New Developments re Harriman Induction book

[merjet]

And though I am a staunch defender of inductive reasoning, I am left dumbfounded by HarriPei's claim that the validity of induction is an "unchallengeable given."

George,

Sorry for this aside, but I keep chuckling. So I might as well get it out.

You used "HarriPei" several times to refer to Harriman and Peikoff, The poet in me kept hearing the tug of the "between the lines."

I wondered about that, too. http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=hairy+pie

[George H. Smith]

And though I am a staunch defender of inductive reasoning, I am left dumbfounded by HarriPei's claim that the validity of induction is an "unchallengeable given."

George,

Sorry for this aside, but I keep chuckling. So I might as well get it out.

You used "HarriPei" several times to refer to Harriman and Peikoff, The poet in me kept hearing the tug of the "between the lines." Why does this seem so oddball and off, like a sour note in a song, but also seems related in a quirky manner? It's just an abbreviation made from joined elisions. And it looks like some kind of Oriental abbreviation, which has nothing to do with nothing.

Hmmmm...

Then I thought about the pronunciation. How do you pronounce that?

Oh...

Hairy pee.

Bingo.

I'll let the metaphors rest right there...

(Back to more serious stuff...)

Michael

At first I was going to write HarriPeik, but then the six-year-old kid inside me screamed out, and I went for the "pee" angle.

[George H. Smith]

Stephen and George,

Do you think Whewell's "consilience of inductions" is similar to Harriman's "integration"?

I peeked at Whewell's Theory of Scientific Method on Google Books and it seems so. See page 18.

There are definitely some similarities.

Whewell's best known idea was the role of "colligation" in induction. Here is how the article on Whewell in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes colligation:

Whewell's first explicit, lengthy discussion of induction is found in his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences, founded upon their History, which was originally published in 1840 (a second, enlarged edition appeared in 1847, and the third edition appeared as three separate works published between 1858 and 1860). He called his induction “Discoverers' Induction” and explained that it is used to discover both phenomenal and causal laws. Whewell considered himself to be a follower of Bacon, and claimed to be “renovating” Bacon's inductive method; thus one volume of the third edition of the Philosophy is entitled Novum Organon Renovatum. Whewell followed Bacon in rejecting the standard, overly-narrow notion of induction that holds induction to be merely simple enumeration of instances. Rather, Whewell explained that, in induction, “there is a New Element added to the combination [of instances] by the very act of thought by which they were combined” (1847, II, 48). This “act of thought” is a process Whewell called “colligation.” Colligation, according to Whewell, is the mental operation of bringing together a number of empirical facts by “superinducing” upon them a conception which unites the facts and renders them capable of being expressed by a general law. The conception thus provides the “true bond of Unity by which the phenomena are held together” (1847, II, 46), by providing a property shared by the known members of a class (in the case of causal laws, the colligating property is that of sharing the same cause).

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Here are some interesting biographical details about Whewell, from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy linked in my last post.

William Whewell (1794–1866) was one of the most important and influential figures in nineteenth-century Britain. Whewell, a polymath, wrote extensively on numerous subjects, including mechanics, mineralogy, geology, astronomy, political economy, theology, educational reform, international law, and architecture, as well as the works that remain the most well-known today in philosophy of science, history of science, and moral philosophy. He was one of the founding members and an early president of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, a fellow of the Royal Society, president of the Geological Society, and longtime Master of Trinity College, Cambridge. In his own time his influence was acknowledged by the major scientists of the day, such as John Herschel, Charles Darwin, Charles Lyell and Michael Faraday, who frequently turned to Whewell for philosophical and scientific advice, and, interestingly, for terminological assistance. Whewell invented the terms “anode,” “cathode,” and “ion” for Faraday. Upon the request of the poet Coleridge in 1833 Whewell invented the English word “scientist;” before this time the only terms in use were “natural philosopher” and “man of science.”

Ghs

[merjet]

Induction and Concept-Formation in Francis Bacon and William Whewell by John McCaskey. This is the John McCaskey referred to in post #1 of this thread. Edited September 21, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[sjw]

It mystifies me why Harriman's book on the history of induction in science doesn't give so much as a passing nod to Whewell, who was one of the great pioneers in this field.

Ghs

How many other people do you know who are as widely and thoroughly read as you are? You are the only person I have *ever* had experience with who has that kind of knowledge. You should be put up in a room somewhere at the top of the ivory tower (no insult intended) and all the young PhD's should have to bring their ideas up to see what they've reinvented.

Shayne

[Robert Campbell]

Nor did I say anything about "eager to please."

With your conspiracy antennae, you should be able to connect the dots.

Ms. Stuttle has retreated so far into mysterianism, there are no longer any dots to connect.

I shall henceforth leave the interpretation of her oracular utterances to others.

Robert Campbell

[George H. Smith]

Induction and Concept-Formation in Francis Bacon and William Whewell by John McCaskey. This is the John McCaskey referred to in post #1 of this thread.

This is an outstanding article. McCaskey knows more about Whewell than I do, and he discusses a number of significant similarities between Whewell and the Rand/Peikoff approach that had not occurred to me.

McCaskey concludes:

I suspect that further investigation of all thinkers on the line would offer valuable insight into questions about those relationships between induction and concept-formation currently at the forefront of Objectivist research.

Bingo! How this differs from the standard Ortho approach. McCaskey's article should have been mentioned in Harriman's book, but I couldn't find any mention of it.

McCaskey is obviously a thoughtful, knowledgeable, and objective scholar. It is difficult for me to understand how he could get along with the ARIans for as long as he did.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

It mystifies me why Harriman's book on the history of induction in science doesn't give so much as a passing nod to Whewell, who was one of the great pioneers in this field.

Ghs

How many other people do you know who are as widely and thoroughly read as you are? You are the only person I have *ever* had experience with who has that kind of knowledge. You should be put up in a room somewhere at the top of the ivory tower (no insult intended) and all the young PhD's should have to bring their ideas up to see what they've reinvented.

Shayne

Thanks.

As I mentioned not long ago on another thread, I have met many people who know more raw facts than I do. My memory is a little above average at best, so as I have read through thousands of books over the past 45 years, I haven't paid much attention to details, unless they are directly relevant to something I am working on at the time, since I would quickly forget them anyway. Instead, I try to get a sense of the essentials of a book, so that I can refer back to it years later, as needed.

I first read some of Whewell's material c. 1980 (though I had heard of him before) while I was browsing the stacks at the UCLA Research Library (where I used to spend half my life). The parts I read from his Philosophy of Induction struck me as very interesting, but it wasn't pertinent to any current project, so I made a mental note to pick up with him at some point in the future.

Then, around 6 years ago, I found a used copy in a local bookstore of William Whewell's Scientific Method, an anthology of some of his key writings on induction. I quickly read the book after getting it -- meaning, I spent a few hours with it, as I do with every book upon first purchasing it -- but, again, the subject was not currently relevant to a project, so I put it on a shelf. It came off the shelf a few weeks ago, as I got involved with the OL debates over induction, and this time I read it more carefully.

In order for the details of a topic to stick in my mind, I need a "hook" that connects the material to an interest of mine. This is the main reason I participate in exchanges on OL. I often use the opportunity to read or review important literature on the topic at hand. These debates provide the motive; they give me a reason to delve into a subject in more depth than I might otherwise do.

Despite my self-assured tone when writing posts, I have never deluded myself into believing that I know all about a subject that I need to know. Continuous learning is one of the greatest joys of life. Without it even the most active mind will quickly stagnate.

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

The real problem, as I have stated many times before, is not with the reasoning per se, but with the empirical matter of determining when we are dealing with things and circumstances that are relevantly similar. This often isn't a problem in everyday life -- no one really doubts, for instance, the empirical generalization that a blowtorch pointed at your bare hand for five minutes from five inches away will cause a burn -- but matters are rarely this simple in science. Hence the need for controlled experiments.

Well, yes.

And Harriman says that properly formed concepts are green lights to induction, whereas improperly formed ones are red lights to induction. But he fails to specify principles of proper formation that can be applied going forward.

Aristotle's distinction between "natural" and "violent" motion turned out to involve improperly formed concepts. Could Aristotle have recognized that they were improperly formed? Could anyone else, knowing what Aristotle and his contemporaries knew, have recognized that? Or could they be seen as improperly formed only when replaced by concepts that were properly formed, such as Galileo's?

(I'll leave aside for now the cases where Harriman levels a charge of arbitrariness rather than incorrect formation. I don't see any clear line between them in his book, but Harriman is more likely to call ideas that he strongly rejects arbitrary.)

And a retroactive judgment that some concept was improperly formed is a case of subsequent progress leading to a discovery that there was an error—and to its correction. But from the Peikovian standpoint, the discovery and subsequent correction of error is deeply problematic: the Peikovian ideal seems to be a completely error-free process that tracks from truth to truths to more truths.

Further, are controlled experiments (whose value Harriman recognizes) always going to be enough? Or do you need some idea of what's worth doing experiments on, and what isn't?

Robert Campbell

[Robert Campbell]

Harriman's failure to mention Whewell is one reason why I strongly suspect that Allan Gotthelf won't be buttonholing his colleagues at Pitt and telling them they must read Harriman.

Because his colleagues in history and philosophy of science will know their Whewell, expect Harriman to know his, and be surprised to find no reference.

Meanwhile, I hope Harriman didn't keep Whewell out of his book because McCaskey had mentioned him.

But such perverse dynamics have been known to operate among the Orthodoxy.

Robert Campbell

[Selene]

Nor did I say anything about "eager to please."

With your conspiracy antennae, you should be able to connect the dots.

Ms. Stuttle has retreated so far into mysterianism, there are no longer any dots to connect.

I shall henceforth leave the interpretation of her oracular utterances to others.

Robert Campbell

No not mysterianism!

Lobby card for the 1959

Plot

Scientifically advanced wanderers from the destroyed planet Mysteroid request a patch of land on Earth and the right to marry earthling women. After a demonstration of their destructive abilities from the help of their giant robot Moguera, mankind must decide whether to capitulate or to resist. Predictably, the earthlings choose to resist. The Mysterians have giant burrowing dome/bases that can come up out of the earth and deploy death rays that emanate from the dome's crown and can melt tanks and jeeps as if they were plastic.

Miraculously, the earthlings develop their own death-ray equipped, agile rocket-aircraft, which enable them to blow up the domes.

Wow! This just might fit!

Edited September 21, 2010 by Selene

[Robert Campbell]

Adam,

I'm not that well versed in the lower reaches of American cinema

Some philosophers call the position that some phenomenon is inherently resistant to explanation "myseterian."

I'd thought someone might react with a video of "96 Tears."

But maybe now I know where ? and the Mysterians got their name.

Robert Campbell

[9thdoctor]

At first I was going to write HarriPeik, but then the six-year-old kid inside me screamed out, and I went for the "pee" angle.

HarriPeik would have evoked the image of a Pekingese, and there's no way it would have fit.

[merjet]

Here is some more interesting reading about Whewell, Mill, and induction.

The Whewell-Mill Debate in a Nutshell 6 pages

Learning from Concepts and Consilience: A Continuation of the Whewell-Mill Debate 30 pages

Edited September 22, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Ellen Stuttle]

I haven't a clue re Gotthelf re Peikoff and expressed no opinion re Gotthelf's Amazon review. Only that Binswanger is genuinely enthused by Peikoff's proposed solution to the problem of induction and thinks it does the job.

This question isn't addressed to Ellen specifically, but I would like someone to tell me: What exactly is Harriman's solution to the problem of induction? [....]

Although you asked in terms of "Harriman's solution," the supposed solution is Peikoff's.

Peikoff's "solution," in a phrase, is concept formation non-contradictorily performed and integrated.

I think the key sections--taken "nearly verbatim" from Peikoff's lectures on "Induction in Physics and Philosophy"--are these excerpted from pages 26-35.

If this somehow seems insufficient or problematic.....

(I think it's a magician's sleight of hand and leads to throwing the correspondence theory of truth out the window.)

The Logical Leap

pp. 26-28

Conceptualizing First-Level Causal Connections

What turns [perceptions of cause and effect] into generalizations? What mediates the passage from a causal connection linking particulars to a universally applicable truth? The answer lies in man's distinctive means of dealing cognitively with particulars: his conceptual faculty. The essence of concept-formation is the passage from particulars to universals.

[....]

In utilizing concepts as his cognitive tools, [the first-level inducer] is thereby omitting the measurements of the particular causal connection he perceives. "Fire" relates the yellow-orange flames he perceives to all such, regardless of their varying measurements; the same applies to "paper" and the process of "burning." Hence the first statement of his concrete observation: "Fire burns paper." This statement is simply a conceptualization of the perceived data--which is what makes it a generalization.

Notice that when our first-level inducer identifies a perceived causal connection in words, he does not do it as a description of unique concretes, even though that is all he perceives; he at once states a universal truth. [....] Logically, the generalization must come first [before the child can describe particular instances]; it is the direct product of applying one's conceptual apparatus to the perceived connection.

[....] Inherent in forming and applying a concept is the understanding that what counts cognitively is only the identity of its referents. The mere passage of time or the mere change of location, assuming everything else remains the same, makes no difference to one's conclusions, because the concept of an existent subsumes all instances everywhere, past, present, and future.

Because of his simple, first-level conceptual structure, our inducer, in the very act of naming what he perceives, automatically drops the measurements of the perceived cause and effect and thereby gains knowledge transcending the given concrete. This is how he is able to grasp that the cause pertains to pushing as such, and the effect to balls as such, no matter where or when the ball is pushed.

[....]

A generalization is the conceptualization of cause and effect; i.e., induction may be described as measurement-omission applied to causal connections. It is nothing more (or less) than an essential form of the method of concept-formation. Just as a concept, through measurement-omission, integrates an unlimited number of particular existents of a certain kind into a single word, so does a certain union of concepts integrate through measurement-omission an unlimited number of particular causal sequences of a certain kind into a single proposition that subsumes them all: a generalization.

Let us now sum up in regard to the axioms of induction. When a first-level inducer identifies his concrete experience of cause and effect in terms of words, his perceptual grasp of the causal relationship becomes thereby a conceptual grasp of it, i.e., a generalization. And since the application of first-level concepts is automatic and self-evident, the two aspects of a first-level generalization--the perceptual and the conceptual--are each, to a human mind, self-evident.

Hence, the conclusion: There are, at the base of all future inductions, absolutely certain first-level generalizations, which extend beyond all possible perception yet follow self-evidently from man's highly limited perceptual experiences, as and when this is processed by his conceptual faculty.

In the next section, Peikoff (as reported "nearly verbatim") claims to "penetrate to the essence of inductive reasoning on any level."

pp. 29-35

The Structure of Inductive Reasoning

[....]

The challenge to logicians and philosophers is to identify a form of reasoning hitherto unacknowledged: a form of reasoning in which the conclusion follows from its premises necessarily, but not deductively. In this type of case, the conclusion does state something new--something that goes beyond all earlier knowledge. Yet that same conclusion, given the earlier knowledge, is inescapable, compelling the mind's acquiescence on pain of self-contradiction.

The lead to solving this problem may be found in our study of the process of reaching first-level generalizations. As we have seen, two elements are involved: the grasp in a concrete form of a causal process, and the conceptual identification of this process. This combination is what validates a first-level generalization. How might this pattern apply to complex, higher-level generalizations?

[....]

If one grasps the observations in [the case of Franklin and the kite], and knows that the conceptual framework is valid, then the generalization follows necessarily. Its denial under these conditions would involve a contradiction. One who denied Franklin's generalization would be contradicting either direct observations and/or a valid conceptual framework.

Whether we speak of first-level or advanced induction, therefore, the same two elements are involved: the grasp of a causal process through concrete observations, and the use of concepts to identify it. The main difference between beginner and scientist here lies in the complexity of the requisite conceptual framework.

[....]

The structure of inductive reasoning, in general, on any level, is observation; the application of one's total conceptual framework; and therefore, necessarily, a generalization.

Now we see the real contrast between induction and deduction. [....]

Deduction is a simple form of reasoning. [The deducer] takes as a given that the conceptual faculty has been used to gain profound new knowledge, and that it has been used properly. [....]

In contrast, an inductive argument is not a self-contained series of premises from which the conclusion follows as a matter of formal consistency. The reason is that the bridge from observation to generalization is not one premise, or even a hundred premises, but the total of one's knowledge properly integrated. [....]

Deduction says : given one specific relation of concepts (e.g., "man" and "mortality"), X must follow. Induction says: Given the entire system of concepts, X must follow. In deduction the conclusion is necessary--otherwise you negate one specific product of the conceptual faculty, one specific generalization. In induction the conclusion is necessary--otherwise you negate the whole system of human concepts, i.e., the sum of knowledge gained by man's reason, i.e., the rational faculty as such.

The problem of induction has been insolvable for so long, because the nature of human consciousness has been misunderstood for so long. To solve the problem of deduction, one must grasp that A is A--which is Aristotle's monumental achievement. But to solve the problem of induction, one must grasp another monumental achievement: Ayn Rand's theory of concepts.

Deduction takes for granted the process of conceptualization. Induction is the conceptualizing process itself in action.

[BaalChatzaf]

Harriman's book is little to do about not much. Whewell covered the same ground and better one hundred and fifty years ago.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited September 23, 2010 by BaalChatzaf

[merjet]

Although you asked in terms of "Harriman's solution," the supposed solution is Peikoff's.

Peikoff's "solution," in a phrase, is concept formation non-contradictorily performed and integrated.

I think the key sections--taken "nearly verbatim" from Peikoff's lectures on "Induction in Physics and Philosophy"--are these excerpted from pages 26-35.

If this somehow seems insufficient or problematic.....

(I think it's a magician's sleight of hand and leads to throwing the correspondence theory of truth out the window.)

Please explain. How does he throw the correspondence theory of truth out the window? Can you give particular examples?

A generalization is the conceptualization of cause and effect; i.e., induction may be described as measurement-omission applied to causal connections. It is nothing more (or less) than an essential form of the method of concept-formation. Just as a concept, through measurement-omission, integrates an unlimited number of particular existents of a certain kind into a single word, so does a certain union of concepts integrate through measurement-omission an unlimited number of particular causal sequences of a certain kind into a single proposition that subsumes them all: a generalization.(p. 28)

So Peikoff is trying to put measurement-omission as the centerpiece of induction. The word mantra comes to mind.

The challenge to logicians and philosophers is to identify a form of reasoning hitherto unacknowledged: a form of reasoning in which the conclusion follows from its premises necessarily, but not deductively. In this type of case, the conclusion does state something new--something that goes beyond all earlier knowledge. Yet that same conclusion, given the earlier knowledge, is inescapable, compelling the mind's acquiescence on pain of self-contradiction. (p. 30)

Hitherto unacknowledged? It seems that Whewell held at least some inductions yield necessary conclusions. Part of Theory of Scientific Method by William Whewell and Robert E. Butts can be seen on Google Books. "Whewell thought that any particular science would eventually arrive at generalizations so inclusive and so simple that they would be seen as propositions that not only express the facts but expressed the fact in a way that the mind would apprehend as necessary" (p. 24). I will have the book in my hands soon, so I may say more later. As for the conclusion stating something new and going beyond all earlier knowledge, Whewell's idea of colligation does that.

Harriman's book is little to do about not much. Whewell covered the same ground and better one hundred and fifty years ago.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Can you elaborate on that?

Edited September 23, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Brant Gaede]

I have yet to read one word, one sentence, one paragraph or one article that explains why The Problem of Induction is a problem except when you cleave it from deduction, but that creates the problem of deduction caused by cleaving from it induction. This problem is really the problem of making statements of knowledge accepted as absolute truth from an intellectual-moral authority and has nothing to do with improving scientific methodology unless you want Lysenkoism. Peikoff can deliver his opinions and his followers can go around remarking "Absolutely!" about them. Before this was mostly a cultural aspect of Objectivism. Good luck to anyone in making it an intellectual one.

--Brant

[sjw]

I have yet to read one word, one sentence, one paragraph or one article that explains why The Problem of Induction is a problem except when you cleave it from deduction, but that creates the problem of deduction caused by cleaving from it induction. This problem is really the problem of making statements of knowledge accepted as absolute truth from an intellectual-moral authority and has nothing to do with improving scientific methodology unless you want Lysenkoism. Peikoff can deliver his opinions and his followers can go around remarking "Absolutely!" about them. Before this was mostly a cultural aspect of Objectivism. Good luck to anyone in making it an intellectual one.

--Brant

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Problem_of_induction

But I agree Brant, it's not a "problem" in the sense of there being a single solution, any more than there's a single solution to the "problem" of deduction -- the solution is all of Aristotle's logic. The problem really is a completion of the work of Aristotle and a finished epistemological theory. No Objectivist will provide this, because once he did, he would no longer be an Objectivist.

Shayne

[Robert Campbell]

Merlin,

As George has previously noted, the doctrine of contextual certainty tends toward relativism and is, at the very least, in tension with any notion of truth by correspondence.

HarriPei are heavily invested in the doctrine of contextual certainty, and Harriman is none too clear about the epistemological context for Newton's laws of motion (how far, if at all, does it go beyond what Isaac Newton actually knew?)

The doctrine of the arbitrary, which Harriman never brings out in toto, but breaks into pieces and scatters through his book, is also in conflict with truth by correspondence insofar as arbitrary assertions are supposedly neither true nor false.

When Harriman says the induction involves the total context of the inducer's knowledge, he never shows how everything the inducer already knew is sufficiently relevant to the generalization that the inducer has arrived at. He uses language that is typical for advocates of coherence theories and that strongly affirms Peikoff's Hegelian and Parmenidean tendencies.

Also, the contrast Harriman draws between totaiizing induction and deduction that could be done from self-contained premises looks to be at odds with those passages in OPAR where Peikoff wants little to do with deduction from self-contained premises. It's one of the weirder aspects of a book that can get pretty strange: in OPAR, Peikoff denounces deduction from any premises that he deems arbitrary, and seems to have little use for any deducing that is not done from premises already known to be true.

Robert Campbell

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....]

(I think [Peikoff's "solution" is] a magician's sleight of hand and leads to throwing the correspondence theory of truth out the window.)

Please explain. How does he throw the correspondence theory of truth out the window? Can you give particular examples?

Yes. His own examples -- pushing-rolling-a-ball and fire burning.

Peikoff himself (the quotes I think are indeed "nearly verbatim," with an omission noted below, from his lectures, a couple of which I heard on tape) cites both as self-evidently and universally correct -- while, in the details, providing instances where the first isn't correct. I'll give direct quotes when I have time.

The "fire" example...yes, of course, fire burns. That's what we mean (in typical English) by "fire" -- burning something.

The example he gives extending supposedly self-evident "first-level" generalizations -- Franklin and the kite (I left out quotes of that segment in what I posted) -- I don't consider even an example of "induction." Instead, an example of putting together this and that observations and drawing an almost-straight deductive conclusion that lightning is a subcategory of the already-established concept "electricity."

An historical detail. In the tapes, Peikoff credits Greg Salmieri (sp?) for saving him, Peikoff, a lot of time by pointing to "direct perception" of "first-level" self-evidently (supposedly) correct generalizations (by which Peikoff means universally true statements). That part is left out of the "nearly vebatim" transcript.

Ellen

[merjet]

As George has previously noted, the doctrine of contextual certainty tends toward relativism and is, at the very least, in tension with any notion of truth by correspondence.

I take it you refer to posts like the following, which includes:

So far as I can recall, Peikoff never expressly defends the notion of degrees of truth, but this notion is an important aspect of the traditional coherence theory of truth. And it has been pointed out previously that Peikoff, despite his technical adherence to the correspondence theory of truth, says a number of things (e.g., about complete integration) that are characteristic of the coherence theory.

An idea can be more or less integrated, and since there can be degrees of integration (i.e., coherence), there can also be degrees of truth, according to the coherence theory. But I should note that Peikoff's use of both the correspondence and coherence theories is not necessarily inconsistent. A philosopher can claim that correspondence is the meaning of "truth," while also maintaining that coherence is the primary criterion, or test, of truth.

This and Peikoff's claims about the truth status of arbitrary claims (that you have noted) imply he deviates from the traditional correspondence theory of truth. However, Ellen's claim was that he was throwing it out, and that surprised me. In relation to coherence, integration is a strong component of Rand's epistemology, and attempts at integrating are essentially coherence tests.

P.S. I wrote about these issues in Objectivity. Page down to page 98 from here. Warning: Loading is very slow.

Edited September 24, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[George H. Smith]

As George has previously noted, the doctrine of contextual certainty tends toward relativism and is, at the very least, in tension with any notion of truth by correspondence.

I have no serious problem with a theory of contextual certainty per se. I think it is a very useful approach, one I have used myself for many years, and I don't think it leads to relativism. My objections have been directed at the equating of contextually justified beliefs with truth and at the corresponding claim that knowledge consists of nothing more than justified belief.

See my discussion here .

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

Merlin,

You cite the heavily holistic passage on p. 123 of OPAR—the one that seems to jump out at nearly everyone—in support of Peikoff's proximity to Bradley and Blanshard.

But, as you further note, Peikoff makes the following claim on p. 171 (which is part of Chapter 5, along with his accounts of certainty and arbitrariness):

Logical processing of an idea within a specific context of knowledge is necessary and sufficient to establish it is true.

And your comment is apposite:

At times it seems Peikoff is more of a coherentist than was Rand herself. The last quotation, for instance, seems in effect to say that coherence establishes truth, a far stronger claim than that coherence is a sign, or criterion, of truth. (1993, p. 99)

If Peikoff really believes that such logical processing is sufficient to prove a claim true, this may help to explain some other extreme statements; for instance, that "the arbitrary" is contextless and incapable of being logically processed. it may also help to explain his strictures on the use of deductive logic, such as no drawing of inferences from allegedly arbitrary premises.

But, as Ms. Stuttle pointed out, if first-level "gens" are true in the broadest possible context, then (apparently) no future evidence can contradict them. So if the kid discovers that balls roll when pushed, and later adds a qualification—not appliclable when the ball is made of iron and is sitting on top of a strong magnet—how are we to apply HarriPei's criteria?

Apparently, the gen about balls rolling is true as soon as the toddler arrives at it, in the form in which the toddler arrived at it. But the toddler wasn't aware of any qualifications or exceptions, so the gen was originally unqualified—and is therefore, apparently, true without qualification. And later discoveries of exceptions, qualifications, boundary conditions cannot detract from its truth.

According to any version of the correspondence theory, the original gen is obviously not true without qualification, because the toddler set no limits on it, and it therefore pertains to some cases in which balls will not roll when pushed.

Therefore, when HarriPei claim not merely that the gen is true in the toddler's context of knowledge, but that it is true in the broadest possible context, now and forevermore, they aren't just knocking a chip out of the correspondence theory of truth, they've left the whole damn thing out on the curb.

And when Harriman takes a poke at Popper, for maintaining that one's generalizations apply to data and in circumstances one has never encountered—even in ones that one will never encounter—he seems to be going after Sir Karl for adhering to the correspondence theory.

More generally, HarriPei don't seem to want anything to do with the notion that learning sometimes involves making errors and correcting them.

Robert Campbell