The so-called 'ESSENTIALS' of Objectivism

[John Dailey]

~ I raised this topic mainly because I've read so many arguers using the term 'essential' without ever delineating what's specifically covered by their use of the term. Methinks not all really agree about what the 'essentials' comprise in their views, which allows ambiguity in interpretation, as in "Everyone agrees that all people should be (ready for the ambiguity?)...'fair.'"

~ I say that Galt's speech is all that O'ism's essentials ARE, and that all other writings by Rand are irrelevent (re 'essentials'.) --- They may be relevent 'explanatorily' (devil-in-the-details, and all that), but, add nothing 'fundamental' (another overused term), and, exempt nothing.

~ This MAY touch on the relatively recent prob of 'open'/'closed' systems views, but...that's another thread, no?

LLAP

J:D

Edited December 24, 2006 by John Dailey

[John Dailey]

Addendum:

~ Does anyone wish to A-D-D what they consider, re Rand's writings, as constituting, given their addition (quoting Rand, or whoever), the totality of the essentials of O'ism, beyond Rand's Galt's speech? (I'm aware of the 'exemption' considerations; not asking about those; irrelevent to my question.) --- If so, let's get a unified basis-for-agreement going...even if debatable re a consensus. But, let's not keep using 'essential' as if we all agree what that means. We all know that we all disagree about what 'fair' means.

LLAP

J:D

Edited December 24, 2006 by John Dailey

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

I adhere to the essentials of Objectivism delineated by David Kelley back in 1990 in The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand. Here is the section from Chapter 5 called "What is Objectivism?" that gives these essentials.

What is Objectivism?

In The Objectivist Newsletter, Ayn Rand described the central tenets of her philosophy as follows:

In metaphysics, that reality exists as an objective absolute;

In epistemology, that reason is man's only means of perceiving reality and his only means of survival;

In ethics, that man is an end in himself, with the pursuit of his own life, happiness and self-interest as his highest end;

In politics, laissez-faire capitalism.[9]

Is this the essence of Objectivism? Certainly these four principles are essential. But they are not enough. These are extremely broad doctrines as stated. Every one of them has been defended by other philosophers, and the package as a whole is not too far from the views of many Enlightenment thinkers. If Ayn Rand had said no more than this, we could not credit her with having created a distinctive system, much less a system that provides the fundamental alternative to Kant. She would properly be regarded as a secular and individualist thinker within the Aristotelian tradition. To identify what makes Objectivism unique, we have to be more specific. We need to identify the basic insights and connections that allowed Ayn Rand to give an original defense of the four principles I stated. So let us take a closer look at each of the relevant areas.

In metaphysics, Ayn Rand's view of reality as objective, her view of facts as absolutes, is basically Aristotelian. But her formulation of this view states its essential elements with unprecedented depth and clarity. Her axiom of existence expresses the insight that existence is the primary metaphysical fact, not to be questioned or explained; that the question "Why is there something rather than nothing?" is meaningless; that existence does not derive from some more fundamental stratum of forms or essences. Her principle of the primacy of existence denies that reality is malleable by consciousness, even a divine consciousness. This closes off the possibility that nature has a supernatural creator—a possibility that Aristotle left open. And it distinguishes her from modern Kantian views which claim that the world we know is merely an appearance, shaped by our own concepts and conventions. Finally, she formulated the laws of identity and causality as axioms that define the realm of metaphysical facts, and that ground the operations of reason. The law of identity, which says that a thing must have a specific and non-contradictory nature, is the basis for all deductive reasoning. The law of causality, which says that a thing must act in accordance with its nature, is the basis of all inductive reasoning. In epistemology, Ayn Rand also agreed with Aristotle—up to a point. She held that reason is man's means of knowledge, that it gives us the capacity to grasp the world as it is, that the material of knowledge is provided by the senses, that the method of reason is logic, and that this method is grounded in fact. But she went far beyond this. I would say that three of her insights in epistemology are essential to Objectivism.

The first is her concept of objectivity, and her rejection of the false dichotomy between intrinsicism and subjectivism. I described this insight at the beginning of my essay, and have relied upon it throughout. It runs through every part of her epistemology, as well as her ethics and politics; it is the Archimedean point from which she overthrows the Kantian system. A second and closely related insight is her recognition that reason is the faculty of concepts, and that a concept is an integration of particulars on the basis of their similarities. A concept is an abstraction. It is not merely a name for an arbitrary collection of things we happen to classify together, but an integration of them into a new mental unit that expands the range of our knowledge. An abstraction, however, does not exist as such, over and above the concretes it integrates; it is the rule by which they are integrated. So it cannot be divorced from its perceptual basis and allowed to float free. As a result of this theory, Objectivism has a highly distinctive view about what it means to think conceptually, to think in principles—a view that avoids the classic defects of rationalism on the one hand and empiricism on the other.

The final point I would mention in epistemology is that reason is a volitional faculty: that conceptual integration, unlike sense-perception, is a cognitive function that must be initiated and directed by choice. This is the essence of our free will, and the source of our need for epistemological standards. It is also the psychological source of hostility toward reason. In analyzing the varieties of irrationalism, as I noted in Section III, Ayn Rand always traced them back to the desire for an effortless, automatic mode of cognition.

This brings us to the fields of ethics and politics, where Ayn Rand's views were most distinctive. Her most important contribution in ethics is clearly her insight that values are rooted in the phenomenon of life. Values exist because the existence of a living organism depends on its own goal-directed action; in order to survive it must treat certain things as good for it and other things as bad. This is her solution to the notorious is-ought problem in philosophy, the problem of how normative conclusions can be derived from facts about the world, and it provides the basis for an objective ethics.

If we value life, then our nature requires certain kinds of actions, which we identify as virtues. Since reason is our basic means of survival, the primary, essential virtue is rationality: the acceptance of reason as an absolute, and a commitment to the use of rational standards and methods in every issue we confront. All of the other virtues are implicit in rationality; they involve the acceptance and use of reason in specific areas such as judging others (justice) or creating value (productiveness). But the virtue of independence deserves special mention because it also involves the recognition and acceptance of the volitional character of reason. The fact that we must initiate and direct the process of thought means that we must not subordinate our judgment of the facts to the minds of others, no matter how numerous; and that the sense of efficacy that is crucial to self-esteem is ours to achieve by our own effort. In this respect, the virtue of independence is the key link between epistemology and politics. Because reason is volitional, it is a faculty of the individual, whose freedom to act independently, on his own autonomous judgment, must be protected by a system of political rights.

If these are the central virtues in Objectivism, what are the central values? Life, of course, is the fundamental value, but what about the subsidiary values, the ones we need if we are to maintain, fulfill, and enjoy our lives? What is most distinctive to Ayn Rand in this regard is her new about the central role of production in man's life. Productive work, the creation of value, is our basic means of dealing with reality and a precondition for the pursuit of any other value. Psychologically, it is a vital source of one's sense of efficacy and self-worth. Production is not merely a practical necessity; it is man's glory. Our ability to reshape the world in the image of our values, in a world open to our achievement, is the essence of her view of man as a heroic being, a view that shaped and colored everything she wrote.

Finally, we cannot omit her explicit rejection of altruism and the mind-body dichotomy. This is a negative point, but we need to include it because Ayn Rand was virtually without precedent here. Many other philosophers have adopted views that are implicitly egoistic, but few were willing to put their cards on the table, to say explicitly: altruism is wrong, self-sacrifice is a perversion of ethics. The same is true of the dichotomy between mind and body, between the material and the spiritual. Ayn Rand is distinctive in her exalted, idealistic defense of such worldly values as sex and wealth.

In politics, the essence of the Objectivist view is the principle of individual rights. The rights of the individual, not the welfare of the collective, provide the moral basis of capitalism. Of course Ayn Rand did not originate the concept of rights; she inherited it from the individualist thinkers of the Enlightenment. Her contribution was to give their political individualism an ethical basis in egoism, the right of each individual to pursue his own happiness; and an epistemological basis in the fact that reason is a faculty of the individual mind. She also identified the fact that rights can be violated only by force. A right is a right to action, not to a good like food, shelter, or medical care, and it can be violated only if someone forcibly prevents one from acting. The political implication of these views is that the government must be strictly limited: limited in function to the protection of rights, and limited in its methods to acting in accordance with objective law.

Such, in briefest outline, is the essential content of Objectivism as a philosophy. Not all of the ideas I've mentioned were discovered by Ayn Rand, but many of them were, and the integration of them into a system was hers. This outline captures the essential principles that distinguish Objectivism from every other viewpoint—no adherent of a rival philosophy would embrace all of them. Conversely, anyone who accepted all of these ideas would have to consider himself an Objectivist. But notice what I have left out. I omitted a number of points in epistemology, ethics, and politics. I omitted the entire field of aesthetics, just as Ayn Rand did in her brief summary. I haven't said anything about the role of philosophy in history, or the identification of Kant as an arch-villain.

I've omitted these things, not because I disagree with them, or because they are unimportant, but because they are not primary. Some are technical theories required to explain and defend the primary claims that I did include. Some are implications and applications of those primary claims. All of them are principles of limited range and significance for the system as a whole. They are logically connected to the points I've mentioned, and they contribute to the richness and power of Objectivism as a system of thought; if we regard them as true, we will naturally include them as elements in the system. But someone may challenge these noncentral tenets without ceasing to be an Objectivist. The outline I gave was not intended as an exhaustive presentation of Objectivism as I understand it. My purpose was to identify the boundaries of the debate and development that may take place within Objectivism as a school of thought.

It's also important to stress that the principles I have mentioned are not to be taken as a list of articles of faith. They are elements in a connected system. I have been asked whether I would consider someone to be an Objectivist if he accepted all these principles but denied some other point—e.g., that honesty is a virtue. My answer is that the question is premature. I would need to know the reason for his position. If he rejects honesty because he doesn't like it, even though he happens to like the points I've mentioned, then he would not be an adherent of the Objectivist philosophy because he is not an adherent of any philosophy. A philosophy is a logically integrated system, not a grab bag of isolated tenets adopted arbitrarily. If the person did have a reason for his position, then I would need to know what it is. I cannot imagine any argument in favor of dishonesty that does not rest on a rejection of rationality, in which case the person is outside the framework of Objectivism. But if his position is that honesty, while good, is not important enough as an issue to be considered a cardinal virtue; or that the scope of legitimate "white lies" is larger than Ayn Rand allowed; or any number of other variant positions in all such cases, I would consider him an Objectivist even if I disagreed with him, as long as he defends his view by reference to the basic principles.

Like any other philosophy, in short, Objectivism has an essential core: a set of basic doctrines that distinguishes it from other viewpoints and serves as the skeleton of the system. The implication is that anyone in substantial agreement with those doctrines is an Objectivist. I believe that a great deal of damage has been done by refusing to take this attitude. It's been thirty years since Atlas Shrugged was published, the length of an entire generation. After all that time, only a handful of philosophers are willing to identify themselves as Objectivists, and our output has been pretty thin; a complete bibliography would not amount to much. This is partly because Objectivism lies so far outside the main-stream of academic thought. But another reason is the insistence on defining Objectivism in the narrow fashion that Peikoff urges, and the atmosphere of dogmatism that accompanies it. In the name of preserving the purity and integrity of the system, Objectivists have too often relied on stereotypical formulations of Ayn Rand's ideas. They have been quick to pounce on thinkers who might have been their allies. They have greeted new extensions of the system with a timid caution that reminds me of the Council of Scholars in Anthem, who spent fifty years debating the wisdom of accepting that radical innovation, the candle. These policies have discouraged independent thinking, they have driven away creative minds, they have kept Objectivism from being the living, growing philosophy it could be.

This is very well put. I am in 100% agreement with this.

Michael

[Victor Pross]

John,

I would agree that Galt’s speech constitutes “Objectivism’s essentials” as it encompasses all the major branches that Rand indicated...while standing on one foot. Galt’s speech is a first for that. No other novel or speech paints the entire picture coloring all those branches—branches essential to any system of philosophy for it to be a systematic philosophy. It is no wonder that Atlas Shrugged was considered “the Bible of Objectivism.”

When viewing the post-AS writings, we may ask if the work derives from the essentials as illustrated in Galt's speech. For example, does Rand’s “new concept of egoism” [The Virtue of Selfishness] fit the bill? Yes. Does the issue of a woman president? No.

-Victor

Edited December 24, 2006 by Victor Pross

[Judith]

I'd say that Galt's speech includes WAY too many specifics to be the "basics".

For me, the basics are pretty much what Rand said when standing on one foot: objective reality in metaphysics, self-interest in ethics, romantic realism in aesthetics (perhaps this one is optional), capitalism in economics, government limited to military, police, and courts in politics, (I forgot exactly the term for it, but whatever-it-is) in epistemology, etc.

And I don't think we're going to achieve agreement or consensus; don't get your hopes up!

Judith

[Judith]

Whoa -- looks like three people answered simultaneously!

[John Dailey]

~ I see.

~ Thanx for the (wow! 3 so quickly!) responses.

~ Hope there's m-o-r-e feedback/input from others re attempting to agree (or rather, 1st defining/clarifying) as to what one sees as essentials.

LLAP

J:D

P.S: Mike: All that Kelley (as Peikoff, and Branden) said, I put next to Rand's adjunctive explanatoriness; for what that's worth. To my lights, O'ism starts with Rand's Galt's speech; all else are addendums.

Edited December 24, 2006 by John Dailey

[John Dailey]

Mike:

~ I think any discussion re 'others' (such as Kelley, Branden, Peikoff, etc) relevence to O'ism's essentials just m-i-g-h-t call for a totally separate thread; they ALL have some relevence even in bringing up unexpectable 'side' (though extremely important) issues. But, re 'essentials', per se? Hmmm. --- I see, from your response, that we may be parting ways here.

Victor:

~ If you can do Galt's speech "...while standing on one foot"...more power to ya, man!

~ Please don't confuse a PR-oriented summarization with what I've clarified as to what *I* meant by the 'essentials' . A summary of 'X' isn't 'X.' I was talking about 'X,' not it's Cliff's Notes.

~ Rand had a 'comment' about a woman president...in TVOS? I thought her commented thought on that was ONLY in some magazine. Whichever, such is an 'adjunct', and, not really arguable as part of her philosophy's 'essentials', correct?

LLAP

J:D

Edited December 24, 2006 by John Dailey

[John Dailey]

Judith:

~ Yes, I understand (boy, do I!) --- By some lights, Galt's speech can seem overly 'specific'. O-t-other-h, therefore(?) everything everyone else has been saying about Rand's philosophy might seem a bit redundant (unless they're complaining/criticizing an aspect or two; that's a different group.)

~ Still, as Tyeve would say (after 2 hands' consideration) "On-the-OTHER-hand..." they, as you, if you re-read Galt's speech, may show, or even find, new perspectives in what you thought you already were familiar enough with, not only subject-wise, but especially subject-connections-wise.

LLAP

J:D

Edited December 24, 2006 by John Dailey

[Jonathan]

Judith:

"For me, the basics are pretty much what Rand said when standing on one foot: objective reality in metaphysics, self-interest in ethics, romantic realism in aesthetics (perhaps this one is optional)..."

Rand said nothing of aesthetics while presenting her philosophy on one foot, and I don't think that she would have identified "romantic realism" as the essence of her aesthetic theory (she believed that art could be judged as good, or even great, whether one agreed with it or not, enjoyed it or not, and whether it was "romantic realism" or not).

J

[Judith]

Rand said nothing of aesthetics while presenting her philosophy on one foot, and I don't think that she would have identified "romantic realism" as the essence of her aesthetic theory (she believed that art could be judged as good, or even great, whether one agreed with it or not, enjoyed it or not, and whether it was "romantic realism" or not).

Yes, I remember that aesthetics weren't included in the "one foot" episode. Someone brought that up elsewhere. I did say, "pretty much" to qualify my statement.

I did say that it might be optional. Nonetheless, I did include it because the overwhelming majority of Objectivists I've encountered do tend to have aesthetic tastes that tend toward romanticism and realism.

Judith

[Guyau]

Michael,

I would like to persuade you and David that one of his propositions that you quoted is incorrect. “The law of causality, which says that a thing must act in accordance with its nature, is the basis of all inductive reasoning.” The law of causality is a genre of the principle that a thing must act in accordance with its nature, but that principle is broader than the law of causality.

Moreover, not all inductions pertain to actions. Identities relied on in inductive explanations need not be only identities applied to action. Those that are applied to action can be either causal or noncausal. Rand’s statement (prefigured by Meyerson 1908) that the law of causality is the law of identity applied to action does not imply that application of the law of identity to action yields only causal principles. It yields other true principles as well. Not all of our explanations are causal explanations.

A good example of that last thesis would be the strange attractor in the phase space of a dissipative chaotic system. The attractor is explanatory, but not causal. The causes of the behavior of the chaotic system are the usual ones of regular (i.e., nonchaotic) classical mechanics.

The proposition that the law of causality is simply the principle that a thing must act in accordance with its nature is false. The proposition that the law of causality is the basis of all inductive reasoning is also false. And neither of these propositions is a necessary implication of Rand’s views on identity or on causality.

We can, of course, broaden the definition of causality idiosyncratically so as to make all the bases of every induction causal bases. That is unwarranted and detrimental to communication.

In addition, there is a prize to be won in legal philosophy for not stretching the concept of causality. The theory of tort liability authored by Richard Epstein—a theory of strict liability—is based on causal analyses of accidental and intentional harms. It requires (and Epstein argues for) a narrow concept of causality. This theory of tort liability fits Rand’s social morality like a glove, for it is based on the norm that individuals in society, like individuals is isolation, should be able to cause harm only to themselves.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

Everything you see in the Kelley excerpt, you can find in Rand's writings. He added nothing new there except form of presentation (unfortunately academic, so not as accessible to the general public).

Stephen,

I have to do some thinking about all that. My basic reaction is that philosophy is being pushed to a place where it does not belong with these considerations. Philosophical principles are supposed to be the bases of scientific ones, not the contrary. Rand stated that philosophy covered subjects a man could think and reason about without specialized equipment or knowledge. See the excerpt below from ITOE (expanded edition, p. 289):

Prof. B: Is the concept of "matter" a philosophical concept or a scientific one?

AR: In the way we are using it here, as a very broad abstraction, it is a philosophical concept. If by "matter" we mean "that of which all the things we perceive are made," that is a philosophical concept. But questions like: what are different things made of? what are the properties of matter? how can you break it down? etc.—those are scientific problems.

Philosophy by its nature has to be based only on that which is available to the knowledge of any man with a normal mental equipment. Philosophy is not dependent on the discoveries of science; the reverse is true.

So whenever you are in doubt about what is or is not a philosophical subject, ask yourself whether you need a specialized knowledge, beyond the knowledge available to you as a normal adult, unaided by any special knowledge or special instruments. And if the answer is possible to you on that basis alone, you are dealing with a philosophical question. If to answer it you would need training in physics, or psychology, or special equipment, etc., then you are dealing with a derivative or scientific field of knowledge, not philosophy.

I will get back to this.

Michael

[Rich Engle]

The "standing on one foot" reply pretty much always gets traction for me.

From the gut, though, I really have always found that the best place she played was in capitalism. She really did something there. Suddenly, making money wasn't dirty anymore. In fact, it was moral.

As far as real field applications go, her principles are elegant and perfect when done in the business world. This was real vision. She nobilized something that was, I suppose, already noble. She reminded us to remember. It changes a person. You walk by structures, or equipment, or what have you, and you don't take it for granted. In fact, you can better visualize the process of creation. Man as builder.

She gave me new eyes. You can look at something like a typewriter or whatever, and suddenly, you see this beauty. Everything becomes much more significant after you read Atlas Shrugged or The Fountainhead.

So say I, any-hoo.

rde

[jenright]

There is a neglected later summary, different from the first, that includes esthetics:

"The essentials are: in metaphysics, the Law of Identity - in epistemology, the supremacy of reason - in ethics, rational egoism - in politics, individual rights (i.e. capitalism) - in esthetics, metaphysical values."

[galtgulch]

Judith,

Long before I met my wife I realized that one essential attribute I wanted to be sure of in a wife would be not just rationality but also a joyous, life affirming sense of life, and boy am I one happy man to see how well our son turned out as a consequence. We named him Adam because he would be the first little fellow we knew of whose parents were conscious of Objectivism and nurtured his faculty of consciousness blah blah blah.

We are helping him move into his new condo in New York City this weekend.

Love this existence and this country and this philosophy.

Happy holidays. Will stand on one foot at one point in tribute to Ayn Rand.

Buy an Ojo.

galtgulch

[Victor Pross]

There is a neglected later summary, different from the first, that includes esthetics:

"The essentials are: in metaphysics, the Law of Identity - in epistemology, the supremacy of reason - in ethics, rational egoism - in politics, individual rights (i.e. capitalism) - in esthetics, metaphysical values."

Sir, this is a good summary--the suprmacy of reason is the tip of the top!

Rich,

Now, now, let’s not cheery-pick and divide up the branches in Ayn Rand’s philosophy. The cheeries are connected to the same tree. Capitalism would not be what it is with out the foundations-- which is the other branches—and specifically where Rand stood [one foot too] on those essentials. Could capitalism survive [or have been developed] on the opposite of these essentials? For example, altruism is ethics...and capitalism? Hmmm.

-Victor

Edited December 24, 2006 by Victor Pross

[Chris Grieb]

John: Where does the esthics reference occur. Someone may have pointed the ommision to Miss Rand.

[Judith]

Judith,

Long before I met my wife I realized that one essential attribute I wanted to be sure of in a wife would be not just rationality but also a joyous, life affirming sense of life, and boy am I one happy man to see how well our son turned out as a consequence. We named him Adam because he would be the first little fellow we knew of whose parents were conscious of Objectivism and nurtured his faculty of consciousness blah blah blah.

We are helping him move into his new condo in New York City this weekend.

I love hearing about these love stories that turn out well!

Love this existence and this country and this philosophy.

I'm not sure if you're saying that's what you do or that's what I should do. I certainly do!

Happy holidays. Will stand on one foot at one point in tribute to Ayn Rand.

Buy an Ojo.

Happy holidays to you and your family. That's a tribute I hadn't considered; maybe I'll do it too!

What's an Ojo?

Judith

[jenright]

John: Where does the esthics reference occur. Someone may have pointed the omission to Miss Rand.

Chris, it's the 2nd-to-last paragraph of "Philosophical Detection," which appears as the 2nd chapter of her collection: Philosophy: Who Needs It.

You may very well be right that someone had pointed out the omission.

[Jonathan]

Judith:

Yes, I remember that aesthetics weren't included in the "one foot" episode. Someone brought that up elsewhere. I did say, "pretty much" to qualify my statement.

Sorry if I came across as curt.

I did say that it might be optional. Nonetheless, I did include it because the overwhelming majority of Objectivists I've encountered do tend to have aesthetic tastes that tend toward romanticism and realism.

It's been my experience that the overwhelming majority of Objectivists say that they love "romantic realism," but their tastes are actually something I'd call romantic fantasy (and quite often romantic children's fantasy). Blunt, exaggerated heroism (exaggerated to the point of fantasy) seems to be their vision of what "romanticism" means, and that, along with a preference for ethical messages which are compatible with Objectivism, is much more important to them in art than any serious aesthetic considerations (such as depth, the presentation of complex, adult dilemmas, quality of artistry, etc.). To them, the romance part of Rand's formulation trumps the realism part, and ethical judgements trump aesthetic ones. To get to the point, I suspect that, to many Objectivists, art is often little more than propaganda which to rally behind or oppose because they believe that "romantic realism" is the standing-on-one-foot essense of Rand's aesthetics -- they falsely believe that Rand proved that romantic realism is the best art, and, therefore, they have reduced themselves to judging art ethically as opposed to aesthetically.

J

Edited December 25, 2006 by Jonathan

[Jonathan]

Thanks for the information on Rand's later inclusion of a one-foot aesthetics summary, John.

J

[John Dailey]

~ Hmm...It's been a while since I've read Rand's writings; nothing like working from memory for others to show your memory's wrong. Missed that about Rand's original 'one-foot' summary excluding esthetics.

~ Given that, now, about my original question...anyone?

~ But, now, therefore, also, 2 additional questions: --1) Do the essentials (whatever one sees them as comprising...and excluding) of Rand's philosophy (presumbly, now, including later 'adjunct' explications of that 10-second 'summary'...and Galt's speech) imply anything about 'Meta'-philosophy (Philosophy-of-History, etc)? --2) How properly determinable should her post-AS adjunct writings be differentiated as to which are essentials and, which not? Like, what rational criteria should one go by there in determing which is which?

LLAP

J:D

Edited December 25, 2006 by John Dailey

[John Dailey]

~ If I may elucidate: As I said, I regard Galt's speech as 'it' for O'ism's totality (and, the extremely simplified 'one-foot' summary IS merely that.) In Rand's later writings she delineated much re the contents thereof, hence, where obvious, such can be includable re the corpus 'proper;' but, most especially relevent here, she discussed 'other' things not included therein (such as, the Philosophy-of-History in FTNI), nor that seem properly 'implied' or derivable from the original (shall we now say?) 4 territories in her '1-foot-summary'

~ So, what are we to make of these 'Meta-' thoughts...especially as to which are essentials, and, which are NOT? Thereby, getting back to my original question, which properly allow 'official' dis-associations?

LLAP

J:D

Edited December 25, 2006 by John Dailey

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

John,

I want to ask you 2 questions on this because you keep using the word "essentials."

1. Who decides? (And why do they decide?)

2. What standard do they use?

I see your own questions pushing off into more or less opinion. ("I think it's Galt's speech;" "I think it includes Rand's later writings;" etc.)

Are not the essentials the integrated principles (and virtues and values)?

Michael