Universals and Measurement


Guyau

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Tabula rasa usually means 'no innate ideas', not 'no inborn talents'. Do you have a citation for whatever you are trying to attribute to Rand here?

I couldn't find the quote on a quick look-through the beginning of the (long) talent thread, but, yes, she does say that explicitly in an oft-quoted and much-debated passage from her introduction to the re-issue of We the Living. Will find it later if no one else coughs it up meantime.

As I'm using it, "literally" means "following or representing the exact words of the original." You can believe your interpretation of Rand's words was "literal." I say nowhere close. It's fabrication, especially with its degree of conflict with ITOE, p. 15:

"In the process of forming concepts of entities, a child's mind has to focus on a distinguishing characteristic -- i.e., on an attribute -- in order to isolate one group of entities from all others. He is, therefore, aware of attributes while forming his first concepts, but he is aware of them perceptually, not conceptually. It is only after he has grasped a number of concepts of entities that he can advance to the stage of abstracting attributes from entities and forming separate concepts of attributes."

What she speaks of in the original passage the two of you were talking about is "implicit" concepts. What are you interpreting her to mean by these?

True or false depends on a particular definition. Of course, given a particular definition, disputes as to an instance falling under it or not can often arise. Regardless, why all the stress on "one true definition"? Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times. And if all "democracy" means in this case is the existence of elections, then there is no conflict.
ITOE, 2nd Exp., pp. 44-47

[see the whole passage for further details.]

When [the growing child] grasps that man's distinctive characteristic is his type of consciousness [...] he reaches the one and only valid definition of man, within the context of his knowledge and of all of mankind's knowledge to date: "A rational animal."

[....] If definitions are conextual, how does one determine an objective definition valid for all men? It is determined according to the widest context of knowledge available to man on the subjects relevant to the units of a given concept.

Objective validity is determined by reference to the facts of reality. But it is man who has to identify the facts; objectivity rquires discovery by man--and cannot precede man's knowledge, i.e., cannot require omniscience. Man cannot know more than he has discovered--and he may not know less than the evidence indicates, if his concepts and definitions are to be objectively valid.

[....] An objective definition, valid for all men, is one that designates the essential distinguishing characteristic(s) and genus of the existents subsumed under a given concept--according to all the relevant knowledge available at that stage of mankind's development.

Did she not mean these and other passages? And her comments about the "true" meaning of "sacrifice," etc?

Ellen

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What she speaks of in the original passage the two of you were talking about is "implicit" concepts. What are you interpreting her to mean by these?

Comparing it to the passage on p. 15 that I quoted, I guess she meant "aware of some units at the perceptual level being similar, but has not brought them to the conceptual level by integrating." Maybe it's something like a pre-concept to Piaget or a prototype concept to Eleanor Rosch. However, I won't venture to say that is what she always meant, nor that her every use is valid.

Edit: My guess is similar to OPAR, p. 75. Another guess is "The First Stage" in D. Kelley's Theory of Abstraction.

Did she not mean these and other passages?

I don't see any significant challenges in ITOE, 2nd Exp., pp. 44-47 you cited related to my claim that Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times.

She even gives an example for a definition of man she regards as valid for a child: "A living being that speaks and does other things no other living beings can do." (p. 44). She even allows for the possibility that "rational animal" becomes inaccurate based on future discovery (p. 47).

An "invalid" definition as she used the word could still be true. She even explicitly said so. "Observe that all of the above versions of a definition of man were true, i.e., were correct identifications of the facts of reality-- and that they were valid qua definition, i.e. were correct selections of distinguishing characteristics in a given context of knowledge." (p. 44, last sentence)

And her comments about the "true" meaning of "sacrifice," etc?

What more exactly are you referring to? Off hand, maybe she thought her definition better captured the essential characteristics.

Edited by Merlin Jetton
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She even explicitly said so. "Observe that all of the above versions of a definition of man were true, i.e., were correct identifications of the facts of reality

But the facts of reality are only available to us through our senses so this should read 'correct identifications of our perceived facts of reality'.

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Tabula rasa usually means 'no innate ideas', not 'no inborn talents'. Do you have a citation for whatever you are trying to attribute to Rand here?

Of course. It is a well-known passage:

"Too many writers declare that they never succeed in expressing fully what they wished to express and that their work is only some sort of approximation. It is a viewpoint for which I have never had any sympathy and which I consider excusable only when it is voiced by beginners, since no-one is born with any kind of talent and, therefore, every skill has to be acquired. Writers are made, not born. To be exact, writers are self-made." (Foreword to "We the Living", italics mine)

Now as you can see, Rand is going far beyond "no innate ideas" into a far more radical tabula rasa scenario in which there are no inborn talents of any kind.

Now of course I regard this as quite a ridiculous claim; it is the sort of thing, as they say, only a philosopher would believe. Obviously you were not aware how radical the views she held were; so now you know. Hence it is, dialling back to my original point, perfectly reasonable to assume that Rand would be suprised by a baby's ability to pick a human face from deliberate simulations shortly after being born, as the experiment I mentioned describes. Recall she even thought that babies' initial perceptions were of an undifferentiated chaos.

The fact that you and I both find such a suggestion laughable indicates you may be more in agreement with me than with Rand.

Admittedly she specialised in sweeping assertions, with precious little qualification or argument, and with a good deal of ambiguity. Admittedly she is perfectly capable of contradicting herself in the same essay, the same page, and even the same phrase, as she does with the Objectivist oxymorons I've regularly highlighted elsewhere. Admittedly all these things make it difficult for the critic, and somewhat easier for the suitably enthusiastic apologist. But at some point one surely has to stop constantly appealing to charity, and, given her above belief that what she wrote reflected what she thought, read what she damn well wrote.

I wrote:
Does the child's concept of "entity" have identity or not, Merlin? Yes or no? If yes, why doesn't Stephen do as I suggest and clearly say so?

Merlin replied:Yes, of course. Stephen can answer the last question is he so chooses.

So here we have another point of agreement, which is excellent. Entities have identities right from the git-go. Now let's review what Stephen wrote, and I criticised:

Elaboration of Identity

For the first day or two after birth, existents for us are plausibly only entities. Such would be the occasions of Mother's face or voice[33]. Very soon existents become for us not mere entities, but identities, particular and specific[34].

You see how this passage seems to conflict with what we're saying here Merlin. Hence my suggestion that Steven clarify.

Now, as to whether or not Rand made a gaffe in the ITOE's description of the initial stages of concept formation - a gaffe that I suspected Stephen of importing - I maintain that she did. Further, in support of this thesis I maintain that not only is step 1) in her proposed theory an error, but I also argue that step 2) is merely the Law of Identity in drag; and further that step 3) is nothing more than a restatement of step 2). Thus her description - which is asserted in a fact-free manner anyway - amounts to little more than the Law of Identity all over again, plus additional verbiage. Anyway, that is a separate debate, and perhaps I will start another thread.

As to the quote you select in favour of your interpretation:

ITOE, p. 15:

"In the process of forming concepts of entities, a child's mind has to focus on a distinguishing characteristic -- i.e., on an attribute -- in order to isolate one group of entities from all others. He is, therefore, aware of attributes while forming his first concepts, but he is aware of them perceptually, not conceptually. It is only after he has grasped a number of concepts of entities that he can advance to the stage of abstracting attributes from entities and forming separate concepts of attributes."

I am not clear how this contradicts what I am saying re Rand. If anything, it supports my interpretation: that according to Rand, the child's concept "entity" has no attributes (i.e identity) as he is only aware of them on a perceptual level, not a conceptual one.

Of course, all this is extremely vague anyway. Nonetheless, with this highlighted, perhaps you and other readers might pause to consider how much of a "fabrication" my argument really is. But then you soften this "fabrication" accusation down to "interpretation" in places, so perhaps my claims are not quite so egregious after all

Now you (and other readers) can compare your interpretation (post #19) to mine (post #22). Which is closer and how much?

As you say, readers can make their own comparison. AFAICS mine remains perfectly reasonable, and is further supported by Rand's radical "tabula rasa" views and her mere regurgitation of the LOI as a some kind of original insight into child psychology, which I regard as a straightforward verbalist gaffe. But of course all this can be debated further.

I don't believe posting my Amazon review on the ARCHNblog is necessary. A link would suffice. My engaging him or not would depend on the nature of his response.

I'll fire it over to Greg and see if he's keen.

True or false depends on a particular definition. Of course, given a particular definition, disputes as to an instance falling under it or not can often arise. Regardless, why all the stress on "one true definition"? Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times. And if all "democracy" means in this case is the existence of elections, then there is no conflict.

So you would argue that it did not in fact matter much to Rand how people defined words like "selfish", "altruism", "sacrifice" etc?

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Merlin, I'll skip the part about "implicit concept," though I'm interested by your guesses; but discussing them would require more detail than I have time for now.

Did she not mean these and other passages?

I don't see any significant challenges in ITOE, 2nd Exp., pp. 44-47 you cited related to my claim that Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times.

Merlin, here is your original comment:

True or false depends on a particular definition. Of course, given a particular definition, disputes as to an instance falling under it or not can often arise. Regardless, why all the stress on "one true definition"? Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times. And if all "democracy" means in this case is the existence of elections, then there is no conflict.

I see a large discrepancy between what you're saying there and what she writes -- with considerable explicating -- in her chapter "Definitions" about the cruciality of and the possibility of forming a "true" definition. You make her sound as if she's proposing a view of optional definitions. She is not proposing that. When she says the definition might change with changes in the context of knowledge, she is still saying that at any given stage of advancing knowledge there is a "right," a "true" definition.

And she claims that -- to repeat once more a sentence which has been many times quoted:

"The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions" (her italics).

She gives examples of definitions of "man" which she condemns. (One of these examples, the opposable thumb example, in regard to which I'd bet she misunderstood the point of the article, I discussed at some length, and I thought you read that discussion.)

Do you have ITOE? If so, I recommend re-reading the whole chapter. There's an example on pg. 51, where she talks about "the concept 'justice,'" which I think gives a good comparison to the "democracy" example. I don't see how one could conclude, reading her analysis there, that she'd for a minute have allowed that it was ok to mean by "democracy" merely "the existence of elections."

She even gives an example for a definition of man she regards as valid for a child: "A living being that speaks and does other things no other living beings can do." (p. 44). She even allows for the possibility that "rational animal" becomes inaccurate based on future discovery (p. 47).

Yes, she does that; but she's saying that at each stage there is ONE correct definition in the current context of knowledge; and in allowing that "rational animal" might someday no longer be "the one and only valid definition of man, [my emphasis] within the context of [the child's mature] knowledge and of all of mankind's knowledge to date," she isn't allowing for options in the correct definition but instead for an expanded context in which we've discovered that there are other "rational animals" along with "man."

She says:

Only when and if some discovery were to make the definition "rational animal" inaccurate (i.e., no longer serving to distinguish man from all other existents) would the question of expanding [notice: expanding not optionally altering] the definition arise. "Expanding" does not mean negating, abrogating or contradicting; it means demonstrating that some other characteristics are more distinctive of man than rationality and animality--in which unlikely case these two would be regarded as non-defining characteristics, but would still remain true."
An "invalid" definition as she used the word could still be true. She even explicitly said so. "Observe that all of the above versions of a definition of man were true, i.e., were correct identifications of the facts of reality-- and that they were valid qua definition, i.e. were correct selections of distinguishing characteristics in a given context of knowledge." (p. 44, last sentence)

No, she doesn't explicitly say that an "invalid" definition could still be true. She explicitly says that the earlier definition, if it was correctly identifying "the facts of reality," was valid in the given context.

And her comments about the "true" meaning of "sacrifice," etc?

What more exactly are you referring to? Off hand, maybe she thought her definition better captured the essential characteristics.

I can't type in, for instance, her whole discussion in Galt's Speech. Do you have the Lexicon? I think it's real clear from the passages therein under "Sacrifice" that she thought "sacrifice" means her definition. She didn't allow for the possibility of the standard meaning of giving up some value which it's painful to give up for the sake of a more important value. She said that such choices are NOT sacrifices -- and she didn't add any such qualifier as "as I define the term."

Ellen

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Merlin, here is your original comment:
True or false depends on a particular definition. Of course, given a particular definition, disputes as to an instance falling under it or not can often arise. Regardless, why all the stress on "one true definition"? Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times. And if all "democracy" means in this case is the existence of elections, then there is no conflict.

I see a large discrepancy between what you're saying there and what she writes -- with considerable explicating -- in her chapter "Definitions" about the cruciality of and the possibility of forming a "true" definition. You make her sound as if she's proposing a view of optional definitions. She is not proposing that. When she says the definition might change with changes in the context of knowledge, she is still saying that at any given stage of advancing knowledge there is a "right," a "true" definition.

I have little to add to Ellen's summary, other than Rand regarded a "definition by non-essentials" as an error; hence identification of the "correct" or "true" "essence" is required for a valid definition. This clearly goes beyond the mere "correspondence with the facts" you suggest. Where it sits with coherence does not seem immediately obvious either.

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This replies to post #29.

Regarding "inborn talents" in the Forward of "We The Living", it wasn't well-known to me. I wasn't involved in and haven't read the lengthy thread (32 pages!) about talents on this forum.

Two common dictionary meanings of talent are:

1. any natural ability or power; natural endowment

2. a superior, apparently natural ability in the arts or sciences or in the learning or doing of anything

I took her point to be that being a talented writer takes much learning and practice, a talent few people have and they aren't born with it. She even put "talent" in quotes, indicating a restricted meaning. You conveniently omit the quotes in post #29. I doubt that Rand was denying the existence of natural abilities in the way you seem to take it. Do you really think she was denying natural abilities like to walk or jump high (like many basketball players) or see as well as Ted Williams did? I don't. Methinks you just found another opportunity to ridicule Rand. Thank you for the fine example of how far you go to make and burn a straw woman. ;)

Hence it is, dialling back to my original point, perfectly reasonable to assume that Rand would be suprised by a baby's ability to pick a human face from deliberate simulations shortly after being born, as the experiment I mentioned describes. Recall she even thought that babies' initial perceptions were of an undifferentiated chaos.

You have a point there. She "winged it" quite a bit in coming to her ideas about the cognition of children.

I am not clear how this contradicts what I am saying re Rand. If anything, it supports my interpretation: that according to Rand, the child's concept "entity" has no attributes (i.e identity) as he is only aware of them on a perceptual level, not a conceptual one.

If an entity has attributes at the perceptual level, it does not lose all of them upon abstraction to the conceptual level, upon making it a unit of a similarity class. If it did, there would be nothing left to regard as similar. Do you really believe Rand thought all the attributes were lost? If 'yes', what is your evidence? How is similarity retained? Moreover, it conflicts with so much she said elsewhere. "Existence is identity." "The attributes are the entity, or an entity is its attributes." (ITOE, p. 266) You confound an entity (concept) having no attributes with the attributes not being mentally separable. Like I said earlier, a more reasonable interpretation is that the child in the first stage does not conceptually distinguish between an entity and its attributes. They are united.

So you would argue that it did not in fact matter much to Rand how people defined words like "selfish", "altruism", "sacrifice" etc?

It mattered to her in the sense that she didn't like the attitudes and actions that went along with such definitions.

I will respond to #30 and #31 hopefully later today.

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I took her point to be that being a talented writer takes much learning and practice, a talent few people have and they aren't born with it. She even put "talent" in quotes, indicating a restricted meaning. You conveniently omit the quotes in post #29. I doubt that Rand was denying the existence of natural abilities in the way you seem to take it.

Oh, but she was. See for example my post here (and the link to the discussion on RoR mentioned in that post). For example, she really thought people could raise their IQ by 40 points if they just choose to do so.

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I took her point to be that being a talented writer takes much learning and practice, a talent few people have and they aren't born with it. She even put "talent" in quotes, indicating a restricted meaning. You conveniently omit the quotes in post #29. I doubt that Rand was denying the existence of natural abilities in the way you seem to take it.

Oh, but she was. See for example my post here (and the link to the discussion on RoR mentioned in that post). For example, she really thought people could raise their IQ by 40 points if they just choose to do so.

I'd guess many IQ raisers didn't test right in the first place. I don't think Rand would have done well on an IQ test unless it was in Russian. She probably never took one.

--Brant

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Oh, but she was. See for example my post here (and the link to the discussion on RoR mentioned in that post). For example, she really thought people could raise their IQ by 40 points if they just choose to do so.

Like has already been done on RoR, we could debate what Rand thought or meant by "talent" for a long time, especially when she put it in quotes. I doubt it would lead to progress.

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...725_8.shtml#163

Here on July 7, 2006 you say: "Rand seems to have thought it was possible to raise your IQ from 110 to 150."

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...ost&p=15621

Here on Dec 29, 2006 you say: "It also squares with her idea that people can raise their own IQ by 40 points, just by choice."

You move from "seems to have thought" to "her idea and just by choice" in 5+ months, and to "she really thought and just by choice" 10 months later. Do you have a citation from Rand herself about raising one's IQ 40 points?

I'll bet Cassius Clay could have raised his IQ score by 40 points just by choice if he knew the 1st test was for the Army and the 2nd test wasn't. :)

Edit: Disregard my request. It's in Ayn Rand Answers, p. 179. In response to a question about writing a revised edition of ITOE for people with an IQ of 110, instead of people with an IQ of 150, she replies: "I'd prefer that people raise their IQ from 110 to 150. It can be done." Maybe a joke, and doesn't mean anybody could. It doesn't apply to somebody with an IQ of 105. :)

Edited by Merlin Jetton
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I took her point to be that being a talented writer takes much learning and practice, a talent few people have and they aren't born with it. She even put "talent" in quotes, indicating a restricted meaning.

Are you arguing that anyone therefore can in principle be as "talented" a writer as anyone else, Merlin? Seriously?

You conveniently omit the quotes in post #29.

If I did I apologise (I dont' have WTL with me at present). Please reinsert them: it is not the slightest bit "inconvenient" to my argument. Once again, do you really want to claim that anyone can be as "talented" a writer as anyone else?? It seems to me you are merely playing with words now.

I doubt that Rand was denying the existence of natural abilities in the way you seem to take it.

The way I "seem to take it!?" At some point, Merlin, you will have to go by what she wrote and not what you would like to imagine her to have written.

Look, here is another example of both her radical tabula rasa beliefs, and her abililty to blissfully contradict herself on the same issue that Ellen Stuttle has brought to my attention:

Rand:"...to perceive the things around him by integrating his sensations into percepts(which is not an innate, but an acquired skill)..." ("The Comprachicos," NL, 190.)

Yes, that's right. According to Rand, even integrating sensations into percepts is an "acquired skill" and is not "innate."

What: can you get a three year course in Sensation-Perception Integration now at Founders College? :D Are you going to defend that assertion now too? Just how far are you prepared to go?

Oh, but wait a minute, before you do...what does she say in the ITOE on this very issue?:

"A percept is a group of sensations automatically retained and integrated by the brain of a living organism. [....] Percepts, not sensations, are the given, the self-evident."

(ITOE)

Now the problem is, I suppose, which side to defend! :D

Do you really think she was denying natural abilities like to walk or jump high (like many basketball players) or see as well as Ted Williams did? I don't.

It's not my fault if Rand came out with wild pronouncements that don't survive a moment's critical thought. That is a problem for her followers to try to justify.

Thank you for the fine example of how far you go to make and burn a straw woman. ;)

I might equally reply that you have provided an excellent example of how strongly humans can cling to beliefs, in the face of direct evidence to the contrary. :D

You have a point there. She "winged it" quite a bit in coming to her ideas about the cognition of children.

Thank you. But of course, for some reason you cling to the belief that she would never be "winging it" anywhere else! Whereas I claim she's "winging it" pretty much 24/7 in her epistemology; hence the similar gaffes rife throughout the ITOE and elsewhere.

Do you really believe Rand thought all the attributes were lost? If 'yes', what is your evidence? How is similarity retained? Moreover, it conflicts with so much she said elsewhere(DB Italics).

Yes! Exactly! It's a "gaffe", or a "howler". My primary thesis is that Rand is a vague and frequently self contradictory writer (you get that when you're "winging it"...) and that presents the first level of difficulty for the critic. We must dispense with this myth that she always wrote clearly and precisely, and always thought coherently. The situation is quite the opposite.

It mattered to her in the sense that she didn't like the attitudes and actions that went along with such definitions.

Nonsense. This is just you watering down her actual statements again into what you'd like to imagine she said. Just to remind you:

"The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions" .

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Did she not mean these and other passages?
I don't see any significant challenges in ITOE, 2nd Exp., pp. 44-47 you cited related to my claim that Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times.
Merlin, here is your original comment:
True or false depends on a particular definition. Of course, given a particular definition, disputes as to an instance falling under it or not can often arise. Regardless, why all the stress on "one true definition"? Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times. And if all "democracy" means in this case is the existence of elections, then there is no conflict.

I see a large discrepancy between what you're saying there and what she writes -- with considerable explicating -- in her chapter "Definitions" about the cruciality of and the possibility of forming a "true" definition. You make her sound as if she's proposing a view of optional definitions. She is not proposing that. When she says the definition might change with changes in the context of knowledge, she is still saying that at any given stage of advancing knowledge there is a "right," a "true" definition.

In all but the 4th sentence I wasn't trying to speak for Rand. I wasn't even using her idea of contextually valid. Maybe I should have made "if" caps, huge, and bold. Does that clarify?

An "invalid" definition as she used the word could still be true. She even explicitly said so. "Observe that all of the above versions of a definition of man were true, i.e., were correct identifications of the facts of reality-- and that they were valid qua definition, i.e. were correct selections of distinguishing characteristics in a given context of knowledge." (p. 44, last sentence)

No, she doesn't explicitly say that an "invalid" definition could still be true. She explicitly says that the earlier definition, if it was correctly identifying "the facts of reality," was valid in the given context.

You are correct she wasn't explicit in what I quoted. However, she was elsewhere, even in what you quoted just before. ""Expanding" does not mean negating, abrogating or contradicting; it means demonstrating that some other characteristics are more distinctive of man than rationality and animality--in which unlikely case these two would be regarded as non-defining characteristics, but would still remain true" (p.47). I don't agree with it for all cases, but she did say it for this case, and arguably for all (p. 43).

And she claims that -- to repeat once more a sentence which has been many times quoted:

"The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions" (her italics).

I agree, and believe I've said so on this forum, that this by itself is an exaggeration. Such conclusions, etc. rest on the non-definitional meaning of a concept sometimes and ultimately on reality. Yet I think there is a big core of truth in what she says, especially with more abstract concepts. "When working high up on a ladder, be careful." And to her credit, she wrote only one page before: "A definition is the condensation of a vast body of observations -- and stands or falls with the truth or falsehood of those observations" (ITOE, p. 48).

Do you have ITOE? If so, I recommend re-reading the whole chapter. There's an example on pg. 51, where she talks about "the concept 'justice,'" which I think gives a good comparison to the "democracy" example. I don't see how one could conclude, reading her analysis there, that she'd for a minute have allowed that it was ok to mean by "democracy" merely "the existence of elections."

Yes about ITOE. I agree but don't recall implying she would have. I was addressing Barnes' example and speaking for myself.

Yes, she does that; but she's saying that at each stage there is ONE correct definition in the current context of knowledge; and in allowing that "rational animal" might someday no longer be "the one and only valid definition of man, [my emphasis] within the context of [the child's mature] knowledge and of all of mankind's knowledge to date," she isn't allowing for options in the correct definition but instead for an expanded context in which we've discovered that there are other "rational animals" along with "man."

Tentatively, this is another case of her exaggerating, but there is a big core of truth in it. Consider two definitions of mathematics I gave on another thread, the first my own and the second I like from a dictionary.

1. the science of quantity and quantifiable structures

2. the group of sciences (including arithmetic, geometry, algebra, calculus, etc.) dealing with quantities, magnitudes, and forms, and their relationships, attributes, etc., by the use of numbers and symbols

I think they are both essential, have the same referents, and are suitable to my context. The first is more compact and likely better understood by somebody with a high level of math knowledge. The second is more detailed and likely better understood by somebody with nearer an average level of math knowledge. The difference is level of abstraction.

An "invalid" definition as she used the word could still be true. She even explicitly said so. "Observe that all of the above versions of a definition of man were true, i.e., were correct identifications of the facts of reality-- and that they were valid qua definition, i.e. were correct selections of distinguishing characteristics in a given context of knowledge." (p. 44, last sentence)

No, she doesn't explicitly say that an "invalid" definition could still be true. She explicitly says that the earlier definition, if it was correctly identifying "the facts of reality," was valid in the given context.

You are correct she wasn't explicit in what I quoted. However, she was elsewhere, even in what you quoted just before. ""Expanding" does not mean negating, abrogating or contradicting; it means demonstrating that some other characteristics are more distinctive of man than rationality and animality--in which unlikely case these two would be regarded as non-defining characteristics, but would still remain true" (p.47). I don't agree with it for all cases, but she did say it for this case, and arguably for all (p. 43).

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This is just a quick question about the quoting function. Merlin, in your post above, you lost most of the italics from my post to which you were responding. How did that happen? I've never found the italics (and/or other) code to be stripped when I used "Reply," which is what I always do use. Did you use "Quote" instead, and does that strip code?

Ellen

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Merlin, here is your original comment:
True or false depends on a particular definition. Of course, given a particular definition, disputes as to an instance falling under it or not can often arise. Regardless, why all the stress on "one true definition"? Rand did not hold there was one true definition for all people and all times. And if all "democracy" means in this case is the existence of elections, then there is no conflict.

I see a large discrepancy between what you're saying there and what she writes -- with considerable explicating -- in her chapter "Definitions" about the cruciality of and the possibility of forming a "true" definition. You make her sound as if she's proposing a view of optional definitions. She is not proposing that. When she says the definition might change with changes in the context of knowledge, she is still saying that at any given stage of advancing knowledge there is a "right," a "true" definition.

I have little to add to Ellen's summary, other than Rand regarded a "definition by non-essentials" as an error; hence identification of the "correct" or "true" "essence" is required for a valid definition. This clearly goes beyond the mere "correspondence with the facts" you suggest. Where it sits with coherence does not seem immediately obvious either.

Truth/correspondence with the facts is a necessary condition for a proposition to be a valid definition. Any proposition that is not true, is a non-starter for a definition.

For any given concept we want to define, there is a number of things we can say about it (i.e., propositions we can state about it) that are true, but only one of those things (propositions) is also a valid definition, in any given context of knowledge, and that is the proposition that identifies the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the referents of the concept.

As the context of knowledge changes, the characteristic that fundamentally distinguishes those referents from other things will change, too; but the earlier proposition stating the fundamental distinguishing characteristic does not become false, just non-definitional.

Why is this controversial? Rand and Aristotle have this right, and all standard logic textbooks do, too. Get with the program, DB.

REB

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This is just a quick question about the quoting function. Merlin, in your post above, you lost most of the italics from my post to which you were responding. How did that happen? I've never found the italics (and/or other) code to be stripped when I used "Reply," which is what I always do use. Did you use "Quote" instead, and does that strip code?

I'm not skilled enough at using the site's software, especially when I want to quote bits and pieces and there are embedded quotes. So I sometimes copy stuff into Notepad (maybe Word would be better), which is primitive font-wise, and work with that, then copy the result to the site. Sometimes I forget to reset the fonts in quoted stuff.

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For any given concept we want to define, there is a number of things we can say about it (i.e., propositions we can state about it) that are true, but only one of those things (propositions) is also a valid definition, in any given context of knowledge, and that is the proposition that identifies the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the referents of the concept.

"The fundamental distinguishing characteristic..."? Why do you suppose that a concept can be defined with just one essential characteristic? Try this: A sprime integers is an odd prime integer. The concept sprime requires two properties, odd and prime for the species and integer for the genus. I admit the concept corresponding to the made up word "sprime" is not particularly useful, but it is a concept never the less and it requires two essential properties.

Here is another definition puzzle for you. Circle, definition A. A circle is a curve that encloses the maximum area on a plane for its perimeter. That is any other curve with the the same perimeter will enclose a lesser area. Circle, definition B. A circle is a set of points all equidistant (the distance is the radius) from a given point (the center). Which is the "true" definition? It turns out that these definitions are logically equivalent. All type A circles are type B circles and all type B circles are type A circles. This requires a non-elementary proof, but it is the case. Here we have two distinct definitions that have the same denotation but very different connotations. Which is the "true" definition? The usual definition (B above) is the more common definition and for non-mathematicians is probably easier to grasp, never the less the the defining properties of definition A is just as "essential" as the defining property of definition B.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Do you really believe Rand thought all the attributes were lost? If 'yes', what is your evidence? How is similarity retained? Moreover, it conflicts with so much she said elsewhere(DB Italics).

Yes! Exactly! It's a "gaffe", or a "howler". My primary thesis is that Rand is a vague and frequently self contradictory writer (you get that when you're "winging it"...) and that presents the first level of difficulty for the critic. We must dispense with this myth that she always wrote clearly and precisely, and always thought coherently. The situation is quite the opposite.

It mattered to her in the sense that she didn't like the attitudes and actions that went along with such definitions.

Nonsense. This is just you watering down her actual statements again into what you'd like to imagine she said. Just to remind you:

"The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions" .

DB, if you spent half the time reading Rand (ITOE) and Peikoff (OPAR) as you spend trying to debunk them, you would know by now that Rand did NOT treat attributes as being lost in the process of concept-formation. Realize that the finger you are using to point out supposed "gaffes" and "howlers" by Rand on this issue is more than offset by the three fingers pointing back at yourself!

Gads. You remind me of the kind of critic who hears the statement, "The Law of Identity is the bridge between metaphysics and epistemology," and says, "What bridge? Bridges are made of stone or steel and concrete. Rand is obviously NOT speaking clearly here, for any fool knows that metaphysics and epistemology do not involve stone, steel, and concrete."

And in regard to Rand's claim about the truth of definitions, which you insist on trotting out as some kind of gross error on her part, I'm not aware that there is anyone else here at OL who needs to have this explained. Apparently it is as uncontroversial to everyone else as anything could be. Nevertheless, I will offer two examples that, to me, very succinctly make Rand's point about truth and falsity of definitions, and maybe you will get a glimmer as to why you are barking up the wrong dogwood tree...

1. Suppose I ostensively define "cow" as those creatures in my goldfish bowl and "walking" as what they are doing. Now, if I say "cows walk," then by the definitions of "cow" and "walking" I am using, my statement is true. (I won't get very far in a culture that uses radically different definitions, because I'll continually have to explain myself; but this kind of arguing at cross-purposes and spending valuable time clarifying different definitions being used goes on all the time.)(For my part, presumably I know I am uttering a truth, which depends on the truth of my concept definitions AND the TRUTH of my attempt to connect those concepts in a proposition. But I have picked a particularly odd and ineffective way to communicate the truth I perceive--viz., what the creatures in my goldfish bowl are doing--to the others.)

2. Suppose I ostensively define "fish" as those milk-giving creatures in my barn and "swim" as what those feathered creatures in the sky do. Now, if I say "fish swim," then by the definitions of "fish" and "swim" I am using, my statement is false. (My fellow human beings might think that I am uttering a truth, but only because they understand "fish" to refer to the creatures in my goldfish bowl and "swim" to refer to what they are doing. Once I point out what I mean by what I say, they realize that I am someone they had better steer widely clear of!)(For my part, presumably I know I am uttering a falsehood, which depends on the truth of my concept definitions AND the invalidity of my attempt to connect those concepts into a proposition. But I have picked a particularly odd and ineffective way to deceive the others, if that is my intent!)

The important point to glean from the above two examples is this: while the truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge DOES rest on the truth or falsehood of his definitions, it does not rest SOLELY on the truth or falsehood of his definitions, but ALSO (in part) upon how the concepts thus defined are combined into propositions.

REB

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Gads. You remind me of the kind of critic who hears the statement, "The Law of Identity is the bridge between metaphysics and epistemology," and says, "What bridge? Bridges are made of stone or steel and concrete. Rand is obviously NOT speaking clearly here, for any fool knows that metaphysics and epistemology do not involve stone, steel, and concrete."

What is it about being literal, exact, correct and precise that you find objectionable? If one is going to characterize the Law of Identity as a bridge one should qualify the statement that so identifies the Law of Identity with some phrase like "in a manner of speaking" or "so to speak" or "as it were".

If my memory serves me well enough, I recall a Russian born novelist advising that we take people precisely at their word. Do you you have that recollection?

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Gads. You remind me of the kind of critic who hears the statement, "The Law of Identity is the bridge between metaphysics and epistemology," and says, "What bridge? Bridges are made of stone or steel and concrete. Rand is obviously NOT speaking clearly here, for any fool knows that metaphysics and epistemology do not involve stone, steel, and concrete."

What is it about being literal, exact, correct and precise that you find objectionable? If one is going to characterize the Law of Identity as a bridge one should qualify the statement that so identifies the Law of Identity with some phrase like "in a manner of speaking" or "so to speak" or "as it were".

If my memory serves me well enough, I recall a Russian born novelist advising that we take people precisely at their word. Do you you have that recollection?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Yes, and that would include not making concrete-bound objections to metaphoric language per se, only if a given metaphor were somehow inappropriate to the situation.

Jesus, I suppose now the jig is up, and DB or GS or Lord Knows Who is going to fine-tooth-comb Rand's ITOE for metaphors she did NOT telegraph (another metaphor, God help me!) with your preferred preambles, as proof that she did not speak precisely. (There are tons of them, and I say this without fear of exaggeration. :-)

Bob, I don't object to precision any more than I object to consistency. But just as Emerson said "a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds," so is a concrete-bound insistence on eschewing, or Baroquely announcing one's use of, metaphor.

It is a gross misinterpretation of Rand's championing of clarity and straight-speaking to suggest that when she uses unannounced metaphors, she has somehow slipped into subjectivity or sloppiness; and it is a gross insult to our intelligence to suggest that we need some kind of semantic training-wheels in order to keep from misunderstanding metaphoric language when used in philosophy.

REB

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Truth/correspondence with the facts is a necessary condition for a proposition to be a valid definition. Any proposition that is not true, is a non-starter for a definition.

Uh huh. But as I've already pointed out, correspondence is necessary but not sufficient. Again: for "true democracy" you could point to the States (constitutional). I point to Britain (parliamentary). Someone points to Germany(proportional). Saddam points to his Iraq, where everyone voted (for him). All these definitions correspond to factual situations, yet obviously conflict with each other. So clearly then appeal to factual correspondence is not sufficient to establish the "truth" or "falsity" of definitions.

This inadequacy leads us to...:

For any given concept we want to define, there is a number of things we can say about it (i.e., propositions we can state about it) that are true, but only one of those things (propositions) is also a valid definition, in any given context of knowledge, and that is the proposition that identifies the fundamental distinguishing characteristic of the referents of the concept.(ital. DB)

...in other words, an appeal to "the fundamental distinguishing characteristic" or what Rand calls the "essence" of the concept. But - and aye,here's the rub! - in the event of disagreement - eg: you may argue a constitutional democracy represents the one "valid" definition, whereas I might hold proportional representation is - how do we decide who has identified the right "essence"?

This is where the problem bites - and this is the very point of Popper's essay "Two Kinds of Definition", have you read it yet? (scroll down). For it turns that it there is no logical way of doing so. The attempt to do so fails in several directions, including infinite regression, as Popper clearly outlines. Thus the "truth" or "falsity" of these competing "essential" definitions - the very thing Rand claims all knowledge rests on - cannot be established. It turns out her hopes are built on sand.

The upshot of this logical result is that in order to be useful, we must therefore decide the meanings of words by mutual agreement i.e. convention - the very thing that Rand vehemently denies. It also follows from this fact that we should write as clearly and simply as possible, and rely on as few arcane or "private" meanings for words as possible, and, due to the various shades of meanings words have accumulated over the years, not let too much of our argument rest on particular words. It also follows that we should not argue over the meanings of words, but over the next level up: plans, proposals, propostions, theories etc*. As Bertrand Russell remarked, the only things that require the exact words are magic spells! :D

Why is this controversial? Rand and Aristotle have this right, and all standard logic textbooks do, too. Get with the program, DB.

I suppose the reason this is still controversial - though fortunately it is becoming less so - is due to the basic logical situation not being well known, and some fundamental unexamined prejudices. Rand and Aristotle have this 100% wrong, I am afraid, and so do the "standard logical textbooks" if and and where they do in fact claim disputes over essentialist definitions are logically decidable. For they are not. This has been known since at least the 1940s! Get with the program, REB.

*Edit: because these are, in principle, logically decidable

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Yes, and that would include not making concrete-bound objections to metaphoric language per se, only if a given metaphor were somehow inappropriate to the situation.

J

It is a gross misinterpretation of Rand's championing of clarity and straight-speaking to suggest that when she uses unannounced metaphors, she has somehow slipped into subjectivity or sloppiness; and it is a gross insult to our intelligence to suggest that we need some kind of semantic training-wheels in order to keep from misunderstanding metaphoric language when used in philosophy.

REB

Subjectivity no. Sloppiness yes. I am a mathematician and I tell you the entire subject rides on the "training wheels" you allude to. Mathematics is precise just because the undefined terms are identified as such, definitions are given (stipulating and lexical equivalence) for other terms, and the axioms of the theory specify exactly what is assumed about the undefined terms and objects. I was also a software designer for 45 years and I tell you compilers and assemblers did not permit sloppy syntax. Bad logic, yes, but sloppy syntax, never (or hardly ever).

Humans are error prone from the git-go. Why should we risk any more error than we cannot avoid by failure to qualify and quantify our utterances sufficiently? There will be error and confusion enough. At least let us make our errors grammatically and with good style of expression. There will always be "bugs". Why invite them unnecessarily?

Is it any wonder that Polemic and Philosophy are rife with error, precisely because they "ride" without "training wheels"?

Ba'al Chatzaf

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DB, if you spent half the time reading Rand (ITOE) and Peikoff (OPAR) as you spend trying to debunk them, you would know by now that Rand did NOT treat attributes as being lost in the process of concept-formation.

Roger, if you spent half as much time reading the ITOE or the rest of Rand's work with even one critical eye open as you do concocting defenses of her obvious bloopers, you would realise she is "winging it" on mere ex cathedra announcements on a pretty much 24/7 basis. I suggest such howlers as her forgetting of the LOI when kicking off her conceptual theory are actually entirely typical of her work, and are no different in kind from her freestyle assertions as to a baby's "undifferentiated chaos" or that people are born without any kind of "talent", or that sensations are automatically integrated into percepts, except they aren't, and all her various oxymorons etc. Why not just say, "well, she obviously contradicts herself here", or "clearly this is a silly, exaggerated statement"? Why dig these holes any deeper? Live by "winging it", die by "winging it"! :D

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Rand and Aristotle have this 100% wrong, I am afraid, and so do the "standard logical textbooks" if and and where they do in fact claim disputes over essentialist definitions are logically decidable. For they are not. This has been known since at least the 1940s!

Daniel,

You mean since Popper?

Of course.

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Rand and Aristotle have this 100% wrong, I am afraid, and so do the "standard logical textbooks" if and and where they do in fact claim disputes over essentialist definitions are logically decidable. For they are not. This has been known since at least the 1940s!

Daniel,

You mean since Popper?

:)

Michael

Since Goedel and Rosser.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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