Why Existence is not a Predicate


BaalChatzaf

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Ayn Rand being bisected, disected and trisected in a manner that would do any Talmudist proud.

I believe I have seen The Elephant.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Did it look like that?

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[Preview of this post: Ba'al might as well have titled the thread "Why Incompetence is not a Predicate." Except then, some people might have caught on that he was about to recycle a very old gimmick on them.]

What Aristotle and Aquinas said about predicating existence was VASTLY different than what Hume/Kant and the moderns said about it. The A's were merely pointing out that you can't say: "Plato is existence," in the same way that you can say, "Plato is bald." Plato can't be either baldness or existence, but he ~can~ be a ~thing~ that is bald and he ~can~ be a ~thing~ that is existent.

So, Plato ~can~ be a bald person, and Plato ~can~ be an existent person (instead of a fictive person like Hercules or a no-longer-existent person like Thales, etc.). I.e., you ~can~ say: "Plato is existent," which means: "Plato is an existent person," or: "...existent entity," or whatever.

We might be more comfortable saying something like: "Plato is a person who exists," or: "...really exists," etc., but the point is that existence ~can~ be predicated just as ~baldness~ can, so long as you are predicating a Plato's ~being~ existent or ~being~ bald. You just can't say that Plato ~is~ existence, any more than you can say that he is baldness. Only that: "Plato is an existent," and "Plato is a baldy."

Kant was an entirely different kettle of fish--and a very rank, smelly one at that. Kant's point (echoing Hume) was that once you have formed the idea of, say, "Barack Obama," saying that "Barack Obama exists" does not "add anything" to the idea you have formed. (This is the straight dope from IK's Critique of Pure Reason.)

In other words, since you already know Barack Obama exists, ~saying~ that he does adds nothing to your knowledge. Well, duh. But that's not the point of propositions anyway. They're not to ~add to~ your knowledge, but to ~state~ your knowledge. And you state your knowledge about a thing by ~predicating~ something of that thing, by stating that that thing ~is~ something. (The Law of Identity, a thing is what it is, it is something rather than nothing in particular.)

You just have to be careful what you say that the thing is. You don't say that an individual is a universal. You say that an individual is ~characterized by~ that universal -- or that an individual is ~a thing~ characterized by that universal. Not "Aristotle is mortality," but "Aristotle is mortal," or "Aristotle is a mortal being." The same goes for each of the units subsumed by a subject concept. Not "man is rationality," but "man is rational," or "man is a rational animal."

That is why "S is P" form is essential to sorting out this ancient problem. If you say "Barack Obama exists," that is like saying "Barack Obama sucks" (as a President). Guess what--you're not "adding to" your knowledge by saying he ~sucks~ any more than saying he ~exists~. So, I'll be damned--"sucking" isn't a predicate either! Hmmmm...something wrong here. I wonder if Kant noticed that little problem with his "logic." It rules out ~all~ predication! (This is a reductio ad absurdum, for those who haven't already noticed.)

Instead, to properly analyze this issue, rewrite the statement: "Barack Obama is a (Presidentially) sucking person." Or: "...a person who sucks as a President." That is how you unambiguously predicate sucking (as a President) of Obama. If it helps with the parallel below, think of it as: "Barack Obama is a person who functions incompetently as a President."

Similarly, rewrite "Barack Obama exists" as: "Barack Obama is a (really) existing person." Or: "...a person who (really) exists." (This is in contradistinction to persons who exist only fictively or in the past, etc.) Stating that Barack Obama exists, or Barack Obama is a real existent, a real thing that exists, is how you predicate existence of him. You don't say that he ~is~ existence. You say that he is ~an existent~. That he is a thing that exists.

Now, you can't say Barack Obama ~is~ incompetence, any more than you can say he is ~existence~. BUT, if you say he is an incompetent or an incompetent person -- then surely you can also say that he is an existent or an existent person. Any and all of these are legitimate ways of predicating incompetence and existence of Barack Obama, as long as you don't say that he ~is~ incompetence or existence.

Really, the problem with trying to predicate existence ~or~ incompetence ~literally~ is that you are committing a category error. And in stating a proposition, that is absolutely the ~last~ thing you want to do. Since a categorical proposition is a restatement in specific form of the Law of Identity, you want your statement to be equivalent to: "A thing is itself." You want the subject and predicate to both refer to the same thing in reality, because a thing ~is~ itself -- and you want the subject and predicate to be in the same ontological category, because a thing is ~itself~.

So, saying "Barack Obama is an incompetent President" fits that pattern. The subject and predicate are referring to the same thing in reality. (Assuming that he is incompetent and not simply malevolent-and-trying-to-appear-incompetent.) The subject and predicate are both in the same category: entity. (Even saying: "Barack Obama is incompetent" is close enough, as long as you take "incompetent" to mean "an incompetent person." It's implicit, anyway, since being incompetent does not exist apart from someone who is incompetent.)

So, saying "Barack Obama is incompetence" is a category error, just as "Barack Obama is existence" is a category error. However, saying "Barack Obama is an incompetent" or "...an existent" is NOT a category error.

And that's the bottom line about predication. To avoid violating the Law of Identity, you have to avoid category errors in propositional form, which means your predications have to be in the same ontological category as the subject. If you do that, it avoids a ~multitude~ of sins, including bizarre mental gymnastics in trying to deal with propositions about non-existent subjects.

So that, boys and girls, is why existence ~is~ a predicate, just as ~incompetence~ is a predicate, SO LONG AS YOU DON'T TRY TO PREDICATE EITHER OF THEM LITERALLY.

REB

P.S. -- Brant, buddy, bless your heart. You tried to tell them.

P.P.S. -- If you reflect on what Kant is trying to pull on us (i.e., those of us who care about logic as a tool of reason and of grasping facts of reality, instead of just a form of mental pud-pulling), it is amazing that his gimmick wasn't exposed long ago. Think about it: if your statement says anything that you already know about the subject, then that disqualifies it as a predicate, and you are adding nothing to your knowledge. Only if what you say about the subject is something you ~don't~ already know does it add to your knowledge and qualify as a predicate. So, as Kant would say: not only isn't existence a predicate, but neither is incompetence a predicate. (Hence, my suggestion of an alternate title for Ba'al's thread.) I'm sure Kant's spiritual great-grandchild, Barack Hussein Obama, is breathing easier tonight, just to know that.

Roger,

Do you have a copy of Logic as a Human Instrument (Harper, 1959), by Francis Parker and Henry Veatch? If so, read their discussion, beginning on page 100, of "The Metaphysical Distinction of Existence from Essence."

Parker and Veatch, both of whom were solid Aristotelians, agree with my earlier argument that existence is not a predicate. More significant for our purpose is their ringing endorsement of Kant's argument (pp. 103-5), as illustrated in Kant's example of the difference between a hundred real dollars and a hundred imaginary dollars. Judging from your comments above, I think you have misunderstood Kant's point.

Ghs

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Arguing the question about whether existence is or is not a predicate seems pretty pointless to me. I don't really care to get involved in it, since I can't really see any value to the discussion. My own view is that Rand explicitly chose to state the "formal" axiom as existence exists rather than existence is due to the fact that an axiom must be irreducible. Using the verb “is” rather than the verb “exists” would open the door to an analysis of the meaning of "to be." The aspect of irreducibility mandates that the predicate simply be a verbal repetition of the subject. What more is there to say on that issue of any significance to Rand’s purpose?

I do understand George's point that phrasing the axiom as "what exists, exists" or “all that exists, exists” is problematic, simply because a skeptic could easily agree with either statement. The skeptic would simply say: "Sure. But we don't know that anything exists." I can understand Peikoff using the phrases "what exists" or “all that exists” as a way to clarify the meaning of the axiom, but Rand would never offer such imprecise statements as the explicit formulation of her axiom.

I must disagree with Roger’s assertion or implication that only propositions refer to facts and that axioms must be in the form of propositions rather than axiomatic concepts.

Concepts point to existents. Propositions point to facts.

Rand made it very clear that axioms cannot be propositions:

Axioms are usually considered to be propositions identifying a fundamental, self-evident truth. But explicit propositions as such are not primaries: they are made of concepts. The base of man's knowledge – of all other concepts, all axioms, propositions and thought – consists of axiomatic concepts.

An axiomatic concept is the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i. e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts.

ITOE, p. 55

In the forward to ITOE, Rand does state that existence exists translates the axiomatic concept of existence into the "form of a proposition (p. 3)." However, the word "form" is important here. Existence exists is a formal statement of the axiomatic concept of existence. Given what she says on p. 55 (above) that propositions are not primaries, I think it is reasonable to conclude that Rand considered existence exists to constitute a statement rather than a literal “proposition.” In the quotes Roger cites, Peikoff also uses the term “statement” rather than “proposition.”

I don’t think this is merely a matter of semantics. Propositions consist of multiple concepts that can be broken down. A repetitive statement of an axiomatic truth cannot be.

And, of course, concepts do refer to facts. These quotes by Ayn Rand explain that concepts express (implicit or explicit) propositions:

There is a passage in the book where I said every concept stands for a number of implicit propositions. And even so, chronologically we have to acquire concepts first, and then we begin to learn propositions. Logically implicit in the concept is a proposition, only a child couldn't possibly think of it. He doesn't have the means yet to say, "By the word ‘table’ I mean such and such category of existents [with all their characteristics]."

ITOE, p. 178

Later she says:

AR: . . .Implicit in every concept is "By this sound I mean such and such category of existents."

Prof. B: But wouldn't you agree that implicit in every concept are all the propositions stating all the facts [the child] needed to form that concept?

AR: That's right.

Prof. F: But isn't a proposition by its very nature complex, that is, made up of two or more concepts?

AR: Oh yes.

Prof. F: But then how can you say that every concept expresses a proposition?

AR: Implicitly. The material is there but a child cannot yet form it, precisely because he needs to form each concept separately before he can unite them.

ITOE, pp. 178-179

Prof. F later states, and Rand agrees, that "every concept is based upon a complex operation like this."

In Chapter 1 of ITOE, Rand states:

The building-block of man's knowledge is the concept of an “existent” – of something that exists, be it a thing, and attribute or an action. Since it is a concept, man can't grasp it explicitly until he has reached the conceptual stage. But it is implicit in every percept (to perceive the thing is to perceive that it exists) and man grasps it implicitly on the perceptual level – I. E., He grasps the constituents of the concept “existent,” the data which are later to be integrated by that concept. It is this implicit knowledge that permits his consciousness to develop further.

ITOE, pp. 5-6

The essential epistemological role of a concept – including axiomatic concepts – is to integrate knowledge. Clearly, then, concepts do refer to actual facts in reality.

The distinction between axiomatic concepts and axioms is purely a formal one. They are equivalent. Existence exists merely translates the axiomatic concept of existence into an explicit statement.

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I can understand Peikoff using the phrases "what exists" or “all that exists” as a way to clarify the meaning of the axiom, but Rand would never offer such imprecise statements as the explicit formulation of her axiom.

Then why would she say in ITOE (p. 241) that existence is "all that which exists," if she didn't want to allow substituting the latter for the former in her axiom?

If Rand was defining or describing existence as "all that which exists," then you can formulate this description equivalently as "Existence is all that which exists" or "All that which exists is existence." The latter fits neatly into a categorical syllogism:

All that which exists is existence. (Definition/description)

Existence exists. (Axiom)

Therefore, All that which exists, exists. (Logical implication)

So, Dennis (and George)....

1. Did Rand goof on p. 241 of ITOE? If so, how so?

2. Or, is there something wrong with my logic? If so, what?

3. Or, would you please reconsider your claim?

I disagree that the logical implication of her axiom and her definition/description is imprecise, and therefore that Peikoff's similar statement is imprecise and unRandlike. Just because she never stated that logical implication does NOT mean that she would disagree with it -- unless there is something drastically wrong with her definition/description!

REB

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I must disagree with Roger’s assertion or implication that only propositions refer to facts and that axioms must be in the form of propositions rather than axiomatic concepts.

Well, if you must, you must. :-)

[REB] Concepts point to existents. Propositions point to facts.

[Dennis] Rand made it very clear that axioms cannot be propositions:

No, she did not. You are misinterpreting what she said below.

[Rand] Axioms are usually considered to be propositions identifying a fundamental, self-evident truth. But explicit propositions as such are not primaries: they are made of concepts. The base of man's knowledge – of all other concepts, all axioms, propositions and thought – consists of axiomatic concepts.

[Dennis] An axiomatic concept is the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i. e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts.

ITOE, p. 55

Rand does NOT say axioms are not propositions. She says exactly the opposite! As you note, in the forward to ITOE, Rand says that "the axiom: Existence exists...is a way of translating into the form of a proposition, and thus, into the form of an axiom, the primary fact which is existence." (ITOE, p. 3) (I would say "transforms;" I think Rand is being sloppy there.) It doesn't get much clearer than that! Unless you want to claim that "the form of a proposition" is not a proposition! But then you'd also have to say that "the form of an axiom" is not an axiom! Wouldn't you? (More below...)

Also, you're drawing the wrong inference from what Rand said. Read it again. She says "axioms are usually considered to be propositions identifying a fundamental, self-evident truth. But explicit propositions as such are not primaries..." (ITOE p. 55) She is NOT saying axioms are not ~propositions~. She is not even denying that they ~identify fundamental, self-evident truths~. She is merely saying that axioms are not ~primaries~. She is saying that no propositions, including axioms, are primaries. They are all made of and thus all (contra your statement below) reducible to concepts. This is uncontroversial, and an appropriate lead-in to her consideration of axiomatic concepts.

My only disagreement with her is her claim that concepts identify facts. They do not. They identify ~existents~. Because each concept of an existent is a file-folder containing data about that existent, the concept ~implies~ facts ~about~ those existents, and it thus contains the ~material~ for such identifications of those facts. The identifications of the facts are ~implicit~ in the concepts, but the identifications are ~explicitly~ made by ~propositions~.

Again, an existent is a thing that exists. A fact is ~something about~ that existent. A tree is not a fact; it is an existent. THAT the tree exists, or is tall, or is dead, etc. is a fact. The concept "tree" refers explicitly to the existent, the tree -- but only implicitly to whatever else you know about the tree, such as that it's really there, that it's tall, that it's dead, etc. All these other ~things about~ the tree are the ~facts~ about the tree, and they are stated explicitly by the proposition. That's why we ~need~ propositions, to make the implicit explicit!

The facts, the things about the existent tree, do in fact exist apart from our awareness of them -- and we do ~implicitly~ know those facts by virtue of forming a robust, data-filled concept about the existent tree -- but we only ~explicitly~ grasp those facts by combining our concept of the tree with our concept of one of the attributes &c about the tree into a proposition. (This is all part of the missing Objectivist theory of propositions I keep muttering about...)

[Dennis] In the forward to ITOE, Rand does state that existence exists translates the axiomatic concept of existence into the "form of a proposition (p. 3)." However, the word "form" is important here. Existence exists is a formal statement of the axiomatic concept of existence. Given what she says on p. 55 (above) that propositions are not primaries, I think it is reasonable to conclude that Rand considered existence exists to constitute a statement rather than a literal “proposition.” In the quotes Roger cites, Peikoff also uses the term “statement” rather than “proposition.”

Dennis, you can't have it both ways! If "Existence exists" being in "the form of a proposition" means it isn't "a literal proposition," then its being "in the form of an axiom" must mean that it isn't a literal AXIOM. If it's not a proposition, but just a "statement" (as if these are different), then because it's not an axiom, it's just a....what?

Give it up, man. You're working way too hard to put a strained misinterpretation on Rand and Peikoff

[Dennis] I don’t think this is merely a matter of semantics. Propositions consist of multiple concepts that can be broken down. A repetitive statement of an axiomatic truth cannot be.

I disagree. Any true statement (OR PROPOSITION) can be broken down into its constituent concepts. The repetition of the concept is always given in a somewhat different perspective of the same thing, so it's not strict repetition. ~Everything~ that exists is a thing that ~exists~. Every ~state of consciousness~ of reality is a state of ~consciousness of reality~. ~Everything that exists~ is ~what it is~. In each case, the predicate offers a distinct, additional perspective on the subject, even though they are referring to the same thing in reality -- just as does a proposition like "All men are mortal beings."

Each of the units referred to by "all men" is identical to one of the units referred to by "mortal beings," though the latter make explicit an additional perspective, additional information about the former. In other words, the latter combined with the former STATE A FACT ABOUT the former. Again, that's what propositions ~do~, including axiomatic propositions (aka axioms).

REB

Edited by Roger Bissell
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And, of course, concepts do refer to facts. These quotes by Ayn Rand explain that concepts express (implicit or explicit) propositions:

Saying it doesn't make it so. Nowhere in the Rand passages quoted below does she say or explain that concepts express ~explicit~ propositions. She ~does~ state that ~propositions~ state facts, and she ~does~ state that concepts express ~implicit~ propositions. But nowhere does she say that concepts "refer to" facts. And nowhere does she say that concepts "express" explicit propositions.

1. Concepts don't "refer to" facts, but the ~forming~ of concepts does ~rely on~ facts about existents. E.g., a child will note some facts: that ~this~ thing is furry and barks, ~this other~ thing is furry and barks, ~that other~ thing is furry and barks, that they're all the same kind of thing, because nothing else he knows is furry and barks, that Mom said ~this~ thing is a "dog," that the other things must be "dogs," too. This in pattern is how a child forms, defines, and attaches words to concepts. Whatever facts he knows, percepually and implicitly when young, are marshalled together to help him explicitly grasp the nature of the ~existent~. Once he explicitly grasps the existent's nature, he has a concept of that existent, and the ~meaning~, the ~referent~ of that concept is the ~existent~ and its ~characteristics~. The ~connections~ between the existent and its characteristics are the ~facts about~ that existent -- and these connections, facts are what is referred to by ~propositions~. That is why we conjoin, integrate the concept of the existent with one or more concepts of its characteristics in order to form a propositional reference to a ~fact about~ the existent.

There truly is a cognitive division of labor between concepts and propositions, and confusing existents and their characteristics with facts about existents (i.e., existents in relation to one or more of their characteristics) blurs and ultimately wipes out that division of labor. As a consequence, yet again, the clarity and economy of our discussions is suffering because of the inability, after FORTY-PLUS YEARS, of Objectivist intellectuals to formulate a valid, robust theory of propositions.

2. Concepts do not "express" ~explicit~ propositions. Something like the reverse is true. On p. 178, Rand does say that "every concept stands for a number of implicit propositions" and "logically implicit in a concept is a proposition" and "every concept represents...an implicit proposition, logically." But to logically stand for or represent the logically implicit is NOT to "express" the logically implicit. (Professor F did not help matters by asking: "...how can you say that every concept expresses a proposition?" Rand did NOT say that. She clarified by saying that the ~material~ for the proposition was "there" implicitly. But the damage was done, since she clarified the point, but not the ~language~.)

The reverse aspect of this is that ~propositions~ express or state ~facts~, by means of integrating concepts, one of which stands for or represents or refers to the ~existent~ that the fact is about, and the other stands for or represents or refers to ~that same existent~, in terms of some ~characteristic~ that existent has.

"Trees are plants" represents the fact that trees are plants. Not: the fact that trees, which is nonsense.

"Ayn Rand is a fact." Yeah, sure, right. It sounds a lot more noble and heroic and inspiring than to say: "Ayn Rand is an existent." But the latter is literally correct. The former actually means: "Ayn Rand is a real existent." Or, more likely: "Ayn Rand is a person whose existence and importance and impact cannot be dismissed or wished away." But the proposition "Ayn Rand is a fact" represents the fact that Ayn Rand is real, not capable of being wished out of existence, etc, not the fact that Ayn Rand, which again is absurd. You can say: "It is a fact that Ayn Rand existed" or "It is a fact that Ayn Rand is a real person, moreover one whose importance cannot be erased." You cannot say (without evoking furrowed brows or snickers): "It is a fact that Ayn Rand."

[Dennis] The essential epistemological role of a concept – including axiomatic concepts – is to integrate knowledge. Clearly, then, concepts do refer to actual facts in reality.

Only implicitly. If you want an ~explicit~ reference to actual facts in reality, you need a proposition. And to explicitly refer to ~basic~ facts, you need an axiom composed of axiomatic concepts.

Both concepts and propositions integrate knowledge. Concepts integrate knowledge about existents. Propositions integrate knowledge about ~facts~ about existents.

[Dennis] The distinction between axiomatic concepts and axioms is purely a formal one. They are equivalent.

No more so than the distinction between a concept and a proposition. The proposition "This car is a red vehicle" is not equivalent or merely formally distinct from "this car." The proposition is an ~explicit~ conceptual integration of "car" and "red vehicle." The concept at best ~implicitly~ integrates them. "My car" is the conceptual file folder for an existent. "Red vehicle" is the conceptual file folder that includes, among other vehicles, the existent that is also in the file folder "my car." That is why we can form the proposition.

Before we have a file folder "red vehicle," we cannot form the proposition. In the "My car" folder, we certainly can have implicit, perceptual knowledge that redness is an attribute of my car, i.e., of the fact that my car is red. But this fact only becomes part of our ~explicit~ knowledge when we (1) form the concept "red vehicle" or "red thing" or "red object," etc., and (2) integrate the two concepts into an "S is P" proposition that affirms that "a thing is itself," viz., that "my car is a [i.e., one of the members of the class:] red vehicle." (This is because every true proposition, whether "S is P" or "S exists," is stated, or statable, as an instance of the Law of Identity.)

Existence exists merely translates the axiomatic concept of existence into an explicit statement.

"Translate" here is one of the secondary meanings of the term: "the conversion of something from one form or medium into another"--viz., the conversion of something from the conceptual form into the propositional form. But the latter is not equivalent to the former, neither in making ordinary propositions out of ordinary concepts, nor in making axioms out of axiomatic concepts. Integrations of concepts into propositions that explicitly refer to facts are not equivalent to integrations of existents into concepts that implicitly refer to facts.

There is no more justification for saying that propositions are equivalent to concepts, than for saying that arguments are equivalent to propositions. They all refer to different aspects of reality, even while the more complex ones are hierarchically composed of the less complex ones. A concept refers to existents. A proposition refers to facts about existents, relationships between existents. And an argument refers to reasons or causes for facts, relationships between facts (i.e., relationships between relationships between facts).

There has long been a gaping hole between the Objectivist theory of concepts and Aristotelian syllogistic. Peikoff and Kelley have done little more than to repeat either the traditional formulas about propositions and/or the modern Boole-Frege-Russell-Goedel disasters. Isn't it past time to start filling in this gap, and discarding the inadequate or wrongheaded assertions of the traditionals and the moderns, with more than "chewed" and rehashed quotes from Rand's offhand remarks about propositions?

REB

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So Rand got a two for one? Anyway, since existence does not does not exist we aren't dealing with a contradiction here. Also, all that exists are existents, not the singular, but now we're getting all out semantical. "That exists, exists," is a weak axiomatic expression if one at all. --Brant everything Rand said in the philosophical workshop is what Peikoff said she said
When I read OPAR, I get the feeling that Peikoff sometimes did not understand, or at least did not fully appreciate, some of Rand's philosophical points. One thing that I have always admired about Rand is how she typically packs a lot of thought into very concise statements. This is one thing that makes her philosophical writings so worthy of close and repeated study. With Peikoff, on the other hand, what you see is what you get. I am in a metaphorical mood, so I will put it this way: Rand's philosophical writings are the tip of an iceberg, whereas Peikoff's philosophical writings -- and I am thinking here of the work he did after Rand's death -- are... well...uh....maybe I should stop here. 8-) Ghs
George, say what you like about Peikoff's post-Randian writings, but she wasn't always correct, and he wasn't always wrong. (Yeah, yeah, I know: a stopped clock...twice a day...etc.) More importantly: anything that was transferred verbatim to OPAR from his 1976 lectures that Rand monitored like a hawk is pretty reliably Rand-certified. I haven't quoted any Peikoffisms in my posts to this thread that are not of that nature. REB

I think Peikoff is a very competent philosopher. I have thought this ever since I read his doctoral dissertation during my college years. But the guy who wrote that dissertation is not the same guy who later become Rand's lackey.

Given the writing style of "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," I have little doubt that it is essentially Rand's work. Years ago, back in the 1970s, Nathaniel Branden told me that the monograph was written with Rand peering over Peikoff's shoulder.

Ghs

I have a copy of that dissertation, too, George. I think it's a very good piece of work.

Ironically, (1) Peikoff's dissertation was written under the thumb of Sidney Hook, a Pragmatist-Socialist, while his later work was written under Rand's thumb (until she passed way, and then it was written under the shadow of Rand's ghost and memories of her voice...and thumb. :-)

(2) A number of years ago, Peikoff disowned his dissertation and firmly dismissed the idea of publishing it.

REB

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[Preview of this post: Ba'al might as well have titled the thread "Why Incompetence is not a Predicate." Except then, some people might have caught on that he was about to recycle a very old gimmick on them.]

What Aristotle and Aquinas said about predicating existence was VASTLY different than what Hume/Kant and the moderns said about it. The A's were merely pointing out that you can't say: "Plato is existence," in the same way that you can say, "Plato is bald." Plato can't be either baldness or existence, but he ~can~ be a ~thing~ that is bald and he ~can~ be a ~thing~ that is existent.

So, Plato ~can~ be a bald person, and Plato ~can~ be an existent person (instead of a fictive person like Hercules or a no-longer-existent person like Thales, etc.). I.e., you ~can~ say: "Plato is existent," which means: "Plato is an existent person," or: "...existent entity," or whatever.

We might be more comfortable saying something like: "Plato is a person who exists," or: "...really exists," etc., but the point is that existence ~can~ be predicated just as ~baldness~ can, so long as you are predicating a Plato's ~being~ existent or ~being~ bald. You just can't say that Plato ~is~ existence, any more than you can say that he is baldness. Only that: "Plato is an existent," and "Plato is a baldy."

Kant was an entirely different kettle of fish--and a very rank, smelly one at that. Kant's point (echoing Hume) was that once you have formed the idea of, say, "Barack Obama," saying that "Barack Obama exists" does not "add anything" to the idea you have formed. (This is the straight dope from IK's Critique of Pure Reason.)

In other words, since you already know Barack Obama exists, ~saying~ that he does adds nothing to your knowledge. Well, duh. But that's not the point of propositions anyway. They're not to ~add to~ your knowledge, but to ~state~ your knowledge. And you state your knowledge about a thing by ~predicating~ something of that thing, by stating that that thing ~is~ something. (The Law of Identity, a thing is what it is, it is something rather than nothing in particular.)

You just have to be careful what you say that the thing is. You don't say that an individual is a universal. You say that an individual is ~characterized by~ that universal -- or that an individual is ~a thing~ characterized by that universal. Not "Aristotle is mortality," but "Aristotle is mortal," or "Aristotle is a mortal being." The same goes for each of the units subsumed by a subject concept. Not "man is rationality," but "man is rational," or "man is a rational animal."

That is why "S is P" form is essential to sorting out this ancient problem. If you say "Barack Obama exists," that is like saying "Barack Obama sucks" (as a President). Guess what--you're not "adding to" your knowledge by saying he ~sucks~ any more than saying he ~exists~. So, I'll be damned--"sucking" isn't a predicate either! Hmmmm...something wrong here. I wonder if Kant noticed that little problem with his "logic." It rules out ~all~ predication! (This is a reductio ad absurdum, for those who haven't already noticed.)

Instead, to properly analyze this issue, rewrite the statement: "Barack Obama is a (Presidentially) sucking person." Or: "...a person who sucks as a President." That is how you unambiguously predicate sucking (as a President) of Obama. If it helps with the parallel below, think of it as: "Barack Obama is a person who functions incompetently as a President."

Similarly, rewrite "Barack Obama exists" as: "Barack Obama is a (really) existing person." Or: "...a person who (really) exists." (This is in contradistinction to persons who exist only fictively or in the past, etc.) Stating that Barack Obama exists, or Barack Obama is a real existent, a real thing that exists, is how you predicate existence of him. You don't say that he ~is~ existence. You say that he is ~an existent~. That he is a thing that exists.

Now, you can't say Barack Obama ~is~ incompetence, any more than you can say he is ~existence~. BUT, if you say he is an incompetent or an incompetent person -- then surely you can also say that he is an existent or an existent person. Any and all of these are legitimate ways of predicating incompetence and existence of Barack Obama, as long as you don't say that he ~is~ incompetence or existence.

Really, the problem with trying to predicate existence ~or~ incompetence ~literally~ is that you are committing a category error. And in stating a proposition, that is absolutely the ~last~ thing you want to do. Since a categorical proposition is a restatement in specific form of the Law of Identity, you want your statement to be equivalent to: "A thing is itself." You want the subject and predicate to both refer to the same thing in reality, because a thing ~is~ itself -- and you want the subject and predicate to be in the same ontological category, because a thing is ~itself~.

So, saying "Barack Obama is an incompetent President" fits that pattern. The subject and predicate are referring to the same thing in reality. (Assuming that he is incompetent and not simply malevolent-and-trying-to-appear-incompetent.) The subject and predicate are both in the same category: entity. (Even saying: "Barack Obama is incompetent" is close enough, as long as you take "incompetent" to mean "an incompetent person." It's implicit, anyway, since being incompetent does not exist apart from someone who is incompetent.)

So, saying "Barack Obama is incompetence" is a category error, just as "Barack Obama is existence" is a category error. However, saying "Barack Obama is an incompetent" or "...an existent" is NOT a category error.

And that's the bottom line about predication. To avoid violating the Law of Identity, you have to avoid category errors in propositional form, which means your predications have to be in the same ontological category as the subject. If you do that, it avoids a ~multitude~ of sins, including bizarre mental gymnastics in trying to deal with propositions about non-existent subjects.

So that, boys and girls, is why existence ~is~ a predicate, just as ~incompetence~ is a predicate, SO LONG AS YOU DON'T TRY TO PREDICATE EITHER OF THEM LITERALLY.

REB

P.S. -- Brant, buddy, bless your heart. You tried to tell them.

P.P.S. -- If you reflect on what Kant is trying to pull on us (i.e., those of us who care about logic as a tool of reason and of grasping facts of reality, instead of just a form of mental pud-pulling), it is amazing that his gimmick wasn't exposed long ago. Think about it: if your statement says anything that you already know about the subject, then that disqualifies it as a predicate, and you are adding nothing to your knowledge. Only if what you say about the subject is something you ~don't~ already know does it add to your knowledge and qualify as a predicate. So, as Kant would say: not only isn't existence a predicate, but neither is incompetence a predicate. (Hence, my suggestion of an alternate title for Ba'al's thread.) I'm sure Kant's spiritual great-grandchild, Barack Hussein Obama, is breathing easier tonight, just to know that.

Roger,

Do you have a copy of Logic as a Human Instrument (Harper, 1959), by Francis Parker and Henry Veatch? If so, read their discussion, beginning on page 100, of "The Metaphysical Distinction of Existence from Essence."

Parker and Veatch, both of whom were solid Aristotelians, agree with my earlier argument that existence is not a predicate.

So, I can't legitimately say: "Horses are things that exist" or "Horses are existents," equally validly as I might say: "Horses exist" or "There are such things as horses"?? (I take these all to be equivalent expressions.)

In particular, I'm interested in what difference, if any, you see between: "Horses exist" and: "Horses are existents."

If they're both valid expressions of the existent proposition about horses, then exactly how is "are existents" functioning, if not as a copula and predicate?

On p. 110 of their book, Parker and Veatch say: "After all, existence propositions, quite as much as subject-predicate propositions, have predicates; ..." Are you saying that "exist" is a predicate, while "are existents" are not a copula and predicate?

They look like a copula and predicate, they quack like a copula and predicate, they waddle like a copula and predicate....so?

So...I think it's clear that even though existence is not a property, it is ~something~ that can be predicated of things, even of itself. But what?

Someone, not an Aristotelian or Objectivist, but a Logical Atomist may have come up with a very strong lead to the answer.

One of Veatch's acquaintances, Reinhard Grossmann, in his 1992 book The Existence of the World thoroughly considers how to properly analyze what he calls "existence facts." He argues that existence does not belong to any of the categories (i.e., it's not an entity, an attribute, a quantity, an action, etc.). He further clarifies that it's not a ~property of a property~ or a "relational property." (I would think that existence and identity ~are~ relational properties, specifically when considering an existent and its characteristics in their reciprocal relations to one another, that's a different issue, for another time.)

Instead, Grossmann says, existence is a "feature" of the world. I.e., it is something about the world. This smells suspiciously like a ~basic fact~ about all of existence...er, um...I mean, the world.

Here is an extended excerpt where his reasoning, latching onto a few bits of modern logic along the way, ends up looking very similar to mine:

[Grossmann]I argued earlier that, contrary to Frege and Russell, it makes perfect sense to say of an individual like Caesar that he exists. But in the sentence 'Caesar exists,' the word 'exists' functions somewhat like a predicate. [OK, "somewhat like." Close enough for the present purpose!] I say 'somewhat,' because there is a difference, a difference which I find revealing: there is no indication of exemplification. 'Caesar exists' is in this regard quite different from 'Caesar is the conqueror of Gaul.' Of course, this fits in well with our contention that existence is not a property and, hence, cannot be exemplified. But the fact remains that in 'Caesar exists' existence is somehow connected with Caesar and we must now ask how this connection appears from our point of view that existence is the variable entity. I think that to say that Caesar exists is to say that he is an existent. Let us be somewhat pedantic and spell this out in detail. The sentence:

(6) 'Caesar exists'

represents the same fact as:

(7) 'Caesar is an existent.'

But here the 'is' does not signify exemplification, but represents identity:

(8) 'Some (at least one) existent is identifical with Caesar.'

Or, written with the variable expression 'e':

(9) 'Some e is such that: e = Caesar.'

This is our most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists. Let 'A' be the name of any entity whatsoever. The fact that A exists is of the form:

(10) Some e is such that: e = A.

or, for short, in English: A is an existent.

!!!

Now, skipping down a couple of paragraphs:

[Grossmann] Every thing is identical with an entity [he means: with an existent]; its existence consists in its being (identical with) an entity. But this means that every thing has its own existence, that every thing is a little piece of existence...Everything exists. If everything exists, then existence must exist. [He is arguing inductively for Rand's Existence axiom.] I fail to understand how anything could have this 'feature' of existence, whatever it may be, unless there is this 'feature' in the first place.

Translation: I fail to understand how it could be a fact that any existent is an existent, unless it is necessarily universally true of EVERY existent that it is an existent--i.e., that all existents exist, that Existence exists.

One more excerpt:

[Grossmann] To say of a particular thing a that it exists, as we have seen, is to say that a is identical with an existent. Similarly, to say that existence exists is to say that existents are identical with existents:

(11) Some e is such that: e = e.

But (11) states that some entity is self-identidcal. According to our view, therefore, to say that existence exists is to say nothing more nor less than that an existent is self-identical. Can this really be the meaning of the existence statement? I think that this view is forced upon us by the discovery that existence is the variable entity [i.e., existent], for I do not see how else one could analyze the fact that the variable exists.

Pretty heavy, abstract stuff. But it makes sense to me.

[GHS] More significant for our purpose is their ringing endorsement of Kant's argument (pp. 103-5), as illustrated in Kant's example of the difference between a hundred real dollars and a hundred imaginary dollars. Judging from your comments above, I think you have misunderstood Kant's point.

OK, you're focusing on a different aspect of the problem than I was.

Yes, I agree that existence is not a property of things, and I do agree with what Parker and Veatch ascribed to Kant: "He insisted that existence just is not a characteristic or attribute of things--that is, in any way comparable to other characteristics or attributes." (pp. 103-104) But they also (as noted above) say that existence propositions have predicates -- and as Grossmann and I argue, "is an existent" functions a lot ~like~ a predicate, even if (somehow) "is an existent" is not fully equivalent to "exists."

REB

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So, I can't legitimately say: "Horses are things that exist" or "Horses are existents," equally validly as I might say: "Horses exist" or "There are such things as horses"?? (I take these all to be equivalent expressions.)

In particular, I'm interested in what difference, if any, you see between: "Horses exist" and: "Horses are existents."

If they're both valid expressions of the existent proposition about horses, then exactly how is "are existents" functioning, if not as a copula and predicate?

On p. 110 of their book, Parker and Veatch say: "After all, existence propositions, quite as much as subject-predicate propositions, have predicates; ..." Are you saying that "exist" is a predicate, while "are existents" are not a copula and predicate?

They look like a copula and predicate, they quack like a copula and predicate, they waddle like a copula and predicate....so?

So...I think it's clear that even though existence is not a property, it is ~something~ that can be predicated of things, even of itself. But what? ...

As I said before, a grammatical predicate is not the same thing as a metaphysical predicate.

Yes, we can say "X is an existent" to mean "X exists" -- but in affirming that X exists we are not saying anything about what X is, i.e., its nature. An "existent" is not an attribute or characteristic of something; it is the thing itself -- the sum total of its attributes, not an attribute per se.

Why is this distinction important? Well, it is not of great significance any longer, primarily because very few philosophers subscribe any longer to the metaphysical systems, such as Neo-Platonism, that talked about "degrees of being." In this way of thinking, which gave rise to the Ontological Argument, entities can be more or less "real." There exists a "great chain of being," with God at the top of the chain.

Nowadays when someone says "God exists" or "God is a necessary being," we understand that nothing has been said about the nature of God, that no attributes have been given by which we could identify God. But when we say "God is a necessary Being" are we not using "necessary Being" as a predicate? Are we not predicating or attributing "necessary Being" to God, so have we not described him in some fashion?. Nope, not at all. The fact that we can use "necessary Being" as a grammatical predicate does not mean that it is a metaphysical predicate. "Being" (or existence) of any kind is not a characteristic of an entity. It is the entity itself.

Similarly, to say "X is an existent" merely affirms the existence of X. This proposition tells us nothing about the nature of X. "Existent," in other words, in not predicate like red or round or big or small. If you tell me that "X is red and round," then you have told me something about X that would help me to identify it, should I ever happen across X. But if you merely say "X is an existent," you have not described or identified X in any manner. You have merely affirmed that X, whatever it is, exists.

Ghs

Addendum: I was going to respond to your post in two parts, so I didn't read the last part carefully before writing my reply. At the end of your post you write: "Yes, I agree that existence is not a property of things, and I do agree with what Parker and Veatch ascribed to Kant...."

Given your position, as expressed here, my post amounts to preaching to the choir, and I honestly don't understand how your position differs from mine.

Ghs

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Roger,

Do you have a copy of Logic as a Human Instrument (Harper, 1959), by Francis Parker and Henry Veatch? If so, read their discussion, beginning on page 100, of "The Metaphysical Distinction of Existence from Essence."

Parker and Veatch, both of whom were solid Aristotelians, agree with my earlier argument that existence is not a predicate.

...On p. 110 of their book, Parker and Veatch say: "After all, existence propositions, quite as much as subject-predicate propositions, have predicates; ..." Are you saying that "exist" is a predicate, while "are existents" are not a copula and predicate?

They look like a copula and predicate, they quack like a copula and predicate, they waddle like a copula and predicate....so?

So...I think it's clear that even though existence is not a property, it is ~something~ that can be predicated of things, even of itself.

Parker and Veatch distinguish between "existence propositions" and "subject-predicate propositions." They note (p. 110) that these terms are not "too felicitous," but they conclude nonetheless that these two types of propositions have fundamentally different meanings (or "intentions"):

After all, existence propositions, quite as much as subject-predicate propositions, have predicates; and subject-predicate propositions, quite as much as existence propositions, intend existence. Nevertheless, inasmuch as in the so-called existence propositions one is concerned with intending merely the fact that something is, whereas in subject-predicate propositions one intends not merely that something is but also what it is, the expression "subject-predicate proposition" is designed to point up the fact that here one has the further concern of knowing what an existent thing is.

To sum up, then, we may say that logical propositions...may be of either of two main types: (1) existence propositions, in which our concern is with knowing that a certain "what" (essence) is; (2) subject-predicate propositions, in which our concern is with knowing what a certain "that" (existing entity or thing) is. The structure of the former may be represented by "S is," that of the latter by "S is P."

So, yes, Parker and Veatch do indeed concede that existence propositions can take the subject-predicate form, but they don't regard this grammatical possibility as relevant to the logical distinction between existence propositions and subject-predicate propositions.

Ghs

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One of Veatch's acquaintances, Reinhard Grossmann, in his 1992 book The Existence of the World thoroughly considers how to properly analyze what he calls "existence facts." He argues that existence does not belong to any of the categories (i.e., it's not an entity, an attribute, a quantity, an action, etc.). He further clarifies that it's not a ~property of a property~ or a "relational property." (I would think that existence and identity ~are~ relational properties, specifically when considering an existent and its characteristics in their reciprocal relations to one another, that's a different issue, for another time.)

Instead, Grossmann says, existence is a "feature" of the world. I.e., it is something about the world. This smells suspiciously like a ~basic fact~ about all of existence...er, um...I mean, the world.

Here is an extended excerpt where his reasoning, latching onto a few bits of modern logic along the way, ends up looking very similar to mine:

[Grossmann]I argued earlier that, contrary to Frege and Russell, it makes perfect sense to say of an individual like Caesar that he exists. But in the sentence 'Caesar exists,' the word 'exists' functions somewhat like a predicate. [OK, "somewhat like." Close enough for the present purpose!] I say 'somewhat,' because there is a difference, a difference which I find revealing: there is no indication of exemplification. 'Caesar exists' is in this regard quite different from 'Caesar is the conqueror of Gaul.' Of course, this fits in well with our contention that existence is not a property and, hence, cannot be exemplified. But the fact remains that in 'Caesar exists' existence is somehow connected with Caesar and we must now ask how this connection appears from our point of view that existence is the variable entity. I think that to say that Caesar exists is to say that he is an existent. Let us be somewhat pedantic and spell this out in detail. The sentence:

(6) 'Caesar exists'

represents the same fact as:

(7) 'Caesar is an existent.'

But here the 'is' does not signify exemplification, but represents identity:

(8) 'Some (at least one) existent is identical with Caesar.'

Or, written with the variable expression 'e':

(9) 'Some e is such that: e = Caesar.'

This is our most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists. Let 'A' be the name of any entity whatsoever. The fact that A exists is of the form:

(10) Some e is such that: e = A.

or, for short, in English: A is an existent.

!!!

Now, skipping down a couple of paragraphs:

[Grossmann] Every thing is identical with an entity [he means: with an existent]; its existence consists in its being (identical with) an entity. But this means that every thing has its own existence, that every thing is a little piece of existence...Everything exists. If everything exists, then existence must exist. [He is arguing inductively for Rand's Existence axiom.] I fail to understand how anything could have this 'feature' of existence, whatever it may be, unless there is this 'feature' in the first place.

Translation: I fail to understand how it could be a fact that any existent is an existent, unless it is necessarily universally true of EVERY existent that it is an existent--i.e., that all existents exist, that Existence exists.

One more excerpt:

[Grossmann] To say of a particular thing a that it exists, as we have seen, is to say that a is identical with an existent. Similarly, to say that existence exists is to say that existents are identical with existents:

(11) Some e is such that: e = e.

But (11) states that some entity is self-identical. According to our view, therefore, to say that existence exists is to say nothing more nor less than that an existent is self-identical. Can this really be the meaning of the existence statement? I think that this view is forced upon us by the discovery that existence is the variable entity [i.e., existent], for I do not see how else one could analyze the fact that the variable exists.

Pretty heavy, abstract stuff. But it makes sense to me.

I'm glad that Grossmann's semantical gymnastics make sense to someone. 8-)

None of this stuff is necessary to understand the meaning of "X exists" or "X is an existent," nor does Grossmann's analysis clarify what we mean. Consider these remarks by Grossmann:

"To say of a particular thing a that it exists, as we have seen, is to say that a is identical with an existent." No. To say that X exists is to say that X exists, period. To say that X is identical with an existent is implicitly to compare two different things. X is not somehow identical to itself; it is itself. We need only say that X is an existent, or that X exists.

Grossman: "to say that existence exists is to say nothing more nor less than that an existent is self-identical." This inflation of philosophic verbiage is pointless and misleading. The weird expression "self-identical" is presumably meant to express identity, but this is not what Rand meant by "existence exists."

Here is my personal favorite: "(9) 'Some e is such that: e = Caesar.' This is our most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists."

According to my dictionary, "perspicuous" means "Clearly expressed or presented; easy to understand." I therefore humbly suggest that "Caesar exists" is the most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists. 8-)

Ghs

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Personally, I think she was in too much of a rush to publish her theory of concepts, and she didn't get it all worked out correctly.

I had the the same impression when going through ITOE.

Imo the current controversial discussion about her inconsistent use of certain terms points in that direction too.

I called the statement "All that exists, exists" facile because it does not positively affirm that anything exists. It merely says that if something exists, then it exists -- and this is not at all what Rand meant by "Existence exists." To my knowledge, Rand never used the expression "All that exists, exists," and I cannot imagine that she ever would have seriously considered it. She was far too careful in her use of words.

George, you're correct that Rand never used just that formulation. But she ~did~ say that "existence" means "all that which exists." (ITOE, p. 241) It follows that "existence exists" means: "all that which exists exists." As for this being a non-affirmation of existence, a mere "if-then," statement, I disagree.

Indeed, the point Rand tried to make was not about an "if-then" relationship here.

For to her, the proposition "Existence exists" was about "the primary fact which is existence". (ITOE, p. 3).

Tautological statements are not about 'if- then' relationships.

If I say e. g. "Ba'al Chatzaf is who he is", I'm not pointing out that "if" there is a Ba'al Chatzaf, "then" he is who he is - instead I'm using the tautological expression as an emphasis.

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Rand describes "existence exists" as a "special underscoring" of man's need to make explicit the axiomatic conceptual status of "existence," which might otherwise remain implicit. What wording would you have suggested? "Existence is existence" would not do the trick, since, like "A is A," this would indicate identity.

But in ITOE (p. 59) Rand explicitly uses "A is A" together with the examples "Existence exists" and "Consciousness is conscious", pointing out that:

"[axiomatic concepts] can be translated into statements only in the form of a repetition (as a base and reminder):

"Existence exists - Consciousness is conscious - A is A". (Rand)

Rand might have said, over and over again, "Existence is an axiomatic concept," but this would not have suited her flair for the dramatic.

Sounds a bit dry, yes. :smile:

I think "Existence exists" serves Rand's purpose very well. People who understand what she meant by the phrase are unlikely ever to read it again without thinking about "existence" as an axiomatic concept. Rand wanted the phrase to serve as a "reminder," and so it does.

I think the "reminder" is both epistemological and metaphysical.

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In the chapter "Axiomatic Concepts," Rand says that the concept "existence" subsumes "every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist." This is the metaphysical aspect that I acknowledged previously. But this is not the primary focus of her discussion of axiomatic concepts. She is not merely affirming that the universe exists; if this were her primary point, precious few philosophers would disagree with her, and she would not have included her discussion of "Existence exists" in a chapter on axiomatic concepts. Here is just one passage among many that makes her point:

I think that in the axiom "Existence exists", the affirmation you mentioned above was actually Rand's primary point.

It is an axiom because one cannot prove existence as such. (see ITOE, p. 55)

The Objectivist philosophy rests on this axiom, and as to your remark that "precious few philosophers would disagree" with Rand here - this is correct, but don't forget how vehemently Rand attacked all skepticism re the reality of existence, so this was of essential importance to her.

Example from AS, p. 498:

"There are no absolutes", said Dr. Pritchett. "Reality is only an illusion: How does the woman know that her son is dead? How does she know he ever existed?"

Rand's 'Existence exists' attack on such fundamental skepticism is an attack on Subjectivism.

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According to my dictionary, "perspicuous" means "Clearly expressed or presented; easy to understand." I therefore humbly suggest that "Caesar exists" is the most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists. 8-)

Ghs

Perspicacious: "having keen mental perception and understanding . . . ."

--Brant

get thee a decent dictionary

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According to my dictionary, "perspicuous" means "Clearly expressed or presented; easy to understand." I therefore humbly suggest that "Caesar exists" is the most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists. 8-) Ghs
Perspicacious: "having keen mental perception and understanding . . . ." --Brant get thee a decent dictionary

You lost me. The word is perspicuous, not perspicacious.

Or is this another one of those subtle bits of humor that passed me by?

Ghs

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According to my dictionary, "perspicuous" means "Clearly expressed or presented; easy to understand." I therefore humbly suggest that "Caesar exists" is the most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists. 8-) Ghs
Perspicacious: "having keen mental perception and understanding . . . ." --Brant get thee a decent dictionary

You lost me. The word is perspicuous, not perspicacious.

Or is this another one of those subtle bits of humor that passed me by?

Ghs

Oops.

--Brant

blush

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According to my dictionary, "perspicuous" means "Clearly expressed or presented; easy to understand." I therefore humbly suggest that "Caesar exists" is the most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists. 8-) Ghs
Perspicacious: "having keen mental perception and understanding . . . ." --Brant get thee a decent dictionary
You lost me. The word is perspicuous, not perspicacious. Or is this another one of those subtle bits of humor that passed me by? Ghs
Oops. --Brant blush

Your reply is both perspicuous and perspicacious. 8-)

Ghs

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According to my dictionary, "perspicuous" means "Clearly expressed or presented; easy to understand." I therefore humbly suggest that "Caesar exists" is the most perspicuous way of representing the fact that Caesar exists. 8-) Ghs
Perspicacious: "having keen mental perception and understanding . . . ." --Brant get thee a decent dictionary
You lost me. The word is perspicuous, not perspicacious. Or is this another one of those subtle bits of humor that passed me by? Ghs
Oops. --Brant blush

Your reply is both perspicuous and perspicacious. 8-)

Ghs

It's amazing how good I am at harvesting compliments from a practically barren field.

--Brant

must be genius

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  • 2 weeks later...

Roger,

Do you have a copy of Logic as a Human Instrument (Harper, 1959), by Francis Parker and Henry Veatch? If so, read their discussion, beginning on page 100, of "The Metaphysical Distinction of Existence from Essence."

Parker and Veatch, both of whom were solid Aristotelians, agree with my earlier argument that existence is not a predicate.

...On p. 110 of their book, Parker and Veatch say: "After all, existence propositions, quite as much as subject-predicate propositions, have predicates; ..." Are you saying that "exist" is a predicate, while "are existents" are not a copula and predicate?

They look like a copula and predicate, they quack like a copula and predicate, they waddle like a copula and predicate....so?

So...I think it's clear that even though existence is not a property, it is ~something~ that can be predicated of things, even of itself.

Parker and Veatch distinguish between "existence propositions" and "subject-predicate propositions." They note (p. 110) that these terms are not "too felicitous," but they conclude nonetheless that these two types of propositions have fundamentally different meanings (or "intentions"):

After all, existence propositions, quite as much as subject-predicate propositions, have predicates; and subject-predicate propositions, quite as much as existence propositions, intend existence. Nevertheless, inasmuch as in the so-called existence propositions one is concerned with intending merely the fact that something is, whereas in subject-predicate propositions one intends not merely that something is but also what it is, the expression "subject-predicate proposition" is designed to point up the fact that here one has the further concern of knowing what an existent thing is.

To sum up, then, we may say that logical propositions...may be of either of two main types: (1) existence propositions, in which our concern is with knowing that a certain "what" (essence) is; (2) subject-predicate propositions, in which our concern is with knowing what a certain "that" (existing entity or thing) is.

George, you surely know how much I respect and admire Parker and Veatch. Veatch has been one of my epistemology/logic gods since about 1971, when Douglas Rasmussen first turned me on to him. I have learned a great deal from them about the nature of propositions, and I have gotten a lot of good clues as to how to deal with propositions about non-existent subjects and the like.

That said, I think that there are gaps in their treatment of propositions just as (though not to the same extent) as there are in Rand's treatment of propositions. I think that their approach would benefit by a vigorous injection of Rand-think, just as hers would benefit by a similar injection of theirs. Let me sketch out what I mean.

First of all, though Existence propositions are clearly different from Subject-Predicate propositions in many of the ways you and Parker-Veatch indicate, they are NOT fundamentally different from one another. The way I see it, just like the axioms of Existence and Identity, they each refer to or "intend" the same basic facts from two different perspectives.

An Existence proposition is a proposition that ~explicitly~ intends existence and ~implicitly~ intends identity. E.g., "X exists" and "There are such things as horses" explicitly assert the existence of something. But they also implicitly assert that those things also have a specific identity. Here's how the implicit identity rider attaches to Existence propositions:

1. X exists.

2. X is a thing that exists. (Standard form with copula and predicate)

3. A thing that exists is a thing that has a nature. (Law of Identity/Existence is Identity)

4. Therefore, X is a thing that has a nature. (Deduction from 2. and 3.)

5. Therefore, X is a thing that exists and has a nature. (Conjunction of 2. and 4.)

6. Therefore, X exists --> X is a thing that exists (and has a nature). (Summary of 1. and 5.)

7. Or, X _IS_ some_THING_ --> X _IS_ _SOME_thing. (Restatement of implication of 6.)

So, implicit in an Existence proposition is an additional assertion of identity.

Similarly, an Identity ("Subject-Predicate") proposition is a proposition that ~explicitly~ intends identity and ~implicitly~ intends existence. E.g., "X has a nature" and "Horses are four-legged" explicitly assert that something has an identity, that it is what it is. But they also implicitly assert that that thing also exists. Here's how the implicit existence rider attaches to Identity ("Subject-Predicate") propositions:

1. X has a nature.

2. X is a thing that has a nature. (Standard form with copula and predicate)

3. A thing that has a nature is a thing that exists. (Law of Identity/Existence is Identity)

4. Therefore, X is a thing that exists. (Deduction from 2. and 3.)

5. Therefore, X is a thing that has a nature and exists. (Conjunction of 2. and 4.)

6. Therefore, X has a nature --> X is a thing that has a nature (and exists). (Summary of 1. and 5.)

7. Or, X _IS_ _SOME_thing --> X _IS_ some_THING_. (Restatement of implication in 6.)

Thus, implicit in an Identity ("Subject-Predicate") proposition is an additional assertion of existence.

These two basic types of propositions, while both implicitly acknowledging that "to be is to be something" and conversely, fulfill a definite division of labor. Each of them, while leaving implicit one of the two essential intentions of ANY proposition, focuses explicitly on the other.

Parker and Veatch delve into this issue to some extent, when they deal with various problems like the truth-value of "The present king of France is bald." They refer to it as a dual or double "designation" of existence and identity. All I have done is basically to somewhat Randianize their approach and try to show the deep correlation and symmetry between the two kinds of propositions.

I think that the failure of logicians to grasp and apply this correlation is (1) the source of a great deal of the trouble, historically, in dealing with propositions about non-existent subjects, and (2) the most likely factor responsible for the doctrine of Existential Import, by which modern logicians treat universal Identity ("Subject-Predicate") propositions as not asserting the existence of their subjects.

To conclude: I am convinced more than ever that Aristotle was a giant, Aquinas was a giant, Ayn Rand was a giant, Parker and Veatch were giants -- but Boole, Frege, Russell, Whitehead et al...not so much.

REB

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So, I can't legitimately say: "Horses are things that exist" or "Horses are existents," equally validly as I might say: "Horses exist" or "There are such things as horses"?? (I take these all to be equivalent expressions.)

In particular, I'm interested in what difference, if any, you see between: "Horses exist" and: "Horses are existents."

If they're both valid expressions of the existent proposition about horses, then exactly how is "are existents" functioning, if not as a copula and predicate?

On p. 110 of their book, Parker and Veatch say: "After all, existence propositions, quite as much as subject-predicate propositions, have predicates; ..." Are you saying that "exist" is a predicate, while "are existents" are not a copula and predicate?

They look like a copula and predicate, they quack like a copula and predicate, they waddle like a copula and predicate....so?

So...I think it's clear that even though existence is not a property, it is ~something~ that can be predicated of things, even of itself. But what? ...

As I said before, a grammatical predicate is not the same thing as a metaphysical predicate.

Yes, we can say "X is an existent" to mean "X exists" -- but in affirming that X exists we are not saying anything about what X is, i.e., its nature. An "existent" is not an attribute or characteristic of something; it is the thing itself -- the sum total of its attributes, not an attribute per se.

Why is this distinction important? Well, it is not of great significance any longer, primarily because very few philosophers subscribe any longer to the metaphysical systems, such as Neo-Platonism, that talked about "degrees of being." In this way of thinking, which gave rise to the Ontological Argument, entities can be more or less "real." There exists a "great chain of being," with God at the top of the chain.

Nowadays when someone says "God exists" or "God is a necessary being," we understand that nothing has been said about the nature of God, that no attributes have been given by which we could identify God. But when we say "God is a necessary Being" are we not using "necessary Being" as a predicate? Are we not predicating or attributing "necessary Being" to God, so have we not described him in some fashion?. Nope, not at all. The fact that we can use "necessary Being" as a grammatical predicate does not mean that it is a metaphysical predicate. "Being" (or existence) of any kind is not a characteristic of an entity. It is the entity itself.

Similarly, to say "X is an existent" merely affirms the existence of X. This proposition tells us nothing about the nature of X. "Existent," in other words, in not predicate like red or round or big or small. If you tell me that "X is red and round," then you have told me something about X that would help me to identify it, should I ever happen across X. But if you merely say "X is an existent," you have not described or identified X in any manner. You have merely affirmed that X, whatever it is, exists.

Based on my previous post, I think it will be clear that I view "X is an existent" as doing more than "merely affirm[ing] the existence of X." It is true that it tells us nothing ~specific~ about the nature of X. But by affirming the fact that X exists (whether correctly or not), it is also implicitly affirming that fact that X has a nature. To be is to be something with a specific nature.

Granted, saying something exists and has a specific nature doesn't make it so. Nor does front-loading your concept of a thing with a bogus, arbitrarily inserted attribute of "existence" or "necessary existence" work as an end-run around the need to have evidence for saying something exists and has a specific nature. (That's the gist of what I get from Kant's denial that "existence" is a real predicate or a property.)

Every legitimate proposition about something must be based on information from the "conceptual file folder" that is one's concept of that thing. Otherwise, it's arbitrary. It might correspond to reality, or it might not. But it's arbitrary.

If I haven't observed any gremlins, nor received any other data about them, but yet I form the idea of them and plop in the notion that they are real and are green, that doesn't make the proposition "Green gremlins are real creatures" either true or false. It's null and void, arbitrary, as are any assertions about God.

But if I want to share the fruits of my creativity and say, "Green gremlins are imaginary creatures," that indeed is true -- and "Green gremlins are not imaginary creatures" is false, because it's a denial of the fact that I have imagined them. And I hereby declare myself to be ineligible for elected office in the State of Tennessee by noting that the same applies to God as a creature of the imagination of far too many people. :-)

REB

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To conclude: I am convinced more than ever that Aristotle was a giant, Aquinas was a giant, Ayn Rand was a giant, Parker and Veatch were giants -- but Boole, Frege, Russell, Whitehead et al...not so much.

REB

If not giants themselves, they begat giants. Albert Tarski and Kurt Goedel.

The logical incompleteness of any mathematical system sufficient to support arithmetic, could not have been proven without the formal and algebraic approach of Boole and Frege. Whitehead and Russel failed in their attempt to base mathematics on logic. Poincare punctured their effort.

Modern formal logic, particularly first order logic of n-adic predicates models mathematical reasoning. Term logic cannot. Try defining the limit of a series using term logic. Betcha you can't. Also term logic cannot adequately produce a theory of sets.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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