Another view of Leonard Peikoff

[Daniel Barnes]

I wrote:

Apropos of the usefulness of Wilber's usage at least, I suppose the question is: what isn't a "holon"?

Mike replied:

What isn't made from "subatomic particles"?

How's that for the same kind of usefulness?

That's a very different statement. Lots of things aren't a subatomic particle! A kidney, for example, is not a quark.

So I ask again: what isn't a holon?

(I suppose the universe, as it's not a part of something greater. But that's about it.)

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

A kidney, for example, is not a quark.

Daniel,

Of course not. It's a whole bunch of quarks. If you didn't like my form, here is another way:

What isn't a whole bunch of "subatomic particles"?

How's that for the same kind of usefulness?

Michael

[Daniel Barnes]

A kidney, for example, is not a quark.

Daniel,

Of course not. It's a whole bunch of quarks. If you didn't like my form, here is another way:

What isn't a whole bunch of "subatomic particles"?

How's that for the same kind of usefulness?

Michael

I think the difference is quite obvious: namely, that subatomic particles represent a final reduction, what is (at least so far) the bottom level in a physical hierarchy. So as you go up each level up in the hierarchy from the bottom you get different things i.e. an atom, a molecule, etc.

Now, this is not true of holons AFAICS. Every time you go up a level, you get the same thing i.e. a holon.

This is highlighted by asking what isn't a holon? There doesn't seem to be much.

Thus I don't really see what the idea is adding. You might as well just say a "thing". But perhaps I am missing something.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

I have been saying (very clearly in fact) that reality is made out of both: form and content. And I have been saying that I don't understand people who think form is governed exclusively by content, emerging from it as the be all and end all force controlling the universe, nor that content is governed exclusively by form like some kind of spook. Use the words holon and particle for form and content if you like (with the caveat that subordinate forms are content for parent forms).

In other words, everything is a holon and everything is made up of quarks.

And I have been saying that form (holon) is not one gigantic form lumping together a bunch of independent subatomic particles, but instead structured according to a bunch of interconnected hierarchical forms.

Incidentally, each type of form is represented by a concept in Objectivism. So is each type of particle. (After being discoverd in both cases, of course.) The entire theory of Objectivist concept formation reflects this reality.

And my point in making my observation about usefulness is that if you are going to ridicule people for saying holons are part of reality and this information is useless, I think it is just as useless (for the exact same reasons) to say reality is made up of subatomic particles. (Let's see if I can do it your your way: "If you say everything is made up of subatomic particles, you have not provided any real information about anything." How's them apples? )

I stated what I did because you seem to think the holon part is meaningless and the subatomic particle part is what gives meaning and structure. As I showed you just now, the subatomic part suffers the same problem as holon using that standard. If you do not think that, I did not understand your ridicule. It made no sense to me.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I think the difference is quite obvious: namely, that subatomic particles represent a final reduction, what is (at least so far) the bottom level in a physical hierarchy. So as you go up each level up in the hierarchy from the bottom you get different things i.e. an atom, a molecule, etc.

Now, this is not true of holons AFAICS. Every time you go up a level, you get the same thing i.e. a holon.

Daniel,

Not true.

As you go down, you merely get smaller and smaller parts, or particles. The name atom or molecule doesn't change its nature of being part of a whole. You even said "at least so far" for your "final reduction." So what is it at the extreme end? Bottom level or on the way? It can't be both. It can't be final and not final at the same time.

Also, you have a misconception about holons. It is not a final top. Just as there is no real final bottom except something we call a quark, there is no real final top, except something we call the universe.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

I think the difference is quite obvious: namely, that subatomic particles represent a final reduction, what is (at least so far) the bottom level in a physical hierarchy. So as you go up each level up in the hierarchy from the bottom you get different things i.e. an atom, a molecule, etc.

Now, this is not true of holons AFAICS. Every time you go up a level, you get the same thing i.e. a holon.

Daniel,

Not true.

As you go down, you merely get smaller and smaller parts, or particles. The name atom or molecule doesn't change its nature of being part of a whole. You even said "at least so far" for your "final reduction." So what is it at the extreme end? Bottom level or on the way? It can't be both. It can't be final and not final at the same time.

Also, you have a misconception about holons. It is not a final top. Just as there is no real final bottom except something we call a quark, there is no real final top, except something we call the universe.

Michael

All evidence indicates that the electron is indivisible. It is not made of anything smaller. Ditto for for the neutrino. The baryons: neutron and proton are made of quarks. At this juncture we do not have the energies necessary to break things into yet smaller particles (assuming that exist) so one can not be totally absolute on this matter(!). What until the LHC goes into operation next month and we shall see what the particle mavens come up with. Even so we cannot produce energies such as existed at the instant of the Big Bang.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited August 13, 2008 by BaalChatzaf

[Dragonfly]

Thus I don't really see what the idea is adding. You might as well just say a "thing". But perhaps I am missing something.

You're right, the notion of a "holon" is completely superfluous, it doesn't add anything new.

[tjohnson]

We sometimes regard an apple as causing our perceptual awareness of it, yet we also know that the apple reflects a group of light rays from it toward our sense organs, and the physical interaction of that light stream with our retinas causes our visual perception of the apple.

I don't think it makes sense to discuss apples reflecting lightwaves. What you mean is that the atoms or electrons reflect the lightwaves and it is our nervous system that manufactures the image in our visual cortex that we call 'an apple'.

And then how do we see that image? (Good luck. ;-))

Ellen

___

We don't "see" the image, we manufacture it from the stimuli.

[tjohnson]

A concept (so far) is not a concrete.

If we accept that 'a concept' represents some sort of visualization in the brain then why would it not be considered a concrete thing?

[Guyau]

Re: #182 (http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...amp;#entry54522)

Roger,

In #172 you had written:

“When I say entities are the only causal agents, I do not mean to exclude their component parts . . . . I mean to exclude attributes, actions, and relationships. To rephrase Rand's/Aristotle's view of causality: causality is the relation between entities or parts of entities and their actions. In other words, entities and their component parts [and only these] . . . are causal agents.”

Rand’s principle of causality says only:

“All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe . . . are caused and determined by the identities of the elements involved.” (MvMM)

Rand was not excluding attributes, actions, and relationships as causes, provided attributes, actions, and relationships are understood as inhering in specific entities.

Dragonfly’s remarks in #184 are right and fully sound on Rand’s broad view, provided events and processes are understood to inhere in entities. They are part of the identities of the entities involved. (I take the Kankakee River to be an entity and spacetime to be an entity. I mean concrete entities, not simply abstract entities like mathematical spaces.)

When a saw is cutting wood, the hardness and shape and motion of the teeth cause the cutting. The speeding up of a spinning figure skater is caused by retraction of arms to the axis of rotation. The Doppler shift of sound-wave frequencies is caused by relative motion between source and receiver. The various types of chemical bonds are caused by various properties of the chemical elements. The various behaviors of elementary particles are caused by their various suites of quantum numbers, which is to say, by their specific quantum characteristics.

Are you drawing a distinction between a cause and a causal agent? To keep in mind that where there is causation there are entities causing (and other entities being affected or being created or destroyed) and that where there is activity there are acting entities? It is not idle to keep those things in mind. Think of how physicists pursue entities fitting the specifications to be the causes known as dark matter and dark energy. It is a pleasing generalization of the world Newton uncovered wherein: See an acceleration? Look for a specific source of the force causing the acceleration.

There is another problem I have with your remark quoted at the top of this note. It does not sound right to say that an entity causes its actions. It bears its actions. The general relationship between entities and their own actions is bearing, not causing. I expect you were saying in shorthand something like Rand's statement quoted above.

Biological entities cause some of their actions, to be sure. The bearing relation remains for biological actions too: I exercise my body. That is a causal relation between an entity and its actions. At the same time, those exercises are borne by that entity (borne as patient, yes, but also borne as any entity bears any of its actions).

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Of Related Interest:

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...ns/1849.shtml#1

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...ns/1849.shtml#5

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...s/1849.shtml#14

http://www.solopassion.com/node/1634

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...amp;#entry15205

Also:

B. Exclusions of Non-Contradiction: Actions

Rand’s law of identity entails that actions come in some exclusive kinds in the following sense. Burning of a leaf and freezing of a leaf are kinds of actions that are exclusive with respect to each other. However, to say that a leaf is burning and floating is no violation of identity, no contradiction. Some actions of objects—burning and freezing in the case of leaves—are exclusive with respect to each other. Rand’s conception of noncontradiction concerning actions pertains to these. (Cf. Republic 436b, 436e; Metaphysics 1061b35–62a1.)

Rand’s law of identity also entails that every entity that has actions has certain actions and not others. A green leaf manufactures chlorophyll; a stone does not. Rand’s conception of noncontradiction concerning actions pertains to these exclusions as well. “The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act; a thing cannot act in contradiction to its nature” (AS 1037). (Cf. On Generation and Corruption 338b15)

I want to prove axiomatic the truth that every action-bearing entity bears certain kinds of action and not others. Suppose an entity could bear any kind of action without restriction of the kind of action. Then it could bear all the acts of a leaf and a stone. Indeed, it could bear all the acts of all the kinds of entity there are. Such an entity would be the conjunction of all the kinds of entity there are with respect to their possible actions.

It would be more. Not only could this super-acting entity bear all the actions of, say, a leaf. It could also burn and freeze at the same time. Yet, having all the possible actions of a leaf, its burning excludes its freezing at the same time. Our super-acting entity is capable of burning and freezing at the same time, and it is incapable of burning and freezing at the same time. Our super-acting entity can float on water, like a leaf, and yet, like a stone, it cannot float on water. These are contradictions. No such entity can exist. There is no entity that can bear any kind of action without restriction of the kind of action.

Moreover, let a person suppose there could be an entity that could bear any kind of action without restriction of the kind of action. Such an entity could bear the act of supposing its existence, just as a person might do. But unlike a person, the super-acting entity could suppose at the same time that such an entity is impossible. But this contradicts the presupposition of a person that contradictories are false.

So I have argued the axiomatic standing of “existence is identity” where the existents are action-bearing entities and the identity is restriction of the kinds of actions of those entities. Rand’s thesis that any entity that exists has a specific nature [“to exist . . . is to be an entity of a specific nature . . .” (AS 1016)] has now been proven to be axiomatic insofar as the action nature of entities is concerned. The postulate that every action-bearing entity bears certain kinds of action and not others must be accepted on pain of self-contradiction.

It should be noticed that I have not proven that, for every action-bearing entity, some of the kinds of action it bears are exclusive with respect to each other. I leave open the possibility that some kinds of entities can bear all the kinds of actions in their repertoire simultaneously. Certainly a leaf is not such an entity.

Edited August 14, 2008 by Stephen Boydstun

[tjohnson]

Yes, especially his logical and epistemological work.

I mean, just look at the world around you. It's ~obvious~ that the world is run by subjective, illogical premises of all sorts. Clinging to Aristotle's laws of logic and rules of definition as we Objectivists do only makes us look all the more foolish and...unevolved. :poke:

REB

By 'laws of logic' do you mean the ones expressed like this?

A=A

A=B or A~=B

It is my understanding that the so-called 'Laws of Thought' cannot be attributed to anyone in particular but are often mistakenly attributed to Aristotle.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

If we accept that 'a concept' represents some sort of visualization in the brain then why would it not be considered a concrete thing?

GS,

I strongly suspect it is. Memory gets stored somehow.

If it ain't concrete, the idea of storing it's a bitch to contemplate.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

A concept (so far) is not a concrete.

If we accept that 'a concept' represents some sort of visualization in the brain then why would it not be considered a concrete thing?

Because it's not valuable to do that. We differentiate between ideas and concretes for the sake of clear and precise thinking. And those concretes you allude to can only be experienced by you unless spoken or written down. If you keep reducing the broth you'll eventually get a hard, burned scum in the bottom of a pan. You can do that with ideas in the brain too and end up with a corpse. Concretes are the referents of ideas. Like soap bubbles, ideas can go "pop!"

--Brant

[tjohnson]

Because it's not valuable to do that. We differentiate between ideas and concretes for the sake of clear and precise thinking. And those concretes you allude to can only be experienced by you unless spoken or written down.

Whether or not my visualizations can be experienced by others (which we all know cannot) is not the issue. The issue is that visualizations, concepts, ideas, etc. do exist in our brains and as such should be considered 'concrete things'. Is it possible you mean you differentiate between words and what they represent?

[BaalChatzaf]

Yes, especially his logical and epistemological work.

I mean, just look at the world around you. It's ~obvious~ that the world is run by subjective, illogical premises of all sorts. Clinging to Aristotle's laws of logic and rules of definition as we Objectivists do only makes us look all the more foolish and...unevolved. :poke:

REB

By 'laws of logic' do you mean the ones expressed like this?

A=A

A=B or A~=B

It is my understanding that the so-called 'Laws of Thought' cannot be attributed to anyone in particular but are often mistakenly attributed to Aristotle.

Aristotle did NOT invent logic. He wrote the first extensive treatise on Logic, -The Organon- (greek for tool-kit) which consisted of -Catagories-, -Prior Analytics-, -Posterior Analytics- and -Sophistical Refutations-. This work was intended to provide an intellectual "Swiss Army Knife" for workers in the various fields of philosophy.

Logic is implicit in our linguistic capability. Anyone who learns how to talk a human language has implicity absorbed some of the rules of inference and identification.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

Because it's not valuable to do that. We differentiate between ideas and concretes for the sake of clear and precise thinking. And those concretes you allude to can only be experienced by you unless spoken or written down.

Whether or not my visualizations can be experienced by others (which we all know cannot) is not the issue. The issue is that visualizations, concepts, ideas, etc. do exist in our brains and as such should be considered 'concrete things'. Is it possible you mean you differentiate between words and what they represent?

Of course. Concepts (ideas, common nouns) and their referents.

--Brant

[Roger Bissell]

Again, I will step into the middle of this, because I think that there are misunderstandings on both sides of the discussion about holons.

~Not~ everything that exists is a holon. A holon is something that is both a part of some whole, and a whole having parts. The fundamental particles -- electrons, neutrinos, quarks, etc. -- are presumed to ~not~ have parts. Thus, while they are parts of larger things, they are ~not~ holons.

Another thing that is not a holon is a ~human being~. You might think that human beings can be regarded as "parts" of a family or a society. Yes, but only in a sense, which depends on our conceptually relating to other human beings, not as a metaphysical relation like atoms to molecules or cells to bodies.

Peikoff talks in Ominous Parallels about the collectivist view that society is an organic whole, and that human beings are just "cells" of that "organism." I hope that we can see that human beings are ~not~ holons, except in a metaphorical sense, very much unlike the sence in which cells and organs are holons ~within~ a human being. Human individuals are only wholes, not parts.

To those who think that "holon" is a superfluous concept, I have to disagree. It means "part-whole." Anything that is both a part and a whole, is a holon. Some things are ~not wholes~, because they have no parts. Some things are ~not parts~, because they are metaphysical individuals, and there is nothing of which they are a metaphysical part.

So, since "holon" ~doesn't~ apply to everything that exists, it is not superfluous. Seems to me it's a rather handy term to use for labeling things that metaphysically exhibit both part-behavior and whole-behavior. (The fact that humans may ~choose~ to submerge themselves in larger units does not make them actual parts, just humans that have given up independent choice.)

REB

[Roger Bissell]

Re: #182

Roger,

In #172 you had written:

“When I say entities are the only causal agents, I do not mean to exclude their component parts . . . . I mean to exclude attributes, actions, and relationships. To rephrase Rand's/Aristotle's view of causality: causality is the relation between entities or parts of entities and their actions. In other words, entities and their component parts [and only these] . . . are causal agents.”

Rand’s principle of causality says only:

“All the countless forms, motions, combinations and dissolutions of elements within the universe . . . are caused and determined by the identities of the elements involved.” (MvMM) [underscoring added by REB]

Rand was not excluding attributes, actions, and relationships as causes, provided attributes, actions, and relationships are understood as inhering in specific entities.

I beg to differ, Stephen. Rand's quoted remark above literally refutes what you claim.

An entity is ~all~ of its identity, not just ~some~ aspect or other. All actions of an entity are caused and determined by the ~identity~ of the entity, not ~some aspect~ of its identity.

Any given attribute or power of an entity is only ~part~ of, ~an aspect of~, that entity. Thus, that particular attribute or power ~cannot~ be the cause of the entity's action, because it is not ~the identity~ of the entity, but only ~an aspect~ of its identity.

The most that can be said about some particular attribute or power, following Aristotle, is that that attribute or power is ~that in virtue of which~ an entity causes some action.

In Aristotle's terms, the entity is the efficient cause of its actions. Its attributes and power are the formal cause of its actions. Using the term "cause" in the latter sense is seductive, because our basic understanding of cause, the understanding of cause that we grow up with, is the notion of ~agency~, which is the efficient cause, the entity.

What you are claiming Stephen -- and endorsing in Dragonfly's and others' comments -- is that it is helpful and legitimate to speak of formal causes as though they were efficient causes. A formal cause is not a causal ~agent~. Only efficient causes are agents, and only entities are efficient causes.

REB

P.S. -- The above point can be seen even more clearly by referring to Rand's comments in Galt's Speech. While a good 15 or so years earlier than the MvMM comments, they are more obviously focused on the nature of causality per se, rather than the Primacy of Existence (things that happen in the universe are governed by identity) vs. Primacy of Consciousness (things that happen in the universe are governed by consciousness or will [or chance]).

Galt says: "All actions are caused by entities. The nature of an action is caused and determined by the nature of the entities that act." (For the New Intellectual, p. 152 pb)

See? She does ~not~ say identities of entities cause actions. She says entities cause actions -- and identities of entities cause/determine identities of actions.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Following through on my intention -- see post #193 -- to "type in the passage in which Koestler introduces the term ["holon"], plus some of his summary of his thesis," I typed up both of those segments (from The Ghost in the Machine) and also a third segment, the start of Chapter 1. I'll post the excerpts in a series of following posts.

I'd like to preface, however, by issuing an advance warning to two, in some cases overlapping, groups here, each of which (in some cases both of which) will scream against an aspect of Koestler's thesis. One group will object to his belief that the standard evolution model of "random variations with natural selection" isn't adequate, the other to his view that individuals can be thought of as "holons" within wider social groupings.

To the first group: Koestler was NOT proposing I.D. theory. He had troubles over how certain features of organisms could evolve on the "random variations" paradigm, for instance the eye (the "for instance" he emphasizes). Please bear in mind (a) that this book was written in 1967, almost 20 years before The Blind Watchmaker (first published in 1986) and almost 30 years before Climbing Mount Improbable (1996); and (b ) that Darwin himself had troubles imagining how the eye could have evolved by his proposed method of slowly accreted small steps.

To both groups: I think you'd find much of value in this book, despite disagreements with particular aspects.

Also to both groups: It's important to be aware of the intellectual climate at the time when Koestler was writing. Koestler's primary subject and focus of critique is the field of psychology, which at that time was Behavorist-dominated in the U.S. and in England and "Gestaltist"-dominated in Europe. He criticizes both approaches, but with special focus on the sterility of Behaviorism. When the book appeared -- only a few years after I'd completed my undergraduate work at Northwestern, where Hull-Spence-learning-theory strongly dominated -- I found Koestler's approach an enormously welcome "breath of fresh air." Today, features of it would seem dated, and people might wonder what some of the "fuss" is about, but I think there's lasting merit in some of his analyses, as well as in the window his critique affords on the historic situation of psychology at the time of the book's publication.

Ellen

___

Edited August 14, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

The Ghost in the Machine

by Arthur Koestler

The Macmillan Company, New York

© Arthur Koestler 1967

pp. 3-4

[This section starts Chapter 1, "The Poverty of Psychology"]

The Four Pillars of Unwisdom

Proverbs ix, I, says that the house of wisdom rests on seven pillars, but unfortunately does not name them. The citadel of orthodoxy which the sciences of life have built in the first half of our century rests on a number of impressive pillars, some of which are beginning to show cracks and to reveal themselves as monumental superstitions. The four principal ones, summarised in a simplified form, are the doctrines

(a) that biological evolution is the result of random mutations preserved by natural selection;

(b ) that mental evolution is the result of random tries preserved by 'reinforcements' (rewards);

(c ) that all organisms, including man, are essentially passive automata controlled by the environment, whose sole purpose in life is the reduction of tensions by adaptive responses;

(d) that the only scientific method worth that name is quantitative measurement; and, consequently, that complex phenomena must be reduced to simple elements accessible to such treatment, without undue worry whether the specific characteristics of a complex phenomenon, for instance man, may be lost in the process.

These four pillars of unwisdom will loom up repeatedly in the chapters that follow. They provide the background, the contemporary landscape, against which any attempt to design a new image of man must be silhouetted. One cannot operate in a vacuum; only by starting from the existing frame of reference can the outline of the new design be set off clearly, by way of comparison and contrast. This is a point of some importance, and I must insert here a personal remark to forestall a line of criticism which past experience has taught me to expect.

If one attacks the dominant school in psychology--as I did in my last book and as I shall do again in the present chapter--one is up against two opposite types of criticism. The first is the natural reaction of the defenders of orthodoxy, who believe that they are in the right and that you are in the wrong--which is only fair and to be expected. The second category of critics belongs to the opposite camp. They argue that, since the pillars of the citadel are already cracked and revealing themselves as hollow, one ought to ignore them and dispense with polemics. Or, to put it more bluntly, why flog a dead horse?*

This type of criticism is frequently voiced by psychologists who believe that they have outgrown the orthodox doctrines. But this belief is often based on self-deception, because the crude slot-machine model, in its modernised, more sophisticated versions, has had a profounder influence on them--and on our whole culture--then they realise. It has permeated our attitudes to philosophy, social science, education, psychiatry. Even orthodoxy recognises today the limitations and shortcomings of Pavlov's experiments; but in the imagination of the masses, the dog on the laboratory table, predictably salivating at the sound of a gong, has become a paradigm of existence, a kind of anti-Promethean myth; and the word 'conditioning', with its rigid deterministic connotations, has become a key-formula for explaining why we are what we are, and for explaining away moral responsibility. There has never been a dead horse with such a vicious kick.

* See Appendix Two: 'On Not Flogging Dead Horses'

[i've re-read that Appendix numerous times over the years, and still find it amusing with its bringing back "how it was then."]

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

First, a brief excerpt which states the basic idea of "holon":

pg. 48

The members of a hierarchy, like the Roman god Janus, all have two faces looking in opposite directions: the face turned towards the subordinate levels is that of a self-contained whole; the face turned upward towards the apex, that of a dependent part. [....] This 'Janus effect' is a fundamental characteristic of sub-wholes in all types of hierarchies.

But there is no satisfactory word in our vocabulary to refer to these Janus-faced entities: to talk of sub-wholes (or sub-assemblies, sub-structures, sub-skills, sub-systems) is awkward and tedious. It seems preferable to coin a new term to designate these nodes on the hierarchic tree which behave partly as wholes or wholly as parts, according to the way you look at them. The term I would propose is 'holon', from the Greek holos = whole, with the suffix on[,] which, as in proton or neutron, suggests a particle or part.

Now, the full section in which he introduces the term "holon."

The Ghost in the Machine

by Arthur Koestler

The Macmillan Company, New York

© Arthur Koestler 1967

pp. 47-49

[several paragraph breaks added;

emphsis and ellipses in original.]

Enter Janus

If we look at any form of social organization with some degree of coherence and stability, from insect state to Pentagon, we shall find that it is hierarchically ordered. The same is true of the structure of living organisms and their ways of functioning--from instinctive behaviour to the sophisticated skills of piano-playing and talking. And it is equally true of the processes of becoming--phylogeny, ontogeny, the acquisition of knowledge. However, if the branching tree is to represent more than a superficial analogy, there must be certain principles or laws which apply to all levels of a given hierarchy, and to all the varied types of hierarchy just mentioned--in other words, which define the meaning of 'hierarchic order'. In the pages that follow I shall outline several of these principles. They may at first sight look a little abstract, yet taken together, they shed a new light on some old problems.

The first universal characteristic of hierarchies is the relativity, and indeed ambiguity, of the terms 'part' and 'whole' when applied to any of the sub-assemblies. Again it is the very obviousness of this feature which makes us overlook its implications. A 'part', as we generally use the word, means something fragmentary and incomplete, which by itself would have no legitimate existence. On the other hand, a 'whole' is considered as something complete in itself which needs no further explanation. 

But 'wholes' and 'parts' in this absolute sense just do no exist anywhere either in the domain of living organisms or of social organisations. What we find are intermediary structures on a series of levels in an ascending order of complexity: sub-wholes which display, according to the way you look at them, some of the characteristics commonly attributed to wholes and some of the characteristics commonly attributed to parts. 

We have seen the impossibility of the task of chopping up speech into elementary atoms or units, either on the phonetic or on the syntactic level. Phonemes, words, phrases, are wholes in their own right, but parts of a larger unit; so are cells, tissues, organs; families, clans, tribes. 

The members of a hierarchy, like the Roman god Janus, all have two faces looking in opposite directions: the face turned towards the subordinate levels is that of a self-contained whole; the face turned upward towards the apex, that of a dependent part. One is the face of the master, the other the face of the servant. This 'Janus effect' is a fundamental characteristic of sub-wholes in all types of hierarchies.

But there is no satisfactory word in our vocabulary to refer to these Janus-faced entities: to talk of sub-wholes (or sub-assemblies, sub-structures, sub-skills, sub-systems) is awkward and tedious. It seems preferable to coin a new term to designate these nodes on the hierarchic tree which behave partly as wholes or wholly as parts, according to the way you look at them. The term I would propose is 'holon', from the Greek holos = whole, with the suffix on[,] which, as in proton or neutron, suggests a particle or part.

'A man', wrote Ben Jonson, 'coins not a new word without some peril; for if it happens to be received, the praise is but moderate; if refused, the scorn is assured.' Yet I think the holon is worth the risk, because it fills a genuine need. It also symbolises the missing link--or rather series of links--between the atomistic approach of the Behaviourist and the holistic approach of the Gestalt psychologist.

The Gestalt school has considerably enriched our knowledge of visual perception, and succeeded in softening up the rigid attitude of its opponents to some extent. But in spite of its lasting merits, 'holism' as a general attitude to psychology turned out to be as one-sided as atomism was[:] because both treated 'whole' and 'part' as absolutes, both failed to take into account the hierarchic scaffolding of intermediate structures of sub-wholes.

If we replace for a moment the image of the inverted tree by that of a pyramid, we can say that the Behaviourist never gets higher up than the bottom layer of stones, and the holist never gets down from the apex. In fact, the concept of the 'whole' proved just as elusive as that of the elementary part, and when he discusses language, the Gestaltist finds himself in the same quandary as the Behaviourist.

To quote James Jenkins again: 'There is an infinite set of sentences in English whose production and understanding is part of the daily commerce with language, and it is clear that neither the S-R nor the Gestalt approach is capable of coping with the problems involved in the generation and understanding of these sentences....We can't regard a sentence as a holistic, unanalysable unit, as the Gestaltists might maintain one should. One cannot suppose that the sentence is regarded as a perceptual unity which has welded its elements together in some unique pattern, as is the usual Gestalt analysis of perceptual phenomena.' * Nor do we find wholes on levels lower than the sentence--phrases, words, syllables, and phonemes are not parts, and not wholes, but holons.

The two-term part-whole paradigm is deeply engrained in our unconscious habits of thought. It will make a great difference to our mental outlook when we succeed in breaking away from it.

* from unpublished 1965 'Stanford Seminar Protocols'

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

The Ghost in the Machine

by Arthur Koestler

The Macmillan Company, New York

© Arthur Koestler 1967

pg. 341

APPENDIX I

GENERAL PROPERTIES OF OPEN

HIERARCHICAL SYSTEMS (O.H.S.)

1. The Janus Effect

1.1 The organism in its structural aspect is not an aggregation of elementary parts, and in its functional aspects not a chain of elementary units of behaviour.

1.2 The organism is to be regarded as a multi-levelled hierarchy of semi-autonomous sub-wholes, branching into sub-wholes of a lower order, and so on. Sub-wholes on any level of the hierarchy are referred to as holons.

1.3 Parts and wholes in an absolute sense do not exist in the domain of life. The concept of the holon is intended to reconcile the atomistic and holistic approaches.

1.4 Biological holons are self-regulating open systems which display both the autonomous properties of wholes and the dependent properties of parts. The dichotomy is present on every level of every type of hierachic organisation, and is refered to as the Janus Effect or Janus principle.

1.5 More generally, the term 'holon' may be applied to any stable biological or social sub-whole which displays rule-governed behaviour and/or structural Gestalt-constancy. Thus organelles and homologous organs are evolutionary holons; morphogenetic fields [*] are ontogenetic holons; the ethologist's 'fixed action-patterns' and the sub-routines of acquired skills are behavioural holons; phonemes, morphemes, words, phrases are linguistic holons; individuals, families, tribes, nations are social holons.

[*] This isn't a reference to Sheldrake, whose writing I think postdated this book. "Field" is being used in the sense of spatial area; Koestler is referring to "location in the epigenetic landscape" (pg. 125), i.e., to an area of the genome which develops into a particular organ or sub-organ.

---

Here's the full list of headings in his outline of "General Properties of Open Hierarchical Systems (O.H.S.)

1. The Janus Effect

2. Dissectibility

3. Rules and Strategies

4. Integration and Self-Assertion

5. Triggers and Scanners

6. Arborisation and Reticulation

7. Regulation Channels

8. Mechanisation and Freedom

9. Equilibrium and Disorder

10. Regeneration

.

___

[Martin Radwin]

Another thing that is not a holon is a ~human being~. You might think that human beings can be regarded as "parts" of a family or a society. Yes, but only in a sense, which depends on our conceptually relating to other human beings, not as a metaphysical relation like atoms to molecules or cells to bodies.

Peikoff talks in Ominous Parallels about the collectivist view that society is an organic whole, and that human beings are just "cells" of that "organism." I hope that we can see that human beings are ~not~ holons, except in a metaphorical sense, very much unlike the sence in which cells and organs are holons ~within~ a human being. Human individuals are only wholes, not parts.

You have obviously not yet been assimilated into the Borg collective. Perhaps resistance is not so futile after all!

Martin

[Paul Mawdsley]

Another thing that is not a holon is a ~human being~. You might think that human beings can be regarded as "parts" of a family or a society. Yes, but only in a sense, which depends on our conceptually relating to other human beings, not as a metaphysical relation like atoms to molecules or cells to bodies.

[...]

(The fact that humans may ~choose~ to submerge themselves in larger units does not make them actual parts, just humans that have given up independent choice.)

Roger,

Is an ant a holon relative to its colony?

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Roger,

A few comments.

~Not~ everything that exists is a holon.

We should define terms, but I know of nothing that is a singularity without parts in form.

A holon is something that is both a part of some whole, and a whole having parts.

Agreed.

The fundamental particles -- electrons, neutrinos, quarks, etc. -- are presumed to ~not~ have parts. Thus, while they are parts of larger things, they are ~not~ holons.

I have two big problems with this statement. The first is equating "presumed" with "is." Just because something is "presumed" to be, that does not mean it "is" XXXX (a single-part existent) and "is not" YYYY (a holon)—or even vice-versa. The correct logic would be to say if the presumption is true, then such-and such "is" or "is not" whatever. A presumption is merely what a person thinks and uses as a premise. A presumption can be correct or incorrect and still be a presumption.

The second problem is human history. Every time human beings have said we have hit rock bottom on the subatomic level, someone discovers something else. Because of this pattern, I think it is very premature to claim that the subatomic particles we know about do not have further parts so nothing else is possible.

Once we do hit rock bottom, if such even exists, I agree that that a "puff of existence" (to use Peikoff's quirky term) is not a holon. Just as I agree that the universe as a whole is not, since it is not a part of anything else. In both cases, though, I do not see any manner of verifying it. It's either too little or too big for our size and reach to make an absolute statement of fact. In this case, at least so far, the best we can do is presume.

Another thing that is not a holon is a ~human being~. You might think that human beings can be regarded as "parts" of a family or a society.

Actually, I don't understand why you left out biology. One human being is a member of a species. That species as a whole cannot be or do anything other than what it does. It has a specific identity. For instance, it cannot reproduce a dinosaur through a member. It cannot reproduce a rock. It only reproduces other human beings. I do not hold to the view that a human being is an independent being without any hierarchical connection whatsoever to existence, a singular blob floating around the universe, so to speak. As souls (egos or whatever you want to call the "I"), we are singular in the sense that we have individual volition. But as animals, all human beings have the same biological nature. That indicates a higher system biologically speaking than the individual, who is a whole within that whole. And even on an ego level, my spiritual construction has much more in common with other human beings than with birds, for instance, starting with a conceptual faculty—one that works in an identical manner to others. I definitely see some kind of system there.

As to treating a human being as a holon within a society, I view this as an intellectual construction, not a biological one or even a metaphysical one. (Hermits exist, for instance.) The reason this intellectual construction crops up is that I believe our minds mirror our biology and the mind usually goes there as a starting reference point, barring any other type of identification. But that does not identify any real nature for society like a species has. In social terms, it is simply an artificial order used as an approach (as a presumption for further elaboration, so to speak).

I see nothing wrong with using the concept of holon as a metaphor in dealing with society for isolated topics where it works. And I suspect the reason it works where it does is because of the identity of the components involved. To repeat, though, it definitely does not work because society has an individual nature that contains human nature within it in same the manner that exists with species. There are too many exceptions for that to be true.

To put it another way, if all societies ceased to exist, individual human beings could still exist. If the human species ceased to exist, all individual human beings would be wiped out.

Michael