Flaw in Rand's Argument


SoAMadDeathWish

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Hi guys, this is gonna be my first post on this forum.

A bit about myself, I've been an objectivist since I was 16, when my econ101 teacher in Highschool turned me onto Atlas Shrugged. I've been studying the works of Rand and Piekoff for about 6 years.

Anyway... lately I've been talking about Objectivism with one of my friends by email. She pointed out what seems to be a flaw in Rand's argument for egoism.

Now, she practically wrote a book about this, but to get to the bottom of it, the problem is basically this:

P1: For all agents, only an agent's life is valuable as an end in itself.

(P2): Agents ought to act to obtain their own values.

C3: Therfore, agents ought to act to promote their own lives.

The first problem is that Rand's ultimate conclusion, C3, does not follow unless you also accept the implicit premise (P2, a premise that Rand didn't include in her arguments, but that is necessary to keep the argument valid).

There's something tricky about P2, though. In one sense (and I think the one that Rand seems to imply), the "ought" can be interpreted practically. That is, in the sense of, "If I want to quench my thirst, I ought to drink water". In this case, the premise is tautological, essentially saying that agents ought to do what they ought to do. However, the "practical interpretation" doesn't fit with the rest of the argument, because the "ought" in C3 is a moral "ought" and not a practical "ought". The conclusion that would follow from this interpretation of P2 would not be C3, but rather C3*: "If an agent values its life as an end in itself, then it ought to act to promote its own life". Now, obviously, there's no issue here if the agent values its life as an end in itself. But what if the agent doesn't value its life as an end in itself? In that case, we cannot conclude that it ought to act to promote its own life. More disturbingly, it would mean that the Toohey's and second-handers cannot be judged on the basis of rational ethics! If we accept the tautologous sense of P2, we are literally compelled to believe that "Hitler did nothing wrong"!

The trouble with going in the other direction and interpreting P2 as a moral "ought" is that the argument then essentially begs the question.

My objection at this point was that P2 is true by tautology, regardless of sense. However, if we accept that agents cannot choose other than to promote their moral values, then ethics becomes impossible! Any action you take would then necessarily be promoting your own life (even suicide).

I've been going over this for hours and I can't figure out the flaw in her argument. Little help?

Naomi, start by quoting Rand then diagram the structure. It's standard intellectual courtesy.

Rand's argumentative flaws don't much matter. Logical or illogical, one or the other. Not enough facts, real or purported. In the overall context of the matter being discused, logic is what is least valuable though necessary. If you jump into her deductive matrix you're in her dogo. Too much advantage hers. To make a kite actually fly you need the empirical winds of induction.

--Brant

she did too

(Michael, by the time this brianiac figures out the proper place of the normative you'll have thrown her out of here--just because it's simple doesn't mean it's easy. The same goes for knowing who you are.)

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Naomi, start by quoting Rand then diagram the structure. It's standard intellectual courtesy.

Rand's argumentative flaws don't much matter. Logical or illogical, one or the other. Not enough facts, real or purported. In the overall context of the matter being discused, logic is what is least valuable though necessary. If you jump into her deductive matrix you're in her dogo. Too much advantage hers. To make a kite actually fly you need the empirical winds of induction.

--Brant

she did too

Brant... you've confused me. :blink:

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Naomi, start by quoting Rand then diagram the structure. It's standard intellectual courtesy.

Rand's argumentative flaws don't much matter. Logical or illogical, one or the other. Not enough facts, real or purported. In the overall context of the matter being discused, logic is what is least valuable though necessary. If you jump into her deductive matrix you're in her dogo. Too much advantage hers. To make a kite actually fly you need the empirical winds of induction.

--Brant

she did too

Brant... you've confused me. :blink:

Thank goodness! I've done my job! (I assume my first sentence is not the problem.)

--Brant

1) not confused

2) confused

3) a new day dawns!

two out of three ain't bad! (especially so far)

facts are where you'll find the real value--philosophical structure is the easy part

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Maybe for you, but don't include me in your "we".

Why not? Logic is the same for everybody. I can understand if you don't like (I definitely don't either) the conclusion, but if you disagree with it, you must do so with some rational justification.

Inferences should be the same, but the premises need not be.

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The same goes for knowing who you are.

Brant,

One of the great things about the human condition is that we are all separate virtual worlds in our own heads, storylines and all. (Some call it subjective.) Believe me, you don't want to see what's in mine. :)

It's like a story between Kurt Vonnegut and his brother (who invented a system to make clouds rain by throwing silver nitrate on them from a plane flying above, if I remember correctly). Kurt went to his workshop and saw open cannisters of acid, batteries with wires connected but exposed, cyanide, stuff like that and a big mess all over the place.

He asked, "Isn't it kind of dangerous to leave things lying around like that?"

His brother responded, with finger tapping his temple, "If you think that's bad, you should see what's in here."

Let's say I resonate.

:)

Michael

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By the time the resonations get in synch., Michael, Naomi will be sitting on her butt outside your closed door. Maybe that'd be for the best, but I don't know. But you can let a weed, if it be a weed, grow a little more before pouring a bottle of RoundUp on it. You do have a couple of hot buttons easy for ignorance to push. Be more like me. Be perfect.

--Brant

hint, hint, hint (I'm so good chocolate cake isn't)

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I said this earlier up-thread, somewhat tongue in cheek but somewhat not: isn't the entirety of the Objectivist ethics an appeal to consequences?

Yes, and ultimately that's all any ethics can be, including an ethics purportedly based on divine authority. Suppose a particular person doesn't want to do what divine authority dictates? What's to impel him/her to do it, unless the threat of damnation as the consequence of disobedient behavior works as a motivator?

Ellen

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I said this earlier up-thread, somewhat tongue in cheek but somewhat not: isn't the entirety of the Objectivist ethics an appeal to consequences?

Yes, and ultimately that's all any ethics can be, including an ethics purportedly based on divine authority. Suppose a particular person doesn't want to do what divine authority dictates? What's to impel him/her to do it, unless the threat of damnation as the consequence of disobedient behavior works as a motivator?

Ellen

I'm not sure I agree with this. I suppose if I were caught cheating on my wife bad consequences would ensue. But those bad consequences are not the reason I don't cheat on my wife.

The same would theoretically be true of God. And, not to cross-pollinate our threads, but what many Christians seem to fail to understand is that they are fully capable of "doing right by God" without imputing to God a character trait that involves threatening or relegating them to some rung in Hell.

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I said this earlier up-thread, somewhat tongue in cheek but somewhat not: isn't the entirety of the Objectivist ethics an appeal to consequences?

Yes, and ultimately that's all any ethics can be, including an ethics purportedly based on divine authority. Suppose a particular person doesn't want to do what divine authority dictates? What's to impel him/her to do it, unless the threat of damnation as the consequence of disobedient behavior works as a motivator?

Ellen

I'm not sure I agree with this. I suppose if I were caught cheating on my wife bad consequences would ensue. But those bad consequences are not the reason I don't cheat on my wife.

The same would theoretically be true of God. And, not to cross-pollinate our threads, but what many Christians seem to fail to understand is that they are fully capable of "doing right by God" without imputing to God a character trait that involves threatening or relegating them to some rung in Hell.

Your consequences net seems to me to be too small for what you're fishing for. That is, there are other bad possible consequences from your example and they aren't all existential. The proper rule of law is a de facto morality dam that enables society to function on a very high, productive level regardless of normally destructive people who rationally decide it's too costly to rape and pillage as opposed to seduce and produce.

--Brant

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I said this earlier up-thread, somewhat tongue in cheek but somewhat not: isn't the entirety of the Objectivist ethics an appeal to consequences?

Yes, and ultimately that's all any ethics can be, including an ethics purportedly based on divine authority. Suppose a particular person doesn't want to do what divine authority dictates? What's to impel him/her to do it, unless the threat of damnation as the consequence of disobedient behavior works as a motivator?

Ellen

I'm not sure I agree with this. I suppose if I were caught cheating on my wife bad consequences would ensue. But those bad consequences are not the reason I don't cheat on my wife.

The same would theoretically be true of God. And, not to cross-pollinate our threads, but what many Christians seem to fail to understand is that they are fully capable of "doing right by God" without imputing to God a character trait that involves threatening or relegating them to some rung in Hell.

Your consequences net seems to me to be too small for what you're fishing for. That is, there are other bad possible consequences from your example and they aren't all existential. The proper rule of law is a de facto morality dam that enables society to function on a very high, productive level regardless of normally destructive people who rationally decide it's too costly to rape and pillage as opposed to seduce and produce.

--Brant

Although I am not sure what you are driving at, if you mean to say I am being faithful because I don't want to feel guilt, or something like that, that misses the mark.

I am being faithful because I honor my wife too much to cheat on her. Fidelity is its own reward. You might even say it is an end in itself. This has nothing to do with consequences, either inside my head or out there in the world, so to speak. The same could be said of God, except that most Christians have so dishonored the name of God by attributing to him arbitrary maliciousness, random favor granting, sanction for the initiation of wars, etc., that the God they honor is not really worth honoring as an end in itself, but only as a consequence to avoid damnation. You can't keep slandering God as a capricious monster and then wonder why He is not worth honoring with simple modifications of behavior, such as by obeying a few commandments.

Worst of all, most Christians don't even believe in the Hell they profess that God believes in, created, and plans to maintain for all of eternity.

How do I know this? If they truly believed their own BS on this subject, they would live much different lives.

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"I have gained this from philosophy: that I do without being commanded what others do only from fear of the law."

One can take it as read that this contains also NOT doing (without being commanded)- and that he meant any Law, man's or God's - thus, Aristotle presented himself as a law unto himself, as a life as an end in itself.

PDS writes: "Fidelity is its own reward. You might even say it is an end itself. This has nothing to do with consequences, either inside my head or out there in the world, so to speak."

Very nicely put -though I disagree, with virtue being its own reward - and I think rather that this has much to do with potential external consequences, and indeed with internal causes.

Fidelity, or any virtue (by which one gains or keeps values, in O'ism) is a value as well, and is meaningless without the individual person, the 'valuer' who holds it.

I think two values are at risk. The one, that the constant value (one's wife, say) is sacrificed to a lesser value (presumably) - and could be subsequently lost; second, the value ("honor" as you say) one has in one's end-in-itself life, in its truthful and independent relationship with reality, is badly undermined. (Whether caught out, or not.

(Hah- well... nobody promised an easy ride, to live by one's own 'Law' and 'Rules', only simply that it should be endlessly rewarding and sustaining and fun.)

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I am being faithful because I honor my wife too much to cheat on her. Fidelity is its own reward. You might even say it is an end in itself. This has nothing to do with consequences, either inside my head or out there in the world, so to speak.

It doesn't sound to me like your being faithful to your wife has nothing to do with consequences. What of a feeling of inner cleanliness? What of the quality of the relationship, the ability to be with her and not feel you're hiding something from her? Or, if you would tell her you were unfaithful if you were, not having that shadow darkening your relationship (if it would darken it)?

Ellen

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Morality (lived) without consequences is like anything happening without consequences. It just doesn't happen; it's impossible unless you define consequences in such a way that there aren't any in this or that example. The fact you don't see, understand or think you don't experience consequences for your actions or non-actions on affecting circumstances is only a failure of identification. This conversation of ours isn't about morality therefore, but applied epistemology, because consequences is axiomatic apropos the delimited context of morality.

--Brant

seek and ye shall find while wasting yer time

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