Free Peikoff course - DIM Hypothesis

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Are you curious about why there is a recent uproar in the world of ARI supporters?

On his website, Leonard Peikoff stated the following about the 2006 elections:

In my judgment, anyone who votes Republican or abstains from voting in this election has no understanding of the practical role of philosophy in man’s actual life—which means that he does not understand the philosophy of Objectivism, except perhaps as a rationalistic system detached from the world.

This did not set well at all in the ARI camp, where many vote Republican on principle. The web in ARI-land is buzzing up a storm.

Peikoff's reasons are based on his DIM hypothesis. If you want to understand how he arrived at his reasoning on this issue, ARI is offering all 15 lectures in Peikoff's 2004 course in streaming audio for free for a limited time if you register there (the CD it is being sold at $315, the tapes at $270, and the course itself at $225). I registered and am listening to the course courtesy of ARI. The link is given below:

The DIM Hypothesis: The Epistemological Mechanics by which Philosophy Shapes Society

Michael

[Jonathan]

So does this mean that "Have you heard DIM?" is about to become the new "Have you read PARC?"?

J

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Jonathan,

From what I have read on other forums, it already has.

There is nothing at all wrong with giving a fair hearing. At least I am seeing where some standard arguments are coming from in the ARI camp.

I have another reason I became interested in this that has nothing at all to do with Objectivist partisan bickering. A much more positive, productive and bigger thing. I will reveal this later. (Gotta finish listening--it's 22 hours and 21 minutes!)

Edit: For what it's worth, here is the course outline from the Internet Course description at the ARI bookstore:

Course Outline

1. Trichotomies in Philosophy. Why are they so numerous and which one(s) are fundamental?

2. Integration. The One in the Many. Integration as the essence of human cognition from start to finish.

3. The DIM Hypothesis. A new trichotomy defining men's different policies in regard to integration.

4. DIM in Philosophy. Plato/Hegel, Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Mill and "the three A's."

5. DIM in Literature. Atlas Shrugged, and then down—to the bottom.

6. DIM in Physics. Newton to Einstein and quantum mechanics.

7. DIM in Historiography. Current trends vs. The Ominous Parallels.

8. DIM in Politics. Five answers to: What is the nature and purpose of a state?

9. DIM in Law. The application of the five answers to the nature and purpose of law.

10. DIM in Child-Raising. What is a good parent—and his/her most prevalent alternatives?

11. DIM in Education. What is a good school? What are its main alternatives today, and why are they so popular?

12. DIM in Regard to Men's Psychology and Character. The different kinds of men who advocate D, I or M.

13. DIM in History. Western development from Greece through the 19th century.

14. Q-&-A Session

15. Conclusion. The United States in the 20th century—and what it will be tomorrow: D, I, or M?

Michael

[reason.on]

I haven't listen to LP's 15 hours of lecturing (the mere thought makes my skin crawl)...but, at first glance the whole idea appears to be little more than a giant truism simplistically applied as somekind of broad theory of everything (in terms of the epistemology of mind).

:sick:

I don't know if I can stomach 15 hours of LP's droning, but I'd be interested in any critical reflections from those who have.

RCR

[Laure]

The course outline sounds really interesting. But I too have a problem with listening to over 20 hours of lectures! Not just because Peikoff's voice is annoying, but just in general I find that I can absorb information more efficiently by reading. I wish it was available in a book.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Christian,

From what I gather, DIM is an attempt to establish a standard to judge the epistemological validity of things with parts, called "wholes" or "integrations" (and that means anything at all anywhere with parts, both concrete and abstract) according to the amounts of objective reality, the arbitrary and denial-of-everything included in the thinking about it.

As a simple parameter for a specific type of focus, I find it to be correct so far. (I would even include an "incomplete awareness" category, but I am stating that too soon since I have not listened to the full course.) As is usual with me, I am at odds with the orthodoxy's view of human nature, which, interestingly enough, is where I find strong elements of the arbitrary and denial - a DM approach, so to speak.

Michael

[Jonathan]

Laure:

The course outline sounds really interesting. But I too have a problem with listening to over 20 hours of lectures! Not just because Peikoff's voice is annoying, but just in general I find that I can absorb information more efficiently by reading. I wish it was available in a book.

Ditto.

J

[reason.on]

The course outline sounds really interesting. But I too have a problem with listening to over 20 hours of lectures! Not just because Peikoff's voice is annoying, but just in general I find that I can absorb information more efficiently by reading. I wish it was available in a book.

Lest I be misunderstood (on what I admit is minor point), it isn't the quality of LP's voice that I dread (to be honest, I have never heard him speak), but rather the quality of what he says. It is difficult enough just to *read* LP (thinking of the Analytic-Synthetic essay), as I find myself having to skim over large portions of text due his over-indulgence in puffery, Randian bombast and inappropriate moralizing. The thought of having to focus and listen, in real-time, to most every word that he says (for 15-20 hrs) gives me the heebie-jeebies.

But, I am curious to know how LP's work compares to Carolyn Ray's Rand-inspired work in epistemological issues...so I may hold my nose and take advantage of the freebie.

RCR

[Neil Parille]

Not to toot my own horn, but I have some comments about the DIM series:

http://objectiblog.blogspot.com/

[Reidy]

Re #8: Several years ago, in a Liberty review of Nathaniel Branden's autobiography, William Bradford asked why the Objectivists, since the late 50s, have gone in for spoken rather than printed exposition. A listener, unlike a reader, can't stop and think a point through, rephrase, spell out an argument or go back to check - just the sort of operations that thorough understanding requires.

The answer might be that this brings in more money, but that's questionable. Unit revenues are greater for a live or taped lecture course or a recording than for a book, but production costs are higher, and you sell fewer copies. If the sellers have checked this out and determined that, after taking these facts into account, the spoken word still brings in a greater net, you have to wonder about the people who are buying it and why they prefer it this way.

Re #3: did you know that, etymologically, "trichotomy" means "haircut"? My observation has been that philosophers do this less often than non-philosophers.

[Chris Grieb]

Until Rand's death there was always the possibility that she would write a book on Objectivism. She did some work on one. Branden did bring out much of his Basic Psycholgy course in his first book.

[Neil Parille]

Reidy,

I think it is easy to give a lecture than to publish a book or a journal article, and many of the Objectivist tape series are from conference lectures.

Objectivists can't complaint that their views are ignored given that there are relatively few books out actually elaborating or defending specific Objectivst positions.

[Robert Campbell]

Peter,

A colleague in psychology says, "You publish, and you take your lumps."

Not trying to publish most of your work could be the road to a lumpless life. But it is also a pretty good way to guarantee your irrelevance.

Robert Campbell

[Roger Bissell]

Are you guys suggesting that Peikoff is chicken-sh.. -- I mean: risk-averse? :-)

Well, here is a quote from his "Two Definitions," one of the lectures he gave under the general heading "Unity in Epistemology and Ethics" about 10 years ago:

...this is the greatest danger, and why if I ever wrote on this topic, which I never will, because I haven’t thought it out properly; I mean, you know, it’s OK for a lecture, but to write it out, you do have to do that for eternity – ...

Get that? He's saying not just that he's not going to write on something that he hasn't thought out properly (which is fine), but that he never will write on it (implying that he may never think it out properly). In other words, he can snare umpteen listeners into paying for the lectures (live or recorded) where they listen to him expound this non-properly-thought-out ideas, but he's not going to give them the benefit of being able to examine those ideas in print. And why? In print, it's "for eternity." But wait a minute: isn't it "for eternity" on recording, too, just much harder to examine and critique? Hmm, maybe that's the point!

However, I think that remaining "lumpless" is not quite what Leonard is after. After all, hasn't he taken quite a few lumps already, for putting out Parallels and OPAR? They're good, but not perfect, and critics have pounced all right. But those books were basically under Rand's tutelage, and he might be partially excused for not yet being "his own man." However, what he writes now, especially DIM and his induction book (assuming they're still forthcoming), is going to be pure Leonard Peikoff. These things have to be perfect, based on "properly thought out" ideas. They won't be perfect, of course, and he will still take lumps. But they will be calculated lumps.

Peikoff does not dare expose himself to the kind of criticism he would face if he turned out books (from his lectures) at the rate of, say, a Nathaniel Branden or a Tibor Machan. And why? Because "the long knives" (the Winsbanger Brigade) are ready to pounce on his errors, and he still (I would imagine) likes being King of the Hill a bit too much to be quite that prolific and casually confident with the printed word. That's why you will never, sad to say, see a printed version (in Peikoff's lifetime) of "Understanding Objectivism" (which many say is his finest original philosophy course).

REB

[Chris Grieb]

Roger; Is the DIM Hypothesis going to be part of Objectivism? Is Peikoff trying to sneak it in the back door. How is this going to be done?

[Reidy]

Peikoff is on record (don't remember where) as saying that Objectivism = what Rand said; others can make valuable philosophical contributions, but they won't be Objectivism. He may yet come up with some Orwellian rationalization, but this is what he'd have to rationalize away.

[Chris Grieb]

Reidy; I accept it occurs in Fact and Value. I think steel griders have been more easily bent.

[Roger Bissell]

Chris, I haven't opined much on DIM to date, but I do have a few thoughts...

I think it is a valuable way of looking at our culture and the many areas in which ideas and ways of thinking affect the development of our culture. I don't know if it is the most fundamental way of doing so, but it seems fruitful to me. The fact that Peikoff has been able to plausibly, often convincingly, apply it across so many areas says a lot about DIM's validity.

I think that the forthcoming book (or at least the lecture course title) is somewhat misnamed. I don't think it's "epistemological mechanics" that shape society. More precisely, it's psycho-epistemological mechanics, i.e., the manner in which one thinks and uses one's mind.

Peikoff in the first lecture discusses three trichotomies. The first is the metaphysical trichotomy: two worlds vs. one world vs. no world. The idealists/spiritualists hold the first, Aristotle/Rand the second, materialists (supposedly) the third. Peikoff gives several examples of this. Second, there is the epistemological trichotomy: intrinsicist, objectivist, subjectivist. Rationalists usually hold the first, Rand the second, empiricists the third.

The third trichotomy, which Peikoff has invented and applied across many areas in his lectures/book, is the Misintegration-Integration-Disintegration trichotomy, how and to what extent one uses logic, causality, etc., in forming one's ideas and policies and doctrines. He actually expands this to not just 3 but 5 categories, however, because he identifies both extreme and moderate versions of M and D. This works nicely, because it allows him to identify intermediate cases in both directions between healthy integration and the failure to integrate properly. There are Ms and Ds who have some respect for and acknowledgement of logic, causality, etc., and they are the Moderate Ms and Moderate Ds.

There has been some uproar over whether Peikoff has correctly applied DIM in evaluating our political system and how much likelihood the extreme Ms (conservative religious fundamentalists) are going to take over and ruin our lives if the Republicans stay in power -- as against the extreme Ds (nihilistic, America-hating or America-castrating leftists). A corollary question is: who is a worse risk to put in power, the moderate Ms (neo-conservatives) or the moderate Ds (or even extreme Ds, egalitarians, multi-culturalists, etc.). This is probably the most obvious area where one has to be very careful in applying an abstract model like DIM to real-world decisions.

The more I look at the world around me, the more I am convinced that Rand was right: it is earlier than we think, and the salvation of America and the world will come not at the ballot box, but from the world of ideas via the universities and those who spread those ideas through speaking and writing. That is why it really scares me and angers me to see those who should be working overtime in getting good fundamental philosophy out into the world instead speaking on Fox News and at major universities, waving nukes around and advocating that we deliberately bomb the civilians and the colleges of countries we don't like.

In brief: I think DIM is brilliant and very valuable, if used with caution and a level head.

REB

P.S. -- As to whether DIM will become, or should be considered, as part of Objectivism, that depends on how strictly or loosely you construe what is Objectivism. (And is that the same as Randianism?) And there is a difference between what should be considered as part of Objectivism and what in fact will be generally accepted as being part of Objectivism. (And who decides?) I don't want to rehash that whole debate (or cluster of debates) here. I'll just tell you my opinion: there will be a power struggle over DIM, and if it (i.e., Peikoff) wins out, then DIM will eventually (not in Peikoff's lifetime) be accepted as part of Objectivism. In other words, I am projecting that the "open model" of Objectivism will eventually win out, mostly likely after both the Peikoff and Binswanger/Kelley generations die off.

However, looking very long range: if Objectivism matters 100 or 1000 years from now, it will not be because of the contributions of any of the current leaders of the Objectivist movement, including DIM and Binswanger's forthcoming book on consciousness and Peikoff's forthcoming book on induction. It will be because someone like Aquinas has come along to write fearlessly, prodigiously, and in a way that integrates those ideas into the culture. I don't see that level of vigor and courage and excellence among living Objectivists. Maybe I'm expecting too much. I'm sure the human race will limp along with or without the mega-intellect I am describing -- unless the Islamo-jihadists blow us all up in the next few years because of ARI's nuke-mongering.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Roger,

This is a real nit, but an important one, I think.

There are not 5 formal categories in DIM, but 6 instead. A cultural phenomenon can also be zero--i.e., without major cultural impact. There are many extremely important works, societies and people Peikoff put there.

Michael

[Robert Campbell]

Roger,

I think you are right that Peikoff will accept irrelevance (plus occasional harsh criticism) from the wider culture as long as he can avoid taking too many lumps in Rand-land.

Peikoff does not dare expose himself to the kind of criticism he would face if he turned out books (from his lectures) at the rate of, say, a Nathaniel Branden or a Tibor Machan. And why? Because "the long knives" (the Winsbanger Brigade) are ready to pounce on his errors, and he still (I would imagine) likes being King of the Hill a bit too much to be quite that prolific and casually confident with the printed word. That's why you will never, sad to say, see a printed version (in Peikoff's lifetime) of "Understanding Objectivism" (which many say is his finest original philosophy course).

Now, how about Harry Binswanger, who has also left a lot of his work unpublished. Same basic motive?

Robert Campbell

[Roger Bissell]

Roger,

This is a real nit, but an important one, I think.

There are not 5 formal categories in DIM, but 6 instead. A cultural phenomenon can also be zero--i.e., without major cultural impact. There are many extremely important works, societies and people Peikoff put there.

Michael

In lecture 3 of DIM, Peikoff spends several paragraphs discussing the "zero" folks, the "eclectics," who do not have a significant influence on the culture, because they do not take a firm stand. I'd quote this material from my personal transcript of the lecture, but I don't want to get in legal trouble -- although I think that quoting that small an amount of material probably would be allowed under "Fair Use."

I do have a question, though -- how can something be "extremely important" and yet be "without major cultural impact"? I don't know too many things like that, do you? :-)

My own preferred approach is to set up a tetrachotomy (such as: rationalist, empiricist, objectivist, nihilist in regard to knowledge, value, etc.), and I've done that with various issues in (and out of) Objectivism, but I haven't tried to assess Peikoff's DIM in that way, yet.

You speak of "formal categories in DIM." Remember, DIM is an analytical tool designed to distinguish between various consistent positions in science, art, education, etc. An eclectic, by definition, does not have a position or a consistent approach.

If we wanted to re-form Peikoff's categories to include eclecticism, we would then have four major categories which we could symbolize as DIME. That's my ten-cent's worth, anyway, heh-heh. :-)

Another point: remember, the moderate Ds and the moderate Ms are intermediate positions between D and I, and between M and I, respectively. They are necessary and useful for the same reason that the concept of "mixed economy" is necessary and useful in studying the politico-economic systems of countries like the U.S. Not being "extreme" positions, however (and Peikoff uses that word), they are less stable, they are transitional and tend to lead to one or the other of the more pure positions (radical D, I, or radical M). That is the official argument, anyway. I wonder, instead, whether the intermediate positions are really the more likely to prevail in a culture, as a kind of "resultant" or "equilibrium position" (to borrow a term from economics) that is how all the complex interrelationships of people and institutions play out. Just musing. No firm position at this time (he said, eclectically :-)

REB

[Roger Bissell]

Roger,

I think you are right that Peikoff will accept irrelevance (plus occasional harsh criticism) from the wider culture as long as he can avoid taking too many lumps in Rand-land.

Peikoff does not dare expose himself to the kind of criticism he would face if he turned out books (from his lectures) at the rate of, say, a Nathaniel Branden or a Tibor Machan. And why? Because "the long knives" (the Winsbanger Brigade) are ready to pounce on his errors, and he still (I would imagine) likes being King of the Hill a bit too much to be quite that prolific and casually confident with the printed word. That's why you will never, sad to say, see a printed version (in Peikoff's lifetime) of "Understanding Objectivism" (which many say is his finest original philosophy course).

Now, how about Harry Binswanger, who has also left a lot of his work unpublished. Same basic motive?

Well, in regard to motives, it's not easy to say. I don't know HB as well as I do LP. Also, I've never met or even corresponded directly with either of them, so my impressions of them are long-distance, between-the-lines readings of (and listenings to) their comments in essays, books, and lectures -- as well as consideration of comments by others who have known them personally.

But one thing I note about Binswanger is that his lectures from the last several years seem all to be clearly focused toward one central goal: his book on consciousness. I've heard a lot of those essays on tape/CD, and they're pretty good, so I expect the book will be pretty good, too. It might be excellent overall, but I doubt it, unless he cleans up some of his thinking, particularly about volition and the mind-body relationship. His published monograph on volition has a lot of problems, sloppy thinking and/or writing, and I don't know that anyone has taken him to task for it, not publicly, anyway. (But my own view on these issues is a bit askew to the standard (?) Objectivist position, anyway, so I may be talking to the wind here.)

Anyway, I think it's clear that Binswanger is following the Branden model for The Psychology of Self-Esteem: get a lot of material out in essays and lectures on different topics but within a broader integrating theme, then knit it together into a book. I don't know whether Binswanger will have much that is new and original to say on consciousness. I rather expect that it will just be a well-organized "chewing" of Rand's and Peikoff's thought. But we'll see in just a few months/years...

Other than that fairly sizeable body of lecture material, Binswanger has little else available on tape/CD that I'm aware of. His course(s?) on logic should be put out as a monograph -- or maybe he and Schwartz and Salmieri and Tracinski and Peikoff could collaborate on a thinking/logic text.

REB

P.S. -- I just had a thought: maybe Peikoff (and others) intend for their lectures to be transcribed and published after they die, and that all of that busy-work will consume more Rand estate funds in order to pay the gnomes who transcribe, edit, and (of course) air-brush out the "mistakes." :-) The Posthumous Objectivism industry could go on for generations in such a fashion. How depressing...

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Roger,

I kinda had to do a second take when Peikoff excluded all ancient Greek government from DIM as not being culturally relevant--being a zero.

Actually, a very interesting perspective on the thinking behind DIM can be obtained from analyzing the omissions.

I liked your turning on a DIME idea, but the the omissions make DIM itself out to be a highly eclectic cultural analysis tool--sort of like analyzing the entire history of mankind according to Christianity and excluding all the non-Christian cultures and epochs as irrelevant to mankind's history.

Hmmmmmm...

Michael

[Neil Parille]

Speaking of tapes, I believe George Walsh's book on religion was a transcribed tape series. The lack of books from Objectivists is surprising, given the ready market fo them.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I just read a highly interesting discussion and critique of the DIM Hypothesis on the Speichers' forum:

Issues with the DIM Hypothesis -- #1 Integration or Identification?

Hat tip to Phil Coates for mentioning this (elsewhere).

I read the full discussion. This is the first time I have paid attention to Betsy Speicher's arguments on a technical issue in Objectivism. I must say I was impressed with this go-round and I certainly learned some things. Here are some highlights I think are important to summarize.

Essentially Ms. Speicher takes Peikoff to task for focusing solely on integration to explain specific people and human events from an epistemological bias, especially his calling integration "the essence of human cognition from start to finish" and "the basic activity of a conceptual consciousness."

Giving ample sources from Rand, Ms. Speicher notes that the main function of consciousness is identification (which is how awareness works). Integration is merely one side of identification. Differentiation is the other side. She also mentioned two more complex types of identification that are critical: identifying causal connections and identifying contradictions. But she kept hammering home the essential point that in Objectivist epistemology, the basis of knowledge is identification and that requires both integration and differentiation. You cannot eliminate one or downplay its role without going off into left field.

I agree with her. Both elements (including her more complex identifications) need to be present in categorizing and analyzing people and human events if one wants to be universal and not arbitrary or lopsided.

Ms. Speicher also gives Peikoff's definition of integration: "an active human process of putting elements together to make a whole." She disagrees with this definition with some unnecessary hairsplitting about the phrase "active human process." (This discussion is here.) I agree with her that this phrase is not good, but not for her reasons (basically she objected to redundancy). I think the phrase is horrible because of the word "human." Other higher animals than human beings integrate sensations into percepts by definition just like they have consciousness. Nonhuman higher animals both integrate and differentiate. They identify things. Peikoff made a very poor choice in using the word "human" to define integration. Speicher also hairsplits on Peikoff's meaning of the word "whole," but I have no real problem with that.

An even more serious flaw in the DIM Hypothesis is inherent to its make-up and characterization. Ms. Speicher shows a clear contradiction in Peikoff's characterization of DIM as a trichotomy. In answer to a poster she wrote (see here for the full post):

If that it so, and DIM is a trichotomy, then it contradicts Dr. Peikoff's own definition of what a trichotomy is.

Very early in Lecture 1 he defined a trichotomy as "Three mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities within a given field or question." (DIM 1-1 3:30). If Hobbes can be classified in two categories, then the DIM categories are not mutually exclusive. If Rush Limbaugh cannot be included in any category, then the DIM categories are not jointly exhaustive.

Another damning criticism of the DIM Hypothesis (in its present form) is Peikoff's lack of clarity and outright vagueness. She correctly mentions that he is on a different wavelength from Rand (see here for the full post):

Precise definitions are especially required with DIM because this is a new hypothesis and because -- as I have been pointing out -- Dr. Peikoff uses terms in ways that are different from the way Ayn Rand did.

I think the jest in her post below is more to the point and gets to the core of what the DIM Hypothesis is really all about. It is a system where a person can be quite arbitrary in classifying specific people and human events, but give the impression of acting with logical validity (see here for the full post):

You can't classify things properly without clear definitions and standards. If we had clear definitions of "integrated" or "disintegrated" and "misintegrated" it would be easier to tell an "M" from a "D." If we had a clear standard, we could employ it to distinguish an "M1" from an "M2."

Lacking that, all we have are guesses about what Dr. Peikoff means and why he classifies things as he does. One "standard" I have seen proposed, in jest, is that an M1 is a religious person Dr. Peikoff likes, and an M2 is a religious person Dr. Peikoff doesn't like.

If this starts to make anyone uneasy, the reason is simple. This sets an arbitrary standard for making moral condemnations with the appearance of legitimacy. Ms. Speicher does not state this in my manner, but her concerns are clear in the following quote (see here for the full post):

What really concerns me is that some people are taking the DIM Hypothesis and applying it by condemning other Objectivists as "disintegrated" or as "rationalists" who don't understand Objectivism. Considering that DIM is not yet fully defined and developed and, being an hypothesis, is not yet fully proven, "applying" it like that is appalling.

I say applying it like that even after it is "fully defined and developed" is appalling. I seriously wonder whether the creator of this so-called tool to explain how philosophy drives social change is aware of the fact that it will be used as a weapon, or if he will use it himself as a weapon to trash those he doesn't like. It can certainly be used to shut down dissent at the leader's whim without scratching his prestige, regardless of the issue and even if the dissenter is right. Now look at that jest above. It starts to make even more sense.

There are several other really good points included in this discussion. If you are interested in the DIM Hypothesis, especially if you have listened to the course, I strongly urge you to go through Ms. Speicher's thread. Toward the end, it veers off on a tangent about stars and galaxies, but you can skim over that. The bulk is well worth it.

Michael