people know what definition is exactly used.
Another example is of course Mike's question about the definition of self-esteem - is "reality-based" part of the definition, then the statement that self-esteem is reality-based is of course a trivial analytic truth. A disadvantage is that such a theory of self-esteem becomes unfalsifiable in this respect, it becomes a mere assertion. Without "reality-based" in the definition you may test the theory that self-esteem is reality-based, otherwise it becomes a mere tautology. In general it's better to make a definition as small as possible if you want to gain knowledge about your subject. The more you include in your definition, the more analytical statements you may derive from it, but the higher the risk that your definition no longer adequately describes a subject in the real world.
The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy
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#101
Greg Browne 
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Posted 29 May 2007 - 09:56 PM
Michael,
Even if the criticism of Peikoff's account of other philosophers which was made in the Merrill article were wholly justified, it largely misses the point, as regards ASD and most of Rand and Peikoff's work, because the account of other philosopher's views is history of philosophy, while it is clear that ASD is primarily a work of philosophy and only secondarily a work in the history of philosophy. (History of philosophy is taught in philosophy departments, and rightly so, but when you are doing history of philosophy you are not doing philosophy, but rather are studying how other people did philosophy). And the case made in the philosophical part of ASD does not depend on the part on the history of philosophy being true.
Now one should worry if a philosopher making a criticism of another's views mispresents the views of the other--that is committing the Fallacy of Straw Man or Straw Person. But there is little danger of this when the critic is attacking a claim or set of claims, as Peikoff does in ASD (and as he and Rand do in most, but not all, of their writings) as opposed to attacking the philosophy of a specific individual or group. It would only be a worry if no one at all advocated those views. But the views Peikoff attacks have certainly been advocated by many important philosophers. The position which combines all of these views is that of the Logical Positivists, the most important philosophers of the English-speaking world from the 1920s to the late 1940s (and, in philosophy of science, until the 1960s; it was still known as "the received view" of scientific theories in 1980s); it was not immediately criticized by their intellectual heirs, the Ordinary Language philosophers, who dominated philosophy in the English-speaking world from the 1940s to the 1960s, and before them it was defended by Hume in the mid-1700s.
Even today, prominent critics of the position, such as Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke, still hold on to most of the dichotomies; they simply no longer align them all as Logical Positivists used to.
And a relatively pure form still is apparently strong among scientists, as Cal's post indicates, which I expected.
As to whether Peikoff's quoted statement is an accurate summary of the situation, I calculate his college career must have run from the late 1950s to early or middle 1960s, and then Ordinary Language philosophy was still dominant (except in philosohy of science, where Logical Positivism remained the received view). Sartre's Existentialism was prominent, and he accepted at least the analytic-synthetic distinction. I know less about the Pragmatists, but their fallibilism, I believe, stopped at logic and math, and so most of them probably accepted it, too. That left Quine as the only real big name opposing it.
As to Peikoff's rejection of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy having been done earlier and better by Quine, it is true that there are many similarities in their positions but also many differences, and, as Roger says, they came at it from different premises, and they also came at in from different directions and reached some opposite conclusions: Peikoff thinks that all truths are such that their denial is self-contradictory, whereas Quine thinks that all truths are revisable. The former is true and I have been giving my reasons in other posts, whereas is the latter claim is hard even for great admirers of Quine to swallow. So, no, Quine did not do it earlier or better.
Even if the criticism of Peikoff's account of other philosophers which was made in the Merrill article were wholly justified, it largely misses the point, as regards ASD and most of Rand and Peikoff's work, because the account of other philosopher's views is history of philosophy, while it is clear that ASD is primarily a work of philosophy and only secondarily a work in the history of philosophy. (History of philosophy is taught in philosophy departments, and rightly so, but when you are doing history of philosophy you are not doing philosophy, but rather are studying how other people did philosophy). And the case made in the philosophical part of ASD does not depend on the part on the history of philosophy being true.
Now one should worry if a philosopher making a criticism of another's views mispresents the views of the other--that is committing the Fallacy of Straw Man or Straw Person. But there is little danger of this when the critic is attacking a claim or set of claims, as Peikoff does in ASD (and as he and Rand do in most, but not all, of their writings) as opposed to attacking the philosophy of a specific individual or group. It would only be a worry if no one at all advocated those views. But the views Peikoff attacks have certainly been advocated by many important philosophers. The position which combines all of these views is that of the Logical Positivists, the most important philosophers of the English-speaking world from the 1920s to the late 1940s (and, in philosophy of science, until the 1960s; it was still known as "the received view" of scientific theories in 1980s); it was not immediately criticized by their intellectual heirs, the Ordinary Language philosophers, who dominated philosophy in the English-speaking world from the 1940s to the 1960s, and before them it was defended by Hume in the mid-1700s.
Even today, prominent critics of the position, such as Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke, still hold on to most of the dichotomies; they simply no longer align them all as Logical Positivists used to.
And a relatively pure form still is apparently strong among scientists, as Cal's post indicates, which I expected.
As to whether Peikoff's quoted statement is an accurate summary of the situation, I calculate his college career must have run from the late 1950s to early or middle 1960s, and then Ordinary Language philosophy was still dominant (except in philosohy of science, where Logical Positivism remained the received view). Sartre's Existentialism was prominent, and he accepted at least the analytic-synthetic distinction. I know less about the Pragmatists, but their fallibilism, I believe, stopped at logic and math, and so most of them probably accepted it, too. That left Quine as the only real big name opposing it.
As to Peikoff's rejection of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy having been done earlier and better by Quine, it is true that there are many similarities in their positions but also many differences, and, as Roger says, they came at it from different premises, and they also came at in from different directions and reached some opposite conclusions: Peikoff thinks that all truths are such that their denial is self-contradictory, whereas Quine thinks that all truths are revisable. The former is true and I have been giving my reasons in other posts, whereas is the latter claim is hard even for great admirers of Quine to swallow. So, no, Quine did not do it earlier or better.
Michael Stuart Kelly, on Feb 1 2006, 03:04 AM, said:
Dragonfly,
You might be interested in one of the harshest criticisms so far of Peikoff's essay. It is from a post by one Gary Merrill on a newsgroup, sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta, dated Aug. 2, 1993. It is titled "Rand’s work: style and quality." He was discussing the poor standards of scholarship in Rand's references from literature, making special complaint against her broad all-inclusive statements about other philosophers and their ideas.
Michael
You might be interested in one of the harshest criticisms so far of Peikoff's essay. It is from a post by one Gary Merrill on a newsgroup, sci.philosophy.tech,sci.philosophy.meta, dated Aug. 2, 1993. It is titled "Rand’s work: style and quality." He was discussing the poor standards of scholarship in Rand's references from literature, making special complaint against her broad all-inclusive statements about other philosophers and their ideas.
Quote
Nor is this brand of scholarship restricted to Rand herself. Her closest followers embrace it as well. Consider Peikoff’s article, “The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy”. This article, said to have been published first in 1967, contains the sweeping claim (p. 89) that “It [the analytic-synthetic dichotomy] is accepted, in some form, by virtually every influential contemporary philosopher – pragmatist, logical positivist, analyst, and extentialist alike.” Well, consider please the following:
But, for all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith. (W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”).
My copy of From a Logical Point of View has an initial copyright date of 1953. ....
Peikoff, like Rand, goes to great lengths to claim (I would say “make a case”, but no genuine evidence is ever introduced) that he is proposing a novel approach where all other philosophers have failed. In the case of the analytic/ synthetic dichotomy I’ve got news for Peikoff: It was done 15 years earlier, and it was done better.
But, for all its a priori reasonableness, a boundary between analytic and synthetic statements simply has not been drawn. That there is such a distinction to be drawn at all is an unempirical dogma of empiricists, a metaphysical article of faith. (W. V. Quine, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”).
My copy of From a Logical Point of View has an initial copyright date of 1953. ....
Peikoff, like Rand, goes to great lengths to claim (I would say “make a case”, but no genuine evidence is ever introduced) that he is proposing a novel approach where all other philosophers have failed. In the case of the analytic/ synthetic dichotomy I’ve got news for Peikoff: It was done 15 years earlier, and it was done better.
Michael
This post has been edited by Greg Browne: 29 May 2007 - 10:39 PM
#102
Daniel Barnes
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Posted 29 May 2007 - 11:54 PM
Greg Browne:
>That left Quine as the only real big name opposing it.
Yes. And this, if Peikoff was reliable as a scholar, would have lead to him writing something like:
“It [the analytic-synthetic dichotomy] is accepted, in some form, by virtually every influential contemporary philosopher – pragmatist, logical positivist, analyst, and extentialist alike, with the notable exception of W.V. Quine, whose "Two Dogmas of Empricism" is one of the most famous works of the last two decades. First published in 1951, "Two Dogmas" has caused considerable controversy in modern philosophy. It is true that there are many similarities between Quine and Objectivism on this issue. For example...."..."It is also true there are many important differences between Quine and Objectivism, such as...." (etc)
But instead we get nothing. Nada. We now have to ask why.
Now, let's assume Peikoff honestly did not know of Quine's theory. As Quine was a 'big name' in philosophy in the 50s and 60s, and this his most famous article, it would be quite fair to therefore describe Peikoff as simply ignorant.
Alternatively, let's assume that Peikoff did in fact know of Quine's theory. If it is true, as you say, that there are many similarities between them, as well as many differences, and that Quine was the only 'big name' also denying the distinction, why would Peikoff then knowingly choose to omit any reference to it? The right approach would have been to do something like the above, even briefly. Yet no. And by doing so, Peikoff instead creates the clearly false impression that Rand is the only voice speaking out against the ASD. This could be quite fairly called misleading,and even dishonest.
I would personally not regard either of the above as indicating a good standard of basic scholarship on Peikoff's part. Do you?
>That left Quine as the only real big name opposing it.
Yes. And this, if Peikoff was reliable as a scholar, would have lead to him writing something like:
“It [the analytic-synthetic dichotomy] is accepted, in some form, by virtually every influential contemporary philosopher – pragmatist, logical positivist, analyst, and extentialist alike, with the notable exception of W.V. Quine, whose "Two Dogmas of Empricism" is one of the most famous works of the last two decades. First published in 1951, "Two Dogmas" has caused considerable controversy in modern philosophy. It is true that there are many similarities between Quine and Objectivism on this issue. For example...."..."It is also true there are many important differences between Quine and Objectivism, such as...." (etc)
But instead we get nothing. Nada. We now have to ask why.
Now, let's assume Peikoff honestly did not know of Quine's theory. As Quine was a 'big name' in philosophy in the 50s and 60s, and this his most famous article, it would be quite fair to therefore describe Peikoff as simply ignorant.
Alternatively, let's assume that Peikoff did in fact know of Quine's theory. If it is true, as you say, that there are many similarities between them, as well as many differences, and that Quine was the only 'big name' also denying the distinction, why would Peikoff then knowingly choose to omit any reference to it? The right approach would have been to do something like the above, even briefly. Yet no. And by doing so, Peikoff instead creates the clearly false impression that Rand is the only voice speaking out against the ASD. This could be quite fairly called misleading,and even dishonest.
I would personally not regard either of the above as indicating a good standard of basic scholarship on Peikoff's part. Do you?
This post has been edited by Daniel Barnes: 30 May 2007 - 02:18 AM
#103
Michael Stuart Kelly
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Posted 30 May 2007 - 03:20 AM
Greg Browne, on May 30 2007, 12:56 AM, said:
Even if the criticism of Peikoff's account of other philosophers which was made in the Merrill article were wholly justified, it largely misses the point, as regards ASD and most of Rand and Peikoff's work, because the account of other philosopher's views is history of philosophy, while it is clear that ASD is primarily a work of philosophy and only secondarily a work in the history of philosophy. . . .
Now one should worry if a philosopher making a criticism of another's views mispresents the views of the other--that is committing the Fallacy of Straw Man or Straw Person. . . .
Now one should worry if a philosopher making a criticism of another's views mispresents the views of the other--that is committing the Fallacy of Straw Man or Straw Person. . . .
Greg,
It is strange you mention this right now because this is precisely a concern I have with Peikoff. Even if you are doing philosophy and not history of philosophy, I see nothing wrong with using quotes from philosophers to back up your discussion. On the contrary, this is proper and lends credibility to the fact that you are accurately describing the ideas in your paraphrases or summaries of schools of thought and/or philosophers mentioned by name.
I am going through OPAR right now in a very slow and thought-out manner, usually a few pages a day, and simply seeing what is what. I have suspended judgment of everything and I am letting the words speak for themselves. So far, my margins are lined with questions and one that keeps reappearing is "Is this accurate?" It always appears when Peikoff makes a generalization about another philosopher or school of thought. A couple of these cases actually do conflict with what I have read of the philosopher cited. Most of the others I have not verified (I am not that widely read in classical philosophy), so this comment is a reminder to myself to look them up.
Here is an example of a statement where I marked "Is this accurate?" and need to look at later (OPAR, p. 24):
Peikoff said:
Hume and Kant searched for a perceptual manifestation labeled "necessity," like a metaphysical glue sticking events together or holding facts in place; unable to find it, they proceeded to banish necessity from the world.
I find it very difficult to understand what this means in terms of their works, but I have given myself the task of finding out over time.
I have to admit that Peikoff has a habit that grates on my nerves in trying to take him seriously (and I don't say this to bash him—I am making a very serious attempt to glean the value I can from his work). Instead of quoting a philosopher, he makes up a quote. He presents this quote as an argument and then debunks this quote. But the truth is that this quote is a fiction written by him. This is not a mere summary. It is presented as an actual quote.
Here is an example of making up a quote in order to debunk it (done 3 times, not just once, in the same paragraph) (OPAR, p. 49):
Peikoff said:
In regard to the senses, the standard argument, long a staple of skeptics, has already been indicated: "A certain object looks red or sounds loud or feels solid, but that is partly because of the nature of human eyes, ears, or touch. Therefore, we are cut off from the external world. We do not perceive reality as it really is, but only reality as it appears to man." Here is the same argument as presented by Kantians, in regard to the conceptual faculty: "Certain abstract conclusions are incontestable to us, but that is partly because of the nature of the human mind. If we had a different sort of mind, with a different sort of conceptual apparatus, our idea of truth and reality would be different. Human knowledge, therefore, is only human; it is subjective; it does not apply to things in themselves." Here is the argument a third time, as applied to logic: "Even the most meticulous proof depends on our sense of what is logical, which must depend in part on the kind of mental constitution we have. The real truth on any question is, therefore, unknowable. To know it, we would have to contact reality directly, without relying on our own logical makeup. We would have to jump outside of our own nature, which is impossible."
These three quotes, presented as "arguments" of different philosophical schools of thought, have a single author, Peikoff, who does not adhere to any of those schools of thought. So why make something like that up? Are there no quotes at all from actual philosophers that clearly present these ideas?
This has a tangential bearing on ASD, but it is related. And I believe it is within your world of inquiry.
Another case is with some reading and video watching I have been doing recently into the works of two philosophers who are greatly admired by Daniel Barnes (Popper) and Dragonfly (Dennett). I wanted (and want) to see if we are discussing real issues or just the rhetoric. I have not seen enough material to make a solid judgment, but I did notice that Rand was not the only one to use rhetoric to the detriment of the idea. I also noted that there are some fundamentals in common with Rand (or that Rand has in common with them, however you want to look at it). I am quoting my own post from another thread on this and it is self evident. I have edited out some non-relevant material.
Michael Stuart Kelly, on May 15 2007, 11:54 AM, said:
The weirdest part I have been discovering about some very good thinkers like Popper and Dennett, to name a couple who are popular with some of the posters, is that they (or their followers) delight in making slights against the human mind, either by rhetoric of trying to prove that the mind is incapable of knowing what it knows. Up to here, OK. We have the epistemological good guys and bad guys. The bad guys claim that knowledge is not possible.
But when I look at the actual works of these people, I see that they talk like bad guys, but build on the same foundation as the good guys. Their underlying metaphysical premises are identical to Rand's: that there is an absolute reality independent of human knowledge and that it is the function of human consciousness to identify it. Below are a couple of examples.
. . .
Let's start with Popper. Daniel has a blog (see here) devoted to a book by Nyquist critical of Objectivism. On it, on May 2, he posted an entry he mischievously titled: Aristotle's "Secret Revolt" Against Reason. . . .
. . . the actual article by Popper that was posted under this entry had a much different title and was not a wholesale rejection of Aristotle or even a portrayal of him engaged in any revolt at all. Once I looked and actually read Popper's article, I saw parallels with Objectivism all over the place, but the language was different—really different. Here are parts of a post I wrote in response to a person who tried to defend the reputation of Aristotle (as if that were needed), but basing his arguments solely on a very superficial scan of Popper's article. Frankly, he demonstrated clearly that he did not understand the material correctly. I omitted some non-essential remarks and generalized by replacing some text in brackets ([]).
This was my take on Popper (admittedly I am in the beginning stage of familiarity with his work). I believe he liked to shock people just as much as Rand did. I have read (I can't remember where) that he had a reputation in life as being cantankerous and combative. But Rand opted for a more direct insulting kind of rhetoric with oversimplified opinions of philosophers, whereas Popper, although more polite, wrote things like he wanted to throw out defining terms in using logic. I see this as nothing more than showmanship and, when I look at what he really means, it isn't the same thing that an Objectivist would mean. Why there is this particular itch to scratch is beyond me.
This brings me to Dennett. I have not read anything by him yet, but I did watch an excellent free online TED lecture:
Can we know our own minds? by Dan Dennett
Now here is the really weird part. Dennett gave a presentation that, to me at least, showed how wonderful our consciousness is and how well suited our sense organs+brain are to identifying entities. He highlighted how the eye never stops, how selectivity plays a huge part in identifying an image and misses lesser details at first, and some things like that. Yet Dennett said over and over that he wanted to convince the the audience that (and this is a direct quote) "Your consciousness is not quite as marvelous as you may have thought it is." He kept saying this while showing how marvelous our consciousness actually is.
I think there is some kind of itch to be the bad boy of science or something like that involved. The more I study these thinkers (including Rand), the more aware I am becoming of the need to filter out what is entertainment and what are the actual ideas.
I keep seeing a bunch of hambones getting in the way of the thinking. I'm serious.
But when I look at the actual works of these people, I see that they talk like bad guys, but build on the same foundation as the good guys. Their underlying metaphysical premises are identical to Rand's: that there is an absolute reality independent of human knowledge and that it is the function of human consciousness to identify it. Below are a couple of examples.
. . .
Let's start with Popper. Daniel has a blog (see here) devoted to a book by Nyquist critical of Objectivism. On it, on May 2, he posted an entry he mischievously titled: Aristotle's "Secret Revolt" Against Reason. . . .
. . . the actual article by Popper that was posted under this entry had a much different title and was not a wholesale rejection of Aristotle or even a portrayal of him engaged in any revolt at all. Once I looked and actually read Popper's article, I saw parallels with Objectivism all over the place, but the language was different—really different. Here are parts of a post I wrote in response to a person who tried to defend the reputation of Aristotle (as if that were needed), but basing his arguments solely on a very superficial scan of Popper's article. Frankly, he demonstrated clearly that he did not understand the material correctly. I omitted some non-essential remarks and generalized by replacing some text in brackets ([]).
Michael Stuart Kelly, on May 8 2007, 08:06 PM, said:
[What is being discussed is specifically] "Two Kinds of Definition" by Karl Popper, introduced on Daniel's blog by his contentious type of Rand criticism (which is a bit problematic with precision from what I read, but that is another issue). This is given in his earlier post:
. . .
Actually, I just read that essay, and getting around all the hot button terms, it is in agreement with Rand's views on many points. Two premises jump out at me: facts exist independently of knowledge, and the purpose of knowledge is to correspond to facts. Popper's criticism is not against that. It is basically against "essentialism," which Rand called "moderate realism" for some reason. But don't take my word for it. Look at what Rand wrote in discussing the four schools of thought on concepts (ITOE, 2nd Expanded Edition, p. 1):
[According to kneejerk criteria,] that must mean that Rand is doing her damnedest to discredit Aristotle by striking "a serious blow" against him and as an Objectivist, she should be ashamed of herself. The fact that metaphysical essences happens to be the part of Aristotle's thinking that Popper was criticizing doesn't seem to phase [this kind of argument].
Now I can't believe [people who argue thus miss] the fact that Popper also bases objective knowledge on sense experience and not intuitive "essences." Popper wrote [in the article]:
Look at what Rand wrote on the same page above:
That happens to be Popper's premise if [one] reads him correctly. Where [one] might get confused is that Popper mentioned "nominalist" and so did Rand:
Now if [one wants] to make some kind of argument based on that, there might be something to it. But the more I read, the more I believe this also is more semantics than meat. Still, I suggest [rereading] Chapter 5 of ITOE, then [rereading] Popper's essay. ... his idea of scientific definition is very similar, although his rhetoric is just as bombastic as Rand's, but arguing against defining terms in a forced bit of logical twisting for shock value. (Apparently, he makes the same mistake she does at times and tries to force his argument into the wrong meanings of the terms he uses. He did here at least. I have a paper in the future coming later on down the road about where Rand does this for rhetorical effect.)
Popper does not use the genus/differentia formula, but he definitely uses the idea that definitions are to be derived from reality, not reality derived from definitions, and that a definition (which is basically a concept as meant by him) is a label and mental unit for a vast number of concretes. He certainly uses different language and his own jargon:
Notice that he is arguing against metaphysical essences that we grasp intuitively and arguing for making mental units for observations (boiling down to the senses), which he calls "defining formula."
Getting back to "truth," Popper does not explicitly claim that omniscience is part of his meaning, but since his idea of knowledge is based on the senses, when [one looks] at his usage, [one] cannot conclude otherwise. Just like when [one looks] at his arguments against "definition," [one has] to see that he is talking about the essentialist version and not Rand's version (which did not even exist at that time). [One] might also notice that in the title, he even mentions two types of definition, so he was also groping for a way to make sure that knowledge was tied to reality, not impose ideas on reality. I believe that just that attempt alone is the reason his falsifiability method has been so successful in practice.
Daniel Barnes, on May 2 2007, 11:55 PM, said:
. . .
The problem for Objectivism is not in admiring Aristotle - there is indeed much to admire - but that his methodology is fundamentally unworkable. This is a major, if somewhat hidden, problem because Rand adopted so much of his methodology wholesale. As a result his problems inexorably become hers. As it happens I've just put a lengthy post up on this very issue, "Aristotle's 'Secret Revolt' Against Reason." which may be of interest.
The problem for Objectivism is not in admiring Aristotle - there is indeed much to admire - but that his methodology is fundamentally unworkable. This is a major, if somewhat hidden, problem because Rand adopted so much of his methodology wholesale. As a result his problems inexorably become hers. As it happens I've just put a lengthy post up on this very issue, "Aristotle's 'Secret Revolt' Against Reason." which may be of interest.
. . .
Actually, I just read that essay, and getting around all the hot button terms, it is in agreement with Rand's views on many points. Two premises jump out at me: facts exist independently of knowledge, and the purpose of knowledge is to correspond to facts. Popper's criticism is not against that. It is basically against "essentialism," which Rand called "moderate realism" for some reason. But don't take my word for it. Look at what Rand wrote in discussing the four schools of thought on concepts (ITOE, 2nd Expanded Edition, p. 1):
Rand said:
2. The "moderate realists," whose ancestor (unfortunately) is Aristotle, who hold that abstractions exist in reality, but they exist only in concretes, in the form of metaphysical essences, and that our concepts refer to these essences.
[According to kneejerk criteria,] that must mean that Rand is doing her damnedest to discredit Aristotle by striking "a serious blow" against him and as an Objectivist, she should be ashamed of herself. The fact that metaphysical essences happens to be the part of Aristotle's thinking that Popper was criticizing doesn't seem to phase [this kind of argument].
Now I can't believe [people who argue thus miss] the fact that Popper also bases objective knowledge on sense experience and not intuitive "essences." Popper wrote [in the article]:
Popper said:
Plato taught that we can grasp the Ideas with the help of some kind of unerring intellectual intuition; that is to say, we visualise or look at them with our 'mental eye', a process which he conceived as analogous to seeing, but dependent purely upon our intellect, and excluding any element that depends upon our senses. Aristotle's view is less radical and less inspired than Plato's, but in the end it amounts to the same. For although he teaches that we arrive at the definition only after we have made many observations, he admits that sense experience does not in itself grasp the universal essence, and that it cannot, therefore, fully determine a definition.
Look at what Rand wrote on the same page above:
Rand - ITOE p 1 said:
For the purposes of this series, the validity of the senses must be taken for granted...
That happens to be Popper's premise if [one] reads him correctly. Where [one] might get confused is that Popper mentioned "nominalist" and so did Rand:
Rand - ITOE p 1 said:
3. The "nominalists," who hold that all our ideas are only images of concretes, and that abstractions are merely "names" which we give to arbitrary groupings of concretes on the basis of vague resemblances.
Now if [one wants] to make some kind of argument based on that, there might be something to it. But the more I read, the more I believe this also is more semantics than meat. Still, I suggest [rereading] Chapter 5 of ITOE, then [rereading] Popper's essay. ... his idea of scientific definition is very similar, although his rhetoric is just as bombastic as Rand's, but arguing against defining terms in a forced bit of logical twisting for shock value. (Apparently, he makes the same mistake she does at times and tries to force his argument into the wrong meanings of the terms he uses. He did here at least. I have a paper in the future coming later on down the road about where Rand does this for rhetorical effect.)
Popper does not use the genus/differentia formula, but he definitely uses the idea that definitions are to be derived from reality, not reality derived from definitions, and that a definition (which is basically a concept as meant by him) is a label and mental unit for a vast number of concretes. He certainly uses different language and his own jargon:
Popper said:
Accordingly, the definition may at one time answer two very closely related questions. The one is 'What is it?', for example 'What is a puppy?'; it asks what the essence is which is denoted by the defined term. The other is 'What does it mean?', for example, 'What does "puppy" mean?'; it asks for the meaning of a term (namely, of the term that denotes the essence). In the present context, it is not necessary to distinguish between these two questions; rather, it is important to see what they have in common; and I wish, especially, to draw attention to the fact that both questions are raised by the term that stands, in the definition, on the left side and answered by the defining formula which stands on the right side. This fact characterizes the essentialist view, from which the scientific method of definition radically differs.
While we may say that the essentialist interpretation reads a definition 'normally', that is to say, from the left to the right, we can say that a definition, as it is normally used in modern science, must be read back to front, or from the right to the left; for it starts with the defining formula, and asks for a short label for it.
While we may say that the essentialist interpretation reads a definition 'normally', that is to say, from the left to the right, we can say that a definition, as it is normally used in modern science, must be read back to front, or from the right to the left; for it starts with the defining formula, and asks for a short label for it.
Notice that he is arguing against metaphysical essences that we grasp intuitively and arguing for making mental units for observations (boiling down to the senses), which he calls "defining formula."
Getting back to "truth," Popper does not explicitly claim that omniscience is part of his meaning, but since his idea of knowledge is based on the senses, when [one looks] at his usage, [one] cannot conclude otherwise. Just like when [one looks] at his arguments against "definition," [one has] to see that he is talking about the essentialist version and not Rand's version (which did not even exist at that time). [One] might also notice that in the title, he even mentions two types of definition, so he was also groping for a way to make sure that knowledge was tied to reality, not impose ideas on reality. I believe that just that attempt alone is the reason his falsifiability method has been so successful in practice.
This was my take on Popper (admittedly I am in the beginning stage of familiarity with his work). I believe he liked to shock people just as much as Rand did. I have read (I can't remember where) that he had a reputation in life as being cantankerous and combative. But Rand opted for a more direct insulting kind of rhetoric with oversimplified opinions of philosophers, whereas Popper, although more polite, wrote things like he wanted to throw out defining terms in using logic. I see this as nothing more than showmanship and, when I look at what he really means, it isn't the same thing that an Objectivist would mean. Why there is this particular itch to scratch is beyond me.
This brings me to Dennett. I have not read anything by him yet, but I did watch an excellent free online TED lecture:
Can we know our own minds? by Dan Dennett
Now here is the really weird part. Dennett gave a presentation that, to me at least, showed how wonderful our consciousness is and how well suited our sense organs+brain are to identifying entities. He highlighted how the eye never stops, how selectivity plays a huge part in identifying an image and misses lesser details at first, and some things like that. Yet Dennett said over and over that he wanted to convince the the audience that (and this is a direct quote) "Your consciousness is not quite as marvelous as you may have thought it is." He kept saying this while showing how marvelous our consciousness actually is.
I think there is some kind of itch to be the bad boy of science or something like that involved. The more I study these thinkers (including Rand), the more aware I am becoming of the need to filter out what is entertainment and what are the actual ideas.
I keep seeing a bunch of hambones getting in the way of the thinking. I'm serious.
btw - To add to Dennett's video, here is a cute video on YouTube of a magic trick that shows the same principles that Dennett observed and demonstrated: Colour changing card trick
Of course, Dennett would point to what we miss to prove that our "consciousness is not quite as marvelous," whereas I think it is wonderful that our conscious focus on what is important to us extends to blocking (or not allowing) the awareness of unimportant details. We have an amazing organ particularly suited to our needs.
I have presented all this as general interest since it is in the general area. I will read all the recent posts on ASD here (and review the former ones) and try to present some intelligent feedback a little later. But I believe that some of the ideas presented above will have bearing on the conclusions and questions I may present. This material is indicative of my present approach to these matters.
(EDIT: For the record, I was finally able to uncover where I got the hat tip for the card trick from (on RoR): here. I couldn't find it over there for a while, but a post was finally made on the thread and I was able to locate it.)
Michael
Know thyself...
#104
Stephen Boydstun
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Posted 30 May 2007 - 08:10 AM
Here is some history of the distinction and the dispute over its validity, which I posted here on 23 Feb 2007. This is from #121 in the thread "Schrodinger's Cat" under the OL sector Metaphysics.
Daniel,
Is there a formulation of the synthetic-analytic distinction that you think stands up to scrutiny? If there is a valid version of the distinction, do you think that version is consistent or inconsistent with the rest of Rand's epistemology, leaving aside the Peikoff-Rand treatment in Peikoff's essay?
Quote
It was Quine's essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," published in 1951, that brought his debate with Carnap over the analytic-synthetic distinction to widespread attention among philosophers. In this essay, Quine argued against the validity of the distinction. Carnap wanted to maintain a sharp distinction between analytic statements depending entirely on the meanings being used and synthetic statements making assertions about the empirical world. Quine's alternative view had it that all statements face the world as part of a corporate body of statements. On this view, experience bears the same kind of evidential relation to the theoretical parts of natural science as it does to mathematics and logic. (See also Quine's 1960 essay "Carnap and Logical Truth," which is in the collection The Ways of Paradox and Other Essays. "Two Dogmas" is in the collection From a Logical Point of View.)
During the 1950s, Putnam was also writing about the analyticity of various statements, such as the statement of Rand's in 1957 that a leaf "cannot be all red and all green at the same time." Other philosophers, too, such as Arthur Pap and Morton White, were writing on the analytic-synthetic controversy during the 50s.
In her journal The Objectivist, immediately after the the issues of the journal containing her "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology," Rand published Peikoff's "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy" (1967). His voice (speaking also for Rand) joined the voices arguing against the validity of the distinction.
During the 1950s, Putnam was also writing about the analyticity of various statements, such as the statement of Rand's in 1957 that a leaf "cannot be all red and all green at the same time." Other philosophers, too, such as Arthur Pap and Morton White, were writing on the analytic-synthetic controversy during the 50s.
In her journal The Objectivist, immediately after the the issues of the journal containing her "Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology," Rand published Peikoff's "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy" (1967). His voice (speaking also for Rand) joined the voices arguing against the validity of the distinction.
Daniel,
Is there a formulation of the synthetic-analytic distinction that you think stands up to scrutiny? If there is a valid version of the distinction, do you think that version is consistent or inconsistent with the rest of Rand's epistemology, leaving aside the Peikoff-Rand treatment in Peikoff's essay?
This post has been edited by Stephen Boydstun: 30 May 2007 - 09:08 AM
#105
Dragonfly
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Posted 30 May 2007 - 01:21 PM
Greg Browne, on May 29 2007, 12:39 AM, said:
Dragonfly, on Jan 31 2006, 06:46 PM, said:
In the second part of the article Peikoff starts his attack on this distinction by elaborating on the concept of "a concept". His position is that a concept of a thing (for example "ice") contains all the characteristics of that thing, in the case of ice all the physical and chemical properties of ice, even those that are still unknown. ...
Peikoffs conclusion is then that it isn't possible to distinguish between analytical and synthetic statements, as any characteristic that is deemed a synthetic truth (like: "ice floats on water"), is already part of the concept itself, so it follows logically from the definition of ice.
This conclusion is fallacious, however. You may define concept to imply all the characteristics, known and yet-to-be-discovered, but a definition necessarily gives only a few essential characteristics. Peikoff silently assumes however that a limited definition of a concept automatically implies all the characteristics of that concept, even those that are still unknown. But a definition isn't the same as the concept, it's only a label on a box, it doesn't tell us what is in that box.
Peikoffs conclusion is then that it isn't possible to distinguish between analytical and synthetic statements, as any characteristic that is deemed a synthetic truth (like: "ice floats on water"), is already part of the concept itself, so it follows logically from the definition of ice.
This conclusion is fallacious, however. You may define concept to imply all the characteristics, known and yet-to-be-discovered, but a definition necessarily gives only a few essential characteristics. Peikoff silently assumes however that a limited definition of a concept automatically implies all the characteristics of that concept, even those that are still unknown. But a definition isn't the same as the concept, it's only a label on a box, it doesn't tell us what is in that box.
Peikoff does not believe this, and in fact he is strongly opposed to it. He says: "on an objective, contextual view of essences, a concept does not mean only the essential or defining characteristics of its units" (p. 103 in IOE, Expanded 2nd ed., 1990), and such a view is his view. The view that the concept means only its definition is a view of the Nominalists (p. 97) , but they are among the people whose views he is criticizing, along with the Platonists, as the discussion from 94 to 105 makes clear. This is one of the most important point he makes in the article, and perhaps the most important.
The point is however that analytical statements depend on exact definitions and not on implied knowledge about a concept. Suppose that research has shown that bachelors on the average live shorter than married men. According to Peikoff this would be one of those characteristics that is implied in the concept "bachelor". Nevertheless the statement "bachelors live on the average shorter than married men" is not an analytic statement while this information is not contained in the definition of a bachelor, in contrast to the statement "a bachelor is not married". You can see the difference when you negate the statements: "bachelors live on the average longer than married men" would be a false statement (if our original supposition is true), but not self-contradictory, whereas "bachelors are married" would be self-contradictory. The validity of the first statement has to be assessed empirically, while the validity of the second statement can be assessed by using logic alone. Therefore mathematics is pre-eminently the domain for analytical statements; mathematical theorems are derived from axioms and definitions alone, not from empirical observations, even if these may be a source of inspiration. For example Euclidean, elliptic, hyperbolic and Riemannian geometry are all consistent geometrical systems for which true theorems can be derived, which will be different for the different geometries, as they don't use the same axioms. Which geometry gives the best description of physical reality is an empirical question that will depend on what system you describe. Euclidean geometry is extremely accurate in daily-life applications, but it won't work for a sphere, while general relativity uses the Riemannian geometry.
Quote
No, Peikoff doesn't say that all analytic truths are certain, nor do I. We say that a concept contains all of the attributes of the things subsumed under it. To put it another way, analytic truths are supposedly truths that are true because of the meaning of the words in them. Well Peikoff and I say that the meaning of a term is the things is refers to, including all of their attributes, known and unknown, so of course we can fail to have certain knowledge of them.
What this in fact means is that Peikoff and you redefine "analytic", an analytic truth is by definition certain, as it follows logically from the definitions. You will never find empirical evidence that 2 + 2 = 4 is false, or that the theorems of Euclidean geometry are false or that we'll discover that there exist married bachelors (names, symbols and definitions may change in the course of time, but that is of course not relevant, just as the statements are equally true if written in Chinese).
Quote
Peikoff says that, in one sense, all truths are analytic---and so implies that no truths are synthetic.
You believe that some truths are synthetic.
To refute him, you must come up with an example of a synthetic truth.
You believe that some truths are synthetic.
To refute him, you must come up with an example of a synthetic truth.
Bob gave already a good example. Another one would be that about the average life span of bachelors I gave above. Or the statement: humans and chimpanzees have a common ancestor. Etc, etc.
Quote
Again, Peikoff denies that analytic truth = definitional truth, so you need to argue for it.
It will help if you give your definition of the phrase 'analytic truth".
It will help if you give your definition of the phrase 'analytic truth".
I googled to find some definitions, like:
A proposition that is true solely on the basis of the definitions of its terms. Or: Analytic truth is a priori, necessarily true, independent of reality. Or: a proposition that is true by definition.
All fine by me.
Quote
The last part of your post applies the above to the ethics debate.
?
#106
Daniel Barnes
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Posted 30 May 2007 - 07:28 PM
Stephen asked me some questions:
>Is there a formulation of the synthetic-analytic distinction that you think stands up to scrutiny?
Hi Stephen
I look at things from a Critical Rationalist, or Popperian perspective. My general view is that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is indeed open to challenge. Everything is. Popper calls it "extremely valuable for a rough survey" but " for many purposes too simple." (Conjectures and Refutations, p 90) I also agree with his discussion of logic and its relation to reality in Chapter 9 of the same volume, where he argues that logic is a means of understanding reality, but, like mathematics, is a human tool that has evolved and improved as a means through trial and error. It is obviously still an open and highly complex problem however.
>If there is a valid version of the distinction, do you think that version is consistent or inconsistent with the rest of Rand's epistemology...?
Obviously I do think it can be a highly useful distinction, even if it breaks down in some respects. As how such a distinction might relate to Rand's epistemology, I find that a difficult question to answer, as I find Rand's epistemology itself extremely vague, inconsistent and incoherent (much of it appears to be mere plays on words). How such a distinction might then fit or not fit with it is anyone's guess AFAICS.
>Is there a formulation of the synthetic-analytic distinction that you think stands up to scrutiny?
Hi Stephen
I look at things from a Critical Rationalist, or Popperian perspective. My general view is that the analytic-synthetic dichotomy is indeed open to challenge. Everything is. Popper calls it "extremely valuable for a rough survey" but " for many purposes too simple." (Conjectures and Refutations, p 90) I also agree with his discussion of logic and its relation to reality in Chapter 9 of the same volume, where he argues that logic is a means of understanding reality, but, like mathematics, is a human tool that has evolved and improved as a means through trial and error. It is obviously still an open and highly complex problem however.
>If there is a valid version of the distinction, do you think that version is consistent or inconsistent with the rest of Rand's epistemology...?
Obviously I do think it can be a highly useful distinction, even if it breaks down in some respects. As how such a distinction might relate to Rand's epistemology, I find that a difficult question to answer, as I find Rand's epistemology itself extremely vague, inconsistent and incoherent (much of it appears to be mere plays on words). How such a distinction might then fit or not fit with it is anyone's guess AFAICS.
#107
Wolf DeVoon
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Posted 30 May 2007 - 09:18 PM
Daniel Barnes, on May 30 2007, 08:28 PM, said:
discussion
logic
reality
volume
mathematics
tool
a means
error
complex
vague
incoherent
logic
reality
volume
mathematics
tool
a means
error
complex
vague
incoherent
Others are brighter than I, but it seems evident that we need to define our terms, and that Rand gave us the best framework to avoid Platonic idealism, Aristotlean essences, etc.
W.
http://stores.lulu.com/wolfdevoon Justice is the armed defense of innocent liberty.
#108
Greg Browne
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 01:29 AM
Hello all.
I see that there are a lot of posts to catch up on.
So, at least for now, I will try to start fresh making some general remarks.
1. The question of whether Peikoff is right in case against the dichotomies in the ASD is a separate issue from whether he, or Rand, accurately portray the views the other philosophers in that article or elsewhere. Probably the latter topic should be given its own thread or threads (perhaps even a whole forum), dedicated to the question: do Rand and Peikoff present their opponents's positions accurately?
I am mainly interested in the former issue and will post mainly on that.
2. Peikoff is definitely not making a Straw Person argument in attacking these dichotomies: they definitely have had many supporters, and still do. They are live issues.
2. It is hard to believe the falsificationism or the falsification principle could be defended without presupposing the dichotomies.
3. These dichotomies are perhaps the most in important issue in modern philosophy, entwined with the development of post-Scholastic thought.
4. The debate may clarified if I state what I think are main arguments of the Logical Positivists' version of Dichotomism (i.e., the belief that all of those dichotomies are valid and they line up), and ask Cal and others who support to it to defend those premises which are controversial.
Here is one:
1. The meanings of terms is a product of linguistic convention.
(2. If the meanings of terms is a product of linguistic convention then truths which are true merely because of the meanings of the terms in them are themselves products of linguistic convention.)
3. Therefore, truths which are true merely because of the meanings of the terms in them are themselves products of linguistic convention.
4. If a truth is a product of linguistic convention then it is not factual (i.e. it says nothing about reality).
5. Therefore, truths which are true merely because of the meanings of the terms in them are not factual (say nothing about reality).
6. Analytic truths are truths who truth can be ascertained merely by knowing the meaning of the terms in them.
7. Therefore, analytic truths are non-factual
8. Truths of logic and math are analytic truths.
9. Therefore truths of logic and math are non-factual.
Now 3, 5 and 7 are subconclusions, leaving 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8 as ultimate premises. I agree that 1, 4, 6 and 8 are true (at least if 6 is interpreted in a certain way).
This leaves 2 as a premise which I dispute, which therefore needs to be argued for. (It is in parentheses because I think that it is a premise that is assumed rather than stated).
Now, Cal, if this does not represent your reasoning for your position perhaps you base it on an argument that truths of math and logic are purely formal. I will try to present this argument tomorrow, unless you do so first.
I see that there are a lot of posts to catch up on.
So, at least for now, I will try to start fresh making some general remarks.
1. The question of whether Peikoff is right in case against the dichotomies in the ASD is a separate issue from whether he, or Rand, accurately portray the views the other philosophers in that article or elsewhere. Probably the latter topic should be given its own thread or threads (perhaps even a whole forum), dedicated to the question: do Rand and Peikoff present their opponents's positions accurately?
I am mainly interested in the former issue and will post mainly on that.
2. Peikoff is definitely not making a Straw Person argument in attacking these dichotomies: they definitely have had many supporters, and still do. They are live issues.
2. It is hard to believe the falsificationism or the falsification principle could be defended without presupposing the dichotomies.
3. These dichotomies are perhaps the most in important issue in modern philosophy, entwined with the development of post-Scholastic thought.
4. The debate may clarified if I state what I think are main arguments of the Logical Positivists' version of Dichotomism (i.e., the belief that all of those dichotomies are valid and they line up), and ask Cal and others who support to it to defend those premises which are controversial.
Here is one:
1. The meanings of terms is a product of linguistic convention.
(2. If the meanings of terms is a product of linguistic convention then truths which are true merely because of the meanings of the terms in them are themselves products of linguistic convention.)
3. Therefore, truths which are true merely because of the meanings of the terms in them are themselves products of linguistic convention.
4. If a truth is a product of linguistic convention then it is not factual (i.e. it says nothing about reality).
5. Therefore, truths which are true merely because of the meanings of the terms in them are not factual (say nothing about reality).
6. Analytic truths are truths who truth can be ascertained merely by knowing the meaning of the terms in them.
7. Therefore, analytic truths are non-factual
8. Truths of logic and math are analytic truths.
9. Therefore truths of logic and math are non-factual.
Now 3, 5 and 7 are subconclusions, leaving 1, 2, 4, 6 and 8 as ultimate premises. I agree that 1, 4, 6 and 8 are true (at least if 6 is interpreted in a certain way).
This leaves 2 as a premise which I dispute, which therefore needs to be argued for. (It is in parentheses because I think that it is a premise that is assumed rather than stated).
Now, Cal, if this does not represent your reasoning for your position perhaps you base it on an argument that truths of math and logic are purely formal. I will try to present this argument tomorrow, unless you do so first.
#109
Daniel Barnes
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 03:46 AM
Greg:
>1. The question of whether Peikoff is right in case against the dichotomies in the ASD is a separate issue from whether he, or Rand, accurately portray the views the other philosophers in that article or elsewhere.
It is germane, because it goes to 1) Peikoff's knowledge or lack thereof of the topic 2) his objectivity in presenting it and 3) his trustworthiness and credibility. These are clearly at issue. However, you can leave it aside if you choose.
>2. Peikoff is definitely not making a Straw Person argument in attacking these dichotomies: they definitely have had many supporters, and still do. They are live issues.
I don't recall anyone saying the ASD was a strawman?
>2. It is hard to believe the falsificationism or the falsification principle could be defended without presupposing the dichotomies.
I don't really see why.
>3. These dichotomies are perhaps the most in important issue in modern philosophy, entwined with the development of post-Scholastic thought.
Perhaps, but what is not clear is whether Rand and Peikoff have much to say that is sensible about it! Most of it seems to be melodramatic vamping.
>4. The debate may clarified if I state what I think are main arguments of the Logical Positivists' version of Dichotomism (i.e., the belief that all of those dichotomies are valid and they line up), and ask Cal and others who support to it to defend those premises which are controversial.
As a Popperian you will not get much of a defence of Logical Positivism out of me...;-)
>1. The question of whether Peikoff is right in case against the dichotomies in the ASD is a separate issue from whether he, or Rand, accurately portray the views the other philosophers in that article or elsewhere.
It is germane, because it goes to 1) Peikoff's knowledge or lack thereof of the topic 2) his objectivity in presenting it and 3) his trustworthiness and credibility. These are clearly at issue. However, you can leave it aside if you choose.
>2. Peikoff is definitely not making a Straw Person argument in attacking these dichotomies: they definitely have had many supporters, and still do. They are live issues.
I don't recall anyone saying the ASD was a strawman?
>2. It is hard to believe the falsificationism or the falsification principle could be defended without presupposing the dichotomies.
I don't really see why.
>3. These dichotomies are perhaps the most in important issue in modern philosophy, entwined with the development of post-Scholastic thought.
Perhaps, but what is not clear is whether Rand and Peikoff have much to say that is sensible about it! Most of it seems to be melodramatic vamping.
>4. The debate may clarified if I state what I think are main arguments of the Logical Positivists' version of Dichotomism (i.e., the belief that all of those dichotomies are valid and they line up), and ask Cal and others who support to it to defend those premises which are controversial.
As a Popperian you will not get much of a defence of Logical Positivism out of me...;-)
This post has been edited by Daniel Barnes: 31 May 2007 - 03:51 AM
#110
BaalChatzaf
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 07:27 AM
Wolf DeVoon, on May 30 2007, 11:18 PM, said:
Daniel Barnes, on May 30 2007, 08:28 PM, said:
discussion
logic
reality
volume
mathematics
tool
a means
error
complex
vague
incoherent
logic
reality
volume
mathematics
tool
a means
error
complex
vague
incoherent
Others are brighter than I, but it seems evident that we need to define our terms, and that Rand gave us the best framework to avoid Platonic idealism, Aristotlean essences, etc.
W.
It is impossible to define ALL our terms. This leads to either circularity or an infinite regress. Some terms must be left undefined, but understood. Understanding of the undefined sterms can be provided by ostensive demonstration or by enumerating examples.
When little babies learn how to talk we don't define our terms for them. We show them things and actions and tell them their names.
Ba'al Chatzaf
"I drank WHAT!!!?????" - Socrates
#111
Wolf DeVoon
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 10:19 AM
BaalChatzaf, on May 31 2007, 08:27 AM, said:
It is impossible to define ALL our terms. This leads to either circularity or an infinite regress. Some terms must be left undefined, but understood. Understanding of the undefined sterms can be provided by ostensive demonstration or by enumerating examples.
When little babies learn how to talk we don't define our terms for them. We show them things and actions and tell them their names.
When little babies learn how to talk we don't define our terms for them. We show them things and actions and tell them their names.
Showing things and actions is ostensible definition of percepts. I admit to doing this with number, letters, colors, body parts, relative size. But our 5-year-old is also interested in abstract concepts. I use genus and defining characteristics to explain broad groups of objects, cause and effect, danger, sex, culture, etc.
I don't get the point about infinite regress. Could you supply an example? Thanks.
W.
http://stores.lulu.com/wolfdevoon Justice is the armed defense of innocent liberty.
#112
Daniel Barnes
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 03:46 PM
Ba'al wrote:
>It is impossible to define ALL our terms. This leads to either circularity or an infinite regress.
Wolf replied:
>I don't get the point about infinite regress. Could you supply an example? Thanks.
Hi Wolf
I will chip in here if you like. It's basically a logical issue. An infinite regress is where a particular proposition requires another proposition to justify it, which in turn requires another one, ad infinitum. In logic this means you simply can't prove the truth of all statements. Aristotle knew this, and thus believed that all statements had to rest on "basic premisses", which are definitions of words. (Rand in turn picked this methodology up wholesale and imported it into Objectivism, with due acknowledgements). Now, what Aristotle overlooked, and as a result of his massive underlying influence, what most people also overlook is that the same problem applies to definitions too, which are after all a form of statement, made up of words which in turn have to be defined. Thus, while people assume that defining terms more clearly will lead to better arguments, it turns out that the opposite is the case - it leads to a series of preliminaries which are theoretically endless.
To concretise this, let's say you're discussing "altruism". Now you and your interlocutor have a disagreement. He says: "our disagreement is perhaps due to the fact that you haven't grasped the true concept of altruism - your basic premiss needs to be checked. What is your definition of altruism?"
You might reply with a standard definition: "the principle or practice of unselfish concern for or devotion to the welfare of others"
Your interlocutor might then say "Aha! I detect several areas of major philosophic concern already! Firstly you seem to be using "principle" and "practice" interchangeably. Perhaps you had best define those terms too so I can check that you haven't been infected by the death-carrying black plague of the Analytic Synthetic Dichotomy or similar. Then perhaps you don't have a grasp on the correct meaning of the word "unselfish" either; we'd better check, so could you define that? Less controversial are the terms like "concern", "devotion" and "welfare", but as we want nothing less than absolute precision in our arguments, we'd better check that you've got off on the right foot with those too. Finally, we better get clear on who you mean by "others" - family, friends, strangers, countrymen, non-humans, what? Better define that as well. (We'll leave any conjunctions, prepositions and definite artilces for now, though this is a little unrigorous of us) So clearly before we can even begin have our little discussion about "altruism", we'd better have a full set of terminological preliminaries to avoid any fundamental errors."
So you dutifully begin to do so, but already you are feeling somehow disheartened, that your initial intellectual fire is starting to go out, spark by spark. If all these tedious preliminaries are necessary to have a truly intellectual debate, you wonder, then perhaps intellectual debate is not for me. And your heart sinks even further as you realise that the definitions of "principle" "practice", "unselfish" etc either contain new words that will have to be in turn defined for the same reason or the same words you are supposed to be initially defining played back at you. In fact, far from being intellectually exciting, the job looks either ultimately circular, or to disappear over the horizon of a potentially infinite pedantry - and you haven't even begun to debate yet! In fact, logically this is exactly the case. Thus, far from leading to clearer and less erroneous arguments (as advertised), the doctrine of "true definition of basic premisses" leads to either endless pedantic preliminaries or a concomitant despair in intellectual argument, and even reason itself. Both are entirely unproductive consequences, and both flow from this basic Aristotelian methodology. (I have advanced the somewhat bold conjecture that Rand's importation of this methodology unwittingly leads to a parallel unproductiveness and sense of frustration in Objectivism). I have linked to Popper's more in-depth essay on the issue here before, but I think this summarises the situation in a shorter form.
>It is impossible to define ALL our terms. This leads to either circularity or an infinite regress.
Wolf replied:
>I don't get the point about infinite regress. Could you supply an example? Thanks.
Hi Wolf
I will chip in here if you like. It's basically a logical issue. An infinite regress is where a particular proposition requires another proposition to justify it, which in turn requires another one, ad infinitum. In logic this means you simply can't prove the truth of all statements. Aristotle knew this, and thus believed that all statements had to rest on "basic premisses", which are definitions of words. (Rand in turn picked this methodology up wholesale and imported it into Objectivism, with due acknowledgements). Now, what Aristotle overlooked, and as a result of his massive underlying influence, what most people also overlook is that the same problem applies to definitions too, which are after all a form of statement, made up of words which in turn have to be defined. Thus, while people assume that defining terms more clearly will lead to better arguments, it turns out that the opposite is the case - it leads to a series of preliminaries which are theoretically endless.
To concretise this, let's say you're discussing "altruism". Now you and your interlocutor have a disagreement. He says: "our disagreement is perhaps due to the fact that you haven't grasped the true concept of altruism - your basic premiss needs to be checked. What is your definition of altruism?"
You might reply with a standard definition: "the principle or practice of unselfish concern for or devotion to the welfare of others"
Your interlocutor might then say "Aha! I detect several areas of major philosophic concern already! Firstly you seem to be using "principle" and "practice" interchangeably. Perhaps you had best define those terms too so I can check that you haven't been infected by the death-carrying black plague of the Analytic Synthetic Dichotomy or similar. Then perhaps you don't have a grasp on the correct meaning of the word "unselfish" either; we'd better check, so could you define that? Less controversial are the terms like "concern", "devotion" and "welfare", but as we want nothing less than absolute precision in our arguments, we'd better check that you've got off on the right foot with those too. Finally, we better get clear on who you mean by "others" - family, friends, strangers, countrymen, non-humans, what? Better define that as well. (We'll leave any conjunctions, prepositions and definite artilces for now, though this is a little unrigorous of us) So clearly before we can even begin have our little discussion about "altruism", we'd better have a full set of terminological preliminaries to avoid any fundamental errors."
So you dutifully begin to do so, but already you are feeling somehow disheartened, that your initial intellectual fire is starting to go out, spark by spark. If all these tedious preliminaries are necessary to have a truly intellectual debate, you wonder, then perhaps intellectual debate is not for me. And your heart sinks even further as you realise that the definitions of "principle" "practice", "unselfish" etc either contain new words that will have to be in turn defined for the same reason or the same words you are supposed to be initially defining played back at you. In fact, far from being intellectually exciting, the job looks either ultimately circular, or to disappear over the horizon of a potentially infinite pedantry - and you haven't even begun to debate yet! In fact, logically this is exactly the case. Thus, far from leading to clearer and less erroneous arguments (as advertised), the doctrine of "true definition of basic premisses" leads to either endless pedantic preliminaries or a concomitant despair in intellectual argument, and even reason itself. Both are entirely unproductive consequences, and both flow from this basic Aristotelian methodology. (I have advanced the somewhat bold conjecture that Rand's importation of this methodology unwittingly leads to a parallel unproductiveness and sense of frustration in Objectivism). I have linked to Popper's more in-depth essay on the issue here before, but I think this summarises the situation in a shorter form.
This post has been edited by Daniel Barnes: 31 May 2007 - 04:00 PM
#113
Michael Stuart Kelly
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 04:01 PM
Daniel,
I always forgot to ask you something I have wanted to for some time. How does Popper imagine two people to be able to talk about the same subject and understand each other?
Michael
I always forgot to ask you something I have wanted to for some time. How does Popper imagine two people to be able to talk about the same subject and understand each other?
Michael
Know thyself...
#114
Daniel Barnes
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 04:52 PM
Mike:
>I always forgot to ask you something I have wanted to for some time. How does Popper imagine two people to be able to talk about the same subject and understand each other?
We rely on conventional meanings, as found as a dictionary, therefore there is little or no debate about who's got the "true premisses." (As Max Eastman nicely put it, words are "vessels of communion", or conventions, and not empty vessels into which private meanings should be installed). If an opponent absolutely insists in having his own personal definition, which flies in the face of standard meanings (for example, "democracy is slavery") we simply agree to adopt their definition, with due caveats where this might be misleading. (for example: If democracy is slavery, then I am not a democrat!...;-))
We do not insist on "absolutely precise" meanings, and assume words are always to a greater or lesser extent vague or rough - hence we should, as Popper nicely puts it, be careful to stay within the "penumbra" of their meaning. (in Rand there seems to be a significant confusion between words on the one hand, and the precision achieved by numbers on the other - an confusion that overlooks their fundamental difference). This is exactly why we should not put too much weight on exact terminology, and should be able to put our arguments in various different ways. As Betrand Russell rightly remarks, the only things that need exact words are magic spells. So we must be careful not to be bewitched by arguments over their exact meanings.
>I always forgot to ask you something I have wanted to for some time. How does Popper imagine two people to be able to talk about the same subject and understand each other?
We rely on conventional meanings, as found as a dictionary, therefore there is little or no debate about who's got the "true premisses." (As Max Eastman nicely put it, words are "vessels of communion", or conventions, and not empty vessels into which private meanings should be installed). If an opponent absolutely insists in having his own personal definition, which flies in the face of standard meanings (for example, "democracy is slavery") we simply agree to adopt their definition, with due caveats where this might be misleading. (for example: If democracy is slavery, then I am not a democrat!...;-))
We do not insist on "absolutely precise" meanings, and assume words are always to a greater or lesser extent vague or rough - hence we should, as Popper nicely puts it, be careful to stay within the "penumbra" of their meaning. (in Rand there seems to be a significant confusion between words on the one hand, and the precision achieved by numbers on the other - an confusion that overlooks their fundamental difference). This is exactly why we should not put too much weight on exact terminology, and should be able to put our arguments in various different ways. As Betrand Russell rightly remarks, the only things that need exact words are magic spells. So we must be careful not to be bewitched by arguments over their exact meanings.
This post has been edited by Daniel Barnes: 31 May 2007 - 04:53 PM
#115
Daniel Barnes
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 05:08 PM
Mike,
In fact, it occurs to me that it might be better to turn your question around, and ask why if Rand insists on having her own specialised definitions of important terms that differ from standard usage (representing concepts such as "sacrifice", or "selfish" for example, but also affecting such a long list of other terms that Objectivist Joseph Rowlands felt that Job No1 in spreading the philosophy was to create his own Objectivist dictionary!), why she should imagine she could talk about such subjects and people would understand her?
In fact, it occurs to me that it might be better to turn your question around, and ask why if Rand insists on having her own specialised definitions of important terms that differ from standard usage (representing concepts such as "sacrifice", or "selfish" for example, but also affecting such a long list of other terms that Objectivist Joseph Rowlands felt that Job No1 in spreading the philosophy was to create his own Objectivist dictionary!), why she should imagine she could talk about such subjects and people would understand her?
This post has been edited by Daniel Barnes: 31 May 2007 - 05:10 PM
#116
BaalChatzaf
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 05:25 PM
Wolf DeVoon, on May 31 2007, 12:19 PM, said:
BaalChatzaf, on May 31 2007, 08:27 AM, said:
It is impossible to define ALL our terms. This leads to either circularity or an infinite regress. Some terms must be left undefined, but understood. Understanding of the undefined sterms can be provided by ostensive demonstration or by enumerating examples.
When little babies learn how to talk we don't define our terms for them. We show them things and actions and tell them their names.
When little babies learn how to talk we don't define our terms for them. We show them things and actions and tell them their names.
Showing things and actions is ostensible definition of percepts. I admit to doing this with number, letters, colors, body parts, relative size. But our 5-year-old is also interested in abstract concepts. I use genus and defining characteristics to explain broad groups of objects, cause and effect, danger, sex, culture, etc.
I don't get the point about infinite regress. Could you supply an example? Thanks.
W.
Let A1 be at term. If A1 is defined it needs at least one term A2 as part of its definition. If A2 is defined it needs at least one term A3 as part of its definition and so on. The sequence A1, A2, A3 .... must either terminate somewhere meaning there is an undefined term or a repetition occurs which means there is circularity. The only other possibility is an infinite sequence of terms A1, A2, ... such that An+1 is part of the definition of An for each n > 1. That is an infinite (or indefinite) regress.
That is why all mathematical theories start with undefined terms and postulates that are not proven.
Ba'al Chatzaf.
"I drank WHAT!!!?????" - Socrates
#117
Michael Stuart Kelly
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 05:44 PM
Daniel,
I am with you to a point. I certainly agree that words carry a variety of meanings. (As a sporadic poet and former songwriter, I am also very much attuned to the emotional load, onomatopoeic load scratching at the subconscious, etc.. As a translator, I am even more attuned to this reality.)
Now where I run into difficulty is if defining our terms results in infinite regress, what on earth are we doing when we turn to a dictionary, as you suggested? Also, if we don't define words, how do we even arrive at the conventions or penumbra you mentioned?
And I am very curious why you keep treating Rand as if words were her thing when concepts were her thing, and missing the hierarchal nature of how concepts are formed.
Remember that concepts are based on identifying the differences and similarities with other things that fall within the scope of awareness.
As to your question, I have no problem in using another word or phrase for self-sacrifice according to the meaning Rand used, say "prejudicial sacrifice" or "sacrifício da porra" or "eggplant" or any other word or phrase. The concept as she used it had a specific meaning (exchanging a higher value for a lower value or no value). What's wrong with having a specific meaning? I think it is a virtue to be clear.
I prefer not to comment too much on the glossary you linked to because on a cursory and very superficial skim, I already found several meanings that are vastly different than what is given by Rand and I have a real problem with how the genus and differentia are expressed. A much better glossary is given here (but you need a copy of ITOE to accompany it) or even The Ayn Rand Lexicon, since they are both in Rand's own words. (Peikoff is also in the Lexicon.)
Compare "abstraction" between them for example, or "concept." The differences are huge. (Even OPAR is chock full of definitions, but you have to read it to find them.)
Michael
I am with you to a point. I certainly agree that words carry a variety of meanings. (As a sporadic poet and former songwriter, I am also very much attuned to the emotional load, onomatopoeic load scratching at the subconscious, etc.. As a translator, I am even more attuned to this reality.)
Now where I run into difficulty is if defining our terms results in infinite regress, what on earth are we doing when we turn to a dictionary, as you suggested? Also, if we don't define words, how do we even arrive at the conventions or penumbra you mentioned?
And I am very curious why you keep treating Rand as if words were her thing when concepts were her thing, and missing the hierarchal nature of how concepts are formed.
Remember that concepts are based on identifying the differences and similarities with other things that fall within the scope of awareness.
As to your question, I have no problem in using another word or phrase for self-sacrifice according to the meaning Rand used, say "prejudicial sacrifice" or "sacrifício da porra" or "eggplant" or any other word or phrase. The concept as she used it had a specific meaning (exchanging a higher value for a lower value or no value). What's wrong with having a specific meaning? I think it is a virtue to be clear.
I prefer not to comment too much on the glossary you linked to because on a cursory and very superficial skim, I already found several meanings that are vastly different than what is given by Rand and I have a real problem with how the genus and differentia are expressed. A much better glossary is given here (but you need a copy of ITOE to accompany it) or even The Ayn Rand Lexicon, since they are both in Rand's own words. (Peikoff is also in the Lexicon.)
Compare "abstraction" between them for example, or "concept." The differences are huge. (Even OPAR is chock full of definitions, but you have to read it to find them.)
Michael
Know thyself...
#118
Wolf DeVoon
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 05:45 PM
Daniel Barnes, on May 31 2007, 05:52 PM, said:
We do not insist on "absolutely precise" meanings, and assume words are always to a greater or lesser extent vague or rough... As Betrand Russell rightly remarks, the only things that need exact words are magic spells. So we must be careful not to be bewitched by arguments over their exact meanings.
I see Russell as a dreadful villain, and there is nothing worse than vagueness in constitutional law. Here follows a definition of justice, prefaced by the method I used to limit debate:
The purposes and limitations of a first principle are: (1) to establish the context and scope of discussion; (2) to affirm the existence of a fundamental truth pertaining to the topic generally; and (3) to define that truth, employing the least ambiguous and most cognitively fruitful concepts that are logically germane to the definition. Men and women have reasoned about law for centuries. Familiar terms, the relations of which are obvious in the structure of a predicate, compel any adversary to concede or to contradict squarely, because a first principle necessarily addresses a fundamental question. The most fundamental issue in law is justice -- not electoral processes or delegated powers, but the right to public justice.
Definitions of justice proffered by others have been lengthy, covering hundreds of pages, intertwining dozens of terms. However, logic is an exact science. Verbosity indicates lack of understanding or deliberate obfuscation. That's why my definition of justice is succinct. A complete theory of justice is presented in one proposition, consisting of one object, one action, and two qualifiers: Justice = armed defense of innocent liberty. The qualifiers are necessary for precision. Verbal defense of liberty isn't justice. It must be armed defense. Not all liberty, just innocent liberty (e.g., the liberty of women and children, who are often unable to defend themselves). My definition does not refer to or imply any ethical principle. The philosophy of law is a separate branch of science, independent of ethics. Moral inquiry pertains specifically to the interests, powers, and dilemmas of an individual, epitomized by the question: "What shall I do?" Legal philosophy addresses impersonal administration of public justice, litigation among parties in dispute, the combined might of a community, and custodial guardianship of certain individuals who are unable or legally prohibited to conduct their own affairs.
What's at issue is man's ability to define appropriate measures and mechanisms for public justice. Although I'm willing to say my solution is provisional, pending a more succinct, more penetrating equation, any future competitor would have to use fewer terms than I.
Miss Rand gave me the lead: "Evil requires the sanction of the victim." No ambiguity.
Wolf DeVoon
see also In Print
This post has been edited by Wolf DeVoon: 31 May 2007 - 06:00 PM
http://stores.lulu.com/wolfdevoon Justice is the armed defense of innocent liberty.
#119
Daniel Barnes
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 06:04 PM
Mike:
>Now where I run into difficulty is if defining our terms results in infinite regress, what on earth are we doing when we turn to a dictionary, as you suggested? Also, if we don't define words, how do we even arrive at the conventions or penumbra you mentioned?
Who says we "don't define words"? What I'm saying is we can't logically resolve differences of opinions over their meanings. Hence the emphasis on "true" terminology, (as opposed to "mere convention") being established before we can discuss anything is misguided. We have to agree on them in order to communicate, thus they are conventions. Dictionaries are records of common agreements over their meanings. Hence if clarification as to the convention is needed, we just repair to the dictionary.
>Now where I run into difficulty is if defining our terms results in infinite regress, what on earth are we doing when we turn to a dictionary, as you suggested? Also, if we don't define words, how do we even arrive at the conventions or penumbra you mentioned?
Who says we "don't define words"? What I'm saying is we can't logically resolve differences of opinions over their meanings. Hence the emphasis on "true" terminology, (as opposed to "mere convention") being established before we can discuss anything is misguided. We have to agree on them in order to communicate, thus they are conventions. Dictionaries are records of common agreements over their meanings. Hence if clarification as to the convention is needed, we just repair to the dictionary.
#120
Wolf DeVoon
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Posted 31 May 2007 - 06:38 PM
BaalChatzaf, on May 31 2007, 06:25 PM, said:
all mathematical theories start with undefined terms and postulates that are not proven.
Respectfully, I was asking about natural language definitions, not mathematical theories. But put it in math terms if we must. 1+1=2, where '1' is a unit (any unit, an integer). Are you saying that math cannot define 'unit' or 'integer'? If not, mathematicians cannot define 'math' or 'arithmetic' either.
W.
http://stores.lulu.com/wolfdevoon Justice is the armed defense of innocent liberty.
