Anarcho-Capitalism: A Branden ‘Blast from the Past’

[Bosco]

But since Ghs's question addresses a crucial issue (crime in an anarchistically structured group), venturing off the pages of the novel would lead me to ask him back how he thinks crimes are to be dealt with in an anarchist society.

Angela:

Good. I will take that as positive movement towards answering a key issue in terms of how an anarchistic society/mineanarchistic society could resolve the murder of one citizen by another citizen.

Adam

This concerns the debate over punishment vs restitution, which is not directly relevant to the issue of anarchism vs minarchism. How should an ideal Randian gvt deal with murder?

[Dennis Hardin]

Rand established the purity standard, especially in her arguments against compromises in matters of principle. Libertarian anarchists have taken her seriously in this regard; her minarchists followers have not.

If an O'ist and theoretical defender of limited government is willing to concede that no legitimate government has ever existed in fact and that no legitimate government is ever likely to exist, then we don't really have much of practical value to argue about. But this is not what typically happens. Instead, the O'ist makes an implicit and illicit jump from an ideal Randian government to the current U.S. government, suggesting that his theoretical justification for limited government somehow applies to the U.S. govenment.

How can this be done? Blank out, as Rand would say.

Ghs

There are several errors involved here. The first is the failure to recognize that the purpose of rights is to make possible the kind of actions required for human existence. Rights are corollaries of ethics applied to a social context. The most fundamental right is a man’s right to self-preservation. To achieve the goal of a human existence in this world, rights must embrace the facts of what this entails in practical reality.

To achieve the goal of enabling men to lead a proper human life, our approach to protecting rights must embrace reality—i.e., our theory must reflect the need for a mechanism to enable real human beings to live together in harmony.

To achieve any practical goal, we must validate our ideas through induction. We cannot claim that a conclusion is valid simply because it has been deduced from other ideas. We must, first and foremost, confirm that our conclusion corresponds to reality. We cannot hold our ideas as if they were forms of “purity” floating in some separate realm of “perfection” above reality.

You begin with a principle torn from its context of enabling men to lead a proper human life—“the non-initiation of force.” Then you leap to the conclusion that government can never be "legitimate" because it can never claim universal consent, and therefore may itself have to initiate force to invoke its monopoly on force. (One could say exactly the same thing about any private defense agency, of course.) You deduce your conclusion from a prior idea while totally ignoring the real world in which we must live.

Your Platonic “ideal of purity and perfection” is utterly divorced from reality, an abstraction drawn from non-existence as a standard for judging existence.

This is Platonism and rationalism. It is not Objectivism.

[George H. Smith]

Rand established the purity standard, especially in her arguments against compromises in matters of principle. Libertarian anarchists have taken her seriously in this regard; her minarchists followers have not.

If an O'ist and theoretical defender of limited government is willing to concede that no legitimate government has ever existed in fact and that no legitimate government is ever likely to exist, then we don't really have much of practical value to argue about. But this is not what typically happens. Instead, the O'ist makes an implicit and illicit jump from an ideal Randian government to the current U.S. government, suggesting that his theoretical justification for limited government somehow applies to the U.S. govenment.

How can this be done? Blank out, as Rand would say.

Ghs

There are several errors involved here. The first is the failure to recognize that the purpose of rights is to make possible the kind of actions required for human existence. Rights are corollaries of ethics applied to a social context. The most fundamental right is a man’s right to self-preservation. To achieve the goal of a human existence in this world, rights must embrace the facts of what this entails in practical reality.

I've read Rand on this topic as many times as you have, probably more. You don't need to summarize her ideas here, since I agree with them.

To achieve the goal of enabling men to lead a proper human life, our approach to protecting rights must embrace reality—i.e., our theory must reflect the need for a mechanism to enable real human beings to live together in harmony.

I agree, and that's why I am an anarchist. People should be able to delegate their right of self-preservation to an agency of their own choosing, so long as that agency respects objective law and is truly an agency devoted to the defense of its customers. To prevent them from doing so by force, as you wish to do, and to compel them to deal exclusively with an agency that you happen to prefer, does not qualify as living "together in harmony." Rather, it is called: Do as I command you to do, even you don't violate anyone's rights, or I will initiate force against you.

To achieve any practical goal, we must validate our ideas through induction. We cannot claim that a conclusion is valid simply because it has been deduced from other ideas. We must, first and foremost, confirm that our conclusion corresponds to reality. We cannot hold our ideas as if they were forms of “purity” floating in some separate realm of “perfection” above reality.

Excellent point. We should therefore examine governments as they have actually existed throughout history and see if one -- even one -- has ever met Rand's basic criteria for a "proper" government. This inductive process will teach us that all governments have initiated force against subjects and citizens. This inescapable inductive conclusion might then motivate you to dig a little deeper than Randian generalities and ask why.

You begin with a principle torn from its context of enabling men to lead a proper human life—“the non-initiation of force.” Then you leap to the conclusion that government can never be "legitimate" because it can never claim universal consent, and therefore may itself have to initiate force to invoke its monopoly on force. (One could say exactly the same thing about any private defense agency, of course.) You deduce your conclusion from a prior idea while totally ignoring the real world in which we must live.

Your Platonic “ideal of purity and perfection” is utterly divorced from reality, an abstraction drawn from non-existence as a standard for judging existence.

This is Platonism and rationalism. It is not Objectivism.

Again, you seem to have forgotten the initial premise that NB laid down in your headline post. NB said:

Branden: This, of course, is their favorite argument and their stock argument. In briefest essentials, I would answer as follows. Let's imagine, to make it very simple, that we--this group in this room tonight-- form a society and agree on the principles to be operative in the society in a political sense. We agree upon a constitution and a government is created for the purpose of carrying out the principles laid down in this constitution

NB deals with the problem of consent by assuming that we have unanimous consent at the time a government is formed. You have never offered any other alternative. So drop the juvenile crap about Platonism and try to focus on the problem at hand.

Lastly, I will call attention to the fact that you have failed to give any reasons as to why we should regard the current U.S. government as legitimate. I assume that you would not regard the current governments of Iran and many other countries as legitimate, so you must have some standards by which you assess such matters. If you happen to know what your standards are, please share them with the rest of us. I'm afraid that shallow polemics against purity, perfection, and Platonism won't do. Well, gee, the governments of Iran and North Korea are not perfect, but only a Platonist would demand perfection!

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I agree, and that's why I am an anarchist. People should be able to delegate their right of self-preservation to an agency of their own choosing, so long as that agency respects objective law and is truly an agency devoted to the defense of its customers. To prevent them from doing so by force, as you wish to do, and to compel them to deal exclusively with an agency that you happen to prefer, does not qualify as living "together in harmony." Rather, it is called: Do as I command you to do, even you don't violate anyone's rights, or I will initiate force against you.

Where does this "objective law" reside? What if the "agency" doesn't respect it? Now we have law, police, courts (and prisons) basically under one roof. When your agency comes knocking on my door investigating a crime wanting to search my abode and meets my agency where is its warrant? Who issued it? No warrant, then no law, then my agency opens fire when your agency tries to force its way in. Since I have the right to defend myself I might also be one of the shooters. The need for law and a uniform set of rules is why government has its monoploy but that monooly is the law not its derivative functions and aspects. There can private security and prisons and courts even police all competing. Competing regarding law, though, is for political philosophers competing for codification by legislation. The anarchist must be reduced to everyone, if not his tribal group, with his own competing idea of what is "objective law" and that competition would be with various weapons making and maintaining space for his or its existence.

--Brant

problems, problems--everywhere, problems--everybody has them and some are optional

[George H. Smith]

I agree, and that's why I am an anarchist. People should be able to delegate their right of self-preservation to an agency of their own choosing, so long as that agency respects objective law and is truly an agency devoted to the defense of its customers. To prevent them from doing so by force, as you wish to do, and to compel them to deal exclusively with an agency that you happen to prefer, does not qualify as living "together in harmony." Rather, it is called: Do as I command you to do, even you don't violate anyone's rights, or I will initiate force against you.

Where does this "objective law" reside? What if the "agency" doesn't respect it? Now we have law, police, courts (and prisons) basically under one roof. When your agency comes knocking on my door investigating a crime wanting to search my abode and meets my agency where is its warrant? Who issued it? No warrant, then no law, then my agency opens fire when your agency tries to force its way in. Since I have the right to defend myself I might also be one of the shooters. The need for law and a uniform set of rules is why government has its monoploy but that monooly is the law not its derivative functions and aspects. There can private security and prisons and courts even police all competing. Competing regarding law, though, is for political philosophers competing for codification by legislation. The anarchist must be reduced to everyone, if not his tribal group, with his own competing idea of what is "objective law" and that competition would be with various weapons making and maintaining space for his or its existence.

--Brant

problems, problems--everywhere, problems--everybody has them and some are optional

I would love to take a year off to wrote a book on these problems, and then another year to write volume two, but I don't have the time. And this is not really necessary, since a number of books have already been written by Rothbard, Barnett, etc.

In an earlier post I mentioned a debate I had with John Hospers in 1975. His key point was that we need a final arbiter, even if that final arbiter sometimes reaches unjust conclusions. This seems to be your position as well. But, to repeat, this doesn't mean that the final arbiter must the same arbiter in each and every case.

Do you have a problem with the federal system advocated by Jefferson and many other Founders? In that system, states were sovereign in certain areas, and laws varied from one state to the next. (They still do, e.g., some states have capital punishment and others don't.) There was no uniform system of law in this scheme. Do you have a problem with this?

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

I agree, and that's why I am an anarchist. People should be able to delegate their right of self-preservation to an agency of their own choosing, so long as that agency respects objective law and is truly an agency devoted to the defense of its customers. To prevent them from doing so by force, as you wish to do, and to compel them to deal exclusively with an agency that you happen to prefer, does not qualify as living "together in harmony." Rather, it is called: Do as I command you to do, even you don't violate anyone's rights, or I will initiate force against you.

Where does this "objective law" reside? What if the "agency" doesn't respect it? Now we have law, police, courts (and prisons) basically under one roof. When your agency comes knocking on my door investigating a crime wanting to search my abode and meets my agency where is its warrant? Who issued it? No warrant, then no law, then my agency opens fire when your agency tries to force its way in. Since I have the right to defend myself I might also be one of the shooters. The need for law and a uniform set of rules is why government has its monoploy but that monooly is the law not its derivative functions and aspects. There can private security and prisons and courts even police all competing. Competing regarding law, though, is for political philosophers competing for codification by legislation. The anarchist must be reduced to everyone, if not his tribal group, with his own competing idea of what is "objective law" and that competition would be with various weapons making and maintaining space for his or its existence.

--Brant

problems, problems--everywhere, problems--everybody has them and some are optional

I would love to take a year off to wrote a book on these problems, and then another year to write volume two, but I don't have the time. And this is not really necessary, since a number of books have already been written by Rothbard, Barnett, etc.

In an earlier post I mentioned a debate I had with John Hospers in 1975. His key point was that we need a final arbiter, even if that final arbiter sometimes reaches unjust conclusions. This seems to be your position as well. But, to repeat, this doesn't mean that the final arbiter must the same arbiter in each and every case.

Do you have a problem with the federal system advocated by Jefferson and many other Founders? In that system, states were sovereign in certain areas, and laws varied from one state to the next. (They still do, e.g., some states have capital punishment and others don't.) There was no uniform system of law in this scheme. Do you have a problem with this?

Ghs

Of course not, but those states were not in your state of anarchy but legal monopolies of law. To some extent we still have that today in state law and federal law.

--Brant

[Dglgmut]

Laws seem to work more as a warning than anything. The "law of the land" does not entail that the law will definitely be enforced. And with The Constitution, I think Jefferson had intended that if the government were to break the "laws" he helped to formulate, the people would simply be given fair warning that their government was deliberately engaging in unethical, uncivil acts.

It could also be a warning to the government, as in, "Follow these rules or be overthrown." That, though, is contingent on the ability of the people to organize.

What is the point of making a law that cannot be enforced? Are the laws really the issue, or is it the morality of the people?

[Brant Gaede]

Laws seem to work more as a warning than anything. The "law of the land" does not entail that the law will definitely be enforced. And with The Constitution, I think Jefferson had intended that if the government were to break the "laws" he helped to formulate, the people would simply be given fair warning that their government was deliberately engaging in unethical, uncivil acts.

It could also be a warning to the government, as in, "Follow these rules or be overthrown." That, though, is contingent on the ability of the people to organize.

What is the point of making a law that cannot be enforced? Are the laws really the issue, or is it the morality of the people?

Morality breaks down under gross societal stress, of which we are getting more and more.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I agree, and that's why I am an anarchist. People should be able to delegate their right of self-preservation to an agency of their own choosing, so long as that agency respects objective law and is truly an agency devoted to the defense of its customers. To prevent them from doing so by force, as you wish to do, and to compel them to deal exclusively with an agency that you happen to prefer, does not qualify as living "together in harmony." Rather, it is called: Do as I command you to do, even you don't violate anyone's rights, or I will initiate force against you.

Where does this "objective law" reside? What if the "agency" doesn't respect it? Now we have law, police, courts (and prisons) basically under one roof. When your agency comes knocking on my door investigating a crime wanting to search my abode and meets my agency where is its warrant? Who issued it? No warrant, then no law, then my agency opens fire when your agency tries to force its way in. Since I have the right to defend myself I might also be one of the shooters. The need for law and a uniform set of rules is why government has its monoploy but that monooly is the law not its derivative functions and aspects. There can private security and prisons and courts even police all competing. Competing regarding law, though, is for political philosophers competing for codification by legislation. The anarchist must be reduced to everyone, if not his tribal group, with his own competing idea of what is "objective law" and that competition would be with various weapons making and maintaining space for his or its existence. --Brant problems, problems--everywhere, problems--everybody has them and some are optional

I would love to take a year off to wrote a book on these problems, and then another year to write volume two, but I don't have the time. And this is not really necessary, since a number of books have already been written by Rothbard, Barnett, etc. In an earlier post I mentioned a debate I had with John Hospers in 1975. His key point was that we need a final arbiter, even if that final arbiter sometimes reaches unjust conclusions. This seems to be your position as well. But, to repeat, this doesn't mean that the final arbiter must the same arbiter in each and every case. Do you have a problem with the federal system advocated by Jefferson and many other Founders? In that system, states were sovereign in certain areas, and laws varied from one state to the next. (They still do, e.g., some states have capital punishment and others don't.) There was no uniform system of law in this scheme. Do you have a problem with this? Ghs

Of course not, but those states were not in your state of anarchy but legal monopolies of law. To some extent we still have that today in state law and federal law. --Brant

The states did not have a legal monopoly of law within their jurisdictions. The federal government was sovereign in some spheres over the states. The Constitution, for example, gives to the federal govenment the power to make sure that state governments are republican in nature. It also prohibits the states from coining money and imposing tariffs. These and other powers were reserved for the federal government exclusively. We thus had -- and still have, if to a lesser degree -- a system of overlapping legal jurisidictions -- the sort of thing than O'ist minarchists claim will lead to chaos and bloodshed.

I didn't say this was an anarchistic system, but it has some very important similarities. And the American system of "divided sovereignty" was characterized as "anarchy" by many European observers. In their view, only a single government that is absoutely (i.e., unconditionally) sovereign over a geographical area can properly be characterized as a "government."

Many of America's Founders, such as Jefferson, were not nearly as hostile to anarchistic societies as are modern O'ists. Jefferson, who was a serious student of Indian culture, noted that some Indian societies functioned very well without a government. Jefferson stated that he regarded this "anarchy" (his word) as the most preferable form of social organization, but he didn't think it would work in a large geographical area. It was impractical, in other words, so Jefferson pointed to a republican form of government as second best.

If this was the O'ist position -- if their chief objection to anarchism was that it is supposedly impractical -- then I would be more sympathetic to their concerns. But they throw out all kinds of theoretical crap that has no foundation in either history or theory. And all this amounts to nothing more than glosses on a few lines written by Ayn Rand, who appears to have known next to nothing about the history of law.

In fact, every organized society in history, including those without monopolistic governments, have had "laws" of some kind, including laws that protect the members of a society against violence by other members. The notion that we need a monopolistic government before objective law is even possible is contradicted by countless historical examples. But many O'ist don't like to read history, and they proceed to hide behind their invincible shield of ignorance.

For one discussion, see David Friedman's article on Iceland, "Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case," at:

http://www.daviddfri...nd/Iceland.html

Here are the first three paragraphs:

The purpose of this paper is to examine the legal and political institutions of Iceland from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries. They are of interest for two reasons. First, they are relatively well documented; the sagas were written by people who had lived under that set of institutions[3] and provide a detailed inside view of their workings. Legal conflicts were of great interest to the medieval Icelanders: Njal, the eponymous hero of the most famous of the sagas,[4] is not a warrior but a lawyer--"so skilled in law that no one was considered his equal." In the action of the sagas, law cases play as central a role as battles.

Second, medieval Icelandic institutions have several peculiar and interesting characteristics; they might almost have been invented by a mad economist to test the lengths to which market systems could supplant government in its most fundamental functions. Killing was a civil offense resulting in a fine paid to the survivors of the victim. Laws were made by a "parliament," seats in which were a marketable commodity. Enforcement of law was entirely a private affair. And yet these extraordinary institutions survived for over three hundred years, and the society in which they survived appears to have been in many ways an attractive one . Its citizens were, by medieval standards, free; differences in status based on rank or sex were relatively small;[5] and its literary, output in relation to its size has been compared, with some justice, to that of Athens.[6]

While these characteristics of the Icelandic legal system may seem peculiar, they are not unique to medieval Iceland. The wergeld--the fine for killing a man--was an essential part of the legal system of Anglo-Saxon England, and still exists in New Guinea.[7] The sale of legislative seats has been alleged in many societies and existed openly in some. Private enforcement existed both in the American West[8] and in pre-nineteenth-century Britain; a famous character of eighteenth-century fiction, Mr. Peachum in Gay's "Beggar's Opera," was based on Jonathan Wild, self-titled 'Thief- Taker General," who profitably combined the professions of thief-taker, recoverer of stolen property, and large-scale employer of thieves for eleven years, until he was finally hanged in l725.[9] The idea that law is primarily private, that most offenses are offenses against specific individuals or families, and that punishment of the crime is primarily the business of the injured party seems to be common to many early systems of law and has been discussed at some length by Maine with special reference to the early history of Roman law.[10]

Ghs

[Bosco]

I agree, and that's why I am an anarchist. People should be able to delegate their right of self-preservation to an agency of their own choosing, so long as that agency respects objective law and is truly an agency devoted to the defense of its customers. To prevent them from doing so by force, as you wish to do, and to compel them to deal exclusively with an agency that you happen to prefer, does not qualify as living "together in harmony." Rather, it is called: Do as I command you to do, even you don't violate anyone's rights, or I will initiate force against you.

Where does this "objective law" reside? What if the "agency" doesn't respect it? Now we have law, police, courts (and prisons) basically under one roof. When your agency comes knocking on my door investigating a crime wanting to search my abode and meets my agency where is its warrant? Who issued it? No warrant, then no law, then my agency opens fire when your agency tries to force its way in. Since I have the right to defend myself I might also be one of the shooters. The need for law and a uniform set of rules is why government has its monoploy but that monooly is the law not its derivative functions and aspects. There can private security and prisons and courts even police all competing. Competing regarding law, though, is for political philosophers competing for codification by legislation. The anarchist must be reduced to everyone, if not his tribal group, with his own competing idea of what is "objective law" and that competition would be with various weapons making and maintaining space for his or its existence.

--Brant

problems, problems--everywhere, problems--everybody has them and some are optional

George mentioned Randy Barnett as one theorist who took significant steps towards addressing these issues. You might be interested in an article that was published in the Libertarian Forum in 1976, where he makes the case that, from a rational, "horizontal" (as opped to verticle, or unidirectional) conception of law, the state is not really a method of administering law at all, since it fails to establish the minimum requirements of a legal code. The piece is on page 5.

http://www.mises.org/journals/lf/1976/1976_02.pdf

Tim Hopkins

[George H. Smith]

Tim,

This is a 1997 lecture by Randy Barnett on "polycentric legal orders" -- Randy's respectable label for anarchism.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

This is off-topic, but here is Randy's testimony before a Senate hearing (2/3/11) on the constitutionality of Obama Care:

Ghs

[Dglgmut]

Laws seem to work more as a warning than anything. The "law of the land" does not entail that the law will definitely be enforced. And with The Constitution, I think Jefferson had intended that if the government were to break the "laws" he helped to formulate, the people would simply be given fair warning that their government was deliberately engaging in unethical, uncivil acts.

It could also be a warning to the government, as in, "Follow these rules or be overthrown." That, though, is contingent on the ability of the people to organize.

What is the point of making a law that cannot be enforced? Are the laws really the issue, or is it the morality of the people?

Morality breaks down under gross societal stress, of which we are getting more and more.

--Brant

I think what I was leading up to is the idea that laws cannot be moral or immoral; moral classifications are reserved for actions.

Laws don't "do" anything, they warn people of what may be done under specified circumstances. If the power to "do" isn't there, then there's no point discussing what warnings ought to be given.

To condemn a law as immoral is to avoid the underlying reality of the situation; that an established power is threatening to carry out immoral actions.

Laws are not the issue; the issue is power (to act immorally). Who should have power? The question only needs to be asked to those who are willing to give up theirs, as anyone with excessive power probably wouldn't agree to surrendering any.

I don't understand this notion that equal power would lead to chaos and bloodshed... Would the history of the world be any more bloody without governments?

[anthony]

Calvin,

A law may be implemented because some or most people merely 'feel like it', and can indeed

be immoral by its subjective nature.

ie, prostitution is legal, on condition that prostitutes pay 80% of their earnings

to the 'underprivileged'. Or any silly example.

This violates the rational principle that a woman or man is independent and self-generating

- by identity;

therefore that she or he is not the slave of other people, and therefore can never

be restricted as to profession, or income.

Immorality breeds immoral law, which leads to capricious power, causing more immoral laws.

[Bosco]

Tim,

This is a 1997 lecture by Randy Barnett on "polycentric legal orders" -- Randy's respectable label for anarchism.

Ghs

Thank you for linking to this. I think his comments about the anarchistic implications of the "power of exit" (emigration) were particularly interesting. He does seem to have distanced himself from anarchism now, although there is no evidence I am aware of that he's repudiated it.

Tim Hopkins

[George H. Smith]

Tim, This is a 1997 lecture by Randy Barnett on "polycentric legal orders" -- Randy's respectable label for anarchism. Ghs

Thank you for linking to this. I think his comments about the anarchistic implications of the "power of exit" (emigration) were particularly interesting. He does seem to have distanced himself from anarchism now, although there is no evidence I am aware of that he's repudiated it. Tim Hopkins

Randy's interests have changed a bit in recent years. Given how much he has written and spoken about anarchism in the past, he may think that there isn't much more for him to say about it. There certainly isn't anyone on the minarchist side of his quality who could give him a run for his money. Most O'ist types are still mired in Randian cliches and know zilch about the history of law.

The topics that Randy covers in the lecture (1997) I linked are covered in much greater detail in The Structure of Liberty (Oxford, 1998). He was writing this book at the time he gave the lecture, and he appears to have used some of the text as notes.

In my opinion, the most interesting part of Randy's lecture is the last part, where he discusses various examples of legal pluralism, including the pluralism that exists in the U.S. today. The passage he quotes from Berman's book (Law and Revolution) is excellent.

Ghs

Ghs

[Dglgmut]

Tony,

I am just trying to simplify things wherever possible. A law must be enforced in order to exist, and therefor a wish for just laws is more exactly a wish for just exercises of power.

You can either wish for a different government or for the same government to act differently. Which is more realistic?

If you were kidnapped would you beg not to be killed or would you try to escape?

If someone commits a crime against you, is it any more or less just if they warned you that they were going to do it? The fact that they have the power to do it is not up for debate, but isn't the important issue whether they should have the power, rather than what warnings you have of them abusing it?

The minarchist wants unequal power, but equal protection of rights. This is obviously unrealistic.

Back to democracy, though: Why is rational self-interest an ideal morality when dealing with individuals but not with groups? Do you assume it is in the best interest of the majority to violate a minority's rights?

If it is objectively true that individual rights are what are necessary for civility and progression amongst a society, then the majority will eventually choose individual rights. If the majority chooses individual rights, there's no turning back... as they would not be given a proper social system, they would be making one for themselves.

In Atlas Shrugged, the "men of the mind" gave their government an ultimatum. How long do you think the strike would have lasted if the majority had the authority to agree to John Galt's terms?

[Dglgmut]

George, I don't think you've brought it up in this thread... Eternal vigilance of the people is an interesting point against minarchism. For a constitution to effectively restrain a government, the watchfulness of the people is demanded.

It's a very unreasonable demand in the sense that it requires people to accept that they are not responsible for themselves--as that's the government's job, yet they are partially responsible for their government. How does one expect a person, who is satisfied giving up any ounce of freedom for security, to keep the government in line?

[Brant Gaede]

Laws seem to work more as a warning than anything. The "law of the land" does not entail that the law will definitely be enforced. And with The Constitution, I think Jefferson had intended that if the government were to break the "laws" he helped to formulate, the people would simply be given fair warning that their government was deliberately engaging in unethical, uncivil acts.

It could also be a warning to the government, as in, "Follow these rules or be overthrown." That, though, is contingent on the ability of the people to organize.

What is the point of making a law that cannot be enforced? Are the laws really the issue, or is it the morality of the people?

Morality breaks down under gross societal stress, of which we are getting more and more.

--Brant

I think what I was leading up to is the idea that laws cannot be moral or immoral; moral classifications are reserved for actions.

Laws don't "do" anything, they warn people of what may be done under specified circumstances. If the power to "do" isn't there, then there's no point discussing what warnings ought to be given.

To condemn a law as immoral is to avoid the underlying reality of the situation; that an established power is threatening to carry out immoral actions.

Laws are not the issue; the issue is power (to act immorally). Who should have power? The question only needs to be asked to those who are willing to give up theirs, as anyone with excessive power probably wouldn't surrendering any.

I don't understand this notion that equal power would lead to chaos and bloodshed... Would the history of the world be any more bloody without governments?

If a law was enacted with immoral intent insofar as it matches the intent we can call it immoral. The enactment, afterall, was an action. Consider, for example, the Nuremberg Laws. We can even call them "evil" just as we can call their enforcement "evil." In this context we can still call them "evil" sans the enforcement. Now I can imagine laws that would be evil if enforced but passed with innocent intent and not enforced therefore not evil, but that's quite a fine point and we default into semantics.

--Brant

[Dglgmut]

If someone tells you they're going to kill you, surely that isn't the same as murder. If the government promises to take 30% of your income, the taking of the income is what you're really concerned about. I say it because the power to act immorally is the real problem, not whether or not that power is being abused--it is, that's clear. How much power abuse is necessary for people to realize, maybe it's not how well we delegate power, but that we delegate power at all.

[George H. Smith]

George, I don't think you've brought it up in this thread... Eternal vigilance of the people is an interesting point against minarchism. For a constitution to effectively restrain a government, the watchfulness of the people is demanded. It's a very unreasonable demand in the sense that it requires people to accept that they are not responsible for themselves--as that's the government's job, yet they are partially responsible for their government. How does one expect a person, who is satisfied giving up any ounce of freedom for security, to keep the government in line?

"Eternal vigilance" is a precondition of any free society, whether minarchist or anarchist.

In the first part of Randy's lecture, he discusses various attempts to limit the power of government, such as voting and separation of powers, and he makes some very telling criticisms. Neverheless, it is significant that Randy doesn't dismiss these devices out of hand. This is the way that I have always argued as well, e.g., in my comments about the separation of powers in my Cato lecture on the rights of resistance and revolution.

Unlike most O'ist minarchists, who condemn proposals for competing justice agencies out of hand and make no effort to learn from the other side -- Rand has spoken, after all, so what else do they need to know? -- the leading libertarian anarchists understand that the notion of a constitutionally limited government has a great deal of value in it. What they have attempted to do is to retain the good aspects and correct the bad parts with a competitive system.

The notion of a "given geographical area" (I believe this is how Rand put it) has generated a great deal of confusion in this controversy. As Randy point out -- and as other anarchists have pointed out for over four decades -- we presently have legal pluralism on a world scale.

I have often asked minarchists whether they would favor a one-world government in theory, provided it was a reasonably good government by O'ist standards. The entire earth is a "given geographical area," so Rand's argument against "competing governments" should apply as much to this area as it does to smaller areas. Not one O'ist that I know of has endorsed the notion of a one-world government, however, so it would appear that they are unwilling to apply Rand's argument consistently.

When Roy Childs and I had our informal "debate" about anarchism with Nathan and Barbara c. 1972, I specifically asked Nathan about a one-world government. I recall his answer well. He didn't object to this idea in theory; he merely said that it was "not practical."

I would similarly maintain that one government is not practical over smaller geographical areas, such as the territorial U.S., at least not for those who care about preserving freedom. But O'ists have never been impressed by my arguments. It seems that they, and they alone, get to decide what is practical and what is not. After that, it is a simple matter of coercing others who may disagree with them.

Ghs

[Dglgmut]

To "keep an eye on" your government is not necessary in a competitive market of legitimate force, as the different protection agencies would keep each other in check.

For example, in the lecture you posted, Barnett talked about "power of exit." Now, even within single countries, the right to move to a different state, or what Randy seemed to favor, simply switch to a different jurisdiction without physically moving, would act as an incentive to keep the states relatively effective in their role of protecting individual rights.

Instead of watching over the government, the imposition should be on the providers of legitimate force to actively seek public endorsement sufficient to stay in business.

[Dennis Hardin]

Again, you seem to have forgotten the initial premise that NB laid down in your headline post. NB said:

Branden: This, of course, is their favorite argument and their stock argument. In briefest essentials, I would answer as follows. Let's imagine, to make it very simple, that we--this group in this room tonight-- form a society and agree on the principles to be operative in the society in a political sense. We agree upon a constitution and a government is created for the purpose of carrying out the principles laid down in this constitution

NB deals with the problem of consent by assuming that we have unanimous consent at the time a government is formed. You have never offered any other alternative. So drop the juvenile crap about Platonism and try to focus on the problem at hand.

This strikes me as a red herring, George. Branden was using the people in the room to construct his example, not as an exact microcosm of any society which organizes a government. It was not his intention to imply that there is always unanimous consent when a government is formed.

He discussed the pro's and cons of representative government by majority rule in a follow-up question which I also posted.

Lastly, I will call attention to the fact that you have failed to give any reasons as to why we should regard the current U.S. government as legitimate.

Ghs

To the extent that the current U.S. government is engaged in the violation of individual rights, I would not argue that it is legitimate.

[Dennis Hardin]

So drop the juvenile crap about Platonism and try to focus on the problem at hand.

I'm afraid that shallow polemics against purity, perfection, and Platonism won't do. Well, gee, the governments of Iran and North Korea are not perfect, but only a Platonist would demand perfection!

Ghs

Here is an expanded version of my “juvenile crap” about Platonism. You claimed to be coming at the issue of government from an Objectivist (Randian) perspective, so I will analyze the issue from that perspective..

Feel free to skip over my summary of Rand’s ideas, since you know them so well. I’m including a summary here so that the full context is clear to anyone who might read this.

To begin with, Objectivism requires that a principle such as rights be placed in its proper philosophical context. Here’s your prior assertion about Rand and the alleged inconsistency of Objectivist minarchists.

Rand established the purity standard, especially in her arguments against compromises in matters of principle. Libertarian anarchists have taken her seriously in this regard; her minarchists followers have not.

Libertarian anarchists take a social principle—rights--and elevate it to the status of an axiom, which means they ignore all the philosophical principles that come before that. It’s comparable to arguing that we should be honest so that everyone will understand each other, making social relationships more harmonious. That view of honesty ignores the full context and hierarchy of honesty as a virtue, which pertains to the relationship between your mind and reality rather than any social application. Without the full context of a principle, there’s no way to know how to apply it.

Here is a summary of what you have tossed out of your philosophical equation when you argue for “pure and perfect” (i.e., Platonic) adherence to the principle of the non-initiation of force (according to Rand and the minarchists—i.e., Objectivism):

We’ll disregard metaphysics and epistemology for now and just focus on ethics. The starting point of ethics is that life is our standard of value. Life has definite conditions that must be met. Life requires that we act long-range. Man is conceptual. He can’t know how to meet the conditions without principles to guide him. The basic moral principle (i.e., virtue) is rationality, because reason is our means of survival. All other, related virtues are simultaneous—honesty, productivity, independence. All are expressions of rationality. All enable man to live the life proper to a rational being.

Politics must provide a social structure which enables man to be moral.. If man survives by the use of his mind, and the essence of force is to make the mind inapplicable to life, then force is evil in principle. The principle that defines a man’s right to be free from force is that of rights. Rights are the starting pointing for any discussion of politics and government. Rights are the means of subordinating society to moral law.

Applying the principle of rights—of abolishing force from human relationships--requires that full context and hierarchy.

It is not self-evident that force is evil, as the libertarian anarchist seems to assume. But the above explanation alone is also insufficient by itself. You cannot simply go from an explanation of morality and deduce the conclusion that force is evil. A long process of induction is involved in reaching that apparently simple conclusion. And then it is not a simple matter of deduction to say that every single instance where force is “initiated” is necessarily evil. Again you must examine all the various concrete situations to see how the principle applies while holding the whole context of the prior discussion of morality and the nature of man.

Consider just two examples of where the principle of the initiation of force alone is not a sufficient guide—gun control and abortion. You have to hold the whole context and hierarchy of the nature of force and rights to untangle the complexity of such issues and apply the principle of rights.

Again, to repeat, politics must provide a social structure that enables men to be moral. Would it be possible to live a productive life in a society where your neighbors all have anti-aircraft weapons mounted on their front lawns, or where everyone wears an AK 47 on his hip? Would it be possible for a woman to live a rational, productive life if she had to carry every single instance of conception to term? The neighbors have not initiated force by buying anti-aircraft guns. Your fellow citizens have not initiated force by buying AK 47s. The embryo has not initiated force by being conceived.

If we apply your principle of the non-initiation of force in the “pure and perfect” manner you advocate, we can do nothing about the neighbors or the machine gun-slingers. And any woman who has an abortion will go on trial for murder.

What about stalkers who fixate on a victim and follow him or her everywhere they go? They don’t use force. Can you “initiate force” against them? Can a person or a celebrity live a normal life with predators stalking them, day and night?

Suppose a motorcycle gang lives next door to you and they don’t happen to like you. Suppose they decided to hold a protest vigil outside your home—just beyond your property line—day and night, strutting around with night sticks and chains, waiting for you or a member of your family to step outside. They haven’t touched you. They haven’t “initiated force.” Maybe they smile and wave in a friendly manner when you look out the window. You can’t interfere with their ‘right of assembly.’ If you get your private agency’s police force to sweep them out, you’re the one “initiating force.”

Suppose someone likes to phone in bomb threats to airports every once in a while, just as a joke. The airport has to shut down and everyone has to exit the premises, costing staff and passengers involved thousands of dollars in wasted time and expense. They don’t have to do that. Airport security could just ignore the threats if they wanted to. Your private defense agency can’t do anything. The caller is just a practical joker. He hasn’t “initiated force.”

The point is that you cannot simply sit on the definition of rights (defined as prohibitions against the initiation of force) and deduce your conclusions about what a government can and cannot do. Government action to protect the individual’s freedom to conduct his or her life can be undertaken in all of the situations described above, and many of these involve (in a technical sense) the initiation of physical force to stop others from interfering with that person’s life. (Or, in the case of abortion, no action will be taken even though the woman is technically “initiating force”.) Using force against private individuals who want to pre-empt the government’s monopoly on the use of force is simply one more example—similar to those cited above--because their actions destroy the structure of society required for a proper human existence.

(As I previously explained, it is not really “initiating force,” because the private defense agency’s use of force (a) violates the rights of all those who do not sanction their usurpation of the government’s function, and (b) threatens everyone else’s rights by destroying the objective structure required to restrain the legitimate use of force.)

You can argue that your anarcho-capitalist scheme is practical all you want, but you cannot legitimately accuse the minarchist of violating the principle of rights. The minarchist is upholding the foundation of rights—the political requirement that men must be free to live a moral life. Because the anarchist ignores that foundation, the charge of violating principle can be made against him, and with much more philosophic “force” behind it.

[anthony]

Dennis,

Really excellent.. I think you have highlighted and explained the disconnect

and floating ideal of the libertarian 'non-initiation of force' principle that's always

been bothersome ( for me.) You've given NIOF its legs.