The end of you


equality72521

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The only atoms that "degenerate" are atoms of radioactive elements that undergo nuclear fission. Most atoms are stable. There is no such thing as a healthy or unhealthy atom. An atom does not "know" whether it is part of a living thing or not.

Sorry there are some who believe that the entire universe is decaying and that even the Atom's and Quarks are decaying. From your post I thought you were one of these. The point which is important (and which I am not sure if you ignored or just didnt get) is that augmenting the body with healthy cells can and will reverse aging.

One could say that the operating principle in the cosmos is permanent transformation. Everything, really everything, is in non-stop motion and transformation.

In philosophical discussions, I often use the abbrevation CIT ("Cosmos in Transformation") as an argument against all those who believe in any philosopical system having the capacity to endure unchanged. Such systems cannot exist because it goes against this universal cosmic principle.

As for those who believe in physical immortality being achieved one day, the Second Law of Thermodynamics should dampen their enthusiasm considerably. For how can humans believe in their immortality in view of what awaits the whole cosmos?

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The only atoms that "degenerate" are atoms of radioactive elements that undergo nuclear fission. Most atoms are stable. There is no such thing as a healthy or unhealthy atom. An atom does not "know" whether it is part of a living thing or not.

Sorry there are some who believe that the entire universe is decaying and that even the Atom's and Quarks are decaying. From your post I thought you were one of these. The point which is important (and which I am not sure if you ignored or just didnt get) is that augmenting the body with healthy cells can and will reverse aging.

One could say that the operating principle in the cosmos is permanent transformation. Everything, really everything, is in non-stop motion and transformation.

In philosophical discussions, I often use the abbrevation CIT ("Cosmos in Transformation") as an argument against all those who believe in any philosopical system having the capacity to endure unchanged. Such systems cannot exist because it goes against this universal cosmic principle.

As for those who believe in physical immortality being achieved one day, the Second Law of Thermodynamics should dampen their enthusiasm considerably. For how can humans believe in their immortality in view of what awaits the whole cosmos?

Very gloomy premise, Angela.

You can cite CIT, my approach is what I think of as the Singularity Principle (SP):

one individual at a time, one day at a time. A rational philosophy will survive.

Do I care a jot (beyond the intellectual exercise) what becomes of the Universe? No, it dies, when I die.

Conversely, does the concept of immortality interest me (past the level of conjecture, or real medical breakthroughs)? No, I sense a hint of neurotic self-indulgence about it.

Tony

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Do I care a jot (beyond the intellectual exercise) what becomes of the Universe? No, it dies, when I die.

Delusional. The Cosmos existed billions (or billyuns) of years before you did and will exist billions of years after you are gone. The same is true for me and everybody and everything else we know up close and personal. This too shall pass....l

Ba'al Chatzaf

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And all the atoms in the universe - do they also constitute a finite set of objects?

No one knows. The number of atoms and the amount of energy we can see withing our light speed horizon is finite, but each second we see 186,000 miles further out in all directions. Know one can know what is beyond the light speed horizon.

Ba'al Chatzaf

No one knows.

Ba'al Chatzaf

But going by the premise that the universe is a closed system - doesn't it follow that the number of atoms in a closed system must be finite?

Edited by Xray
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And all the atoms in the universe - do they also constitute a finite set of objects?

No one knows. The number of atoms and the amount of energy we can see withing our light speed horizon is finite, but each second we see 186,000 miles further out in all directions. Know one can know what is beyond the light speed horizon.

Ba'al Chatzaf

No one knows.

Ba'al Chatzaf

But going by the premise that the universe is a closed system - doesn't it follow that the number of atoms in a closed system must be finite?

No. It could be an unbounded closed system with non-finite diameter. Example: an affine 4 space. Closed in the topological sense but metrically unbounded. We don't know. We only know (in principle) as far as we can see. Our boundary of knowledge is the instantaneous light horizon. We can guess what the road is "beyond the headlights" but we can not know for sure.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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As for the universe being boarded by non-existence (which is another way to say lack of existence), this statement assumes a number of things, not the least of which is that ours is the only universe.

Universe = the totality of everything that exists. There cannot be multiple universes by the very definition of the word.

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As for those who believe in physical immortality being achieved one day, the Second Law of Thermodynamics should dampen their enthusiasm considerably. For how can humans believe in their immortality in view of what awaits the whole cosmos?

Existence invalidates that possibility. If the second law of thermodynamics could "kill" the universe, it would have done so by now, seeing as the universe has always existed. Do you assume something external to the universe brought it into life? There is nothing external to the universe, by definition.

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As for the universe being boarded by non-existence (which is another way to say lack of existence), this statement assumes a number of things, not the least of which is that ours is the only universe.

Universe = the totality of everything that exists. There cannot be multiple universes by the very definition of the word.

The totality of everything we know to exist. Definitions do not create reality. Let's say there is one other universe. We cannot know it unless it runs into ours. One or a thousand or a million. Makes no difference. We cannot define them into and out of existence; we are only talking about what we know, so far. What we can properly say is that we have no evidence whatsoever for the existence of another universe or a multiplicity of universes.

--Brant

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As for the universe being boarded by non-existence (which is another way to say lack of existence), this statement assumes a number of things, not the least of which is that ours is the only universe.

Universe = the totality of everything that exists. There cannot be multiple universes by the very definition of the word.

The totality of everything we know to exist. Definitions do not create reality. Let's say there is one other universe. We cannot know it unless it runs into ours. One or a thousand or a million. Makes no difference. We cannot define them into and out of existence; we are only talking about what we know, so far. What we can properly say is that we have no evidence whatsoever for the existence of another universe or a multiplicity of universes.

--Brant

Better to use the term "cosmos". Which consists of billyuns and billyuns of galaxies each containing billyuns and billyuns of stuhrs.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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As for those who believe in physical immortality being achieved one day, the Second Law of Thermodynamics should dampen their enthusiasm considerably. For how can humans believe in their immortality in view of what awaits the whole cosmos?

Existence invalidates that possibility. If the second law of thermodynamics could "kill" the universe, it would have done so by now, seeing as the universe has always existed. Do you assume something external to the universe brought it into life? There is nothing external to the universe, by definition.

Where does it say that the universe has always existed? Do you still believe in the 'steady state' theory?

Edited by Xray
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Do I care a jot (beyond the intellectual exercise) what becomes of the Universe? No, it dies, when I die.

Delusional. The Cosmos existed billions (or billyuns) of years before you did and will exist billions of years after you are gone. The same is true for me and everybody and everything else we know up close and personal. This too shall pass....l

Tony meant this in a philosophical, not in a literal sense, Ba'al.

The same as someone (I think it was a priest) said so poignantly in the memorial service for the many victims of 9/11 that '3000 worlds have died', meaning that together with each the individual who was killed there, the world, the universe of this individual perished as well.

Edited by Xray
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Tony meant this in a philosophical, not in a literal sense, Ba'al.

For me (and for genetic reasons) there is only the literal sense.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Tony meant this in a philosophical, not in a literal sense, Ba'al.

For me (and for genetic reasons) there is only the literal sense.

Ba'al Chatzaf

And he means that literally.

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As for those who believe in physical immortality being achieved one day, the Second Law of Thermodynamics should dampen their enthusiasm considerably. For how can humans believe in their immortality in view of what awaits the whole cosmos?

Existence invalidates that possibility. If the second law of thermodynamics could "kill" the universe, it would have done so by now, seeing as the universe has always existed. Do you assume something external to the universe brought it into life? There is nothing external to the universe, by definition.

Where does it say that the universe has always existed? Do you still believe in the 'steady state' theory?

The universe exists. To believe that the universe at some point did not exist is to believe that something, outside the universe, brought it into existence. The only thing that can be outside the universe is non-existence, or "nothing". That is entirely irrational. Regardless, even if that were the case, it would still invalidate the second law of thermodynamics as an absolute.

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Do I care a jot (beyond the intellectual exercise) what becomes of the Universe? No, it dies, when I die.

Delusional. The Cosmos existed billions (or billyuns) of years before you did and will exist billions of years after you are gone. The same is true for me and everybody and everything else we know up close and personal. This too shall pass....l

Tony meant this in a philosophical, not in a literal sense, Ba'al.

The same as someone (I think it was a priest) said so poignantly in the memorial service for the many victims of 9/11 that '3000 worlds have died', meaning that together with each the individual who was killed there, the world, the universe of this individual perished as well.

Thanks, Angela,

Quite right.

My statement is confined to the existence of the Universe; its end will likely be "billyuns" of years after the end of life as we know it.

However, knowing that there will be a continuation of Life after mine, makes me immensely glad.

Tony

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As for those who believe in physical immortality being achieved one day, the Second Law of Thermodynamics should dampen their enthusiasm considerably. For how can humans believe in their immortality in view of what awaits the whole cosmos?

Existence invalidates that possibility. If the second law of thermodynamics could "kill" the universe, it would have done so by now, seeing as the universe has always existed. Do you assume something external to the universe brought it into life? There is nothing external to the universe, by definition.

How can human mind grasp the idea of "eternity"?. Imo to us humans, the idea that something "always was" is every bit as inconceivable as the idea of something being created from nothing.

The same goes for infinity. Just take the idea of "infinite density". How can this physical impossibility be understandable to us?

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As for those who believe in physical immortality being achieved one day, the Second Law of Thermodynamics should dampen their enthusiasm considerably. For how can humans believe in their immortality in view of what awaits the whole cosmos?

Existence invalidates that possibility. If the second law of thermodynamics could "kill" the universe, it would have done so by now, seeing as the universe has always existed. Do you assume something external to the universe brought it into life? There is nothing external to the universe, by definition.

How can human mind grasp the idea of "eternity"?. Imo to us humans, the idea that something "always was" is every bit as inconceivable as the idea of something being created from nothing.

The same goes for infinity. Just take the idea of "infinite density". How can this physical impossibility be understandable to us?

It might be grasped by mathematical symbols, but it would be the symbols not the actuality that'd be grasped. This planet had been around 4 1/2 billion years before human beings showed up. In the Grand Canyon there are limestone layers hundreds of feet thick. The "Redwall" alone is like 700 feet thick. Used to be the bottom of seas and tiny creatures died and their bones under pressure became that limestone. That immensity of time and those numbers are really no easier to grasp than if they were infinite; they might as well have been. Reality's a wonder which makes it so wonderful.

--Brant

Edited by Brant Gaede
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Ray Kurzweil in his book discusses the rapid development of technology and how we will achieve immortality by the year 2040. One of the ways in which we will achieve immortality is to upload our consciousness. There will then be two you's, however this does not mean that YOU have immortality only one of you has immortality, and from the second you are uploaded the second you becomes not you thought it contains all of your memories up to that point. The way in which an individual could achieve immortality however would be to use Nanites to (over time) replace their body. Instead of one swift download, your cell's which die are replaced with nanites. In this way it will be impossible to make a distinction between the individual who was you pre-nanite vs when you are fully nanite. Also one of his predictions is that there will be a hybrid where some humans decide not to become fully integrated with technology and will only have partial upgrades which still allow for us to download information directly into the brain, as well as to experience virtual reality within reality(as an overlay).

Kurzweil's fantasies have little basis in real physics

Ba'al Chatzaf

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equality72521 wrote:

Ray Kurzweil in his book discusses the rapid development of technology . . . The way in which an individual could achieve immortality however would be to use Nanites to (over time) replace their body. Instead of one swift download, your cell's which die are replaced with nanites. In this way it will be impossible to make a distinction between the individual who was you pre-nanite vs when you are fully nanite.

end quote

Ba'al Chatzaf responded:

Kurzweil's fantasies have little basis in real physics

end quote <BR style="mso-special-character: line-break"><BR style="mso-special-character: line-break">

From Wikipedia:

The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned [from Crete] had thirty oars, and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new and stronger timber in their place, insomuch that this ship became a standing example among the philosophers, for the logical question of things that grow; one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending that it was not the same.

—Plutarch, Theseus[1]

It has been a while so I will reprint some old letters about the "replacement problem."

I have also been thinking about another old Objectivist quandary: Is *Volition* axiomatic? I will publish something on that in a little while.

If this interests you, enjoy! A couple college math professors chime in.

Peter Taylor

From: " Jane Yoder" <janeyoder@earthlink.net>

Reply-To: janeyoder@earthlink.net

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: Re: The Jung Question

Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2001 9:41:30 -0700

. . . .For example, Edith Hamilton's work on mythology details the story of Theseus. I generally remembered him as the guy who slew the minotaur with the help of Ariadne's clew. However, starting out in life he was the son of Athens' King Aegeus and a plebeian woman. Once he grew to manhood he could claim his heredity by lifting an ancient stone in the courtyard and withdrawing his father's sword. Upon presentation at court, he could claim his lineage. (shades of the Arthurian)

Theseus not only completed his trial but sought to slay thieves and bandits on his way to Athens. One such was that nasty guy Procrustes to whom we attribute all those top-down ideologies to this day. So Theseus was a hero in his own right before he got to meet his father.

I wasn't going to tell the rest of the tale but I can't resist. At the time Theseus arrived in court youths were being assembled to send to old King Minos who needed to feed his minotaur in the labyrinth. Theseus volunteered for the mission, vowing to slay the monster. All the youths were paraded in the streets prior to meal preparation. Ariadne, the king's daughter, fell in love with Theseus immediately and concocted the plan to provide him with the clew. (What some girls will do for a date!) She thought he was to marry her upon return and some preparation was made as they sailed off together. However, he jilted her on the isle of Naxos never to be heard of again until Richard Strauss wrote his opera :-)

Looking forward to the next issue of JARS and your article Joe. Thank you for the question.

Jane

From: Michael Hardy <hardy@math.mit.edu>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: The Ship of Theseus and Rand's Trichotomy

Date: Sun, 29 Jul 2001 21:06:41 -0400 (EDT)

Since it has been a full two years since we last discussed this topic (so that the newer subscribers weren't around, and the older ones may have new ideas since then), and since I find the topic charming, I write to (re-)introduce the topic of the Ship of Theseus and the objectivity (as contrasted, not ONLY with subjectivity, but also with INTRINSICITY) of the concept of IDENTITY.

Theseus was an ancient hero whose ship, like all ancient ships, was made of wood. When some of the boards were found to have rotted, they were replaced with new boards and the ship remained in good condition, and the old boards were burned. Years later, some other boards were found to have rotted, and were replaced with new boards, and the ship remained in good condition, and the old board were burned.

Many years after that, some some other boards were found to have rotted, and were replaced with new boards, and the ship remained in good condition, and the old board were burned. And so it went. After several centuries of this, ALL of the boards had been replaced, and none of the boards that made up the ship originally still existed.

So is this the SAME ship that Theseus owned originally? If not, at what point in time did it cease to be the same ship? Was it when 48.7% of the boards had been replaced?

That's the story as I read it last time we had this discussion, in, I think, June and July of 1999. Here's an embellishment of my own. From the day his ship was commissioned, Theseus has paid an annual fee for a parking permit to anchor his ship in a particular harbor. The contract forbids the use of the permit for any other ship than the one for which it was issued. (And we have to suppose that Theseus is still alive after a time described a couple of paragraphs ago as `several centuries.') So somebody who thinks the correct answer to the question in the foregoing paragraph is "no" decides to make something of it, and the matter comes before a judge. You are the judge. The law and the contract do not contemplate the possibility that the identity of the ship might be philosophically problematic, as it becomes in this case, so you must rely upon your wits.

Is Theseus guilty?

If I were the judge, I would say he is innocent. Lawyers sometimes speak of whether A should be considered B for the purposes of C. Would the proverbial "reasonable person" to whom lawyers sometimes appeal, consider this the "same" ship for the purposes of such parking-permit contracts? That our -purposes- are involved in the question of the ships -identity- might seem absurd if you think of the -identity- of the ship as -intrinsic- to the ship, in the way its mass or its chemical composition are intrinsic to it. Tom Radcliffe, a physicist who has from time to time participated in this forum, once wrote that an entity's identity is neither intrinsic nor subjective, but objective. That is an instance of "Rand's trichotomy." Ayn Rand considered many philosophical errors to be instances of the "false dichotomy" of "intrinsicism-versus-subjectivism."

Here are three examples:

(1) We classify things. Some things are trees; they belong to that -class- of entities we consider trees. Some things are philosophical disputes; they belong to that -class- of things we consider philosophical disputes. Etc. Either (a) we classify some things as "chairs" because their chairhood is one of their intrinsic attributes, or (B) We just happen to feel like arbitrarily classifying them in a certain way, or © Neither of the above; Our purpose of understanding the world is served by that way of classifying things; Chairhood is neither intrinsic, as in (a), nor subjective, as in (B), but objective.

(2) Either (a) Orange juice is good; its goodness, like its acidity and its viscosity are intrinsic attributes of it, or (B) I -like- orange juice! So there!, or © Orange juice is good-for-me; my well-being is served by drinking orange juice; Its goodness is neither intrinsic, as in (a) nor subjective, as in (B), but objective.

(3) (a) In 30% of all planets that look in all respects that we have seen identical to what Earth looks like (the same fossils have been found on those planets as here, etc.), birds evolved from dinosaurs; the -probability- that birds evolved from dinosaurs on this planet is therefore 30%; the probability is an intrinsic attribute of that population of planets in which 30% are thus-and-so, or (B) There are no such other planets and we're not sure whether birds evolved from dinosaurs, but 30% is how sure of it I happen to feel, or © 30% is the degree to which the known evidence supports the proposition; the probability is neither intrinsic, as in (a), nor subjective, as in (B), but objective.

That's Rand's trichotomy. Notice that justifying the claims to objectivity, of the classification of certain entities as elm trees or furniture or legal contracts, may be difficult and problematic; that ascertaining degree of salubriousness of orange juice may require much research, and assignment of the sort of probability that is seen in #3© exceeds the abilities current science (and I'm not talking about biology, but rather about probability-as-epistemology).

I have heard it said by objectivist philosophers that intrinsicism had to come first -- it is the most primitive of the three, and objectivism had to come last.

Rand held, in her book on epistemology, that "existence" and "identity" are "axiomatic concepts" (and another of those is "consciousness"). She also said "Existence is identity", and more informally, "To be, is to be something", (and "Consciousness is identification"). So it seems she thought the first two of these axiomatic concepts are two different ways of viewing the same fact

of reality.

Was Tom Radcliffe right to say that identity is not intrinsic?

Mike Hardy

Michael Hardy

hardy@math.mit.edu

<http://math.mit.edu/~hardy>

From: Gregory Wharton <jgw@demetriou.net>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: The Ship Formerly Known as Theseus'

Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2001 10:13:28 -0700

Ah. The dreaded Ship of Theseus is once again reconstructed as a topic of debate on OWL. Let's see if we can dispatch this maritime conundrum to the depths from which it has arisen.

We all know that existence is composed of subatomic particles. Scientific experiment confirmed this for us long ago to a reasonable degree of certainty. These particles move around a lot, shifting incessantly from one location to another. They apparently have little regard for such tidy notions as "entity"--at least in the macroscopic sense in which we are used to thinking about such things.

If I walk across the carpet, shuffling my feet, I (like Theseus' ship) shed some of my constituent parts (electrons) and pick up a whole host of new ones. Does this change my identity? Am I no longer myself? When I touch you on the tip of your nose and give you a good shock, am I then making myself a part of you? Is your identity irrevocably changed? Should you go and get yourself a new driver's license?

Were it not for an understanding of the nature of entity and identity in a philosophical sense, the mind would truly boggle at such questions (and, continuing the thread, whose mind would be doing the boggling, eh?--such are the confusions from which midnight dorm-room speculations are born).

In an objective sense, what is identity? How can we rationally say that Theseus' ship is still the same entity when the entirety of its component parts have been replaced piecemeal over the years? How can we say that I am me, even though (over the course of my 32 years of life), my body has already completely regrown its skeleton at least four times? I regrow my skin in entirety every few months (faster if I've had a sunburn). My parts have been updated and replaced every bit as thoroughly as the planks in Theseus' hull.

Rand provided us with a powerful, and deceptively simple, answer to these questions: objective identity arises from the relationships between things, and not the things in themselves.

There is no dichotomy or trichotomy involved in this answer. It is a synthesis.

Rand attacked the two dominant epistemic positions of modern times--intrinsicism and subjectivism--by pointing out that they each failed to take into account how subject and object interrelate. Universal concepts, she noted (following Abelard and the other conceptualists), arise not from our arbitrary imposition of named order, nor from the "essences" of objects in and of themselves. Rather, universal concepts are rooted in reality through relationships of things to one another (and to us in particular), and named according to the importance of certain of those relationships to us and to the fact of the relationships themselves.

A human being is a system of organic molecules interrelated in such a way as to form a macroscopic structure with certain characteristics: conceptual thought, opposable thumbs, tool use, upright posture, pizza cravings, inability to look away from auto accidents.

When a portion of that system no longer serves its function in the system and is replaced by a new component, the relationships which compose the system remain integral. Just because I loan you a few electrons when I rub my feet on the carpet and tap you on the nose does not make either of us any less ourselves.

Though Theseus has replaced every part of his ship over the years, the parts still make a ship. The ship is still Theseus'. The form the new parts take in their interrelationships is virtually identical to the original form. Theseus would reasonably call it the same ship, and objectively, so would we.

If you were to take the cast-off parts and reconstruct a ship from them, it would not be the same ship. The parts were cast off because they no longer served to keep the interrelated system of the Theseus' ship integral to itself. Constructing a new ship out of them would simply result in a new relationship (both internal and external to that system), and would then result in a new identity: "Theseus' Old Ship" or "Theseus' Other, Shoddy and Less Well-built, Ship" or "Theseus' Used Ship, Low Money Down, No Interest Until Christmas, Some Restrictions Apply!"

How about me? Am I the same man I was fifteen or thirty years ago? That depends on how you look at it.

The subatomic particles of which I am composed at this present moment have not been with me since the time I was born. In all likelihood, I presently have few or no component subatomic parts which have been mine since I was in utero. If we were to take the intrinsicist position, adapted through our knowledge of subatomic structures and biochemical reality, we would have to say then that I am no more the same person as the individual who shared my name at some arbitrarily small past point in time as I am you. The intrinsicist physicist must presume that my identity is discontinuous from each moment to fractional moment at the whim of Heisenberg. The subjectivist would probably say something to the effect that I am whoever I feel like I want to be at this particular moment if it brings me emotional fulfillment, and that with each imaginative re-invention of my personality I become a new person expressing a particular will to be.

Subjectivists are prone to saying silly things like that.

As an objectivist, I merely note that the parts which compose me, though they may change from time to time, and have evolved in their relationships to one another over time, still form a system of interrelationships which has the fundamental characteristics of being me. I have grown from 23 inches to 6'-5". I've suffered heartache and loss. I bear the scars of living. But, I am still myself..

Heisenberg may be uncertain about the nature of my component quarks, I may be feeling a little confused about my place in the world, but I am still me, and I know it--objectively.

When the system of interrelationships which composes me irrevocably breaks down and dissipates, for whatever reason, then I will cease to be. My parts may still be around to some extent, stinking up the place, but my identity will have evaporated. "I" will be gone.

For Theseus' ship to objectively cease being the Ship of Theseus, we require more than just the selective, but complete, replacement of its component parts piecemeal over time. The relationships between parts composing that identity must themselves vanish. If Theseus dies, then it is no longer the Ship of Theseus even though we might never have replaced any of its parts. At that point its identity will change: becoming the Ship Formerly Known as Theseus' or some such. If the ship burns to the waterline and sinks, we get the same result (and probably a good-sized insurance claim to boot).

This is power of Rand's metaphysics and epistemology. What is, is. Things are what they are. The identities of complex entities arise from the relationships among things that are. Our concepts are objective to the extent that they recognize these relationships.

The Ship of Theseus does not loose its identity with each repair, no more than I cease being me every time I clip my fingernails or eat a pizza.

Now, if you'll excuse me, this concept-forming bipedal hominid has a pizza craving to satisfy.

~g

J. Gregory Wharton, AIA

Architect | Philosopher

Seattle, Washington USA

From: Paul Bryant <levi_bryant@yahoo.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: The Ship of Theseus and Rand's Trichotomy

Date: Mon, 30 Jul 2001 18:04:43 -0700 (PDT)

I've thought about this problem quite a bit since we first discussed it a few years ago and have begun to wonder whether its intractability might not lie in treating the axiom as a metaphysical statement, rather than a predicative one. This becomes more clear if we change the nature of the thought experiment. The problem with the Ship of Theseus example is that it directs all our attention towards an entity (the ship), instead of what we say of the ship. By changing the example we might attain a greater deal of insight into the problem.

Living in Chicago, one example that comes immediately to my mind consists of

our references to "the four o'clock train." What is it about the four o'clock train that leads us to call it "*the* four o'clock train"? In other words, why do we attribute identity to this train? After all, the train that comes daily at four o'clock is not likely to be the same train that came at four o'clock the day before, nor will the conductor or the passengers likely be the same. Yet still we attribute identity to this train. What, then, is the same about this train?

Well, for starters, the identity of the train seems to have nothing to do with the train itself. The train changes from day to day. Sometimes the train will be the same, most of the time it will not. Of course, it is true that we can say that *this* train on *this* day is identical to itself. But when we're talking about *this* train on *this* day, we're no longer talking about the four o'clock train but about an entity. If the four o'clock train has the property of identity, then, it has very little to do with the entity itself. *Rather,* the identity belonging to the four o'clock train is a result of system or structure. The four o'clock train is the four o'clock train because of the position it occupies within a system of times belonging to Chicago's train schedule. This structure isn't something that could be discovered by observing the train, it is not a quality of the train or a material property, but is rather a symbolic structure. The train itself is just something that fills in this structure, but could just as easily be another train.

The situation is analogous to that found pertaining to the identity of chess pieces. No longer how long I observe the different pieces of my chess set, I can never discover any physical properties that make one piece a knight and another piece a queen or pawn. What makes a knight a knight or a queen a queen has nothing to do with the physical chess piece itself, but with the system of rules belonging to chess. In fact, it's because the physical chess pieces themselves are arbitrary with respect to the rules of chess, that I am able to substitute a quarter for a pawn when I lose a pawn and still have it serve the same function in the game. In other words, it is not the material identity of the entity that makes a particular chess piece what it is, but rather it's structural place within the system of rules outlined by chess.

This suggests a way of solving the problem of the Ship of Theseus. As I noted above, perhaps one of the things that makes this problem so intractable is that we emphasize the ship as entity too much, rather than focusing on the symbolic/conceptual dimension involved in identifying the ship as the same.

What can we say about the Ship of Theseus at the level of the symbolic, of signs, of the conceptual rather than at the level of entity or the metaphysical? Well first, the Ship of Theseus *is* Theseus's Ship. This seems like a trivial point, but we must bear in mind that ownership is a symbolic relation. It confers an identity on the ship by attributing a relation of "belong-to-Theseus" upon it. When we speak of the ship being the same, one thing we are saying about the ship is that it is a ship that belongs to Theseus, that is Theseus's property. Other symbolic relations that belong to the ship consist of its function and use. Once again, the function and use of the ship are not something that can be discovered from observing the qualities of the ship, but are rather conferred on the ship by putting it to that use.

To be sure, it is because the ship has certain physical properties that it can be put to the use of trading or transport, but this use, this telos or end is not something that could be deduced by observing those properties.

Another function of identity with respect to the ship consists of the relations the elements (nails, boards, rope, pitch, etc) share with respect to one another in the organized structure of the ship. Often, when we are speaking of identity we are speaking of structural identity or sameness of configuration, rather than material identity or sameness of matter.

Finally, a fourth symbolic relation seems to be continuity in time and space. Although the material elements of the ship change in the Ship of Theseus story, they change in a continuous or related space-time which goes a long way towards establishing the attribution of identity with respect to the ship.

By approaching the question in structural/symbolic terms rather than material/metaphysical terms the problem seems to resolve itself. Such a solution, however, would possibly stand in conflict with some fundamental tenants of objectivism insofar as it would treat identity as a function of meaning and relations rather than as a metaphysical structure of the universe. On the other hand, it is difficult for me to attribute identity to existence itself insofar as the universe seems to be constantly changing and mutating in such a way that identity is never present. However, the structural / symbolic approach seems more in keeping with actual scientific practice than the material / metaphysical approach insofar as what the scientist studies when he studies nature is not so much "things" or "entities" but the relations and structures that these entities exemplify in their becoming and change.

Paul Bryant,

Department of Philosophy,

Loyola University of Chicago

From: Ram Tobolski <rtb_il@yahoo.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Another go at Identity

Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2001 12:31:07

How can Theseus' ship preserve its identity over time, when each of its constituent parts has been replaced?

1. STRUCTURE

One possible answer is, that while the constituent parts have all been replaced over time, the overall ship structure remained the same.

But this is not enough: suppose along with Theseus' ship another, structurally-identical ship was also built. Then, according to the structure criterion, that other ship is identical with Theseus's ship!

But that other ship is obviously not identical with Theseus's ship. And therefore the structure criterion is not sufficient as a criterion of identity.

2. CONTINUITY

Let TS-1 be Theseus' ship when it was brand new. Let AS be another ship that was built simultaneously, having the same structure. Let TS-2 be Theseus' ship after 10 years, still having the same structure as the original.

We say that TS-2 is identical to TS-1, but that AS is not identical to TS-1. So, why? What is the relevant difference between TS-2 and AS, that makes TS-2, but not AS, identical to TS-1?

The expected answer seems to me to be, that there is some kind of ~continuity~ over time between TS-1 and TS-2 that does not exist between TS-1 and AS.

- What kind of continuity over time, and why does this continuity preserve identity?

After some meditations, I came up with the following solution: A continuity that preserves identity over time is a continuity that is founded on preservation laws.

Suppose that TS-1 has a (structural or functional) property P. And suppose that TS-2 has the same property P. Is this a part of their identity? Yes- but only if TS-2 having P has been ~caused~ by TS-1 having P, plus one or more preservation laws.

The most relevant preservation law, in the case of Theseus' ship, is the law that a defective part is being replaced with a similar, but effective, part.

3. A MATTER OF DEGREE

- How can identity be preserved when some properties and relations have not been preserved?

For example, let TS-3 be Theseus's ship after its beak has been redesigned. Is TS-3 identical with TS-1? In practice, we'll say "of course" without hesitation. How can this be understood in theory?

My current opinion is that there is no real, metaphysical full-identity in this case (and in most other cases). There is only partial-identity, albeit a high degree of identity. Many important properties and relations have been preserved. Some have not been preserved. So, there is a high degree of identity (continuity through preservation laws) but not full identity.

When we deal with complex objects, there is usually only one ~candidate~ for identity. When we look at the seas, ten years after Theseus' ship has been built, there is only one ship that is even a ~candidate~ to be identical with the original ship.

Simpler objects demonstrate that this is not necessarily the case. Suppose I take a stone S, and break it into two smaller stones, S1 and S2. Is either of S1 or S2 ~identical~ with S? Both have some claim to this identity.

The concept IDENTITY that we use in practice is, then, not purely metaphysical. It is partly epistemological. It is dependent, surely, on a metaphysical basis. To assert that X1 is identical with X2 demands that X1 and X2 have a high degree of metaphysical identity (continuity through preservation laws). How high, this is an epistemological consideration.

Ram

From: "Matthew Ferrara" <educator@worldnet.att.net>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: RE: Another go at Identity

Date: Sat, 18 Aug 2001 12:31:19 -0400

With respect to the Theseus-ship discussion it might be easier to say that, when it comes to identity, the thing is certainly more than just the sum of its parts...

I think that for the last few thousand years, humans have not had any problems with their identity due to the loss of or mutation of or replacement of atoms, subatomic particles or otherwise.

More likely, identity crises are easily identified as and linked to those clusters of atoms and molecules called priests, demagogues and tyrants.

Tongue in cheek (or passing through cheek as it's apparently porous...)

Matthew Ferrara

From: Drew Schaefer <drewschaefer@ftnetwork.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: RE: Another go at Identity

Date: Mon, 20 Aug 2001 05:46:50 -0700

In response to Matthew (who wrote: "With respect to the Theseus-ship discussion it might be easier to say that, when it comes to identity, the thing is certainly more than just the sum of its parts...

[snip]

"More likely, identity crises are easily identified as and linked to those clusters of atoms and molecules called priests, demagogues and tyrants.") and Ram's notes from earlier this weekend ("How can Theseus' ship preserve its identity over time, when each of its constituent parts has been replaced?

[snip]

"The concept IDENTITY that we use in practice is, then, not purely metaphysical. It is partly epistemological. It is dependent, surely, on a metaphysical basis. To assert that X1 is identical with X2 demands that X1 and X2 have a high degree of metaphysical identity (continuity through preservation laws). How high, this is an epistemological consideration.")

I wondered perhaps on a more Objective level, if we were blind to the obvious:

Look at the apostrophe.

A is A: Theseus found a ship that suited him, according to a) his needs; B) means to pay; and, c) with a seller willing to transact. In what we might assume was a typical contract for the exchange of goods, Theseus paid an acceptable amount in a currency of exchange for the goods in question (being one seaworthy ship).

Two men willing to freely transact, did so.

Upon receipt of the moneys, the buyer can be assumed to have taken possession and title, and the ship Theseus coveted then became - Theseus' ship. ~that~ ship became one "of Theseus."

The ship endured much work, over the years spent riding the high seas and all; repairs were made by Theseus or for Theseus by others, perhaps specialists. The ship, in physical transformation by replacement of a beam here, a keel board there, a new mast, all were performed to - Theseus' ship.

And he retained title to same.

A socially-accepted indication of possession (in a land which operates under the rule of law) is the simple irreducible piece of information necessary to know how to identify - Theseus' ship.

I would never argue (nor know how) to Theseus that the ship he was going to sell me, after 15 years of use, which use necessitated nearly total restorations, was no longer his to sell me. (What it's value would be is a separate question!)

This raises again the issue of to what extent Ms. Rand believed certain forms of government ~were~ necessary - to provide transactional law (Contracts) as well as property law (titles), amongst limited others.

Drew

Edited by Peter Taylor
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So much about so little but all very interesting. It's that story thing. Things change or are changed over time. Is and was. sometimes is and was are basically the same, sometimes completely different, frequently in between.

--Brant

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Here are some very funny (and at the same time very 'philosophical') scenes from Woody Allen's film "Hannah And Her Sisters", about Mickey (played by Allen) wanting to switch to Catholicism, and the reaction of his Jewish parents to this decision.

Enjoy. :)

Screenplay of the altercation between Mickey and his parents:

MOTHER

(crying)

Why? Oh, my God!

She sobs hysterically, staggering offscreen to the bathroom;

she shuts the door. Mickey walks into view, in the living

room, looking after his shocked mother, who continues to cry

over the scene.

MICKEY

(overlapping and gesturing)

I don't understand.

(turning to his

offscreen father)

I thought that you would be happy.

FATHER

(offscreen)

How can we be happy?

His father walks into view, carrying a teacup and a candy

dish. He strides past Mickey towards the kitchen.

MICKEY

(following his father)

Well, because I never thought of

God in my life. Now I'm giving it

serious thought.

FATHER

(offscreen, in the kitchen)

But Catholicism? Why not your own

people?

MICKEY

(gesturing at the

kitchen door to his

offscreen father)

Because I got off to a wrong foot

with my own thing, you know. B-b-

b-but I need a dramatic change in

my life.

. FATHER

(offscreen)

You're gonna believe in Jesus Christ?

MICKEY

(gesturing)

I know it sounds funny, but I'm

gonna try.

FATHER

(offscreen)

But why? We raised you as a Jew.

MICKEY

(shrugging)

So, just 'cause I was born that

way... You know, I'm old enough to

make a mature decision.

Mickey's father walks into view; he stands by the stove near

the kitchen doorway, picking up a dirty glass and some bowls

to clean.

FATHER

But why Jesus Christ? Why, for

instance, shouldn't you become a

Buddhist?

Holding the dirty dishes in his hand, Mickey's father looks

at his son.

MICKEY

(gesturing)

A Bud--? That's totally alien to

me. Look, you're getting on in

years, right? Aren't you afraid of

dying?

Mickey's father walks offscreen again, to the kitchen sink.

FATHER

(offscreen)

Why should I be afraid?

MICKEY

(loudly gesturing)

Oh! 'Cause you won't exist!

FATHER

(offscreen)

So?

MICKEY

(gesturing)

That thought doesn't terrify you?

Mickey's father walks out of the kitchen, past his son, to

the living room.

FATHER

(waving his arm)

Who thinks about such nonsense?

Now I'm alive. When I'm dead, I'll

be dead.

MICKEY

(following his

father, gesturing)

I don't understand. Aren't you

frightened?

FATHER

(offscreen)

Of what? I'll be unconscious.

MICKEY

(turning and walking

down the hallway)

Yeah, I know. But never to exist

again!

FATHER

(offscreen)

How do you know?

MICKEY

Well, it certainly doesn't look

promising.

Mickey stops at the bathroom door at the other end of the

hallway. He starts to pound it.

FATHER

(offscreen)

Who knows what'll be?

Mickey's father comes back on screen; he's carrying a plate

of hors d'oeuvres and an empty glass towards the kitchen.

He stops and looks down the hall at Mickey, who's now

struggling to open the bathroom door.

FATHER

(gesturing with his

hands full)

I'll either be unconscious or I

won't. If not, I'll deal with it

then. I'm not gonna worry now

about what's gonna be when I'm

unconscious.

MICKEY

(pounding on the door)

Mom, come out!

MOTHER

(offscreen in the bathroom)

Of course there's a God, you idiot!

You don't believe in God?

MICKEY

(sighing)

But if there's a God, then wh-why

is there so much evil in the world?

(shrugging)

What-- Just on a simplistic level.

Why-why were there Nazis?

MOTHER

(offscreen in the bathroom)

Tell him, Max.

Mickey, reacting, hits his forehead.

FATHER

(offscreen)

How the hell do I know why there

were Nazis? I don't know how the

can opener works.

Edited by Xray
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In the above film scene, Mickey grapples with the dreadful prospect of non-existence.

Is it the biologiclly hardwired drive to live which is instilled so strongly in us humans that the idea of non-existence seems so unacceptable, leading to mental constructions of an afterlife in many religions?

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In the above film scene, Mickey grapples with the dreadful prospect of non-existence.

Is it the biologiclly hardwired drive to live which is instilled so strongly in us humans that the idea of non-existence seems so unacceptable, leading to mental constructions of an afterlife in many religions?

Are you asking if most people are scared of dying? Hell yes!

Ba'al Chatzaf

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In the above film scene, Mickey grapples with the dreadful prospect of non-existence.

Is it the biologiclly hardwired drive to live which is instilled so strongly in us humans that the idea of non-existence seems so unacceptable, leading to mental constructions of an afterlife in many religions?

Are you asking if most people are scared of dying? Hell yes!

Ba'al Chatzaf

In the above film cut from "Hannah", Mickey's father was not in the least upset by what upset his son so much. Not all religions have the idea of an afterlife. Ancient Judaism, if I'm informed correctly, doesn't.

Edited by Xray
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