Popper Talk

[Brant Gaede]

x

Appeal to the man and appeal to authority.

--Brant

The authority of expertise and competence. Talk to people who get paid to do logic and find out what logic is. Talk to the people who have made blockbuster contributions to the field like Frege, Tarski or Goedel.

Rand's definition of logic is wrong. In the one hundred and fifty years (give or take) since George Boole initiated the modern era of logic (logic as a formal and mathematical discipline) logic has been the discipline/art of valid inference. That is a century and a half of solid progress in the field, well beyond the point reached by Aristotle.

Would you say asking Thomas Edison what an incandescent lamp is, is a mere appeal to authority? Invoking the creators and shakers is no mere appeal to authority. It is asking the people who MADE the field, what it is they are doing.

Ba'al Chatzaf

You denigrate Rand by referring to her as a novelist as opposed to novelist/philosopher. That's basically specious ad hominem in the context of your argument from authority. There was a famous and great surgeon in the 19th C. who denigrated the germ theory of disease by deliberately operating with filthy hands. He had "expertise." He had "competence." Neither meant the "authority" was right. Please stick to the arguments. As for Rand's definition, it would seem that you can have non-contradictory identification and an invalid inference because of a lousy premise. There is too much emphasis on the conclusion, too little on the data and their source. Rand mostly uses logic to bind her philosophical system together, jumping from one platform to the next or even abandoning logic altogether with her views on aesthetics which don't flow from anything save her personal views and tastes. Her views on ethics and politics are too sketchy and simplistic and rationally controversial, by which I mean Utopian therefore dangerous when used by fanatics to justify action by reference to philosophy rather than facts. The communists in Cambodia had gone to France where the leftist intelligentsia filled their heads with Marxist crap. They went home and murdered millions of Cambodians following in the footsteps of Lenin/Stalin, Mao and Hitler. Someday some ass calling himself an "Objectivist" might do much the same.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

1. A particular operation may be "true" in terms of inference, but if it is based on a false premise (an admitted false premise at that!), it is using "rotten material" so to speak in terms of connecting with reality. There is a difference between Logic (capital "L") as a field of cognition and logic as a single operation. I stand by what I wrote about not being interested in word games as a tool for living.

2. I am not using the language of formal logic. "Valid concept" in the usage I mean here is a concept that has referents that can reduce to reality, not fantasy.

3. I admit my use of "stolen concept" is a bit of a stretch, but it basically goes like this. The genetic roots of Logic, so to speak, is to be a cognitive tool for dealing with reality. (I seriously doubt the ancients were interested in creating merely the equivalent of mental crossword puzzles.) The logic you guys are talking about can find truth in false premises. Stolen concept. Reality got stolen.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

No one is talking about finding "truth in false premises." We are talking about "valid" as used in logic.

Please at least bother to READ what you are replying to.

Ellen

___

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

Oops. That was a slip. (In my popular lingo as given in No. 2, "valid concept" means a true one. But you are correct, valid also means correct according to a particular rule, regardless of context.)

Let me try again:

1. A particular operation may be "valid" in terms of inference, but if it is based on a false premise (an admitted false premise at that!), it is using "rotten material" so to speak in terms of connecting with reality. There is a difference between Logic (capital "L") as a field of cognition and logic as a single operation. I stand by what I wrote about not being interested in word games as a tool for living.

2. I am not using the language of formal logic. "Valid concept" in the usage I mean here is a concept that has referents that can reduce to reality, not fantasy.

3. I admit my use of "stolen concept" is a bit of a stretch, but it basically goes like this. The genetic roots of Logic, so to speak, is to be a cognitive tool for dealing with reality. (I seriously doubt the ancients were interested in creating merely the equivalent of mental crossword puzzles.) The logic you guys are talking about can find validity in false premises. Stolen concept. Reality got stolen.

You also have a word you can stretch, "validity," from meaning adherence to a particular rule to a broader meaning with metaphysical overtones to claim that knowledge can never be reliable, which I actually have read in places.

One more comment. In popular usage, valid knowledge and true knowledge are synonyms and logic is a tool for obtaining knowledge.

Michael

[Rodney]

I'm with Daniel and Ellen on this one, Michael. I think AR would be too--for her it was just a matter of emphasis. She wanted to focus on the ultimate proper purpose of logic: to find out the truth. But if pressed as above, she would agree that logic has to do with self-consistency as such.

Someone alert me to any possible evidence that I am wrong about Rand's view.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

No one is talking about finding "truth in false premises." We are talking about "valid" as used in logic.

Please at least bother to READ what you are replying to.

Ellen

___

Michael,

One clarification: The truth of a conclusion does not depend on the truth of the premises. A statement is true or false no matter how it is arrived at. But "valid" in logic does not mean "true." It means correct reasoning.

It's so frustrating trying to talk to you because you keep responding to something different -- something of your own imagining -- instead of to what the people you're responding to have said. (Quick example, yesterday when you informed me you hadn't said Miller had endorsed the Dykes article and accused me of chanelling you, when I hadn't said you did say Miller had endorsed the Dykes article. If you'd paid attention to what I actually wrote, you might have seen this. And that's only one small example. The pattern happens so chronically in exchanges with you as to be incredibly aggravating.)

I now have to scoot; won't be back on line for several hours.

Ellen

___

[BaalChatzaf]

One more comment. In popular usage, valid knowledge and true knowledge are synonyms and logic is a tool for obtaining knowledge.

Michael

In the technical literature an argument is -valid- if the conclusion follows from the premises, be they true or not. An argument is -sound- if it is valid and there premises are true.

If you can show a implies b you still cannot conclude b unless a is true. So arguments that start from true premises have a preferred status.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

From the horse's mouth. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, "Concepts of Consciousness," p. 35-36:

A special sub-category of concepts pertaining to the products of consciousness, is reserved for concepts of method. Concepts of method designate systematic courses of action devised by men for the purpose of achieving certain goals. The course of action may be purely psychological (such as a method of using one's consciousness) or it may involve a combination of psychological and physical actions (such as a method of drilling for oil), according to the goal to be achieved.

Concepts of method are formed by retaining the distinguishing characteristics of the purposive course of action and of its goal, while omitting the particular measurements of both.

For instance, the fundamental concept of method, the one on which all the others depend, is logic. The distinguishing characteristic of logic (the art of non-contradictory identification) indicates the nature of the actions (actions of consciousness required to achieve a correct identification) and their goal (knowledge)—while omitting the length, complexity or specific steps of the process of logical inference, as well as the nature of the particular cognitive problem involved in any given instance of using logic.

Concepts of method represent a large part of man's conceptual equipment. Epistemology is a science devoted to the discovery of the proper methods of acquiring and validating knowledge.

I understand "proper methods of acquiring and validating knowledge" to mean "connected to reality," not simply "to observe rules." If logic is not to be used to validate knowledge, then what good is it? What is its goal (purpose)?

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

I understand "proper methods of acquiring and validating knowledge" to mean "connected to reality," not simply "to observe rules." If logic is not to be used to validate knowledge, then what good is it? What is its goal (purpose)?

Michael

To infer true conclusions from true premises by valid arguments. In science, the premises are validated by experiment, not logic. To find out if you have a ten dollar bill in you wallet, you don't argue. You look.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited September 16, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Here is more. Peikoff makes a description that sounds an awful lot like most of the arguments I have read in these discussions about logic. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand, "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," by Leonard Peikoff, pp. 93-94:

Now we reach the climax: the characteristically twentieth-century explanation of the foregoing differences. It is: Analytic propositions provide no information about reality, they do not describe facts, they are "non-ontological" (i.e., do not pertain to reality). Analytic truths, it is held, are created and sustained by men's arbitrary decision to use words (or concepts) in a certain fashion, they merely record the implications of linguistic (or conceptual) conventions. This, it is claimed, is what accounts for the characteristics of analytic truths. They are non-empirical—because they say nothing about the world of experience. No fact can ever cast doubt upon them, they are immune from future correction—because they are immune from reality. They are necessary—because men make them so.

"The propositions of logic," said Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, "all say the same thing: that is, nothing." "The principles of logic and mathematics," said A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic, "are true universally simply because we never allow them to be anything else."

Synthetic propositions, on the other hand, are factual—and for this, man pays a price. The price is that they are contingent, uncertain and unprovable.

The theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy presents men with the following choice: If your statement is proved, it says nothing about that which exists; if it is about existents, it cannot be proved. If it is demonstrated by logical argument, it represents a subjective convention; if it asserts a fact, logic cannot establish it. If you validate it by an appeal to the meanings of your concepts, then it is cut off from reality; if you validate it by an appeal to your percepts, then you cannot be certain of it.

That's about it in a nutshell.

Michael

[Rodney]

Michael,

The Peikoff example doesn't carry much weight with me (merely because it seems irrelevant to this). But the first one does; let me mull it over.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Rodney,

I did not include the Peikoff example as an explanation of logic. I was roaming on the CDROM and this thing described the essence of the arguments that have been occurring recently so well that I decided to haul it out and show it. It's merely for the descriptive purpose of showing some differences between the sides.

Michael

[Rodney]

Oh. Anyway, I've got my thoughts together and will try to find time to write them out tomorrrow.

EDIT: Sorry about the delay. Soon I hope.

Edited September 18, 2007 by ashleyparkerangel

[tjohnson]

That's about it in a nutshell.

Michael

I agree with the nutshell except I would reword it like this; Analytic<=>Mathematics, Synthetic<=>Everything else. I think Einstein said something along the lines of this - insofar as mathematics applies to nature it is inexact and insofar as it is exact it does not apply to nature.

Edited September 16, 2007 by general semanticist

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

GS,

I did not add the final comment that Objectivism rejects the dichotomy.

Michael

[tjohnson]

GS,

I did not add the final comment that Objectivism rejects the dichotomy.

Michael

That's unfortunate

[Rodney]

As promised, I’ll present my thoughts on Ayn Rand’s definition of logic, and why she chose it, as against the conventional definition offered by the other posters. And I’ll restrict myself to that, due to time constraints (currently I am editing four university textbooks).

(Maybe one day, when I am retired, as many denizens of Objectivist boards seem to be, I will be able to fully participate. I apologize if anyone has already made these points in this long thread or elsewhere.)

To repeat, the conventional definition is very proper and correct: logic is the study of the principles of valid inference (or, maybe more precisely, deduction), quite apart from the truth or falsity of premises and conclusions. When I first heard Ayn Rand’s definition, I myself was puzzled about why she did not define logic as “The art of noncontradictory statement.” (Also, later I wondered why she used the word art rather than science or study, but more on that presently.) I concluded—as I said earlier here—that she wished to emphasize the purpose and use of logic. That is, she saw no point in using reason apart from the goal of obtaining knowledge.

I think that is basically what MSK was saying, though his casual, folksy style at times makes it hard to grasp his point. (On the other hand, to give the Daniel his due, Barnes is usually crystal-clear, as are some of the others.) However, thinking about it some more, I see other factors in Rand’s definition.

If one’s conclusions are to be true, all of one’s premises have to be also—at least towards the end of the reasoning chain. But there are many, many alternative paths to this goal, and they necessarily involve dealing with false premises, using reductio ad absurdum, dead ends, etc. That is why we need the science or study of logic as the term is popularly and professionally understood. This field is a universe unto itself, and it does not have to take cognizance of any outside truth in the premises it juggles. False and arbitrary premises and false conclusions do not matter, because the discipline assumes we are starting from a stance of ignorance and confusion; it cannot be in the position of dictating in advance what we must think about the subject matter to which we want to apply it.

If one believed that proper definitions are to be arrived at by consulting dictionaries and encyclopedias (and some here do believe it), that would be all there is to say on the topic. However, as Ayn Rand maintained, definitions must be revised and new concepts must be formed as our knowledge increases. (According to my own thinking, these two processes may actually be combined in what I would call development of a concept. I have more to say on this in the Lulu.com essay “Understanding Imaginaries Through Hidden Numbers.”) Thus, in her definition of logic, Ayn Rand formed a wider, more fundamental concept of it, which related to the conventional one without contradicting it.

The higher complexities of the science of logic in the conventional sense are not normally needed in human life or even in science. Usually the logical chains are short and immediately appreciable. We don’t see most scientists, in their investigations, painstakingly listing the premises they have established or wish to assess, then applying logical formulas or symbols to get their results or judge them (mathematics might be one of the exceptions to this). They simply observe reality and use reason. What scientists need, and what daily human life needs, is a manner of thought whereby observations of reality can coalesce into a sense of seeing, so that the truth “pops into view.” What they need is a process directly analogous to what happens when we look at our hand in front of us: a gathering of visual information and integration of it into a conscious state whereby we automatically know the hand exists—as opposed to having an open-to-disproof theory that it is there.

According to Ayn Rand, man is aware of reality, and the essential nature of awareness is not successive falsification and alteration, but seeing. Now, in many respects, but not all, science traffics in conjectures, hypotheses, theories, but at the root it depends on observation, which is the use of the faculty of sight. And in daily human life, awareness in this sense heavily predominates, the underlying, simple logic having largely been made automatic. For example, if you know your brother is in his two-room apartment, and do not see him in the first room, you do not reason, “He must therefore be in the second”; you instantly know it. It is not a conjecture, hypothesis, or theory; it is awareness. (The abstract human possibility of error has no effect on this certainty. And in truth, myriad other facts in your experience of the situation, held together by logic, are contributing to your ruling-out of this possibility in the situation before you. Moreover, this possibility cannot extend to all of human knowledge. In this, as in a few other issues, Ayn Rand said all that will ever need to be said: that it logically implies man is not conscious. Therefore, to borrow an expression my professor of Logic used at the start of his course, “It is bound to be false.”)

For these reasons, Ayn Rand did not want to describe logic as “the study of the principles of valid inference,” even though as a detailed, scientific discipline, that is what the term means. That definition puts the focus on the possibility of error in logical chains, which is a special danger with long chains and deserves to be studied independently. (She approved Leonard Peikoff’s taped lecture courses on such logic, which incidentally I have listened to.) Rather, she wanted to characterize logic at its interface with reality and with human life.

This is why she used the word “identification” rather than “statement.” The activity of being logical involves as its end result the construction of a web of identifications—ones that might be translated into statements that are true—a web that constitutes our sense that we are actually seeing the world instead of inquiring into it.

And this is also why she used the word “art” rather than “science”—she was directing her attention to the activity of being logical as a fundamental human mode of being aware. Consider the alternative terms she might have used. “Practice” and “habit” have the wrong connotations. “Science” takes us back to the formal, detailed, systematic sense. Keep in mind also that she was writing a novel, and wanted to use vivid, colorful language. As a word that satisfies these needs, while also conveying a sense that using logic can be a sophisticated process, even when all the chains are short and clear, “art” does the job.

Edited September 20, 2007 by ashleyparkerangel

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Here is a cute talk I came across on You Tube by Ken Wilber on the three strands of epistemology (in science), which he ends with Popper. In all of the discussions I have had about Popper, it is the first two strands that have been unclear to me from Popper admirers, yet according to Wilber, the third strand, Popper's, is dependent on the first two: injunction and apprehension. His comments on applying these three to consciousness and spirituality is very interesting. I am still mulling that over.

Here is the blurb from the video:

The three strands of deep science—injunction, apprehension, confirmation—give us a reliable methodology for learning about both the world without and the world within. Want to know what the moons of Jupiter look like? Look through a telescope. Want to know what satori is? Sit down and count your breaths. While you're at it, have a couple friends do the same thing, and then compare notes. After all, if your experience of satori involves becoming one with a jelly donut, you, um, might want to see if that happened to anyone else...

I admit the jelly donut thing in the blurb is not as intellectually appetizing as it is physically.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

I admit the jelly donut thing in the blurb is not as intellectually appetizing as it is physically.

Michael

This Zen mystic goes to the Subway ™ Sandwich Shop and asks the counter man to make him one with everything.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Selene]

Here is the Popper reference that you provided to Mr. Personality...2007