New Discussion of Peikoff's Arbitrary

[KacyRay]

I just read the first paragraph of Robert Campbells essay of the Peikovian Doctrine of the arbitrary assertion, and I feel compelled to point something out...

In my first comment in this discussion, I made the statement "Peikoff was right". If I may, I'd like to retract that statement. I read Peikoff's doctrine many years ago and I only remember it vaguely. I do remember that my primary takeaway from it is that there does exist a category of propositions that do not qualify as true or false.

I found that specific idea to be compelling, and from there I developed my own formulation that all propositions fit into two broad categories - those which have truth value, and those which don't.

So where I'm going with this is - my conversation here and any argument I make is in favor of my own formulation and conclusions, not in favor of Peikoff's. I credit him with providing the foundation of where I went with these formulations, but I can't say I honestly remember one single sentence of his essay, let alone the conclusions it arrives at.

I *categorically* reject any idea that you can judge the truth-value of any proposition based on who proposes it. I regard that idea as dishonest and (in Peikoff's case) a heaping helping of self-serving horseshit.

So to be clear - I'm arguing in favor of my own formulations, not in defense of Peikoff's.

My contention is that:

- Any proposition about the nature of reality will fit into one of two broad categories: Those which have truth value and those which don't.

- Those which do may have a truth value of true or false. (Whether or not that value is as-of-yet determined is irrelevant, so long as it is determinable).

- Those which do not are arbitrary, and the only proper way to handle such statements is to reject them out-of-hand.

Also:

- There are specific features a proposition must possess in order to have truth value. It must be, at a minimum, verifiable, falsifiable, and subject to examination.

For now, these are the only points I am arguing for. I also contend that an understand of the principles listed above is a vital component of polemic discourse, as the deliberation of arbitrary propositions only serves to credit them with value and merit that they do not possess.

[KacyRay]

Due to the garbage computer I am forced to use on this ship, I can't seem to get past page 1 of Campbell's article without it crashing.

On page one, though, it seems to indicate that Piekoff's definition of "arbitrary assertion" is an emotional claim that is devoid of evidence (paraphrased).

Contrast that to mine: A statement about reality which has no truth value (i.e. either unverifiable, unfalsifiable, or not subject to examination).

This might be the key in understanding why his doctrine has the potential for moral implications whereas mine does not.

Edit: I should point out that an emotional statement devoid of evidence CAN have truth value! If it is subject to examination, verifiable, and falsifiable... it has truth value. The truth value of a proposition *need not be known* in order for the proposition to possess truth value. Again, this is my position, not Piekoff's (as far as I know).

By way of example - An ordinary Christian claim that Jesus is going to return "soon" is an arbitrary claim that should be rejected out of hand. Harold Camping's claim that Jesus was going to return on May 21st 2011 was not an arbitrary claim - it was, in fact, false.

As an interesting aside... I have on several occasions pointed out to people that Camping claim (as crazy and silly as it sounded) actually possessed virtues that ordinary christian claims of "soon" do not possess, and his claims had the merit of courage behind them. He put his reputation on the line by offering a testable proposition - which, if nothing else, gives him the distinction of a courage that few christians (and mystics in general) possess.

And on 21 May 2011 we found out why.

At least his claim wasn't arbitrary. It was false, and as far as I'm concerned, that made it more useful.

[KacyRay]

Now that I've been able to get to page 2, I am able to see with clarity that my argument is clearly distinguished from Piekoff's.

"Peikoff has yet to present an example of an arbitrary claim or supply any instructions as to how to identify one."

Since I've already done both, I trust that my own formulations merit consideration, for reasons that Piekoff's didn't.

[KacyRay]

"Such statements are so strong as to pose a metalogical problem. For if what Peikoff says is true, what is the status of a correct judgment that a claim is arbitrary? How does one arrive at that judgment?"

According to my own formulation, the burden of truth-value demonstration lies with the person uttering the proposition. In other words, it is not for the listener to decide whether or not a statement is arbitrary, rather it is on the proponent of the statement to ensure that his or her proposition meets the criteria required for a statement to have truth value (verifiable, falsifiable, and subject to examination).

Consider the proposition "There is a live cat in my desk drawer".

Given that the proposition was made under the following conditions:

- No indication has been made that there is a cat in my desk drawer.

- No one has opened or looked in my desk drawer in the last 20 years.

- I love cats and would be thrilled to find one in my desk drawer.

According to Peikoff, this statement is arbitrary, as A) there are potential emotional reasons for make such a statement and B) There is no evidence whatsoever to support my contention.

According to me, this statement has truth value. It is verifiable, falsifiable, and subject to examination.

In this case, the statement would be false. But not arbitrary.

This should sufficiently address the question posed by Mr. Campbell.

[KacyRay]

By the way... I'm in the time zone GMT+2, which is why you see a flurry of posts. I'm not trying to appear obsessive... I was just going over this while the rest of you were probably sleeping.

[BaalChatzaf]

"Such statements are so strong as to pose a metalogical problem. For if what Peikoff says is true, what is the status of a correct judgment that a claim is arbitrary? How does one arrive at that judgment?"

According to my own formulation, the burden of truth-value demonstration lies with the person uttering the proposition. In other words, it is not for the listener to decide whether or not a statement is arbitrary, rather it is on the proponent of the statement to ensure that his or her proposition meets the criteria required for a statement to have truth value (verifiable, falsifiable, and subject to examination).

Consider the proposition "There is a live cat in my desk drawer".

Given that the proposition was made under the following conditions:

- No indication has been made that there is a cat in my desk drawer.

- No one has opened or looked in my desk drawer in the last 20 years.

- I love cats and would be thrilled to find one in my desk drawer.

According to Peikoff, this statement is arbitrary, as A) there are potential emotional reasons for make such a statement and B) There is no evidence whatsoever to support my contention.

According to me, this statement has truth value. It is verifiable, falsifiable, and subject to examination.

In this case, the statement would be false. But not arbitrary.

This should sufficiently address the question posed by Mr. Campbell.

The sentence is either true or false. Go look and see which.

[BaalChatzaf]

Right. I skipped a step in getting in getting back to KacyRay's phrasing of it as "1=x." I assumed that it was logically implied, but here's the entire chain:

6 + x = 7

therefore x = 1

therefore 1 = x

J

Obviously if you add more substance to an arbitrary statement you can render it true of false.

I was deliberate with my x=1 formulation. We aren't solving for x, we are making an entirely arbitrary statement

If I say x=1, the truth of that equation is not only unknown, it is *unknowable* (unless x is assigned a value). A statement that has no truth value is arbitrary.

But it's not unknowable. In saying "x=1" you are identifying x as 1. And then when you say that x + 6 = y, we know that y = 7.

J

Given that x = 1.

[KacyRay]

The sentence is either true or false. Go look and see which.

Assuming you're referring to the "cat" sentence...

Yes. That's what I said. It has truth value. That's another way of saying it's true or false.

Were you intending to agree with me? Not sure where you were going with that.

[Brant Gaede]

It seems to me that arbitrary is a derivative of false and a way of suggesting examination and dealing quickly with false statements claimed to be true but only for simple on-the-face-of-it claims. This could be called the fallacy of the arbitrary. In science reason is used to identify, acquire and evaluate data. This is where all the hard work is. It is not valuable, though, to tell an Einstein that his thought experiments are "arbitrary" therefore invalid and not worthy of consideration as opposed to thinking about them and from that go about acquiring data.

This "arbitrary" business in Objectivism is just another attempt to expand the catechism for purposes of control. Instead of a philosophy that states ~look at reality~ we have a philosopher or philosophers stating don't forget the official position respecting the matter of X. Using the philosophy as a reality buffer with appeal to its authority has been wrong since Galt made even worse since Galt and Branden and a spike through its heart by Peikoff who once could see himself going around the world putting the works of Ayn Rand in caves to preserve them for the future.

--Brant

Edited April 5, 2013 by Brant Gaede

[Brant Gaede]

I can no longer edit my posted posts since I upgraded to a DSC 3.0 modem. I used to be able to switch to coming here through AOL for editing, but no longer. I had previously been unable to edit though IE. The OL software was pretty much ruined with the last upgrade. Why they have to keep fiddling with it is beyond me. Every improvement has meant giving up more value (to me) than was acquired.

--Brant

edit: I downloaded Firefox and now I can edit again

Edited April 5, 2013 by Brant Gaede

[KacyRay]

It seems to me that arbitrary is a derivative of false and a way of suggesting examination and dealing quickly with false statements claimed to be true but only for simple on-the-face-of-it claims. This could be called the fallacy of the arbitrary. In science reason is used to identify, acquire and evaluate data. This is where all the hard work is. It is not valuable, though, to tell an Einstein that his thought experiments are "arbitrary" therefore invalid and not worthy of consideration as opposed to thinking about them and from that go about acquiring data.

This "arbitrary" business in Objectivism is just another attempt to expand the catechism for purposes of control. Instead of a philosophy that states ~look at reality~ we have a philosopher or philosophers stating don't forget the official position respecting the matter of X. Using the philosophy as a reality buffer with appeal to its authority has been wrong since Galt made even worse since Galt and Branden and a spike through its heart by Peikoff who once could see himself going around the world putting the works of Ayn Rand in caves to preserve them for the future.

--Brant

Brant,

A thought experiment is not a proposition (a statement about the nature of reality). It's a thought experiment, and I'm specifically discussing propositions.

Are you arguing against Peikoff's doctrine? Or my formulation?

If you're arguing against mine, it sounds to me like you are contending that all propositions have truth value. I'm interested to hear how you can justify that when I've demonstrated that some have none at all.

Do you have an argument? I hear you, that you don't agree, and that's well and good. But I'm wondering if you have an argument against my formulation.

- Do you believe that all propositions have "truth value"?

- If so, how can you justify this in light of the examples I've provided? Can you demonstrate the truth value in Russels Teapot example, or in the proposition 1 = x?

- If not, how would you classify those that do not?

[Brant Gaede]

Kacy, I'm not arguing against your position on the arbitrary per se.

--Brant

as for the teapot example I don't clearly remember it, but there are millions and millions of them orbiting the sun right now--coffee pots too

[BaalChatzaf]

It seems to me that arbitrary is a derivative of false and a way of suggesting examination and dealing quickly with false statements claimed to be true but only for simple on-the-face-of-it claims. This could be called the fallacy of the arbitrary. In science reason is used to identify, acquire and evaluate data. This is where all the hard work is. It is not valuable, though, to tell an Einstein that his thought experiments are "arbitrary" therefore invalid and not worthy of consideration as opposed to thinking about them and from that go about acquiring data.

This "arbitrary" business in Objectivism is just another attempt to expand the catechism for purposes of control. Instead of a philosophy that states ~look at reality~ we have a philosopher or philosophers stating don't forget the official position respecting the matter of X. Using the philosophy as a reality buffer with appeal to its authority has been wrong since Galt made even worse since Galt and Branden and a spike through its heart by Peikoff who once could see himself going around the world putting the works of Ayn Rand in caves to preserve them for the future.

--Brant

Brant,

A thought experiment is not a proposition (a statement about the nature of reality). It's a thought experiment, and I'm specifically discussing propositions.

Are you arguing against Peikoff's doctrine? Or my formulation?

If you're arguing against mine, it sounds to me like you are contending that all propositions have truth value. I'm interested to hear how you can justify that when I've demonstrated that some have none at all.

Do you have an argument? I hear you, that you don't agree, and that's well and good. But I'm wondering if you have an argument against my formulation.

- Do you believe that all propositions have "truth value"?

- If so, how can you justify this in light of the examples I've provided? Can you demonstrate the truth value in Russels Teapot example, or in the proposition 1 = x?

- If not, how would you classify those that do not?

6 + x = 7 -> x = 1. If you assert that 6 + x is equal to 7 (i.e. the premise is true) then the conclusion must follow. Modus Ponens.

[KacyRay]

Gents,

I'd like to make a modest request. I was hoping someone could address the formulation I've proposed and either concur or offer arguments against.

I don't know why we're talking about 6+x=7. Not sure why premises I never posited are being injected into my own formulation.

My contention is that:

- Any proposition about the nature of reality will fit into one of two broad categories: Those which have truth value and those which don't.

- Those which do may have a truth value of true or false. (Whether or not that value is as-of-yet determined is irrelevant, so long as it is determinable).

- Those which do not are arbitrary, and the only proper way to handle such statements is to reject them out-of-hand.

Also:

- There are specific features a proposition must possess in order to have truth value. It must be, at a minimum, verifiable, falsifiable, and subject to examination.

For now, these are the only points I am arguing for. I also contend that an understanding of the principles listed above is a vital component of polemic discourse, as the deliberation of arbitrary propositions only serves to credit them with value and merit that they do not possess.

I have also already repudiated Peikoff's doctrine of the arbitrary assertion, insofar as I understand it to be defined as "an emotional claim that is devoid of evidence" (paraphrased).I find this definition or characterization to be inaccurate and useless.

By way of analogy, I presented the following PROPOSITIONS:

1 = 1 is true

1 = 2 is false

1 = x is arbitrary

I did not offer these up in order to discuss algebra. I offer them up as mathematical analogies to logical statements.

If you are having trouble accepting a mathematical analogy, here are some concrete examples:

1) I am a human being = true

2) I am a horse = false

3) I am a deity whose true identity may be known only to the gods = arbitrary

Here's another example:

1) The rapture did not happen yesterday = true

2) The rapture happened yesterday = false

3) The rapture will happen soon, and by "soon", I mean "soon in heavenly terms", because to god a day is as a million years = arbitrary

Do you see the difference between statements numbered 1 and 2 and those numbered 3? Statements 1 and 2 are verifiable, falsifiable, and subject to examination. The statements numbered 3 are not.

Bonus example:

4) The rapture will happen tomorrow = Undetermined, but with truth value.

Statement #4's truth value is undetermined, but it still has truth value because it meets the criteria I've identified. It is verifiable, falsifiable, and subject to examination.

Now... if, after I've explained all this, you still think that there is no essential difference between a false statement and an arbitrary one, I think at this point it's on you to show me the holes in my formulation. That's why we discuss epistemology, right?

[Brant Gaede]

I'll leave you to the discussion you want, Kacy, and I won't try to explain how I think you did something that you disclaim doing. That'd be tedious and unproductive and maybe I was wrong, but I personally have no interest in formulations leading to an argument's conclusion (6 + x = 7 -> x = 1). The big question in a logical proposition is whether the premises are going to justify where correct logic takes them because it may take them to the garbage dump, not any illogic along the way. "Check your premises" is an Objectivist mantra if there ever was one. I do admit my mind isn't set up for mathematical symbology.

--Brant

[KacyRay]

Okay... we all understand that a proposition and a logical statement are two different things, right?

Right?

And we all know that I'm not the guy who started with the algebra equations, right?

We do, right?

"I'll leave you to the discussion you want, Kacy, and I won't try to explain how I think you did something that you disclaim doing."

What I want - which I stated very clearly - is for anyone who believes that there is no distinction between an arbitrary proposition and a false one to rebut the formulations I've provided on why they are two different things. That's called "having a conversation" and it's actually quite an appropriate thing to do around these here parts.

"The big question in a logical proposition is whether the premises are going to justify where correct logic takes them because it may take them to the garbage dump, not any illogic along the way."

Propositions are not logical statements. You seem to be confused about this.

A proposition is a statement about reality.

A logical statement is one that has one or more premises that lead to a conclusion. It normally takes an "if/then" form.

I'm not talking about logic. I'm talking about propositions. I thought for sure I had articulated this clearly enough. What seems to be the rub here?

[BaalChatzaf]

A proposition is a statement about reality.

A logical statement is one that has one or more premises that lead to a conclusion. It normally takes an "if/then" form.

I'm not talking about logic. I'm talking about propositions. I thought for sure I had articulated this clearly enough. What seems to be the rub here?

In English a proposition is a meaningful declarative sentence.

The sentence "unicorns have one horn" is not a statement about reality but it is a meaningful declarative sentence. Since we define a unicorn as a kind of one horned animal that sentence is true. Never mind that unicorns do not exist.

[Brant Gaede]

Okay... we all understand that a proposition and a logical statement are two different things, right?

Right?

And we all know that I'm not the guy who started with the algebra equations, right?

We do, right?

"I'll leave you to the discussion you want, Kacy, and I won't try to explain how I think you did something that you disclaim doing."

What I want - which I stated very clearly - is for anyone who believes that there is no distinction between an arbitrary proposition and a false one to rebut the formulations I've provided on why they are two different things. That's called "having a conversation" and it's actually quite an appropriate thing to do around these here parts.

"The big question in a logical proposition is whether the premises are going to justify where correct logic takes them because it may take them to the garbage dump, not any illogic along the way."

Propositions are not logical statements. You seem to be confused about this.

A proposition is a statement about reality.

A logical statement is one that has one or more premises that lead to a conclusion. It normally takes an "if/then" form.

I'm not talking about logic. I'm talking about propositions. I thought for sure I had articulated this clearly enough. What seems to be the rub here?

What can you do with a proposition without logic(al thinking)? It is needed to create it if valid and to evaluate it once made. Anyway, an arbitrary proposition is a subcategory of a false one or if it's arbitrary it's false too.

--Brant

you seem to have a severely delimited view of the nature and use of logic--there is no reason without it

edit: I confused Bob's post as yours re algebra formulation; my apologies

[KacyRay]

Anyway, an arbitrary proposition is a subcategory of a false one or if it's arbitrary it's false too.

So, after I carefully lay out an argument for why arbitrary and false are two different things, you feel no need to demonstrate the problems with it or present one of your own. You simply dismiss it with "Eh, no they aren't".

Good to go.

you seem to have a severely delimited view of the nature and use of logic--there is no reason without it

Which would be important to point out if we were discussing reason or the use of logic. But we're not. We're discussion propositions. I'm well aware of how logic and reason work. But we're not talking about either of those topics. We can if you want to, in another thread... but can we just talk about propositions in this thread?

edit: I confused Bob's post as yours re algebra formulation; my apologies

Noted. But I really wish you'd at least provide an argument for your position. I brought this up in order to process it through the minds of others and see how it comes out... not to have it dismissed out of hand.

If the subject doesn't interest you, that's fine. Just say so. I'll wait until someone else comments on it. But I think I've put up some solid points worth at least considering.

[Brant Gaede]

I really don't think I'm arguing with you about much, Kacy. Saying arbitrary is a subcategory of false is rather trivial. Considering the new thread, I'm more than willing to drop it. In fact, I do. This is because I no longer see "arbitrary" as trivial in itself except when used for ad hominem attacks because the likes of Peikoff have been excluded from the discussion.

--Brant

boy!--that was a lot of work!