Trying to elucidate Rand's attributes


Kallikanzarid

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So in the context of this thread on attributes, would you say they are epistemologic or of ideas related to reality? (For clarity's sake in this context)

I don't see any opposition between epistemologic and 'ideas related to reality'.

After all, epistemology deals with issues of knowledge, and knowledge is connected to reality.

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Xray, if you posit that there is a reality independent of our senses, then it makes sense to ask questions about it separately from the questions about what we observe. Metaphysics is usually about trying to answer these questions. If there is no way to answer these questions, it's fair to ask whether metaphysics is meaningful at all.

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So in the context of this thread on attributes, would you say they are epistemologic or of ideas related to reality? (For clarity's sake in this context)

I don't see any opposition between epistemologic and 'ideas related to reality'.

After all, epistemology deals with issues of knowledge, and knowledge is connected to reality.

In the context of this thread I was arguing that attributes are epistemologic , not metaphysic. And that is why I do not think the phrase 'ideas related to reality' adds any clarity in this context.

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Alexei, I think tmj put it over well, and for further research Rand's 'Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology' is worth your time.

(I am far from a true-blue scholar like Stephen, so must refer you there.)

Also, though you don't think much of Peikoff on "modern philosophy", he has an essay in ItOE - 'The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy', which I suspect is relevant to your concerns. It is a rather, um - labored - work, in my opinion (perhaps my excuse for not understanding its full import for years) maybe as a result of Rand peering over LP's shoulder and criticising it until she found it acceptable - as I gather. Which could put anyone off their stroke, certainly. ;)

I really don't want to invest time and money into this book. I'll be satisfied with a relevant quote.

>>>I'm interested in your "trivial" remark earlier. The inductive may appear "trivial", it strikes me.

Do you hold much store in induction, that pillar of O'ist epistemology?

I assume you mean the remark on how your version of metaphysics is trivial. What I meant is that if you claim that "existence is identity", but neglect to state precisely what identity is, then what you're saying is meaningless, you're doing nothing more than introducing a synonym into your vocabulary. And I don't see how induction comes into play here: induction is a method of acquiring knowledge, I can't see how you can tie it to metaphysics.

"An axiomatic concept is the identification of a primary fact of reality, which is implicit in all facts and in all knowledge. It is perceived or experienced directly, but grasped conceptually. The first and primary axiomatic concepts are "existence", "identity" and "consciousness". [AR: Axiomatic Concepts]

"When concepts are integrated into a wider concept, they serve as units and are treated *epistemologically* as if each were a single (mental) concrete - always remembering that *metaphysically* (i.e., in reality) each unit stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind. When concepts are integrated into a wider one, the new concept includes *all* the characteristics of its constituent units; but their distinguishing characteristics are regarded as omitted measurements..." [AR: Abstraction from Abstractions]

==========

"...philosophy has been torn by the conflict between the rationalists and the empiricists. The former stress the role of logic in man's acquistion of knowledge, while minimizing the role of experience [i.e. observation, induction]; the latter claim that experience is the source of man's knowledge, while minimizing the role of logic. This split...is institutionalized in the theory of the anaytic-synthetic dichotomy."

"[Rather] man's knowledge is not acquired by logic apart from experience or by experience apart from logic, but *by the application of logic to experience.*"

[...]

"In one sense no truths are "analytic". No proposition can be validated merely by "conceptual analysis"; the content of the concept-i.e., the characteristics of the existents it integrates- must be discovered and validated by observation, before any "analysis" is possible. In another sense,all truths are "analytic". When some characteristic of an entity HAS been discovered, the proposition will be seen to be "logically true..." "In either case, the analytic-logical-tautological vs. synthetic-factual dichotomy collapses."

(Necessity and Contingency)

"The theory of the analytic-synthetic dichotomy has its roots in two types of error: one epistemological, the other metaphysical. The epistemological...is an incorrect view of the nature of concepts. The metaphysical error is: the dichotomy between necessary and contingent facts."

[...]

"Metaphysically, all facts are inherent in the identities of the entities that exist; i.e., all facts are "necessary". In this sense, to be IS to be "necessary". The concept of "necessity" in a metaphysical context, is superfluous.

[...]

Contemporary advocates of the theory of"contingent facts" hold, in essence, the same metaphysics. [ As the 'supernaturalists']

[...]

A major source of confusion...is the failure to distinguish *metaphysical* facts from *man-made* facts ..."

[LP:The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy]

======================

Alexei, I've cast the net wide with excerpts, more to whet your appetite, than to answer specific queries.

If ItOE still doesn't interest you, not much else I can add.

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whYNOT, so Rand holds "identity" to be something self-evident and not requiring explanation? I beg to differ! It looks more like a vague hand-waving tool than a legitimate concept.

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whYNOT, so Rand holds "identity" to be something self-evident and not requiring explanation? I beg to differ! It looks more like a vague hand-waving tool than a legitimate concept.

K.,

The hallmark of an axiomatic concept in the Randian system is that you have to use it to be able to deny it, thereby you automatically validate it.

Thus, to deny existence, you have to exist. To deny identity, you have to talk about something that has an identity--and you yourself have to have one. To deny consciousness, you have to be conscious.

Those axiomatic concepts (existence, identity and consciousness) are the big three, but not the only ones.

An axiomatic concept cannot be proven. On the contrary, it is the fundamental standard you use to prove everything else. We're talking metaphysics and epistemology here, not deductive propositional logic. In effect, they underly deductive propositional logic and connect it to reality. (Induction, too.)

Rand's way of defining an axiomatic concept is by what she calls an "ostensive" process, which mostly means pointing and saying something like, "That is what I mean." For the axiomatic concept of existence, she not only pointed, she swirled her arm all around.

(Although this relies on sight, I believe the pointing was indicative of the process, not limiting on it. In other words, an ostensive definition happens when you successfully indicate something you detect by one or more of the senses. To my knowledge, Rand never said anything about using the other senses for ostensive definitions in the manner I just did, but I believe it is implicit in her approach.)

I can dig up quotes if you like, but that is the gist of it.

Michael

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K.,

The hallmark of an axiomatic concept in the Randian system is that you have to use it to be able to deny it, thereby you automatically validate it.

Thus, to deny existence, you have to exist. To deny identity, you have to talk about something that has an identity--and you yourself have to have one. To deny consciousness, you have to be conscious.

Those axiomatic concepts (existence, identity and consciousness) are the big three, but not the only ones.

An axiomatic concept cannot be proven. On the contrary, it is the fundamental standard you use to prove everything else. We're talking metaphysics and epistemology here, not deductive propositional logic. In effect, they underly deductive propositional logic and connect it to reality. (Induction, too.)

Rand's way of defining an axiomatic concept is by what she calls an "ostensive" process, which mostly means pointing and saying something like, "That is what I mean." For the axiomatic concept of existence, she not only pointed, she swirled her arm all around.

(Although this relies on sight, I believe the pointing was indicative of the process, not limiting on it. In other words, an ostensive definition happens when you successfully indicate something you detect by one or more of the senses. To my knowledge, Rand never said anything about using the other senses for ostensive definitions in the manner I just did, but I believe it is implicit in her approach.)

I can dig up quotes if you like, but that is the gist of it.

Michael

MSK,

I was responsible for sending Alexei here, just for the record. Send all blame this way.

I hate to do this but I must object slightly to "The hallmark of an axiomatic concept in the Randian system is that you have to use it to be able to deny it, thereby you automatically validate it."

On the basis of the quoted statement you then go on to say that "Those axiomatic concepts (existence, identity and consciousness) are the big three, but not the only ones."

You're confusing two different ways in which "axiom" is used. I know of three different meanings: 1 - "a statement unquestioned during analysis," 2 - "a statement which is self-refuting to deny," 3 - "a logically irreducible fact which is implicitly assumed by every possible claim to knowledge."

You're conflating Type 2 Axioms (self-refuting denial) with Type 3 Axioms.

Yes, there are more than three Type 2 Axioms. Mises' Axiom Of Human Action, the existence of time, etc. are both Type 2 Axiomatic since denying them will validate them (it takes a span of time to say "time does not exist," denying that individuals act teleologically requires that you act with the aim of denying the axiom that individuals act to achieve aims, etc.).

But Rand was pretty consistent on using "Axiom" to refer to Type 3 Axioms. Whilst these DO pass the self-refuting denial test (and thus you can say they're a subcategory of Type 2 Axioms), their essential characteristic is that they are the assumptions of any possible claim to knowledge. Claiming to know Fact X about Entity Y presupposes that Entity Y exists (existence), that it has a specific nature of which X is true (identity), and that the person making the claim is capable of observing/perceiving Entity Y (consciousness).

I've noticed that often this conflation between Type 2 and Type 3 Axioms occurs in libertarian circles. This is probably due to the prevalance of the self-refuting denial test amongst Misesian-Rothbardians, as well as the fact that Rand herself used the self-refuting denial test to validate her Axioms as true. But still, the point is that self-refuting-denial is a lower threshold compared to presupposition-of-any-claim-to-knowledge.

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Andrew,

I don't see where I confused anything and I don't see where the disagreement is.

I was giving the way Rand uses axiomatic concepts and you said that is the way Rand uses axiomatic concepts, yet I am confusing it.

Sorry, but that sounds silly to me.

:smile:

Michael

MSK,

I think you misread me. I apologize for any lack of clarity above.

Basically, Rand's understanding of an "axiom" is a logically irreducible concept... something which all claims to knowledge inevitably presuppose. You can't logically prove them, since logic assumes the axioms.

You confuse Rand's narrow use of "axiom" with a wider use of the term... i.e. a concept which is self-refuting to deny.

Rand DID argue that the axioms she postulated were self-refuting to deny, true, but just because she accepted that a characteristic of her axioms was that the denial of them was self-refuting, that doesn't mean she argued the essential characteristic of her axioms was that they were self-refuting.

Let's take, for example, Mises' Axiom Of Human Action. It is self-refuting to deny it, since to deny it requires you act teleologically (i.e. act with the aim of denying it).

But whilst the Axiom of Human Action is self-refuting to deny, it isn't logically irreducible. It presupposes the existence of human beings, it presupposes that these human beings have a specific nature, and it presupposes that we have a means by which we ascertain what that specific nature is (Existence, Identity, Consciousness).

So, in short, Rand's three metaphysical axioms are distinguished by the fact they're the unavoidable preconditions of any claim to knowledge. A fact which is self-refuting to deny isn't necessarily a logically irreducible fact.

If this doesn't clarify, maybe I should do a Venn Diagram?

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studiodekadent, since you've showed up, I'd like to continue our discussion of free will vs. determinism, even though it's off topic here. I think I've found exactly the kind of argument that captures my problem with Randian free will. From Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic:

"We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition [lacking any literal significance]."

Since there is no prediction to be made from either determinism or free will hypotheses, it's only fair to consider them pseudo-propositions in this sense.

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Andrew,

I don't need a Venn diagram and I still don't see where I confused anything.

You appear passionately intent on splitting some kind of hair on a dog that just ain't barking.

Sorry, but I don't want to waste my time on analyzing the minutia of labels you like or dislike.

Besides, I use validate to mean confirm by observing, to note correspondence between idea and reality. I believe Rand did, too, at least some of the time (I would have to look it up, but probably all of the time). And I don't recall her ever referring to Mises to provide the grounds for her axioms.

There is no such thing as valid epistemology divorced from reality, i.e., self-contained logic--contained only inside the skull, in Rand's conception.

To be valid in Rand's system, a concept has to ultimately be able to boil down to the senses--which connect the human mind to outside reality. Concepts are made ("integrated") from percepts which are made from sensations. And an axiomatic concept is just that--a concept. I.e., it boils down to the senses. You can't deny a concept by using the same one as your method. You can't deny a concept based on senses by using your senses. This is pure Rand.

Agree or disagree, this is what she held.

I don't see what the problem is and there are oodles of quotes in the Objectivist literature to back up what I said. If you don't like it because Mises said this or that, or you frame axiom by some hair-splitting proposition or other, or whatever, that's fine with me.

I wrote this: "An axiomatic concept cannot be proven. On the contrary, it is the fundamental standard you use to prove everything else. We're talking metaphysics and epistemology here, not deductive propositional logic. In effect, they underly deductive propositional logic and connect it to reality. (Induction, too.)"

By way of explaining my "confusion" to me, you wrote this: "Basically, Rand's understanding of an "axiom" is a logically irreducible concept... something which all claims to knowledge inevitably presuppose. You can't logically prove them, since logic assumes the axioms."

They mean the same thing!

Dayaamm!

They only mean something different if your meaning is you divorce epistemology from reality (i.e., from sensory input), and, I might be mistaken, but I don't believe you believe that.

Michael

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MSK,

It is probably me not explaining myself very well here. I apologize.

Also, I'm not trying to say "Mises is better than Rand" or anything. Remember that I disagree with Mises on epistemology.

What I am saying is that Rand's three axioms, whilst they all pass the self-refuting-denial test, aren't the ONLY propositions which pass the self-refuting-denial test. I think we both agree here.

So, what separates Rand's three axioms from the other propositions which pass the self-refuting-denial test? Logical irreducibility. Rand's axioms ARE irreducible, but other things which pass the self-refuting-denial test (for example, the axiom of human action, or the existence of time) are NOT irreducible. They presuppose Rand's axioms.

This is why Rand's axioms are the ONLY axiomatic concepts within Objectivism.

That is all I am saying.

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This is why Rand's axioms are the ONLY axiomatic concepts within Objectivism.

That is all I am saying.

Andrew,

sigh...

From ITOE, Chapter 6 - "Axiomatic Concepts":

The first and primary axiomatic concepts are "existence," "identity" (which is a corollary of "existence") and "consciousness." One can study what exists and how consciousness functions; but one cannot analyze (or "prove") existence as such, or consciousness as such. These are irreducible primaries. (An attempt to "prove" them is self-contradictory: it is an attempt to "prove" existence by means of nonexistence, and consciousness by means of unconsciousness.)

I don't know how you translate "first and primary" into ONLY, but there it is.

Michael

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Andrew,

Rather than present terms other than the big three that are axiomatic concepts in Objectivism, terms that Rand did not explicitly designate as axiomatic concepts, and explain why they are axiomatic concepts (like, say, "existent"), I tried to find an explicit statement by Rand designating one. And I did find such a statement. (There are probably more, but I stopped looking after I found this one.)

It's in the workshop portion of ITOE (p. 252):

The notion of "self" is an axiomatic concept; it's implicit in the concept of "consciousness"; it can't be separated from it.

It would be an interesting project to hammer together Rand's criteria for axiomatic concepts and come up with a list of some of those that follow the first three.

Michael

(EDIT: On a personal note, if there is that little guy in your brain freaking out, going, "Oh my God, I'm wrong, I'm wrong! How can that be? There has to be some mistake! I have to find something that shows...! I don't know...! How can I possibly face this and survive? Woe is me! Woe is me!" and blah blah blah, just shoot him. Go ahead. Shoot him. Shoot him dead. :smile:

You are way more valuable than what he wants. That's from me and I'm sure many around here feel the same about you.

I listened to that little sucker for years and he is the No. 1 reason that held me back when I should have known better. It's OK to get shit wrong at times. I still do and I probably will until I die, But that little sucker always tries to rise like Lazarus. Then I have to shoot him again. It took years, but at least I'm starting to get some pleasure out of it. :smile:.)

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whYNOT, so Rand holds "identity" to be something self-evident and not requiring explanation? I beg to differ! It looks more like a vague hand-waving tool than a legitimate concept.

Yes, "hand-waving" - or finger-pointing, as MSK remarks. The rest you've seen in the discussion above, roughly that you had to have existence, identity and consciousness to make the query you made. Trying to refute them is to try to refute yourself.

Objectivism holds there is no split between the a priori proposition(deductively by way of unit-definition, but independent of experience) - and the a posteriori (inductively through facts of experience, but separated from logic). It's instead an epistemic two-way street, with each reinforcing the other, way I see it.

"Identity", as axiomatic concept, derives in each individual from an aggregated intimacy with the facts of experience, so is a posteriori, synthetic - and "self-evident" (I think) - while the Law of Identity subsumes all concrete, analytic, a priori truths.

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> Yes, "hand-waving" - or finger-pointing, as MSK remarks. The rest you've seen in the discussion above, roughly that you had to have existence, identity and consciousness to make the query you made. Trying to refute them is to try to refute yourself.

It's a bold statement, considering how vague this "identity" is.

> while the Law of Identity subsumes all concrete, analytic, a priori truths.

Law of identity, as it is commonly formulated (A = A for any symbol A) is not nearly enough to develop non-trivial formal theories. And since analytic truths are tautologies which reflect the way we're using language, it's hard to see how metaphysics is related to them at all.

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i see how in mathematics , a specialized system, terms are logically consistent, but philosophically the analogy breaks down, mainly because the reasoning that leads to the consistentness of the specialized system is in fact dependent on the consistentcy of the former

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... it's hard to see how metaphysics is related to them at all.

K.

Sensory input and integrating (or abstracting) that.

This is the missing part in your "formal theories."

You are considering the mind's system (i.e., "formal theories") as separate from reality--separate from observing reality, existing in some kind of imaginary realm of formal rules and only there is where everything has to work, be proven, validated, etc.

To Rand, the mind exists within reality.

I've noticed this is hard to understand when a person has had a classical logic approach grilled into him.

Agree or disagree, OK. But blaming Rand's system for not working within a system that is incomplete according to her is... I don't know what to call it... futile?... waste of time?...

It's like sailing with half a ship, only the part above water, and wondering why it keeps sinking, but looking at others sailing with the full ship, not seeing the part under water, and wondering what that is all about.

Agree or disagree with Rand, her system does not treat the mind disassociated from the rest of reality. Tautology, or trivial theory, as a form of folly ("it tells us nothing about reality") does not really apply when looking from her perspective. Existing while imagining nonexistence is a form of folly to her. Having identity and questioning the law of identity is folly to her. You've cut off half the system that way.

This is not because of the logical rules--this is because of observation. Logic derives from the mind plus reality (through sensory input) to her, not just the mind alone. Ditto for math.

I believe the trick is to try to look from her perspective, then formulate a rebuttal if you disagree. At least you will be talking about the correct thing.

Michael

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Michael,

> You are considering the mind's system (i.e., "formal theories") as separate from reality--separate from observing reality, existing in some kind of imaginary realm of formal rules and only there is where everything has to work, be proven, validated, etc.

They exist as languages. The reason why we need formal languages is because informal ones often lead us to make mistakes.

> To Rand, the mind exists within reality.

I did not claim otherwise.

> Tautology as a form of folly ("it tells us nothing about reality") does not really apply when looking from her perspective.

I agree that tautologies are useful (I do love math).

> Existing while imagining nonexistence is a form of folly to her.

I'd like to discuss this in detail. I don't think we have basis to assert existence as something more than just a tool of reasoning about our perception. Rand's argument "Being aware is being aware of something" seems like an abuse of grammar to me, because she takes a common pattern of English language (something as a placeholder for an object) and then implies that if there is a placeholder, clearly there must be an object. Yet if you apply Ayer's weak verification criterion, you'll see that Rand's assertion doesn't have literal significance.

> Having identity and questioning the law of identity is folly to her.

This "identity" being the vaguest thing ever, I don't think there is much meaning in this claim. Law of identity is a simple mathematical convention which reflects our desire to use symbols consistently. Rand's "identity"... I don't know what the hell it is! Since the meaning of the word "identity" is so radically different in two parts of the sentence, I doubt that it's meaningful. It looks like a hand-waving trick that I complained about earlier.

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> Yes, "hand-waving" - or finger-pointing, as MSK remarks. The rest you've seen in the discussion above, roughly that you had to have existence, identity and consciousness to make the query you made. Trying to refute them is to try to refute yourself.

It's a bold statement, considering how vague this "identity" is.

> while the Law of Identity subsumes all concrete, analytic, a priori truths.

Law of identity, as it is commonly formulated (A = A for any symbol A) is not nearly enough to develop non-trivial formal theories. And since analytic truths are tautologies which reflect the way we're using language, it's hard to see how metaphysics is related to them at all.

To complete the circle Michael sketches about the full system of apprehending reality, one should add here that in Objectivism (well, in reality, to be accurate) everything begins and ends with the individual - his mind, his knowledge. Importantly, his certainty.

Knowledge, then, is not a floating abstraction approached by formal rules, or held 'collectively' - somehow (which to Rand was the philosophy of skepticism): It's deeply personal.

The epistemology provides the bridge between the metaphysics and the ethics.

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