Dialectical Objectivism: An Answer to Ronald E. Merrill


dan2100

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This was first published online a few years ago, so my opinions might have changed somewhat. I'm placing it here to jump start discussion -- not to give my final word on the subject.

Though it may be the intention of Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical's author, Chris M. Sciabarra, to gain "recognition and respectability in the scholarly community," Ronald Merrill should live up to his own rhetoric and judge the book on whether it identifies Rand's debt to Russian philosophy and shows Objectivism to be essentially dialectical. Whether the book will affect academy is of secondary importance in my view. (That said, I believe the number of Objectivists and Objectivist-sympathezing professors is and has been growing. Thus, I believe the "recognition and respectability in the scholarly community" will come regardless of Sciabarra's book.)

I agree that the book is not light reading, but this is a minor weakness if it's a weakness at all. Is every philosophy book supposed to be written at the eighth grade reading level? Yet the book is not obscure, nor is specialized jargon as plentiful as Merrill would have us believe. The quote that Merrill uses to illustrate his point -- "Rand's approach to the ontological foundations of philosophy was minimalist." (Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical, p130) -- comes after Sciabarra explicitly defines "ontology." In my opinion, Sciabarra does not try to belittle his readers or speak in code words to the knowing few. Instead, he's fairly good at describing what he means. He then goes on to use his more technical terms repeatedly. This may lead to a problem to those who skim the book and aren't familiar with what his terms means, but how often have Objectivists criticized others for taking Rand out of context?

Also, if any Objectivist would be philosophers are not "proficient in... philosophical terminology" they should be. If Objectivists are to be taken seriously they must not only know what they are dishing out, but have some ability to understand other philosophers. I'm not maintaining this as an absolute virtue. Obviously, not everyone can be, wants to be or should be a philosopher, but it's a sad commentary on the Objectivist movement -- a movement that allegedly holds individual judgement and philosophy in high esteem -- when most of the people involved do not know the ideas they are against, or even take the time to understand things outside their worldview.

While I disagree with Merrill's characterization of Sciabarra's application of "dialectical," the latter does seem to go overboard -- using dialectics to explain almost all of Objectivism. However, his contention is that Objectivism is essentially dialectical. If this is so, then dialectics should underlie all aspects of that philosophy. Even if Sciabarra only concentrated on the anti-dualist bent of Objectivism, he would have been identifying an important strand in Objectivism. While Rand even casually admitted this, I think an extended study would still be beneficial. It would be another way of showing how Objectivism works. This would then make its insights more easily applicable and its limits more appreciated.

Anti-dualism, in fact, is something covered in mainstream Objectivism. Leonard Peikoff, in the close of Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, sees the history of philosophy as a duel between Plato and Aristotle. He criticizes the former for separating body and mind, the archetypal dualism present in Western philosophy. (Of course, this is open to debate.) However, it is only by going beyond this and looking dialectically at this history that we see mind/body and related dualism not as mere splits, but as creating tensions. These tensions act to create further distortions as well as to constantly open new possibilities for opposition. In other words, because reality is whole, those who deny one part while reifying another build the very ground for their opponents. Idealism helps materialism -- in the same way that vocal teetotalers often are ex-alcoholics!)

In order to escape the trap of dualism, a dialectical understanding, as Rand seems to have had, is necessary. Her method was to question the framework within which the oppositions exist. Much of her philosophy is really, in terms of the conventions she grew up around, an attempt to transcend the fragmentation and the arbitrary "package-dealing" all around her -- in both Russia and America. To equate "anti-dualism" and "dialectics" is a profound mistake, I believe, because dualism is usually arbitrary. Anti-dualism, like counterfeit individualism, can be just as arbitrary as the dualism it purports to overcome. In this respect, Merrill oversimplifies.

As for the dialectical thread running through "Aristotle, Hegel, Marx, Lenin, and Rand," one should not assume that using dialectical method makes one identical to all other dialecticians. I believe Sciabarra should have gone into more detail on this matter. He should have provided a longer catalog of dialectics and dialecticians. This, I admit, is a problem with the book. However, in light of Merrill's criticism, I ask does the fact that d'Holbach, Diderot, Feuerbach, Marx, Lenin, Rand, and Richard Dawkins were all atheists make the concept of atheism "unconstitutionally vague"?

Also, look at the following paragraph from Merrill's review:

'Sciabarra is on to something much more productive when he discusses "anti-Dualism" in a second sense, as a methodology, not philosophical content. In this sense of the term, anti-Dualism means the tendency to reason or argue by means of rejecting false antitheses. This "dialectical" method of argumentation, says Sciabarra, can be traced back to the "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" sequence attributed to Hegel, and further to the "golden mean" sought by Aristotle. But this is not really anti-Dualist in the sense of rejecting antitheses. In fact, if we examine Rand's reasoning in detail, we find that almost always she ends up replacing the false antithesis with a new, corrected antithesis. Nonetheless, Sciabarra's insight is valuable because it stimulates us to analyze more closely the various lines of argument that Rand used.'

The true synthesis at the end of the triad is not supposed to be merely the opposite of the antithesis in the middle. If it were, we would be back with the thesis. A true synthesis would have to be something that identified the original thesis and antithesis as parts of a larger whole. By identifying this larger whole, the synthesis has transcended the narrow confines of the original dualism (i.e., the range fenced in by the thesis and antithesis).

By identifying that some opposing views -- e.g., the Christian view of splitting sex and love -- are really restrictive, Rand was able to identify the package as well as offer a solution -- e.g., the unity of sex and love in a romantic relationship -- that could not provided within the old dualism. Whether Rand does this to point out the false dichotomy or to offer an alternative as yet unpresented within the dichotomy, she seems to be using a dialectical process. The solution often is not merely something outside of the false dichotomy, but something which combines the fractured parts of the dichotomy. To stick with the same example, Rand's view of romantic relationships is not one of rejecting both love and sex, but of combining them.

There is also a problem with seeing dialectics as compromising (in the Golden Mean or any other sense). Dialectics as used here cannot be a compromise. A compromise would be an admission that the problem offered by a given dualism is insoluble at the current time. Dialectics offers a solution not by mindlessly mixing one side with the other, but by taking what is true and valid in either side and integrating them. The Objectivist theory of perception is not a blend of naïve realism a la Aristotle and subjectivist idealism a la Berkeley. It is a theory which admits both the existence of external objects and the relativity of the senses. It ignores the diaphanous model accepted by previous realists and idealists. Even in dialectics, old unities can be overthrown when they are shown to be false or hasty.

Merrill brings up a good point about influences on Rand elsewhere in his review. It is hard to see how someone can absorb something and reject other things, given some sort of cultural determinism. However, Sciabarra does not deny free will and he does not uphold cultural determinism. The point is that if Rand was a certain type of thinker, then she had to get her method from somewhere. Partly, she made innovations, but, one must admit, partly, she took what was present around her when she was growing up. This is not to surrender to some form of determinism but to show that even volition has limits.

However, to truly demonstrate that Rand got her method from Russian philosophy, one would need more access to her notebooks. Even then, it's not likely Rand wrote something like "Gee, that Lossky, I think I'll take his methods and throw out the mystical claptrap..." The case will remain, most likely, like much of the biographical scholarship, tentative. (I confess that I'm not an expert on Russian philosophy. I found Sciabarra's sections on it interesting, if a little repetitious.)

(James Lennox also brings up a similar point, though with much more facility than this author in his review of the book, "The Roots of Ayn Rand?" IOS Journal 5(4). I have some disagreements with Lennox's characterizations of dualisms in Objectivism. I hardly think the dichotomy between "existence" and "consciousness" is similar in any "important way" to the previous incarnations of dualism, such as Descartes' division between spirit and matter.) That both Lossky and Rand sought to avoid competing "schools of thought" does not mean they succeeded. Here, I part company with Sciabarra. I think it is too early to tell what will become of the various factions within Objectivism. Who could have predicted that Martin Luther's 95 Theses would spark the Reformation that has led to there being hundreds of sects of Christianity? Who can tell if the issues now motivating the factions within the Objectivist movement may not diverge in the future. People who originally fought over whether libertarians are hopeless nihilists may in the future find other differences -- more important to them -- to fight over. (This seems to be the case with the Peikoff/Kelley split.)

Anyway, real science, if that is the benchmark to be used, is not so monolithic. Despite 130 years of Darwin, there are factions within evolutionary biology for instance. Questions over the tempo of evolution, the units of selection, and the role of initial conditions are still sources of controversy. They are also, in a seemingly dialectical fashion, sources of growth.

I also disagree with Merrill's characterization of the third part the book -- "The Radical Rand." This section deals with Rand's social theory -- her views of the dynamics of the welfare state, the role of ideas in society, and the means of effecting social change for the better. This is, but should not be, original work. Outside of Rand's own works, this field gets little attention from Objectivists. Sciabarra is really the first to break out into the open about it. Much of his work seems tedious and will probably be refined by later thinkers. I wrote that this "should not be" original because many Objectivists go on and on about changing society. One would think this would be the most studied area of her philosophy. Instead, with the exception of Peikoff's The Ominous Parallels, this area has relegated to the dustbin. It is good to see Sciabarra recover it -- even if one may disagree with his particular analyses.

I hope I have at least shown why Sciabarra's book is not worthy of the review given by Merrill. One would hope reviewers would not go to their keyboards with axe in hand -- that instead of being ready to attack, they would be ready to learn.

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Dan,

Excellent review. Thanks for posting it. I may have additional comments later, when I can find some time. I've been involved in so many spirited exchanges on OL recently that I need to refocus my attention on the real world. 8-)

Ghs

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Dan,

Excellent review. Thanks for posting it. I may have additional comments later, when I can find some time. I've been involved in so many spirited exchanges on OL recently that I need to refocus my attention on the real world. 8-)

Ghs

Thanks, George. It's more of a response to a review than a review. But I hope it'll stir the pot a little...

Speaking of this, I recall Robert White actually applying Sciabarra's dialectical take on Rand's social theory to New Zealand. Sadly, his paper on this is not available online and I believe he may not want it published anywhere.

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Thank you for the nice post. I'd like to dovetail the conversation slightly into the direction of observing dualities.

Some developmentalists argue that duality is a necessary step in expanding one's knowledge about the universe. Mind and body for instance. They both exist, and they must both be observed to exist separately before they can be integrated. Prior to being recognized as separate, the amalgamation doesn't allow a person to understand the key differences between the two.

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This whole question of dualism might be an interesting one, important to the study of Sciabarra and Hegel, but I don't see that it has much to do with Rand. James Lennox, in his review of Ayn Rand, the Russian Radical (which I still consider the best comment on the book; read the whole thing), points out that Rand rejected what she thought were false alternatives and embraced what she thought were sound ones. Lennox mentions consciousness and object, metaphysical and man-made, reason and force. In post #1, Dan Ust mentions yet another: Aristotelianism and Platonism. It wasn't an important theme to her one way or another.

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This whole question of dualism might be an interesting one, important to the study of Sciabarra and Hegel, but I don't see that it has much to do with Rand. James Lennox, in his review of Ayn Rand, the Russian Radical (which I still consider the best comment on the book; read the whole thing), points out that Rand rejected what she thought were false alternatives and embraced what she thought were sound ones. Lennox mentions consciousness and object, metaphysical and man-made, reason and force. In post #1, Dan Ust mentions yet another: Aristotelianism and Platonism. It wasn't an important theme to her one way or another.

Thanks for providing a link to the Lennox review. Sciabarra also responded to it:

http://www.nyu.edu/projects/sciabarra/rad/PubRadReviews/lennor.html

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Yes, Sciabarra replied, saying (here I paraphrase) I do not agree with Lennox. I would have preferred a more favorable review. No dispute there. His answer on the present point (Rand accepted some dualisms and rejected others, so that neither counts as an essential to her theory) is that you can, trivially, rephrase any two-way opposition in a way that makes it look like a unity. On this account, nothing would count as a dualism, since no pair of terms would be opposites if you couldn't do just this. Neatest trick of the week, in the New Yorker's phrase.

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Yes, Sciabarra replied, saying (here I paraphrase) I do not agree with Lennox. I would have preferred a more favorable review. No dispute there. His answer on the present point (Rand accepted some dualisms and rejected others, so that neither counts as an essential to her theory) is that you can, trivially, rephrase any two-way opposition in a way that makes it look like a unity. On this account, nothing would count as a dualism, since no pair of terms would be opposites if you couldn't do just this. Neatest trick of the week, in the New Yorker's phrase.

On your point about dualisms rephrased as unities, I think I'd have to disagree. I think the dualisms she accepted were, as I stated earlier, radically different than previous dualisms -- well, the previous ones she rejected. For instance, mind/body or spirit/matter dualisms usually posit that both realms are ontologically separate and then the problem becomes how to connect them in any way. Rand's existence/consciousness dualism -- if it can be called that -- is not the same. Consciousness is subsumed under existence -- the realm of consciousness is not outside of or apart from existence. Don't you agree?

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If I understand your statement

"the dualisms she accepted were, as I stated earlier, radically different than previous dualisms"

correctly, it's not historically accurate. The oppositions she bought into, such as consciousness/object, Aristotelian/Platonic and metaphysical/man-made (sometimes termed natural/conventional or physis/nomos), have been around for centuries. Body/soul, which she didn't, goes back as far as Plato. The opposite, which she accepted, goes back to Aristotle, who didn't actively rail against Plato on this topic but simply laid out an alternative, in which consciousness is a capability of living organisms and not a distinct entity.

Rand had something new to say about old topics. The above-mentioned are some examples. Rights, the nature of universals and the nature of art are some others. This is further evidence that dualisms and dichotomies are simply the wrong place to look for an understanding of her thought and not the big deal (to paraphrase Biden) for her that Sciabarra tries to make them out to be.

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If I understand your statement

"the dualisms she accepted were, as I stated earlier, radically different than previous dualisms"

correctly, it's not historically accurate. The oppositions she bought into, such as consciousness/object, Aristotelian/Platonic and metaphysical/man-made (sometimes termed natural/conventional or physis/nomos), have been around for centuries. Body/soul, which she didn't, goes back as far as Plato. The opposite, which she accepted, goes back to Aristotle, who didn't actively rail against Plato on this topic but simply laid out an alternative, in which consciousness is a capability of living organisms and not a distinct entity.

Rand had something new to say about old topics. The above-mentioned are some examples. Rights, the nature of universals and the nature of art are some others. This is further evidence that dualisms and dichotomies are simply the wrong place to look for an understanding of her thought and not the big deal (to paraphrase Biden) for her that Sciabarra tries to make them out to be.

I disagree. Although I prefer not to use the terminology "dualisms," because it tends to blur rather than clarify, I do think that pointing out, analyzing, and moving beyond ~false dichotomies~ is a MAJOR part of Rand's philosophy and methodological approach.

Case in point: intrinsicism vs. subjectivism. Why would Rand and Peikoff devote such an enormous amount of time and energy to explicating how this false dichotomy runs through all the branches of philosoiphy and throughout historical debates in philosophy, if it weren't a "big deal" and exactly the ~right~ "place to look for an understanding of her thought"??

And how about these:

Idealism vs. materialism?

Rationalism vs. empiricism?

Altruism vs. Stirnirite egoism?

Authoritian government vs. anarchism?

Reason vs. emotion?

Also, there ~is~ such a thing as a ~true~ dichotomy. In other words, a jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive division of ideas in a given realm.

Advocating sacrifice vs. advocating no sacrifice.

Having a government that protects rights vs. not having a government that protects rights.

Holding that knowledge requires both experience and logic vs. not holding the knowledge requires both experience and logic.

Maintaining that consciousness has both identity and a real object vs. not maintaining that consciousness has both identity and a resl object.

Reason and rational emotion vs. irrationality and irrational emotion.

Rand, Branden, and Peikoff have focused on ~each~ of these true dichotomies, and the false dichotomies that they transcend, in their essays and lectures.

And Chris Sciabarra is spot on in making a "big deal" about this in his Russian Radical book -- which I think is the most important book on Rand and the Objectivist philosophy to date. (And that's saying a lot, because I think that Peikoff's OPAR and Branden's The Vision of Ayn Rand are both very important.)

REB

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Roger,

Good post! The place where I think most Objectivists get caught up is that there is a big difference between how a philosophy is discovered and how it is analyzed and validated. Objectivism places a big emphasis on contextual discovery in acquiring knowledge. Dialectics are a method of discovery, not validation. That is one of the reasons German dialectic philosophers went off the deep end, little or faulty validation.

Jim

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Peter,

One thing that should make you suspicious of the Lennox review is how a writer who would normally be inclined to accept every bit of Ayn Rand's self-description suddenly decides that she was misremembering or telling a tall tale when it comes to one issue: taking a course in Ancient philosophy from Nicholas Onufrievich Lossky.

Why?

Robert Campbell

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If I understand your statement

"the dualisms she accepted were, as I stated earlier, radically different than previous dualisms"

correctly, it's not historically accurate. The oppositions she bought into, such as consciousness/object, Aristotelian/Platonic and metaphysical/man-made (sometimes termed natural/conventional or physis/nomos), have been around for centuries. Body/soul, which she didn't, goes back as far as Plato. The opposite, which she accepted, goes back to Aristotle, who didn't actively rail against Plato on this topic but simply laid out an alternative, in which consciousness is a capability of living organisms and not a distinct entity.

Rand had something new to say about old topics. The above-mentioned are some examples. Rights, the nature of universals and the nature of art are some others. This is further evidence that dualisms and dichotomies are simply the wrong place to look for an understanding of her thought and not the big deal (to paraphrase Biden) for her that Sciabarra tries to make them out to be.

I disagree. Although I prefer not to use the terminology "dualisms," because it tends to blur rather than clarify, I do think that pointing out, analyzing, and moving beyond ~false dichotomies~ is a MAJOR part of Rand's philosophy and methodological approach.

Case in point: intrinsicism vs. subjectivism. Why would Rand and Peikoff devote such an enormous amount of time and energy to explicating how this false dichotomy runs through all the branches of philosoiphy and throughout historical debates in philosophy, if it weren't a "big deal" and exactly the ~right~ "place to look for an understanding of her thought"??

And how about these:

Idealism vs. materialism?

Rationalism vs. empiricism?

Altruism vs. Stirnirite egoism?

Authoritian government vs. anarchism?

Reason vs. emotion?

Also, there ~is~ such a thing as a ~true~ dichotomy. In other words, a jointly exhaustive, mutually exclusive division of ideas in a given realm.

Advocating sacrifice vs. advocating no sacrifice.

Having a government that protects rights vs. not having a government that protects rights.

Holding that knowledge requires both experience and logic vs. not holding the knowledge requires both experience and logic.

Maintaining that consciousness has both identity and a real object vs. not maintaining that consciousness has both identity and a resl object.

Reason and rational emotion vs. irrationality and irrational emotion.

Rand, Branden, and Peikoff have focused on ~each~ of these true dichotomies, and the false dichotomies that they transcend, in their essays and lectures.

And Chris Sciabarra is spot on in making a "big deal" about this in his Russian Radical book -- which I think is the most important book on Rand and the Objectivist philosophy to date. (And that's saying a lot, because I think that Peikoff's OPAR and Branden's The Vision of Ayn Rand are both very important.)

REB

Yes, I agree with most of what you say above and this is an excellent way to view the issue of anti-dualism -- or, rather, accepting your contention that "dualism" in this context muddies the waters, of dichotomies, false and otherwise.

One minor disagreement, though: "Having a government that protects rights vs. not having a government that protects rights." I think the only government to be had is one that violates rights. A government that doesn't, to me, is chimerical. But that's a discussion for another time.

Edited by Dan Ust
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