David Harriman's Book


Robert Campbell

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(As I recall JS Mill offered a variety of different types of induction, but ultimately admitted they all boiled down to the enumerative method).

Your recall is poor. This page indicates the importance of eliminative methods that go beyond simple enumeration.

It may well be - and who are we Popperians to complain about an eliminative instead of enumerative method! But who cares now, because Merry Christmas:

! Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Popper's objections to induction are the same as Hume's. He says he merely took Hume's objection more seriously than Hume did (although he disagrees with Hume's theory of knowledge). It seems pretty reasonable to consider Hume's objections "run of the mill" by now.

I feel weird saying this, but in some ways I give Popper more credit than you seem to do. It is a gross oversimplification to say that Popper's objections to induction were the same as Hume's.

Popper did more than reject Hume's epistemology; he rejected the theory of causation that was intimately linked to Hume's criticism of induction. As Popper wrote in "An Afterthought on Induction" (Objective Knowledge, p. 86):

This Humean argument of the invalidity of induction was, at the same time, the heart of his disproof of the existence of a causal link. But as such I found it neither very relevant nor valid.

Despite his various objections to Hume's approach, Popper claims to have found in Hume "a gem of priceless value for the theory of objective knowledge; a simple, straightforward, logical refutation of any claim that induction could be a valid argument, or a justifiable way of reasoning." Now, what was this priceless gem? Popper (p. 86) writes: "Induction, Hume had shown, was invalid because it led to an infinite regress."

The problem is that this was not Hume's argument. Hume contended that inductive reasoning involves circular reasoning, not an infinite regress. As he wrote in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , when we argue from past experience to what will occur in the future, we do so on the supposition that "the future will resemble the past," and this "must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question." (Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed., pp. 35-36.)

The difference here is substantial, because if it can be show that belief in the uniformity of nature can be justified independently of any particular inductive inference (as I believe it can), then Hume's argument lacks force. Not so if inductive reasoning involves an infinite regress, as Popper contends.

More needs to be said about this topic, obviously, but I want to do my best to avoid writing long and complex posts. In my experience people tend not to read such posts, or at least not read them very carefully.

Ghs

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Suppose you ask a person why he believes that eating will satisfy his hunger. He will give a response very similar to the one I gave. But then you, being a true Popperian, correct him:

"No, no, that's not why you believe this at all. You see, at some point in your life -- perhaps when you were a baby -- you got hungry and were curious what would satisfy it. You then formed a hypothesis; you conjectured that, well, maybe eating something will end my hunger. Then you decided to test your hypothesis, i.e., to falsify it, by eating some food. That didn't falsify your hypothesis, so you stayed with that conjecture, and, like any rational person, you are still attempting to falsify it. But you haven't so far, so when someone asks if you are certain that eating will satisfy your hunger, you should say: No, of course not; I could never be certain of such a thing. All I say is that I have not yet been able to falsify my hypothesis."

What balderdash this is.

Well I agree, but then you wrote it.

You are getting with the program, at long last. :rolleyes:

Actually, in terms of say a biological process like eating, Popper argues that our bodies are programmed with expectations; a baby does not need to first receive hypothetico-deductive instruction before looking for their mother's breast. But Popper argues these in-built expectations have no more rational weight than any other expectation - the mother's breast may turn out to actually be the solidified sap of a tree, suitably shaped. The baby's in-built expectations may be mistaken - they are therefore a form of hypothesis, or guess.

A one-day-old infant who can can form a hypothesis? Very impressive.

An innate expectation, which seems to be nothing more than another term for "instinct," has nothing to do with this issue. Even if we say that we have an innate desire for food, this does not explain why we regard bread as food but don't regard dirt as food. Such judgments are formed, via induction, on the basis of our experiences.

To the extent that is has any plausibility whatsoever, this is only because it is surreptitiously riding piggy back on inductive reasoning. In some ways it is nothing more than a tortuous restatement of inductive reasoning.

I am not one to argue over terms as you know, let alone mere "torturous restatements" of them. I leave that to professionals..;-)

I said tortuous, not torturous, but I agree that Popperian reasoning in the example I discussed is both.

Ghs

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Popper's objections to induction are the same as Hume's. He says he merely took Hume's objection more seriously than Hume did (although he disagrees with Hume's theory of knowledge). It seems pretty reasonable to consider Hume's objections "run of the mill" by now.

I feel weird saying this, but in some ways I give Popper more credit than you seem to do. It is a gross oversimplification to say that Popper's objections to induction were the same as Hume's...

The problem is that this was not Hume's argument. Hume contended that inductive reasoning involves circular reasoning, not an infinite regress. As he wrote in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding , when we argue from past experience to what will occur in the future, we do so on the supposition that "the future will resemble the past," and this "must be evidently going in a circle, and taking that for granted, which is the very point in question." (Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed., pp. 35-36.)

The difference here is substantial, because if it can be show that belief in the uniformity of nature can be justified independently of any particular inductive inference (as I believe it can), then Hume's argument lacks force. Not so if inductive reasoning involves an infinite regress, as Popper contends.

More needs to be said about this topic, obviously, but I want to do my best to avoid writing long and complex posts. In my experience people tend not to read such posts, or at least not read them very carefully.

Why should I complain if you give Popper even more credit than I do? Well, let's commit Hume to the flames then for his damnable confusion of circularity and regress, and replace him with Popper's more forceful formulation. Even better, I'd be happy to accept that Popper screwed up by attributing this argument to Hume in the first place, when in fact he'd come up with a better one.

This is going exceedingly well.

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Why should I complain if you give Popper even more credit than I do? Well, let's commit Hume to the flames then for his damnable confusion of circularity and regress, and replace him with Popper's more forceful formulation. Even better, I'd be happy to accept that Popper screwed up by attributing this argument to Hume in the first place, when in fact he'd come up with a better one.

This is going exceedingly well.

If Popper gets an A for originality, he gets an F for his reasoning on induction. That's the problem.

Okay, maybe not an F; this is a rhetorical exaggeration. More like a C minus.

Hume didn't confuse circularity with infinite regress. That was Popper's confusion, so let's consign him to the flames, at least on the subject of induction.

I happen to be sympathetic to Popper's "conjectures and refutations" approach to physics -- an approach that should have put you on my side in the recent discussion of the philosophy of science on another thread. (Perhaps you didn't want to spoil your perfect record by saying anything that would support my claims.) What I object to are Popper's efforts to apply the "conjectures and refutations" approach to all knowledge.

Like many great thinkers, Popper had an idée fixe and overextended it.

Ghs

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Is inference based merely on enumeration arbitrary? Well...no...I wouldn't call that. It depends on the conclusion that is drawn. It may just be a case of fallacious reasoning. I agree that Peikovians tend to overdo use of the word "arbitrary."

George,

They don't just tend to overdo a usage.

Peikoff appears to believe that the distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary closely tracks the distinction between irrational and rational, and is more basic than the distinction between false and true.

In fact, he believes that an arbitrary assertion has no truth value, and is essentially meaningless. (That's the only aspect of the doctrine that Harriman doesn't bring up in his book, but I very much doubt he would criticize it.)

He believes that exposure to an arbitrary assertion induces cognitive paralysis in any rational mind (and Harriman does allude to that part of the doctrine).

Robert Campbell

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I happen to be sympathetic to Popper's "conjectures and refutations" approach to physics -- an approach that should have put you on my side in the recent discussion of the philosophy of science on another thread. (Perhaps you didn't want to spoil your perfect record by saying anything that would support my claims.)

Had I but known you would have had my sword, dull as it is, by your side in a moment. Of course Popper's "conjectures and refutations" is the right approach to physics. What puzzles me then, is why this seems to be a point of difference between you and Ellen. Because that's definitely her position on science in general, including physics. But I'm not sure what thread you're referring to.

What I object to are Popper's efforts to apply the "conjectures and refutations" approach to all knowledge.

Well in this you might agree more with Ellen, and less with me. The important thing I think is however that we have now established some firm areas of agreement, even if what I call the "hypothetico-deductive" method you call the "inductive" method. Who would quarrel over mere terminology? And further, physics has been one of the most astonishingly successful fields of human endeavour, it is not exactly shameful to have Popper's methodology associated with it.

Like many great thinkers, Popper had an idée fixe and overextended it.

This is certainly true of most great thinkers, and could well turn out to be true of Popper.

Anyway, I am about to get on to a plane, but this is certainly far more fruitful than endless bickering.

Edit: Mind you at this rate we are going to need a bigger bus...

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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On more thing before I rejoin the real world for a while....

I previously said that some aspects of the Popperian "conjectures and refutations" approach implicitly depend on the validity of inductive reasoning. I have also mentioned the problem of how we know that bread qualifies as food but other things, such as dirt, do not. I now want to illustrate the former point by means of the latter example.

If we conjecture that bread is food but dirt is not, how do we test -- i.e., attempt to falsify -- the latter point? It might be said that we tried eating dirt as children, spat it out, and decided it wasn't fit to eat. Okay, but how do we know that no dirt is fit to eat? Why do we stop after a few instances of eating dirt? Why don't we keep sampling dirt in an effort to falsify the hypothesis that no dirt is fit to eat?

We don't do this for a simple reason: From our experience with a few cases of eating dirt, we conclude, via inductive reasoning, that those unpleasant experiences will repeat themselves in any future attempts to eat dirt. We reach a conclusion about the nature of dirt from a limited number of particular cases.

In other words, if inductive reasoning is never valid, there would be no way to falsify a hypothesis or even render it improbable. For just because x was incompatible with our hypothesis in the past would be no reason to assume that instances similar to x would be incompatible with our hypothesis in the future. We would be required to "test" our hypothesis over and over again, indefinitely, with additional instances of x, and then we could only say that this particular x is compatible or incompatible with a hypothesis. We could never (legitimately) generalize about all x's. We could only say that the dirt we have eaten so far is not food. We could never justifiably say that dirt we haven't tried yet is not food. We could never learn from experience. We would need to keep eating dirt over and over again in an effort to falsify our hypothesis that dirt is not food, and, logically speaking, this process would never end.

Now, this is an infinite regress.

Ghs

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The important thing I think is however that we have now established some firm areas of agreement, even if what I call the "hypothetico-deductive" method you call the "inductive" method. Who would quarrel over mere terminology?

This is not a matter of mere terminology. I didn't equate the hypothetico-deductive method with induction. I suggested that Popper's "conjectures and refutations" model -- which, btw, is not the same thing as the traditional hypothetico-deductive method -- relies on the validity of induction in the same sense that Popper rejects induction. I contend that Popper is wrong about induction on his own terms. See my last post for a partial explanation of this.

Ghs

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For just because x was incompatible with our hypothesis in the past would be no reason to assume that instances similar to x would be incompatible with our hypothesis in the future. We would be required to "test" our hypothesis over and over again, indefinitely, with additional instances of x, and then we could only say that this particular x is compatible or incompatible with a hypothesis. We could never (legitimately) generalize about all x's. We could only say that the dirt we have eaten so far is not food. We could never justifiably say that dirt we haven't tried yet is not food. We could never learn from experience. We would need to keep eating dirt over and over again in an effort to falsify our hypothesis that dirt is not food, and, logically speaking, this process would never end.

But this is not entailed in the least by the hypothetico-deductive method, and is in fact strongly criticised by it. People can and do cling to their beliefs, even in spite of contrary evidence. In fact the more people believe their beliefs to be justified by some means, the more they cling to them. A hypothesis, on the other hand, such as "Dirt is delicious and nourishing", might be given up at any time - even after a single trial. It's only a hypothesis - it's not a justified true belief. There is no requirement to eat dirt over and over in order to keep testing it, though you are welcome to if you so wish. Plenty of people do the equivalent with their dearly held convictions. That's a personal choice, not a methodological requirement...;-)

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For just because x was incompatible with our hypothesis in the past would be no reason to assume that instances similar to x would be incompatible with our hypothesis in the future. We would be required to "test" our hypothesis over and over again, indefinitely, with additional instances of x, and then we could only say that this particular x is compatible or incompatible with a hypothesis. We could never (legitimately) generalize about all x's. We could only say that the dirt we have eaten so far is not food. We could never justifiably say that dirt we haven't tried yet is not food. We could never learn from experience. We would need to keep eating dirt over and over again in an effort to falsify our hypothesis that dirt is not food, and, logically speaking, this process would never end.

But this is not entailed in the least by the hypothetico-deductive method, and is in fact strongly criticised by it. People can and do cling to their beliefs, even in spite of contrary evidence. In fact the more people believe their beliefs to be justified by some means, the more they cling to them. A hypothesis, on the other hand, such as "Dirt is delicious and nourishing", might be given up at any time - even after a single trial. It's only a hypothesis - it's not a justified true belief. There is no requirement to eat dirt over and over in order to keep testing it, though you are welcome to if you so wish. Plenty of people do the equivalent with their dearly held convictions. That's a personal choice, not a methodological requirement...;-)

I am not talking about all versions of the hypothetico-deductive model -- you have unnecessarily complicated matters by introducing this label -- nor am I talking about what people might or might not believe. I am taking about Popper's version of falsifiability and its implications for induction.

Nor am I talking about the absurd hypothesis that "Dirt is delicious and nourishing." I am talking about why we reasonably exclude dirt as a type of food after only a few instances of trying to eat it. This conclusion would have no reasonable basis without inductive reasoning.

You have skirted all of these issues.

As for clinging to one's beliefs, do you cling to your belief that Popper was right in this area? Do you believe that Popper's arguments are justified? Have you attempted to falsify them? If so, by what means?

Ghs

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I've revised this reply a couple times after positing it, so some people may need to reread it.

Is inference based merely on enumeration arbitrary? Well...no...I wouldn't call that. It depends on the conclusion that is drawn. It may just be a case of fallacious reasoning. I agree that Peikovians tend to overdo use of the word "arbitrary."

George,

They don't just tend to overdo a usage.

Peikoff appears to believe that the distinction between arbitrary and non-arbitrary closely tracks the distinction between irrational and rational, and is more basic than the distinction between false and true.

In fact, he believes that an arbitrary assertion has no truth value, and is essentially meaningless. (That's the only aspect of the doctrine that Harriman doesn't bring up in his book, but I very much doubt he would criticize it.)

He believes that exposure to an arbitrary assertion induces cognitive paralysis in any rational mind (and Harriman does allude to that part of the doctrine).

Robert Campbell

I'm familiar with the Peikovian theory of arbitrary assertions.

An arbitrary proposition -- i.e., a proposition for which absolutely no evidence and/or arguments (reasons in the generic sense) have been given -- is not credible and therefore does not merit serious consideration. But this doesn't entail that an arbitrary proposition is meaningless. The proposition Elephants exist on Mars (assuming no evidence is presented for this claim) is arbitrary but not meaningless.

Does an arbitrary proposition have truth value? Yes, in the sense that it is either true or false. The point is that, lacking credibility, an arbitrary proposition doesn't reach the point where we need concern ourselves about its truth value. Without evidence and/or arguments in its favor, it has not earned this cognitive status. It should be dismissed out of hand without further consideration.

Is an arbitrary statement necessarily irrational? Qua abstract proposition, not necessarily -- but qua concrete assertion, yes.

Ghs

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George,

It's a little more subtle and weird than that.

An example will illustrate. Peikoff judges the Brandens to be such dirty rotten scoundrels that their accounts of Rand's life are arbitrary, even when they present true facts. He considers such true facts to have been presented by an arbitrary process that needs validation from some other source before those facts can have any cognitive meaning whatsoever, even as possibilities.

Thus, to him, everything the Brandens ever wrote about Rand after the break does not need to be discussed, since there is literally nothing cognitive to discuss.

That argument is how he got out of having to comment on The Passion of Ayn Rand.

He and his minions use this device as a whip in other areas to keep the rabble in line.

Michael

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George,

It's a little more subtle and weird than that.

An example will illustrate. Peikoff judges the Brandens to be such dirty rotten scoundrels that their accounts of Rand's life are arbitrary, even when they present true facts. He considers such true facts to have been presented by an arbitrary process that needs validation from some other source before those facts can have any cognitive meaning whatsoever, even as possibilities.

Thus, to him, everything the Brandens ever wrote about Rand after the break does not need to be discussed, since there is literally nothing cognitive to discuss.

That argument is how he got out of having to comment on The Passion of Ayn Rand.

He and his minions use this device as a whip in other areas to keep the rabble in line.

Michael

Peikoff's assertions in this regard are arbitrary and should be summarily dismissed. :rolleyes:

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Shayne,

As I understand it, "arbitrary" to Peikoff is a cognitive event that is not cognitive.

:)

Robert C wrote a brilliant paper on this.

Michael

A while back some Objectivist told me what a bastard Robert C was. I asked him why and he couldn't be bothered to explain. Is this why? Or, more importantly, is that an "arbitrary" assertion? ;)

Shayne

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Hey MSK or Shayne,

Sorry for interrupting with an off-topic issue, but I didn't know where else to put this request. Would one of you mind doing something about the file size of Shayne's avatar image of Thomas Paine? Currently it massively exceeds OL's stated limits of "no bigger than 120 pixels by 120 pixels in size," and "no larger than 50 KB." It weighs in at 2400 x 3122, with a compressed file size of 1.2M, which decompresses on some of my devices at a whopping 21.4M!!!!! It makes following any thread which Shayne is posting on a freaking nightmare on certain devices.

Thanks,

J

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Hey MSK or Shayne,

Sorry for interrupting with an off-topic issue, but I didn't know where else to put this request. Would one of you mind doing something about the file size of Shayne's avatar image of Thomas Paine? Currently it massively exceeds OL's stated limits of "no bigger than 120 pixels by 120 pixels in size," and "no larger than 50 KB." It weighs in at 2400 x 3122, with a compressed file size of 1.2M, which decompresses on some of my devices at a whopping 21.4M!!!!! It makes following any thread which Shayne is posting on a freaking nightmare on certain devices.

Thanks,

J

Wow. I figured it shrunk automatically. I'll fix it.

Edit: Fixed.

Shayne

Edited by sjw
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Thanks!

J

NP.

Michael: Something might be wrong in your administrative setup, usually forums like this provide ways of making it impossible to upload massive files like that. Some also provide ways of auto-scaling, which is why when it worked I thought it had automatically shrunk it.

Shayne

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My opinion for years, without knowledge of Peikoff's or anyone else's, has been that concept formation is induction, pure and simple.

Rand already stated that concept formation was essentially a process of induction. ITOE, p. 36: "The process of observing facts of reality and of integrating them into concepts is, in essence, a process of induction."

Yes. I meant to say that induction is essentially concept formation.

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An arbitrary proposition -- i.e., a proposition for which absolutely no evidence and/or arguments (reasons in the generic sense) have been given -- is not credible and therefore does not merit serious consideration. But this doesn't entail that an arbitrary proposition is meaningless. The proposition Elephants exist on Mars (assuming no evidence is presented for this claim) is arbitrary but not meaningless.

Does an arbitrary proposition have truth value? Yes, in the sense that it is either true or false. The point is that, lacking credibility, an arbitrary proposition doesn't reach the point where we need concern ourselves about its truth value. Without evidence and/or arguments in its favor, it has not earned this cognitive status. It should be dismissed out of hand without further consideration.

George,

Here is what Peikoff says in OPAR (the quotations are from Chapter 5):

None of the concepts used to describe human knowledge can be applied to the arbitrary; none of the classifications of epistemology can be usurped in its behalf. Since it has no relation to evidence, an arbitrary statement cannot be subsumed under concepts that identify different amounts of evidence: it cannot be described as "possible," "probable," or "certain." [. . .] Similarly, such a statement cannot be subsumed under concepts that identify different relations between an idea and reality. An arbitrary statement is neither "true" nor "false." (p. 165)
A relationship between a conceptual content and reality is a relationship between man's consciousness and reality. There can be no "correspondence" or "recognition" without the mind that corresponds or recognizes. If a wind blows the sand on a desert island into configurations spelling out "A is A," that does not make the wind a superior metaphysician. The wind did not achieve any conformity to reality; it did not produce any truth but merely shapes in the sand. Similarly, if a parrot is trained to squawk "2 + 2 = 4," this does not make it a mathematician. The parrot's consciousness did not attain thereby any contact with reality or any relation to it, positive or negative; the parrot did not recognize or contradict any fact; what it created was not merely falsehood, but merely sounds. Sounds that are not the vehicle of conceptual awareness have no cognitive status. (p. 165)
An arbitrary claim emitted by a human mind is analogous to the shapes made by the wind or to the sounds of the parrot. Such a claim has no cognitive relationship to reality, positive or negative. The true is identified by reference to a body of evidence; it is pronounced "true" because it can be integrated without contradiction into a total context. The false is identified by the same means; it is pronounced "false" because it contradicts the evidence and/or some aspect of the wider context. The arbitrary, however, has no relation to evidence or context; neither term, therefore—"true" or "false"—can be applied to it. (pp. 165–166)

And here, for good measure, is what Peikoff has to say, in a 1997 lecture course, on the cognitive paralysis occasioned by exposure to an arbitrary assertion:

If and when you see that a claim is arbitrary, then you cannot think about its cognitive status at all. You can't think about its validity as a claim. You can't weigh it, assess it, determine its probability, its possibility, its invalidity, its truth, its falsehood, anything. It is non-process-able. A rational mind stops in its tracks, in the face of any attempt to process such a claim.

Now, I want to introduce a word that we're going to make big hay out of subsequently. A rational mind is functionally

paralyzed in this context. It's paralyzed, if it tries to do anything cognitive, to weigh, to judge, to process, to classify.

There is nothing it can do to move one cognitive step in any direction, once the arbitrary sets the task. So, if you try to do

it, you just sit there. [. . .] When I write my book, I'm going to have a whole chapter on paralysis. This isn't infantile, but

adult paralysis. And it's all over [my treatment of] induction[,] as one of the most helpful techniques. Unfortunately,

that's not written down, so I can't discuss it. (Objectivism through Induction, Lecture 11)

Robert Campbell

PS. The book that Peikoff adverted to was never written. Later, he farmed out his treatment of induction to Harriman, whose book does not devote a whole chapter to Peikovian paralysis.

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It's as if Peikoff is afraid to actually think--that he wants to replace thinking with a mechanical process, perhaps one that can be computerized if some way could only be identified to ID anything arbitrary. Is this his way, along with the DIM hypothesis, to turn philosophy into science with a kind of faux mathematics? Solving the problem of induction could be a way of solving the problem of anyone who questions Objectivism or questions his authoritative philosophical pronouncements. Stasis.

--Brant

An arbitrary proposition -- i.e., a proposition for which absolutely no evidence and/or arguments (reasons in the generic sense) have been given -- is not credible and therefore does not merit serious consideration. But this doesn't entail that an arbitrary proposition is meaningless. The proposition Elephants exist on Mars (assuming no evidence is presented for this claim) is arbitrary but not meaningless.

Does an arbitrary proposition have truth value? Yes, in the sense that it is either true or false. The point is that, lacking credibility, an arbitrary proposition doesn't reach the point where we need concern ourselves about its truth value. Without evidence and/or arguments in its favor, it has not earned this cognitive status. It should be dismissed out of hand without further consideration.

George,

Here is what Peikoff says in OPAR (all quotations from Chapter 5):

None of the concepts used to describe human knowledge can be applied to the arbitrary; none of the classifications of epistemology can be usurped in its behalf. Since it has no relation to evidence, an arbitrary statement cannot be subsumed under concepts that identify different amounts of evidence: it cannot be described as "possible," "probable," or "certain." [. . .] Similarly, such a statement cannot be subsumed under concepts that identify different relations between an idea and reality. An arbitrary statement is neither "true" nor "false." (p. 165)
A relationship between a conceptual content and reality is a relationship between man's consciousness and reality. There can be no "correspondence" or "recognition" without the mind that corresponds or recognizes. If a wind blows the sand on a desert island into configurations spelling out "A is A," that does not make the wind a superior metaphysician. The wind did not achieve any conformity to reality; it did not produce any truth but merely shapes in the sand. Similarly, if a parrot is trained to squawk "2 + 2 = 4," this does not make it a mathematician. The parrot's consciousness did not attain thereby any contact with reality or any relation to it, positive or negative; the parrot did not recognize or contradict any fact; what it created was not merely falsehood, but merely sounds. Sounds that are not the vehicle of conceptual awareness have no cognitive status. (p. 165)
An arbitrary claim emitted by a human mind is analogous to the shapes made by the wind or to the sounds of the parrot. Such a claim has no cognitive relationship to reality, positive or negative. The true is identified by reference to a body of evidence; it is pronounced "true" because it can be integrated without contradiction into a total context. The false is identified by the same means; it is pronounced "false" because it contradicts the evidence and/or some aspect of the wider context. The arbitrary, however, has no relation to evidence or context; neither term, therefore—"true" or "false"—can be applied to it. (pp. 165–166)

And here, for good measure, is what Peikoff has to say, in a 1997 lecture course, on the cognitive paralysis occasioned by exposure to an arbitrary assertion:

If and when you see that a claim is arbitrary, then you cannot think about its cognitive status at all. You can't think about its validity as a claim. You can't weigh it, assess it, determine its probability, its possibility, its invalidity, its truth, its falsehood, anything. It is non-process-able. A rational mind stops in its tracks, in the face of any attempt to process such a claim.

Now, I want to introduce a word that we're going to make big hay out of subsequently. A rational mind is functionally

paralyzed in this context. It's paralyzed, if it tries to do anything cognitive, to weigh, to judge, to process, to classify.

There is nothing it can do to move one cognitive step in any direction, once the arbitrary sets the task. So, if you try to do

it, you just sit there. [. . .] When I write my book, I'm going to have a whole chapter on paralysis. This isn't infantile, but

adult paralysis. And it's all over [my treatment of] induction[,] as one of the most helpful techniques. Unfortunately,

that's not written down, so I can't discuss it. (Objectivism through Induction, Lecture 11)

Robert Campbell

PS. The book that Peikoff adverted to was never written. Later, he farmed out his treatment of induction to Harriman, whose book does not devote a whole chapter to Peikovian paralysis.

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When I write my book, I'm going to have a whole chapter on paralysis.

I'm interested to read this chapter on mental paralysis. I suspect Peikoff knows a lot about the subject, as he's had considerable experience with it. Living with it and inflicting it on others.

Edited by Ninth Doctor
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