Blame David Hume


BaalChatzaf

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Bob,

We are not using different terminology. You are merely restricting deduction to the one problem, not to the whole shebang.

On examining whether a premise is true or not, would you simply accept it or reject it on faith? Or would you look at the premises underpinning it and use deduction to check?

Michael

It it is a singular or particular statement, I would use my use. For instance the statement - "there is a five dollar bill in my wallet". To see if that is true I would look in my wallet. That is just plain empirical verification or refutation.

As Fransisco said to James Taggart -- words have meanings.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Bob,

We agree about the importance of observation. But just to arrive at the terms "wallet" or "five dollars," you had to use deduction. Maybe a baby would not when he first encountered these things, but as he grew,, he started checking his observations against his other knowledge and started making propositions about it. Enter deduction. If you check the validity of any concept, you ultimately use deduction to some degree.

btw - I do not separate deduction from induction as a stand-alone process. Both are needed and they constantly interact back and forth in our normal thinking. I also agree that induction relies on observation while deduction relies on propositions. But here is the starting point where they meet. It is impossible for humans to have developed propositions without any observation ever, so the very existence of propositions entails accepting the premise that observation came first.

Michael

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Premises are not checked (individually) by deduction.

Bob,

Of course they are. You simply abandon the problem you are working on for a while and examine them. You use deduction in that examination.

Michael

I think you are both making good points, just two different points.

For example, the deductive argument:

All men are mortal.

Socrates is a man.

Socrates mortal.

First deduction is used to test the validity of the argument. Must the conclusion be accepted as valid by the rules of deduction regardless of premise truth? As BC said deduction does not consider the truth of the premises, only if the argument is in a valid form. When this is decided this cycle of deduction is done.

Then the process of thinking continues by checking the soundness (truth) of the premises. As Michael said, this examination can involve deduction or induction.

For example, perhaps on examining premise 1 we employ a second round of deduction and form the argument that at least in form supports its truth:

All men are people who stop breathing at some point.

All people who stop breathing at some point are mortal.

All men are mortal

Of course these premises will have to be checked for soundness too in another round of deduction or induction, or be considered axiomatic.

Edited by worldlogicleague
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  • 2 months later...
How about 'table'? What is the fundamental characteristic of a table?

"A man-made object consisting of a flat, level surface and support(s), intended to support other, smaller objects." - ITOE, 11.

"A piece of furniture consisting of a smooth flat slab fixed on legs." - Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary

An array of numbers indicating how to multiply single digits.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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In going thru almost this whole thread, only the Law of Identity is given any use - and while deduction is in referent to the Law of Identity, induction is properly in referent to the Law of Causality...

[and no, those Laws are not the same, else ye'd not need using the two Laws but just the one]

Edited by anonrobt
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  • 2 years later...
Had David Hume not lived, it is very likely that Kant, The Evil One, would be more than a minor footnote in the history of philosophy. So why not blame Hume?

I've long argued this very point, and now consider the answer rather simple: Rand just doesn't know what she's talking about. She hasn't studied Hume or Kant in any detail, and doesn't really know - or want to know - the main problems involved that these men were wrestling with. Recall in the ITOE (p304-5) what she called "the big question of induction" - the problem central to Hume's critique, and therefore Kant's - she admits she "couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it...". That's right: for all her overwrought invective aimed at Hume in her writings, she can't even begin to formulate a response to what is considered his central question! Further, with breathtaking naivety she adds "...it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process [of induction] in that field." Rand doesn't seem to realise the problem of induction is a logical problem, not something "a scientist in a given field" can "illustrate the whole process in that field." With that in mind, what more do you need to know about Rand vs Hume - and by extension, Rand vs Kant?

H.W.B Joseph solved Hume's 'problem of induction' in 1916 in his ~Introduction to Logic~. I pointed this out in two essays on Popper (1996 & 1999) and reiterate it in my recent book ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. Blatant plug? Absolutely!

Nicholas Dykes

The problem of induction is essentially epistemological. A metaphysical

posit, such as the Law of Identity (or the Uniformity of Nature or a number of others) can explain how[/b>]induction works, but it can't resolve the epistemic problem of reaching sure conclusions on the basis of limited evidence.

We can say that it is in the nature of the Sun to rise in the east (or it is part

of its identity to do so, etc), and we can reach a conclusion about what

will happen tomorrow on that basis. But a conclusion is only as good as its premise. In order

to reach a sure conclusion about what will happen tomorrow, a sure premise is needed. So the metaphysical posit of Identity or Nature would need to be known

surely, in order to solve the epistemic problem. But how does one obtain sure knowledge of a thing's nature or identity

on the basis of limited evidence? That is itself the problem of induction, or a close relative. So nothing has been resolved epistemologically.

Is the metaphyscial posit useless, then? As I said, it explains how induction works; without it, induction might seem magical. So a problem, that of how induction works, is addressed, but it does not solve the problem of induction, because it does not make any induction more certain than it was before.

When one is talking about identity, it is tempting to think that identity is a simple concept of A=A. But such a simple concept cannot do the metaphysical

work we need it to do. The fact that everything is self-identical tells us nothing:

what we are actually appealing to is the idea that everything has a unique

identity - A is not B is not C. (Even self-indentity is complex in reality: is the butterfly identical to the caterpillar?). The unique and individual natures

of things are not given by the tautology A=A, they have to be studied

and learnt. So the problem of limited data is not avoided by identity.

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Had David Hume not lived, it is very likely that Kant, The Evil One, would be more than a minor footnote in the history of philosophy. So why not blame Hume?

I've long argued this very point, and now consider the answer rather simple: Rand just doesn't know what she's talking about. She hasn't studied Hume or Kant in any detail, and doesn't really know - or want to know - the main problems involved that these men were wrestling with. Recall in the ITOE (p304-5) what she called "the big question of induction" - the problem central to Hume's critique, and therefore Kant's - she admits she "couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it...". That's right: for all her overwrought invective aimed at Hume in her writings, she can't even begin to formulate a response to what is considered his central question! Further, with breathtaking naivety she adds "...it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process [of induction] in that field." Rand doesn't seem to realise the problem of induction is a logical problem, not something "a scientist in a given field" can "illustrate the whole process in that field." With that in mind, what more do you need to know about Rand vs Hume - and by extension, Rand vs Kant?

H.W.B Joseph solved Hume's 'problem of induction' in 1916 in his ~Introduction to Logic~. I pointed this out in two essays on Popper (1996 & 1999) and reiterate it in my recent book ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. Blatant plug? Absolutely!

Nicholas Dykes

The Problems of Induction.

There are a number of aspects to induction. One is induction as methodology, or inspiration or hypthesis formation, the aspect where a pattern is noticed and some law is postulated on that basis, without regard to its truth. Another is the epistemic issue of justifying the drawing of a general conclusion from limited data. A third is the metaphyscal undepinning or explnation of epistemic induction, ie the nature of physical law. Of these, the epistemic issue is the most difficult, and itself breaks down into a number of problems.

The Epistemic Problems of Induction.

The epistemic problems of induction are broadly related to the process of deriving a general conclusion from a limited set of data. It is needed to give a foundation to laws, and laws are, by most accounts, needed to give a foundation to causality. Induction is needed because scientific generalisation need to hold in the future: yet any "for all" statement — any statement, therefore, including future states of affairs — cannot be emprically justified directly. Such statements have to be somehow inferred from what is known of the past.

In its strongest form the problem of induction is the problem of deductively deriving a statement to the effect that "All A are F" from a certain number of examples of A which are F.

It can be briefly stated that this, "strong", version of the Problem of Induction is almost certainly insoluble. That should not be taken to mean that induction is false, unnecessary or mythical.

The problem of induction is essentially epistemological. A metaphysical

posit, such as the Law of Identity (or the Uniformity of Nature or a number of others) can explain how]induction works, but it can't resolve the epistemic problem of reaching sure conclusions on the basis of limited evidence.

We can say that it is in the nature of the Sun to rise in the east (or it is part

of its identity to do so, etc), and we can reach a conclusion about what

will happen tomorrow on that basis. But a conclusion is only as good as its premise. In order

to reach a sure conclusion about what will happen tomorrow, a sure premise is needed. So the metaphysical posit of Identity or Nature would need to be known

surely, in order to solve the epistemic problem. But how does one obtain sure knowledge of a thing's nature or identity

on the basis of limited evidence? That is itself the problem of induction, or a close relative. So nothing has been resolved epistemologically.

Is the metaphysical posit useless, then? As I said, it explains how induction works; without it, induction might seem magical. So a problem, that of how induction works, is addressed, but it does not solve the problem of induction, because it does not make any induction more certain than it was before.

When one is talking about identity, it is tempting to think that identity is a simple concept of A=A. But such a simple concept cannot do the metaphysical

work we need it to do. The fact that everything is self-identical tells us nothing:

what we are actually appealing to is the idea that everything has a unique

identity - A is not B is not C. (Even self-identity is complex in reality: is the butterfly identical to the caterpillar?). The unique and individual natures

of things are not given by the tautology A=A, they have to be studied

and learnt. So the problem of limited data is not avoided by identity.

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Had David Hume not lived, it is very likely that Kant, The Evil One, would be more than a minor footnote in the history of philosophy. So why not blame Hume?

I've long argued this very point, and now consider the answer rather simple: Rand just doesn't know what she's talking about. She hasn't studied Hume or Kant in any detail, and doesn't really know - or want to know - the main problems involved that these men were wrestling with. Recall in the ITOE (p304-5) what she called "the big question of induction" - the problem central to Hume's critique, and therefore Kant's - she admits she "couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it...". That's right: for all her overwrought invective aimed at Hume in her writings, she can't even begin to formulate a response to what is considered his central question! Further, with breathtaking naivety she adds "...it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process [of induction] in that field." Rand doesn't seem to realise the problem of induction is a logical problem, not something "a scientist in a given field" can "illustrate the whole process in that field." With that in mind, what more do you need to know about Rand vs Hume - and by extension, Rand vs Kant?

H.W.B Joseph solved Hume's 'problem of induction' in 1916 in his ~Introduction to Logic~. I pointed this out in two essays on Popper (1996 & 1999) and reiterate it in my recent book ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. Blatant plug? Absolutely!

Nicholas Dykes

The Problems of Induction.

There are a number of aspects to induction. One is induction as methodology, or inspiration or hypthesis formation, the aspect where a pattern is noticed and some law is postulated on that basis, without regard to its truth. Another is the epistemic issue of justifying the drawing of a general conclusion from limited data. A third is the metaphyscal undepinning or explnation of epistemic induction, ie the nature of physical law. Of these, the epistemic issue is the most difficult, and itself breaks down into a number of problems.

The Epistemic Problems of Induction.

The epistemic problems of induction are broadly related to the process of deriving a general conclusion from a limited set of data. It is needed to give a foundation to laws, and laws are, by most accounts, needed to give a foundation to causality. Induction is needed because scientific generalisation need to hold in the future: yet any "for all" statement — any statement, therefore, including future states of affairs — cannot be emprically justified directly. Such statements have to be somehow inferred from what is known of the past.

In its strongest form the problem of induction is the problem of deductively deriving a statement to the effect that "All A are F" from a certain number of examples of A which are F.

It can be briefly stated that this, "strong", version of the Problem of Induction is almost certainly insoluble. That should not be taken to mean that induction is false, unnecessary or mythical.

The problem of induction is essentially epistemological. A metaphysical

posit, such as the Law of Identity (or the Uniformity of Nature or a number of others) can explain how]induction works, but it can't resolve the epistemic problem of reaching sure conclusions on the basis of limited evidence.

We can say that it is in the nature of the Sun to rise in the east (or it is part

of its identity to do so, etc), and we can reach a conclusion about what

will happen tomorrow on that basis. But a conclusion is only as good as its premise. In order

to reach a sure conclusion about what will happen tomorrow, a sure premise is needed. So the metaphysical posit of Identity or Nature would need to be known

surely, in order to solve the epistemic problem. But how does one obtain sure knowledge of a thing's nature or identity

on the basis of limited evidence? That is itself the problem of induction, or a close relative. So nothing has been resolved epistemologically.

Is the metaphysical posit useless, then? As I said, it explains how induction works; without it, induction might seem magical. So a problem, that of how induction works, is addressed, but it does not solve the problem of induction, because it does not make any induction more certain than it was before.

When one is talking about identity, it is tempting to think that identity is a simple concept of A=A. But such a simple concept cannot do the metaphysical

work we need it to do. The fact that everything is self-identical tells us nothing:

what we are actually appealing to is the idea that everything has a unique

identity - A is not B is not C. (Even self-identity is complex in reality: is the butterfly identical to the caterpillar?). The unique and individual natures

of things are not given by the tautology A=A, they have to be studied

and learnt. So the problem of limited data is not avoided by identity.

Without induction, learning from our past experience would not be possible. In a way, learning is induction.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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