Ayn Rand Society 2007 - Khawaja Paper


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The title of Onkar Ghate’s paper at the Pacific Division Meeting 2009 is “Ayn Rand and the Foundation Stones of a Soul.”

This paper explores three issues central to Rand’s conception of man as a being of self-made soul: self-esteem, sense-of-life, and psycho-epistemology. Dr. Ghate draws upon the following texts:

Rand

“The Goal of My Writing” – RM

“Philosophy: Who Needs It” – PWNI

“This is John Galt Speaking” – AS

“The Objectivist Ethics” – VS

“The Metaphysical and the Man-Made” – PWNI

“Philosophy and Sense of Life” – RM

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology

“Basic Principles of Literature” – RM

“The Age of Envy” – NL

“Of Living Death” – VR

“Altruism as Appeasement” – VR

“Causality versus Duty” – PWNI

“Art and Sense of Life” – RM

The Fountainhead

“How to Read (and Not to Write)” – The Ayn Rand Letter

“The Missing Link” – PWNI

“Selfishness without a Self” – PWNI

“Egalitarianism and Inflation” – PWNI

“For the New Intellectual” – FNI

“The Comprachicos” – NL

Branden

“The Objectivist Theory of Volition” – The Objectivist (TO)

“Mental Health versus Mysticism and Self-Sacrifice” – VS

“Self-Esteem” – TO

“Pseudo-Self-Esteem” – The Objectivist Newsletter (ON)

“Psycho-Epistemology” – (ON)

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  • 3 years later...

The Beloved Self

Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Alison Hills (Oxford 2012)

From the publisher:

Part One introduces three different versions of egoism. Part Two looks at attempts to prove that egoism is false, and shows that even the more modest arguments that do not try to answer the egoist in her own terms seem to fail. But in part Three, Hills defends morality and develops a new problem for egoism, an epistemological problem. She shows that it is not epistemically rational to believe the most plausible versions of egoism.

The first part of the book will be most relevant to those interested in moral theory, as it contains detailed discussions of recent interpretations of virtue ethics and especially of Kant's moral theory. The second and third part of the book turn to epistemology, particularly moral epistemology, and include an account of the relationship between knowledge and action, a new theory of moral understanding, and a discussion of the epistemically rational response to various kinds of disagreement. Hills also defends a new account of virtue and of morally worthy action.

"Standard" egoism, Kantian egoism, and virtue egoism are the three classes of egoism chaptered in the book. Presumably, Rand fits under the class virtue egoism. Though Ayn Rand or Tara Smith are apparently not mentioned in this book, I expect it would be worthwhile to consider how Prof. Hills’ theory applies (or fails to apply) to Rand’s theory of rational egoism. I made such a comparison of speak-not-her-name Rand in the case of Richard Kraut’s book and its treatment of egoism here.

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I like this in particular: "...if one does not hold one's own life as the motive and goal of one's actions, one is acting in aself-destructive way".[sB]

No neutral position: one or the other, Self-affirming, or self-destructive.

I think Richard Kraut (from excerpts) is floundering, mainly with who should be the beneficiary of one's actions and life. He can't escape the notion of 'the moral good' being of utlity for others - so tries to compromise. Stephen shows that the good can often be both, without compromise of egoism (over-simply).

(If I may add - all of this reminds me of the common and implicit view I call the 'replaceability of man', in which each of us is called upon to put his shoulder to the wheel along with our brothers and sisters; when one falls, another steps up in his place, endlessly.. Before, even, the morality of this is rejected - how does it affect the conviction and performance of each individual effort, knowing his sacrifice - in advance?

Second, how does one man see his brother at the wheel, if not with pity, resentment or disgust?)

Mercifully, by this review, it seems Prof Kraut is effectively despatched with a scholastic knock to the head!

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Merlin,

In both agent egoism and beneficiary egoism, I mean an ethical egoism, which means the deliberatively normative. Agent egoism is rightness of the selfishness entailed in independent, self-directed thought and action. It means that thinking for oneself, sticking to one’s own reflective verdicts on what is true and right, and acting accordingly is something right. Agent egoism is the rightness of individual autonomy. Kant, Rand, and Kraut concur that that is something right. The arguments for the rightness of agent egoism would vary among them.

Beneficiary egoism is rightness of always aiming to be the beneficiary of your actions. What one would think through and do by one’s own lights when one got the draft notice during the Vietnam War would be seriously affected according to whether one accepted beneficiary egoism. Beneficiary egoism would include rightness of seeking always one’s own wellbeing and happiness.

Objectivists argue for beneficiary egoism, not only for agent egoism, as I discussed in connection with Kraut’s book. Kant and Kraut (modern Aristotelian) do not accept beneficiary egoism with its always. Kant restricts it greatly, thinking that only a little self-benefit in earthly life is necessary for preserving autonomy.

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Tony,

Thanks for the reflection. I wanted to state my own position a bit. I think Rand’s rational egoism has much towards a correct ethical theory. With the little revision of her theory (if it is a revision) I put forth in the discussion of Kraut’s book, I see an even more correct ethical theory. I took that slightly modified, near-Randian theory to be still an egoistic one. I used to think such an alteration rendered the theory not an egoistic one. But when I read Kraut’s book, it struck me as unfair in the way he set up what could count as egoism, and it occurred to me that I was also being too narrow on that.

An old criticism of egoism by me was this one: When I tell someone the truth, it is typically not primarily out of concern for my own interests, but concern for theirs. After thinking over Kraut’s arguments, I changed my view of how that stands with egoism. I think since then that my usual reason for telling the truth is not outside ethical egoism. There is a rational egoism that allows as justified that reason for telling the truth.

By my lights, any correct ethical theory must incorporate Rand’s position on the fundamental relation between value and life. By my lights also, if any theory of ethical egoism were correct, it would have to be a rational egoism. I still very much doubt an entirely egoistic theory can be correct, due to the considerations here: a, b, c, d

A word more about Kraut. As mentioned in my discussion, he does not think ethics can uniquely specify the proportion in an acceptable mix of self and other as beneficiary of one’s actions. So in his view, it is not a deficiency of an ethical theory that it cannot specify that exact proportion in the way egoism (under his formula for egoism) can specify it. I would leave open the possibility that Kraut is correct in this. Perhaps temperamental variations, all healthy, vary so profoundly as not to allow a unique specification of the mix by ethical theory. Similarly, there are ethical choices—choices significantly affecting one’s life—that one makes within Rand’s egoistic system which are not determined by that system. Examples would be what career(s) one pursues and the proportion of work and personal relationships one selects.

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  • 2 weeks later...

.

A recording of the debate noted by Neil Parille in #25, between Onkar Ghate and Michael Huemer concerning Rand’s ethics, is available here.

“Making a Virtue of Selfishness? A Debate about Ayn Rand’s Ethics”

This debate was discussed on RoR here.

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Merlin,

In both agent egoism and beneficiary egoism, I mean an ethical egoism, which means the deliberatively normative. Agent egoism is rightness of the selfishness entailed in independent, self-directed thought and action. It means that thinking for oneself, sticking to one’s own reflective verdicts on what is true and right, and acting accordingly is something right. Agent egoism is the rightness of individual autonomy. Kant, Rand, and Kraut concur that that is something right. The arguments for the rightness of agent egoism would vary among them.

Beneficiary egoism is rightness of always aiming to be the beneficiary of your actions. What one would think through and do by one’s own lights when one got the draft notice during the Vietnam War would be seriously affected according to whether one accepted beneficiary egoism. Beneficiary egoism would include rightness of seeking always one’s own wellbeing and happiness.

Objectivists argue for beneficiary egoism, not only for agent egoism, as I discussed in connection with Kraut’s book. Kant and Kraut (modern Aristotelian) do not accept beneficiary egoism with its always. Kant restricts it greatly, thinking that only a little self-benefit in earthly life is necessary for preserving autonomy.

Stephen: Your delineation and explanation helps a lot.

"Agent egoism is the rightness of individual autonomy".

I think right there is the base from where the rational egoist operates. That rightful autonomy is then

the primary - *always*. My view of it, is of a 'state of being', incorporating his virtues: of implicit, rather than of explicit actions.

Seamlessly, it connects to his world of value, action and inter-action, - therefore into the sphere of beneficiary egoism - the secondary level: which imo, is usually, or largely, but not *always*, self-targeted.

To justify "not always":

If the beneficiary is always oneself, where does that leave room for volition and independent judgment?

I really can't accept that kind of (or any) categorical imperative. For instance, the telling of truth - when it may not be of direct self-interest - is only one, important element of this, as you say in #31. I believe, when one has lived long enough (!) one comes to realize that chosen acts of other-beneficiation will not compromise one's morality or oneself: Not an iota - in fact, conversely it can be most rewarding.

Benevolence prompts some of that, but not all. "Life as the standard of value", with faithfulness to the justice in reality - pretty much complete the picture. (And all this before we arrive at close bonds with selected other individuals.)

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The Beloved Self

Morality and the Challenge from Egoism

Alison Hills (Oxford 2012)

[snip]

"Standard" egoism, Kantian egoism, and virtue egoism are the three classes of egoism chaptered in the book. Presumably, Rand best fits virtue egoism.

Thanks for mentioning this book. I have been reading it. Hills' descriptions of standard egoism and virtue egoism are excellent and clear. I agree that Rand fits under virtue egoism.

Her description of Kantian egoism is probably as good and clear as one might find, given the murkiness of Kant's writing. Her description of Kantian duty is a duty to supremely rational principles, never to God or society as Rand at least suggested. However, since Kant tried to bar self-interest and happiness as having any part of said supremely rational principles, Rand's vehement rejection of Kant's ethics is certainly understandable.

Hills tries to defend egoism from its critics. I am not done reading the book yet, but I suspect she would be an advocate of virtue egoism.

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I am done reading The Beloved Self, skipping several pages. It looked interesting before reading it, but I am not impressed.

My suspicion that she would be an advocate of "virtue egoism" was wrong. Her goal is what she calls the Holy Grail of morality -- a response to the challenge from egoism, a response that an egoist would accept and the egoist agree that egoism is false. Of course, her depiction of egoism is rather narrow -- pure self-interest without constraints. Being a predator is surely included. She clearly agrees with what she calls common sense morality. According to common sense morality, morality has practical authority -- we have reason to do what is morally right and not to do what is morally wrong, and not merely because it is usually in our interests to do so. For example, we have moral reason to help others, not to lie, not to kill, and so on. She says that egoism denies such common morality, but no sensible knave egoist is going to be very impressed by such moral reasons.

Her oft-used proposition that egoism is false -- rather than wrong -- seems unusual. Both egoism and egoists exist, so how can they be false?

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  • 1 year later...

Related to ##27-38:

The new issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies includes an essay by Marsha Enright titled "The Problem with Selfishness."

. . .
John Aglialoro, a co-producer of the film Atlas Shrugged Part II was quoted recently in an interview:*

“The left dismisses Ayn Rand,” he says. “The version of her that they attack is childish, it’s a cartoon.” But he understands why. “I wish she didn’t say ‘selfishness’ as she did. That she was for ‘selfishness.’ She was human, and probably meant that in a rhetorical way. But if she was on this earth again, maybe she’d put it another way.”

No. And she would be right to decline that alteration. The center of pure self-interest is pure selfishness. That pure form of selfishness is articulated—expressly, by the name selfishness—in The Fountainhead, where it is contrasted to a variety of conceptions commonly accepted as selfishness. Her novel argues that the latter are incoherent and at odds with pure selfishness, which entails independence and a certain kind of integrity. It is not only those unfitting parts in common conceptions of selfishness that are attacked as immoral in our culture. It is also pure selfishness, as exposed by Rand in Fountainhead, that is daily attacked in moral criticism of behavior by voices such as those speaking Christianity.

Rand was right in the Preface to The Virtue of Selfishness to defend her choice of the term selfishness as naming a core of human being needing to be championed. I would wish only she had added, “See also The Fountainhead.” Yes, selfishness in common parlance entails things excluded and antithetical to the selfishness Rand applauded. That makes for an invitation to further examination of the phenomena and the concept of selfishness. I mean among open-minded readers. Such are not those who understand well enough what is Rand’s ethical egoism and understand well enough the selfishness she was holding up as a glory, but are then smearing it for the sake of religion and politics, in a word, for the sake of old mistaken morality.
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Suppose Ayn Rand had used "egoism", "self-interest", or "self-determination" rather than "selfishness" as the title of her book. It would been less provocative but more accurate about what she meant.

Defending her choice (VoS, introduction), she wrote: "In popular usage, the word "selfishness" is a synonym of evil; the image it conjures is of a murderous brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own ends, who cares for no living being and pursues nothing but the gratification of the mindless whims of any immediate moment."

That is mostly incorrect. Like I say in my JARS article, Egoism And/Or Altruism (link), we learn the far more common usage of "selfishness" while children. It describes a child who wants to play with other children's toys but is unwilling to share his/her own toys, hogs things, or otherwise disregards other people. That meaning is deeply engrained in popular usage, and any attempt to overcome it faces a very steep uphill battle.

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Suppose Ayn Rand had used "egoism", "self-interest", or "self-determination" rather than "selfishness" as the title of her book. It would been less provocative but more accurate about what she meant.

Defending her choice (VoS, introduction), she wrote: "In popular usage, the word "selfishness" is a synonym of evil; the image it conjures is of a murderous brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own ends, who cares for no living being and pursues nothing but the gratification of the mindless whims of any immediate moment."

That is mostly incorrect. Like I say in my JARS article, Egoism And/Or Altruism (link), we learn the far more common usage of "selfishness" while children. It describes a child who wants to play with other children's toys but is unwilling to share his/her own toys, hogs things, or otherwise disregards other people. That meaning is deeply engrained in popular usage, and any attempt to overcome it faces a very steep uphill battle.

So Rand was wrong and stupid, huh? Needed you to clear things up.

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[Ayn Rand] wrote: "In popular usage, the word "selfishness" is a synonym of evil; the image it conjures is of a murderous brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own ends, who cares for no living being and pursues nothing but the gratification of the mindless whims of any immediate moment."

That is mostly incorrect. Like I say in my JARS article, Egoism And/Or Altruism ... we learn the far more common usage of "selfishness" while children. It describes a child who wants to play with other children's toys but is unwilling to share his/her own toys, hogs things, or otherwise disregards other people.

So Rand was wrong and stupid, huh? Needed you to clear things up.

Allow me to mediate by pointing out that what we of the Baby Boom generation learned was not necessarily what Rand learned in the generation before.

In The Fountainhead, egoism and egoTism are not differentiated. Later, she noted the problem and chalked it up to both her own unfamiliarity with the nuances of English, but also to the inexact usage of both words.

Speaking once to my teenaged daughter, I said: "The difference between us is that as a egoist, I place my self-interest above the interests of other people. As an egoTist, you do not even recognize that other people have interests." (... changes a lightbulb by holding it in the socket and letting the world revolve around her.")

Dictionary.com places the origin of egoTist at 1705-1715, but cautions that it can be confused with egoist.

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/egotist

The Oxford Dictionaries Online say:

"The words egoism and egotism are frequently treated as interchangeable, but there are distinctions which are worth noting. Egotism, the more commonly used term, means ‘the fact of being excessively conceited or absorbed in oneself’. Strictly speaking, egoism is a term used in Ethics to mean ‘a theory that treats self-interest as the foundation of moral behaviour’, although this sense is not dominant today; around 90 per cent of the citations for egoism in the Oxford English Corpus are for the meaning ‘excessive conceit’."

See also Mirriam-Webster online. (Origin 1714).

In ethics, the principle that we should each act so as to promote our own interests. The great advantage of such a position is that it avoids any possible conflict between morality and self-interest; if it is rational for us to pursue our own interest, the rationality of morality is equally clear. The prescriptive thesis of ethical egoism can be distinguished from the descriptive thesis of psychological egoism. Psychological egoism is a generalization about human motivation, namely, that everyone always acts so as to promote his or her own interests.

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/egotism

ego·ism noun \ˈē-gə-ˌwi-zəm, -gō-ˌi- also ˈe-\
1
a : a doctrine that individual self-interest is the actual motive of all conscious action

b : a doctrine that individual self-interest is the valid end of all actions

http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/egoism

Note that I cite these not as technical authorities but as metrics of common culture. Contrary to what most educated people seem to believe, "the dictionary" (and many exist) does not tell you what a word "really means" but how "everyone" uses it. For a technical word such as "coulomb" or "cantilever" or "metastasis" the "everyone" will be those technically competent in an area of study. However, for most words, the definition will be what the editors find that "most" people mean when they use a word.

Selfishness, capitalism, and romanticism are easy for us. But note also that while "the dictionary" may give the technical definition correctly, in common usage, voltage is confused with current, mass with weight, tension with deformation, fishes are separated from animals, and so on. And any number of politically aware, university-educated people will be happy to explain to you why the USSR did not have real communism.

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Looking again the the Mirriam-Webster note on Egoism, I must say that we seem to be making progress.

The great advantage of such a position is that it avoids any possible conflict between morality and self-interest; if it is rational for us to pursue our own interest, the rationality of morality is equally clear.
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This is deeply troubling:

Much worse than a smear about being selfish, it trivializes it.

That is not only the psychological view, it is homo economicus, the calculating profit-maker, the only person perceived by economists. As for the former it is not "the" psychological perspective, as psychology has many. Most schools of thought place great(er) emphasis on sub-conscious motives, rather than the facile claim of "always acting to promote one's self interest." In fact, we do not always act for economic profit, even in market contexts.

We all know the experience of buying something for cash in an open market. If the seller can round $26.14 down to twenty-six even, then certainly for $26.84, you can say, "Keep the change." I do that at coin shows, and for more than cents on the dollar. Dealers are expected to do it. Buyers are not; so I do.

I believe that the best anthropological explanation for commerce is that it began with ritual gift exchange. It is hard to place the oldest seashells daubed with red ochre because older ones are found: 35,000 years ago ... 92,000 years ago... But their location far from the sea suggests that they were passed to at least one other person.

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I believe that the best anthropological explanation for commerce is that it began with ritual gift exchange. It is hard to place the oldest seashells daubed with red ochre because older ones are found: 35,000 years ago ... 92,000 years ago... But their location far from the sea suggests that they were passed to at least one other person.

In spite of our war like passions and tendencies, we homo saps are a trading, talking, story exchanging lot. That is why we have survived and that is why there is some hope for us. Homo saps not only fight with each other (at times) but we sit down with each other to break bread, we bed down with each other (selectively I hope!!!) to make love and or babies. We love to gab with each other. Our story telling urge is probably one of the most important social processes humans have. We are a talkative lot and most of the time we would rather talk and sometimes yell at each other rather than spill blood. Some of us, have a mechanical and or scientific knack. If we let these people do their thing, that make life a lot more comfortable.

In spite of my social disabilities I have come to like our tribe of advanced ape. Who knows, some day we can become bonobos rather than chimps.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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