Parsing Existence


Guyau

Recommended Posts

Alfonso,

I agree with you if the issue is really mistrust of the senses. But I often see a semantic game instead.

When I was a smart-ass Randroid, I used to call this "cheap profundity." (You should have heard my voice dripping with contempt when I said that, too. It was something to behold. :) ) Nowadays I don't want to humiliate anyone or be a smart-ass anymore, so I just try to ascertain what is going on and, if it is merely semantics, identify it when it becomes repetitive and tiresome.

I don't see GS as an excuse-making second-hander. In between the lines of the semantic games I often glimpse a really nice person who thinks for himself.

Michael

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Alfonso,

I agree with you if the issue is really mistrust of the senses. But I often see a semantic game instead.

When I was a smart-ass Randroid, I used to call this "cheap profundity." (You should have heard my voice dripping with contempt when I said that, too. It was something to behold. :) ) Nowadays I don't want to humiliate anyone or be a smart-ass anymore, so I just try to ascertain what is going on and, if it is merely semantics, identify it when it becomes repetitive and tiresome.

I don't see GS as an excuse-making second-hander. In between the lines of the semantic games I often glimpse a really nice person who thinks for himself.

Michael

Michael -

Agreed in the case of GS. Semantic games are not my favorite sport.

Alfonso

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Well, what's the problem?

Brant,

That's what I have started asking.

Michael

Those who wish to fundamentally mistrust their senses based on this are encouraged to demonstrate they mean what they say via their behavior - to attempt to behave as if they really mistrusted their senses. Not to reach for food - who knows what is really there on the plate? Not to walk forward -- who knows what might be there, with your senses merely tricking them?

That sort of skepticism is not sustainable in practice. Those who profess it deny it when they cash or deposit checks, make a phone call, eat dinner, make love, etc.

Alfonso

Make love first! Confuse yourself later!

--Brant

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Well, what's the problem?

Brant,

That's what I have started asking.

Michael

Those who wish to fundamentally mistrust their senses based on this are encouraged to demonstrate they mean what they say via their behavior - to attempt to behave as if they really mistrusted their senses. Not to reach for food - who knows what is really there on the plate? Not to walk forward -- who knows what might be there, with your senses merely tricking them?

That sort of skepticism is not sustainable in practice. Those who profess it deny it when they cash or deposit checks, make a phone call, eat dinner, make love, etc.

Alfonso

Make love first! Confuse yourself later!

--Brant

By the logic of their own position, such skeptics should reproduce seldom, perhaps only accidentally - even less often than Objectivists!

Alfonso

Link to comment
Share on other sites

We can abstract the way things are in a manner that reflects the way things are because we are part of the way things are.

Micheal, when you say 'things' in this statement where are these things located? Are they inside or outside your nervous system?

Edited by general semanticist
Link to comment
Share on other sites

General semanticist seems to subscribe to the view that perception is a kind of representation. I'm not yet convinced of it, but what he has written gives indications. The view is quite common. I wrote a short article about it and posted it to Rebirth of Reason here.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

General semanticist seems to subscribe to the view that perception is a kind of representation. I'm not yet convinced of it, but what he has written gives indications. The view is quite common. I wrote a short article about it and posted it to Rebirth of Reason here.

What is the stuff we are storing in our brains, if not a representation of what is Out There. We perceive trees, for example. There is not enough room for trees, rocks and sky in our heads, so what is there in our heads? All we carry are time persistent and spatially homologous neural traces. If that is not representation, then what is it?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Link to comment
Share on other sites

General semanticist seems to subscribe to the view that perception is a kind of representation. I'm not yet convinced of it, but what he has written gives indications. The view is quite common. I wrote a short article about it and posted it to Rebirth of Reason here.

I subscribe to general semantics, it is no secret :) Everything I am saying is covered in Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelian Systems and General Semantics by Korzybski. The trouble with Objectivism (and much of philosophy for 2000 odd years) is that it doesn't differentiate between TWWAF and our abstractions (perceptions) from it and also our perceptions (concepts) from our words for them. TWWAF=>lower order abstractions (perceptions, conceptions, visualizations, etc.) =>higher order abstractions (language). In this scheme, we are aware of structure in our lower order abstractions (LOA) and we attempt to reproduce it in our higher order abstractions (HOA). The HOA can then influence LOA by directing attention to structural details that maybe were not being noticed. So for example, when someone learns to distinguish between a red spruce tree and a black spruce tree it involves allowing the language to influence how we "see" things.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The trouble with Objectivism (and much of philosophy for 2000 odd years) is that it doesn't differentiate between TWWAF and our abstractions (perceptions) from it and also our perceptions (concepts) from our words for them. TWWAF=>lower order abstractions (perceptions, conceptions, visualizations, etc.) =>higher order abstractions (language).

I think you need a better understanding of Objectivism.

So for example, when someone learns to distinguish between a red spruce tree and a black spruce tree it involves allowing the language to influence how we "see" things.

Such learning rests on the actual differences between red spruce and black spruce.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

With the exception of proper names, every word we use is a concept that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.

Here is an example of confusing words with what they represent. A concept is NOT a word. I have asked people what a 'concept' refers to and nobody seems to know yet they will talk about them and write volumes about them.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Such learning rests on the actual differences between red spruce and black spruce.

How does one distinguish between an actual difference and a perceived difference?

Edited by general semanticist
Link to comment
Share on other sites

With the exception of proper names, every word we use is a concept that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.

Here is an example of confusing words with what they represent. A concept is NOT a word. I have asked people what a 'concept' refers to and nobody seems to know yet they will talk about them and write volumes about them.

I did a brief search in ITOE. I did not find what you quoted and trust it's there. She could have used better words at times. However, there are other places in ITOE that should not be ignored.

"Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" (p. 10).

"So the word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept" (p. 163)

Italics mine. It's clear that she didn't always confuse words and concepts.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I did a brief search in ITOE. I did not find what you quoted and trust it's there. She could have used better words at times. However, there are other places in ITOE that should not be ignored.

"Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind" (p. 10).

"So the word is not the concept, but the word is the auditory or visual symbol which stands for a concept" (p. 163)

Italics mine. It's clear that she didn't always confuse words and concepts.

Well, I'm glad she didn't always confuse the two! :) I got that from the newly posted link http://www.aynrandlexicon.com/

I searched under 'concept' and it was in the first entry.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The trouble with Objectivism (and much of philosophy for 2000 odd years) is that it doesn't differentiate between TWWAF and our abstractions (perceptions) from it and also our perceptions (concepts) from our words for them. TWWAF=>lower order abstractions (perceptions, conceptions, visualizations, etc.) =>higher order abstractions (language). In this scheme, we are aware of structure in our lower order abstractions (LOA) and we attempt to reproduce it in our higher order abstractions (HOA). The HOA can then influence LOA by directing attention to structural details that maybe were not being noticed. So for example, when someone learns to distinguish between a red spruce tree and a black spruce tree it involves allowing the language to influence how we "see" things.

What is the source of your knowledge of Objectivism? Have you ever sat down and actually read ITOE?

Alfonso

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The is exactly what happens when a sentence is removed from its context. The quote GS cited is from "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art," The Romantic Manifesto, p. 17 and is preceded by a qualification (which I put in bold).

Man retains his concepts by means of language. With the exception of proper names, every word we use is a concept that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.

In ITOE Rand states that a word transforms a concept into a mental entity, i.e., gives it a concrete form on the perceptual level. When she says "every word we use is a concept" in this excerpt, she obviously means "is" in the incomplete sense of "one form of" (like a radish is a plant) and not in the sense of "stating the full identity" or of "one word (word) being another name for the first word (concept)." In other words, every radish we eat is a plant, but not every plant we eat is a radish. The same goes for words and concepts. All words (except proper names) are concepts, but not all concepts are words. (She is referring to words that belong to a language, not simply random sounds or strings of letters.)

Here is a longer passage from ITOE (pp. 9-10) that makes this clear:

A concept is a mental integration of two or more units which are isolated according to a specific characteristic(s) and united by a specific definition.

The units involved may be any aspect of reality: entities, attributes, actions, qualities, relationships, etc.; they may be perceptual concretes or other, earlier-formed concepts. The act of isolation involved is a process of abstraction: i.e., a selective mental focus that takes out or separates a certain aspect of reality from all others (e.g., isolates a certain attribute from the entities possessing it, or a certain action from the entities performing it, etc.). The uniting involved is not a mere sum, but an integration, i.e., a blending of the units into a single, new mental entity which is used thereafter as a single unit of thought (but which can be broken into its component units whenever required).

In order to be used as a single unit, the enormous sum integrated by a concept has to be given the form of a single, specific, perceptual concrete, which will differentiate it from all other concretes and from all other concepts. This is the function performed by language. Language is a code of visual-auditory symbols that serves the psycho-epistemological function of convening concepts into the mental equivalent of concretes. Language is the exclusive domain and tool of concepts. Every word we use (with the exception of proper names) is a symbol that denotes a concept, i.e., that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.

(Proper names are used in order to identify and include particular entities in a conceptual method of cognition. Observe that even proper names, in advanced civilizations, follow the definitional principles of genus and differentia: e.g., John Smith, with "Smith" serving as genus and "John" as differentia—or New York, U.S.A.)

Words transform concepts into (mental) entities; definitions provide them with identity. (Words without definitions are not language but inarticulate sounds.)

I have a lot of trouble taking the following kind of pronouncement seriously from a person who has proclaimed openly that he is not familiar with the material. Not only does it sound pompous, it is wrong.

The trouble with Objectivism (and much of philosophy for 2000 odd years) is that it doesn't differentiate between TWWAF and our abstractions (perceptions) from it and also our perceptions (concepts) from our words for them. TWWAF=>lower order abstractions (perceptions, conceptions, visualizations, etc.) =>higher order abstractions (language).

How on earth someone can know "the trouble with" anything he does not understand and refuses to read is beyond me.

Intuition? Faith? Guessing?

Michael

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Words transform concepts into (mental) entities; definitions provide them with identity. (Words without definitions are not language but inarticulate sounds.)

So how does she explain the existence of undefined terms? When you can no longer define terms with other terms you have to accept that not all your terms can be defined. At this point we must have faith that the other guy knows what we mean. So Rand considers the building blocks of ALL language inarticulate sounds? Interesting.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

GS,

Every time you post a snide comment about Objectivist epistemology, you make a primary mistake that shows you do not understand it yet. It would be really good if you became familiar with it. Then you can make all the snide remarks you want to make. At least it will not look like simple taunting from the ignorant.

Michael

Link to comment
Share on other sites

GS,

Every time you post a snide comment about Objectivist epistemology, you make a primary mistake that shows you do not understand it yet. It would be really good if you became familiar with it. Then you can make all the snide remarks you want to make. At least it will not look like simple taunting from the ignorant.

Michael

Micheal,

I notice you accuse some people of "Rand bashing" quite often. I take this to mean you have a strong emotional connection to writings of Rand. I suggest you try to be more objective about criticisms of Rand, after all it is called "objectivism". If you can't be objective using it as a guide then it seems either YOU don't understand it, or it doesn't work, or both.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

GS,

My emotional attachment is to correctness.

The basis of objectivity is being familiar with the subject you are discussing. I am not being emotional by pointing out that you don't know what you are talking about with Objectivism. You simply don't. Dressing it up with snide remarks like "interesting" and things like that merely highlights this to those of us who do know the philosophy.

I could easily misrepresent general semantics, talk about "the trouble with" it and so forth and get it completely wrong just like you do with Objectivism. I prefer to be objective and read it first. That is a value I do hold emotionally.

My patience gets strained when you get something all wrong, say you don't care about checking for accuracy and will not do so, claim that your misunderstanding is Objectivism, criticize it, then get snide about it.

You can do much better than that. There is no excuse for doing this. You are intelligent.

Michael

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Such learning rests on the actual differences between red spruce and black spruce.

How does one distinguish between an actual difference and a perceived difference?

Well, since Merlin didn't answer I will. There is no such thing as an "actual difference" . Differences are manufactured in our nervous system and when people have similar abstractions we attribute the characteristics to "the object".

Link to comment
Share on other sites

GS,

My emotional attachment is to correctness.

The basis of objectivity is being familiar with the subject you are discussing. I am not being emotional by pointing out that you don't know what you are talking about with Objectivism. You simply don't. Dressing it up with snide remarks like "interesting" and things like that merely highlights this to those of us who do know the philosophy.

I could easily misrepresent general semantics, talk about "the trouble with" it and so forth and get it completely wrong just like you do with Objectivism. I prefer to be objective and read it first. That is a value I do hold emotionally.

My patience gets strained when you get something all wrong, say you don't care about checking for accuracy and will not do so, claim that your misunderstanding is Objectivism, criticize it, then get snide about it.

You can do much better than that. There is no excuse for doing this. You are intelligent.

Michael

Please don't patronize me. You bring this on yourself by accusing me of not understanding instead of addressing what I said. If I don't understand, please show me where I'm wrong. It seems Rand did not consider undefined terms whatsoever, is this true?

Edited by general semanticist
Link to comment
Share on other sites

Such learning rests on the actual differences between red spruce and black spruce.

How does one distinguish between an actual difference and a perceived difference?

Well, since Merlin didn't answer I will. There is no such thing as an "actual difference" . Differences are manufactured in our nervous system and when people have similar abstractions we attribute the characteristics to "the object".

How do you know that there is no such thing as an "actual difference"? If differences are "manufactured" in our nervous system unconnected to "the object", then you have no basis for claiming anything about "actual difference". Unless you claim you have some means of cognition that most of us don't.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It seems Rand did not consider undefined terms whatsoever, is this true?

No.

Michael

Please provide a citation where Rand did consider undefined terms.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now