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Roger Bissell

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My Apollo essay-- "Will the Real Apollo Please Stand Up? Rand, Nietzsche, Rand, and the Reason-Emotion Dichotomy" -- was published in the Spring 2009 issue of JARS, which was actually distributed mid-year of 2010, due to continuing serious health problems of the journal's editor and my good friend, Chris Sciabarra.

Parts of the essay received much valuable discussion here on OL, and I subsequently revised it to include a section on dichotomies and to clarify the material on personality type and mental functions (from the Jungian and Myers-Briggs perspectives, which are noticeably less rigorous than that of Objectivism). Thanks to everyone who provided helpful feedback and suggestions.

Here is the abstract for my essay:

The author probes the "Tower of Babel" effect surrounding Western civilization's long-standing fascination with the Greek god Apollo. He clarifies the reason-emotion dichotomy and shows the Classical-Romantic opposition of Apollo and Dionysus, as adopted by Ayn Rand and (supposedly) by Friederich Nietzsche, to be an inaccurate way to characterize either Apollo (god of reason) or Dionysus (god of emotion). Temperament theorist David Keirsey's linkage of Apollo with emotion is found to be similarly wanting, and an argument based on insights of personality type theorist Janet Germane is offered that Apollo instead is most fundamentally the god of intuition.

This essay will appear as a chapter in my forthcoming book True Alternatives, as will two other thematically related essays which have appeared in recent JARS issues, and several others which will appear in forthcoming issues of JARS. (The next essay to be submitted to JARS will probably be "The Logic of Liberty: Aristotle, Ayn Rand, and the Logical Structure of the Political Spectrum.")

For further information, visit the home page of JARS at: http://www.aynrandstudies.com. There you will find information about subscription and back issue prices, as well as a full listing of the contents of back issues.

Best to all,

REB

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You, GHS and Stephen B. are the scholarly jewels of this forum.

From the three of you , I have gotten an additional education.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Subject: Rand was correct on Apollo vs. Dionysus

> the Classical-Romantic opposition of Apollo and Dionysus, as adopted by Ayn Rand and (supposedly) by Friederich Nietzsche, to be an inaccurate way to characterize either Apollo (god of reason) or Dionysus (god of emotion).

Roger, it's a literary metaphor not intended to be literally precise in every respect, only to use one aspect or trait associated with Apollo and one with Dionysus. Or to deny the fact that the Greek gods were composites - over centuries they acquired many traits or aspects. Many of them contradictory. Or at least a grab bag.

(wikipedia - Apollo)

"Apollo has been variously recognized as a god of light and the sun; truth and prophecy; medicine, healing, and plague; music, poetry, and the arts; and more....the leader of the Muses...As god of colonization, Apollo gave oracular guidance on colonies..."

"In literary contexts, Apollo represents harmony, order, and reason—characteristics contrasted with those of Dionysus, god of wine, who represents ecstasy and disorder. The contrast between the roles of these gods is reflected in the adjectives Apollonian and Dionysian. However, the Greeks thought of the two qualities as complementary: the two gods are brothers.."

(wikipedia - Dionysus)

"Dionysus (pronounced /ˌdaɪəˈnaɪsəs/ dye-ə-NYE-səs; Greek: Διόνυσος, Dionysos) was the god of the grape harvest, winemaking and wine, of ritual madness and ecstasy....He is a god of epiphany...In its fully developed form, his central cult imagery shows his triumphant, disorderly arrival or return, as if from some place beyond the borders of the known and civilized. "

Rand, of course, draws on the associations that have accreted in the western tradition. An not just Nietzsche.

For a most dramatic confirmation of the view of Dionysus held by the classical Greeks -themselves-, Roger, have you read Euripide's "Bacchae" and its characterization of Dionysus and his besotted, crazed followers?

Edited by Philip Coates
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Subject: Rand was correct on Apollo vs. Dionysus

> the Classical-Romantic opposition of Apollo and Dionysus, as adopted by Ayn Rand and (supposedly) by Friederich Nietzsche, to be an inaccurate way to characterize either Apollo (god of reason) or Dionysus (god of emotion).

Roger, it's a literary metaphor not intended to be literally precise in every respect, only to use one aspect or trait associated with Apollo and one with Dionysus. Or to deny the fact that the Greek gods were composites - over centuries they acquired many traits or aspects. Many of them contradictory. Or at least a grab bag.

(wikipedia - Apollo)

"Apollo has been variously recognized as a god of light and the sun; truth and prophecy; medicine, healing, and plague; music, poetry, and the arts; and more....the leader of the Muses...As god of colonization, Apollo gave oracular guidance on colonies..."

"In literary contexts, Apollo represents harmony, order, and reason—characteristics contrasted with those of Dionysus, god of wine, who represents ecstasy and disorder. The contrast between the roles of these gods is reflected in the adjectives Apollonian and Dionysian. However, the Greeks thought of the two qualities as complementary: the two gods are brothers.."

(wikipedia - Dionysus)

"Dionysus (pronounced /ˌdaɪəˈnaɪsəs/ dye-ə-NYE-səs; Greek: Διόνυσος, Dionysos) was the god of the grape harvest, winemaking and wine, of ritual madness and ecstasy....He is a god of epiphany...In its fully developed form, his central cult imagery shows his triumphant, disorderly arrival or return, as if from some place beyond the borders of the known and civilized. "

Rand, of course, draws on the associations that have accreted in the western tradition. An not just Nietzsche.

For a most dramatic confirmation of the view of Dionysus held by the classical Greeks -themselves-, Roger, have you read Euripide's "Bacchae" and its characterization of Dionysus and his besotted, crazed followers?

I certainly have, Phil. But I don't see Dionysus himself being portrayed as "besotted" or "crazed." Actually, while he sounds rather witty and sarcastic and provocative a good deal of the time, he also urges calmness at least twice in the dialogue. (He ~did~ scourge and drive mad his aunts who had betrayed him and his mother. They're sort of anti-Muses -- no pun intended -- in contrast to the serene, gentle spirits for whom Dionysus's half-brother Apollo was the overseer.)

For that matter, I can find passages in other works that depict Apollo as petty and vengeful, overcome by emotion, in ways I could not detect regarding Dionysus in Euripides's play.

I say this not to prove a contrary thesis (that Apollo is the god of emotion and disorder, while Dionysus is the god of reason, calmness, and order), but that neither reason and emotion, nor order and disorder are the ~primaries~ regarding these two Greek gods -- and that Rand bought into a false historical stereotype in her essay, especially in characterizing Nietzsche's portrayal of Apollo.

Now, fair is fair, Phil. Have ~you~ read ~my~ essay in JARS? (For that matter, have you read ~any~ essays in ~any~ issue of JARS? Chris's journal is very worthy, even the issues in which my essays don't appear <g>, and it is the only Rand-related journal or publication I'm aware of that is not under the thumb of one of the two orthodox Objectivist organizations. A place for independent Objectivists to publish -- a place worthy of your support.)

Sure, it's OK to critique the ~abstract~ of my essay. It's there to provide a capsule summary of my thesis, and you certainly challenge it head-on. But I think you're wrong to defend what Rand did. She misrepresented both Apollo ~and~ Nietzsche (~and~ Dionysus), in the process of making a ~valid~ point about reason vs. ~irrational~ emotion. I just don't think that the thematic ends justify the literary means in Rand's Apollo/Dionysus essay.

Nor, for that matter, do I think the thematic ends justify the literary means in her distortion of the Atlas myth in her novel. It was ~Heracles~ who "shrugged", not Atlas. Heracles offered to hold up the earth, heavens, or whatever, in return for Atlas's running an errand for him. When Atlas didn't reassume his former burden, Heracles did what any rational, self-interested individual would do. He shrugged. "Heracles Shrugged" -- hey, it's got a nice ring to it!

By the way, I pointed out the Atlas/Heracles bit in my essay, too, Phil. Again, I encourage you to buy that back issue of JARS (Spring 2009, Vol. 10, No. 2) and read the essay. A well-informed, thoughtful critique of it would be most interesting to read, and you're just the guy that could do it, so why not get busy and write one and submit it to Chris? I'm sure he'd welcome it with open arms. (And then I'd get to write ~another~ piece for JARS in reply. :-)

Best,

REB

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Roger,

At Phil's request, I mailed him three back issues of the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies some time ago.

I assume Phil received them, but he has not commented on them, either in any private communication with me or on this site.

Robert Campbell

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Roger,

At Phil's request, I mailed him three back issues of the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies some time ago.

I assume Phil received them, but he has not commented on them, either in any private communication with me or on this site.

Robert Campbell

Robert, that was quite generous of you. Are you aware that Phil relocated not long ago from California to Florida (I think to help take care of his mother)? I'm assuming he's still there. Perhaps there was a slip-up in the mail.

Or, perhaps Phil hasn't yet gotten through the large number of abstracts posted on the JARS web site. :-)

Phil, you there, buddy?

REB

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  • 1 year later...

Roger Bissell details the relationship of his view of the objective to Rand’s in “Ayn Rand and ‘The Objective’” (2007). I thought it might be of interest to indicate some of his somewhat different relationship to Descartes (1596–1650).

Bissell notes that “medieval Scholastic philosophers defined the term ‘objective’: being an object before the mind. (‘Object’ is late Middle English from the medieval Latin objectum, meaning ‘thing presented to the mind’.)” Bissell’s variant of this notion is what he calls the existentially objective, “that which pertains to an aspect of existence insofar as it is held as the object of consciousness” (65). Descartes uses a variant of this notion of the objective in his third Meditation and in his first set of Replies. In the latter, he writes that “objective being in the intellect” means

the object’s being in the intellect in the way in which objects are normally there. By this I mean that the idea of the sun is the sun existing in the intellect—not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e. in the way in which objects are normally in the intellect. Now this mode of being is of course much less perfect than that possessed by things which exist outside the intellect . . . . (102–3)

In the third Meditation, Descartes says we have two “ideas” (forms of awareness) of the sun in us. The perceptual one tells us the sun is small; the intellectual one, the one from astronomical reasoning, tells us the sun is very large, even larger than the earth (39). It is the intellectual one that counts for an objective reality.

Bissell applies the notion of the existentially objective not only to the sun as in the intellect, but to the sun as we perceive it (72–79). He holds to the Objectivist view that there are automatic cognitions we call perception, which are always true, unlike our perceptual judgments, which can be in error. Descartes held that view as well. He took it that the reason we err in judgment is that we let our will outrun or understanding. An example would be the judgment from perception that the sun is small in comparison to earthly things. The reason Descartes would not count our perception of the sun as an objective reality is not because our sensory perception of the sun (short of judgment) errs, but because the percept is obscure and confused, not clear and distinct. However the perception itself engages the formal reality of the sun—and it does in a feeble way—we do not attain objective reality of the sun in it (see further, Carriero 2009, 157–59). Rejecting that view of the percept, one can count the sun in the percept as an objective reality alongside the sun in the intellect.

In the Cartesian view, the objective realities in our minds must be cognitively caused by formal realities; the former signify the latter. Descartes’ view is brought around to Bissell’s by applying that principle not only to sun in the intellect, but in the percept (cf. Carriero 2009, 187–88).

With Aristotle in our background, we might expect something called a formal reality to be the form component of external objects, which is able to pass into the perceptual system, thence into intellect. But Descartes had cast out Aristotelian form-matter composites as well as the Aristotelian view of knowledge as assimilation of forms. He had dropped also the medieval view that external objects give off intelligible species for reception in the intellect. Nevertheless, like his notion and name objective realities, Descartes’ notion and name formal realities is descended from Scholasticism. The sun’s formal reality is the sun itself, and in Descartes’ view, particularly as interpreted and amplified by Arnauld (1612–94), formal realities are the target of objective realities. (See further, Yolton 1984.)

I will try to write a further note here in the future, on Descartes-Arnauld and Bissell’s “Mind, Introspection, and ‘The Objective’” (2008). Hope these days you are working on your book, Roger.

References

Carriero, J. 2009. Between Two Worlds – A Reading of Descartes’ Meditations. Princeton.

Descartes, R. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy and Objections and Replies. In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, translators. Cambridge.

Yolton, J. W. 1984. Perceptual Acquaintance – From Descartes to Reid. Minnesota.

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  • 3 weeks later...

Roger Bissell details the relationship of his view of the objective to Rand’s in “Ayn Rand and ‘The Objective’” (2007). I thought it might be of interest to indicate some of his somewhat different relationship to Descartes (1596–1650).

Bissell notes that “medieval Scholastic philosophers defined the term ‘objective’: being an object before the mind. (‘Object’ is late Middle English from the medieval Latin objectum, meaning ‘thing presented to the mind’.)” Bissell’s variant of this notion is what he calls the existentially objective, “that which pertains to an aspect of existence insofar as it is held as the object of consciousness” (65). Descartes uses a variant of this notion of the objective in his third Meditation and in his first set of Replies. In the latter, he writes that “objective being in the intellect” means

the object’s being in the intellect in the way in which objects are normally there. By this I mean that the idea of the sun is the sun existing in the intellect—not of course formally existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e. in the way in which objects are normally in the intellect. Now this mode of being is of course much less perfect than that possessed by things which exist outside the intellect . . . . (102–3)

In the third Meditation, Descartes says we have two “ideas” (forms of awareness) of the sun in us. The perceptual one tells us the sun is small; the intellectual one, the one from astronomical reasoning, tells us the sun is very large, even larger than the earth (39). It is the intellectual one that counts for an objective reality.

Bissell applies the notion of the existentially objective not only to the sun as in the intellect, but to the sun as we perceive it (72–79). He holds to the Objectivist view that there are automatic cognitions we call perception, which are always true, unlike our perceptual judgments, which can be in error. Descartes held that view as well. He took it that the reason we err in judgment is that we let our will outrun or understanding. An example would be the judgment from perception that the sun is small in comparison to earthly things. The reason Descartes would not count our perception of the sun as an objective reality is not because our sensory perception of the sun (short of judgment) errs, but because the percept is obscure and confused, not clear and distinct. However the perception itself engages the formal reality of the sun—and it does in a feeble way—we do not attain objective reality of the sun in it (see further, Carriero 2009, 157–59). Rejecting that view of the percept, one can count the sun in the percept as an objective reality alongside the sun in the intellect.

In the Cartesian view, the objective realities in our minds must be cognitively caused by formal realities; the former signify the latter. Descartes’ view is brought around to Bissell’s by applying that principle not only to sun in the intellect, but in the percept (cf. Carriero 2009, 187–88).

With Aristotle in our background, we might expect something called a formal reality to be the form component of external objects, which is able to pass into the perceptual system, thence into intellect. But Descartes had cast out Aristotelian form-matter composites as well as the Aristotelian view of knowledge as assimilation of forms. He had dropped also the medieval view that external objects give off intelligible species for reception in the intellect. Nevertheless, like his notion and name objective realities, Descartes’ notion and name formal realities is descended from Scholasticism. The sun’s formal reality is the sun itself, and in Descartes’ view, particularly as interpreted and amplified by Arnauld (1612–94), formal realities are the target of objective realities. (See further, Yolton 1984.)

I will try to write a further note here in the future, on Descartes-Arnauld and Bissell’s “Mind, Introspection, and ‘The Objective’” (2008). Hope these days you are working on your book, Roger.

References

Carriero, J. 2009. Between Two Worlds – A Reading of Descartes’ Meditations. Princeton.

Descartes, R. 1641. Meditations on First Philosophy and Objections and Replies. In The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch, translators. Cambridge.

Yolton, J. W. 1984. Perceptual Acquaintance – From Descartes to Reid. Minnesota.

Thanks for your fascinating comments, Stephen! When you get a chance, please also comment, if you would, on Note 28 in this essay, where I delve into the parallels between Kant's views and Rand's trichotomy.

I am indeed working on a book (The Logic of Liberty and Other Essays) applying the tetrachotomy methodology to various philosophical topics, and at this point, it is about 80% finished, with an anticipated length of about 300-350 pages. However, it is growing and spreading like kudzu, and I may have to split it into three "smaller" books!

Best,

REB

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Roger, here are some quick thoughts this morning on Note 28, whose topic could be developed into a major study.

For an epistemological trichotomy parallel between Kant and Rand, the fit seems poor at the pole of the intrinsic: Kant has it that the noumenon has whatever character it has, and whatever that is, it is unknowable to us (benignly unknowable; false leads of cognition and consequences of them are all phenomenal in our earthly existence). In Rand’s view, there is nothing unknowable to the human mind. Things as they are are as they are, and things as they are are knowable to us (cf. epsilon . . . iota . . .).

The fit seems poor at the pole of the subject: Kant has his forms of outer sense (space and time) and his form of inner sense (time) as coming from dark depths of the subject, whereas Rand takes them to be in existence available for apprehension in perception and conception. Kant would dispute the claim that in his view “the structure of the mind determines the content of knowledge.” He would say, “No, only the forms; the content comes from sensation.” The differences between Kant’s notion of forms of sensory intuition (bringing into account his distinction between sensory intuition and perception) and Rand’s notion of perceptual form (Kelley) needs to be sorted out. Similarly, the differences between Kant’s notion of forms of the understanding (categories and principles) and Rand’s notion of the conceptual form of awareness (Peikoff) needs to be sorted out. For this latter sorting, I would look into not only Kant’s general doctrine, but into his particular categories and principles of the understanding for comparison with Rand. I anticipate that some of them are from the side of Rand’s conceiving subject, but many are not (e.g. existence and causality).

Radical problems for Kant at those poles render his and Rand’s conception of the objective substantially different. In what ways concepts generally, as well as philosophic categories (entity, action, attribute, relation) and philosophic axioms, are objective according to Rand can be compared to the way Kant thinks his categories and principles are objective. If you dig into this further, I would recommend letting go of Kemp Smith and getting the Pluhar (or Guyer) translation, with its very helpful index and translation notes.

Caspar Theobald Tourtual (1802–1865) was a visual physiologist and psychologist. He was a perceptual realist, not a transcendental idealist. He regarded his major work (1827) “as a physiological contribution to Kantian theory of the senses” (quoted in Hatfield 1990, 143). Tourtual divided theory of the human senses into two parts: physiological and transcendental. The latter did not coincide with Kant’s concept transcendental, but had as common general concern the side of the subject. Tourtual means by transcendental, as quoted by Gary Hatfield: “metaphysical consideration of the content of our sensory representations, insofar as this content is preformed in [the faculty of] sensibility, through the generation and development of life, preceding all external influence” (145). I’m unsure how Tourtual would assimilate the finding in our own time that without appropriate sensory experience during critical periods of development, the visual system (in kittens, but surely in us too) will not develop, and the animal will be blind. But I wanted to give Tourtual’s picture of what he was doing in the transcendental wing of his work, for the sake of the following excerpt from Hatfield’s The Natural and the Normative. (Substitute intrinsic for objective; substitute objective for middle.)

The second relevant piece of Tourtual’s “transcendental” ruminations pertains to his general orientation toward the metaphysics and epistemology of sensory perception. Tourtual himself identified three basic positions in the history of philosophical consideration of the senses—the objective, subjective, and “middle” standpoints—which he identified with three metaphysical theories of truth (xxxiii-xl). The objective standpoint he identified with empiricism, which he characterized as the view that objects directly cause sensory representations and are thereby presented immediately to the mind without any significant contribution on the part of the knowing subject. The subjective standpoint he identified with rationalism, which he characterized as the view that the mind constructs the world; he placed Kant’s transcendental idealism under this rubric. The middle way, which Tourtual claimed for his own, gives a role to both subject and object in the production of sensory representations. (145–46)

I don’t want to leave the impression that Tourtual’s middle position coincides, when studied in more of its specifics, with a Randian objective status of perception in a trichotomy of perceptual theories. And I don’t want to leave the impression that Tourtual had an adequate understanding of Kant. I have displayed only that Tourtual came explicitly to an epistemic trichotomy in broad terms parallel what could pass for a Randian one when hers is applied to perception (counter her theory in one cleavable respect, as you stress). If Kant’s theory of sensory perception and intuition is to be placed in the trichotomy, it is I expect to be placed where Tourtual placed it. I would suggest that all the forms of idealism (Berkelean and German [& subsequent British] idealism; with question of subjective classification of Rationalists left open for decision under class formula) should be studied, supposed as in the subjective class, and should guide one’s making formula for classifying theories of perception as subjective (meaning from the side of the subject), therewith reaching most basic and precise criteria for a triple division historically, informing possibilities and fine distinctions for best craft of a triple division analytically.

Stephen

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Roger, here are some quick thoughts this morning on Note 28, whose topic could be developed into a major study.

For an epistemological trichotomy parallel between Kant and Rand, the fit seems poor at the pole of the intrinsic: Kant has it that the noumenon has whatever character it has, and whatever that is, it is unknowable to us (benignly unknowable; false leads of cognition and consequences of them are all phenomenal in our earthly existence). In Rand’s view, there is nothing unknowable to the human mind. Things as they are are as they are, and things as they are are knowable to us (cf. epsilon . . . iota . . .).

The fit seems poor at the pole of the subject: Kant has his forms of outer sense (space and time) and his form of inner sense (time) as coming from dark depths of the subject, whereas Rand takes them to be in existence available for apprehension in perception and conception. Kant would dispute the claim that in his view “the structure of the mind determines the content of knowledge.” He would say, “No, only the forms; the content comes from sensation.” The differences between Kant’s notion of forms of sensory intuition (bringing into account his distinction between sensory intuition and perception) and Rand’s notion of perceptual form (Kelley) needs to be sorted out. Similarly, the differences between Kant’s notion of forms of the understanding (categories and principles) and Rand’s notion of the conceptual form of awareness (Peikoff) needs to be sorted out. For this latter sorting, I would look into not only Kant’s general doctrine, but into his particular categories and principles of the understanding for comparison with Rand. I anticipate that some of them are from the side of Rand’s conceiving subject, but many are not (e.g. existence and causality).

Radical problems for Kant at those poles render his and Rand’s conception of the objective substantially different. In what ways concepts generally, as well as philosophic categories (entity, action, attribute, relation) and philosophic axioms, are objective according to Rand can be compared to the way Kant thinks his categories and principles are objective. If you dig into this further, I would recommend letting go of Kemp Smith and getting the Pluhar (or Guyer) translation, with its very helpful index and translation notes.

Caspar Theobald Tourtual (1802–1865) was a visual physiologist and psychologist. He was a perceptual realist, not a transcendental idealist. He regarded his major work (1827) “as a physiological contribution to Kantian theory of the senses” (quoted in Hatfield 1990, 143). Tourtual divided theory of the human senses into two parts: physiological and transcendental. The latter did not coincide with Kant’s concept transcendental, but had as common general concern the side of the subject. Tourtual means by transcendental, as quoted by Gary Hatfield: “metaphysical consideration of the content of our sensory representations, insofar as this content is preformed in [the faculty of] sensibility, through the generation and development of life, preceding all external influence” (145). I’m unsure how Tourtual would assimilate the finding in our own time that without appropriate sensory experience during critical periods of development, the visual system (in kittens, but surely in us too) will not develop, and the animal will be blind. But I wanted to give Tourtual’s picture of what he was doing in the transcendental wing of his work, for the sake of the following excerpt from Hatfield’s The Natural and the Normative. (Substitute intrinsic for objective; substitute objective for middle.)

The second relevant piece of Tourtual’s “transcendental” ruminations pertains to his general orientation toward the metaphysics and epistemology of sensory perception. Tourtual himself identified three basic positions in the history of philosophical consideration of the senses—the objective, subjective, and “middle” standpoints—which he identified with three metaphysical theories of truth (xxxiii-xl). The objective standpoint he identified with empiricism, which he characterized as the view that objects directly cause sensory representations and are thereby presented immediately to the mind without any significant contribution on the part of the knowing subject. The subjective standpoint he identified with rationalism, which he characterized as the view that the mind constructs the world; he placed Kant’s transcendental idealism under this rubric. The middle way, which Tourtual claimed for his own, gives a role to both subject and object in the production of sensory representations. (145–46)

I don’t want to leave the impression that Tourtual’s middle position coincides, when studied in more of its specifics, with a Randian objective status of perception in a trichotomy of perceptual theories. And I don’t want to leave the impression that Tourtual had an adequate understanding of Kant. I have displayed only that Tourtual came explicitly to an epistemic trichotomy in broad terms parallel what could pass for a Randian one when hers is applied to perception (counter her theory in one cleavable respect, as you stress). If Kant’s theory of sensory perception and intuition is to be placed in the trichotomy, it is I expect to be placed where Tourtual placed it. I would suggest that all the forms of idealism (Berkelean and German [& subsequent British] idealism; with question of subjective classification of Rationalists left open for decision under class formula) should be studied, supposed as in the subjective class, and should guide one’s making formula for classifying theories of perception as subjective (meaning from the side of the subject), therewith reaching most basic and precise criteria for a triple division historically, informing possibilities and fine distinctions for best craft of a triple division analytically.

Stephen

Awesome, thoughtful comments, Stephen--thanks! The related material from my philosophy of mind JARS essay will definitely be informed and I hope improved by what you have generously shared here.

And by all means, keep us posted, in case you embark on the study you alluded to above!

Best,

REB

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  • 5 months later...

This note joins #57 and the block quote below.

Roger is correct more than he realized or said concerning the objectivity of a percept (pp. 72–81). He recognized that a percept is a relation between a subject and an object accessed in the percept. Something similar that pattern can be said of the sensations giving rise to the percept. They are physical things as affecting our receptors and as affecting inputs to the brain. But there is also a normative character to a percept that sensations do not possess unless they themselves become our percept. Every percept is a provider of (i) reasons for certain beliefs and not others and (ii) reasons for certain actions and not others.

So percepts are norms, not only presentations of reality. Their normativity is broader than its bearing on a particular judgment based on them or a particular action based on them. A percept is a normative base for multiple possible correct or incorrect judgments or actions.

Judgments and their concepts, and some actions too, are volitional selections over percepts (or over inner life). They have a more determinate and plain relation to correctness or incorrectness, a normativity come to particular bloom, the normativity fastened upon by Peikoff, Rand, and many other philosophers.

For much lead to the new insight of this note, I am indebted to Charles Larmore’s The Practices of the Self (2010, 79).

Background

. . .

−Objectivity−

Rand's most elementary sense of the concept objective is the sense of ordinary parlance. This is the sense she talks of when explaining why she has chosen Objectivism as the name of her philosophy. She credits Aristotle as the first to correctly define "the basic principle of a rational view of existence and of man's consciousness: that there is only one reality, the one man perceives—that it exists as an objective absolute (which means: independently of the consciousness, the wishes, or the feelings of any perceiver)" [FNI 22].

In 1965 Rand published two refinements of her concept of objectivity. Early in the year, she wrote:

Objectivity is both a metaphysical and an epistemological concept. It pertains to the relationship of consciousness to existence. Metaphysically, it is the recognition of the fact that reality exists independent of any perceiver's consciousness. Epistemologically, it is the recognition of the fact that a perceiver's (man's) consciousness must acquire knowledge of reality by certain means (reason) in accordance with certain rules (logic). (FAE 18)

Later that year, Rand refined her concept of objectivity further. In the context of discussing objectivity in moral values, she observed that

There are, in essence, three schools of thought on the nature of the good: the intrinsic, the subjective, and the objective. The intrinsic theory holds that the good is inherent in certain things or actions as such, . . . regardless of a benefit or injury they cause to the actors and subjects involved.

The subjectivist theory holds that the good bears no relation to the facts of reality, that it is a product of a man's consciousness, created by his feelings.

The intrinsic theory holds that the good resides in some sort of reality, independent of man's consciousness; the subjectivist theory holds that the good resides in man's consciousness, independent of reality.

The objective theory holds that the good is neither an attribute of "things in themselves" nor of man's emotional states, but an evaluation of the facts of reality by man's consciousness according to a rational standard of value. . . . The objective theory holds that the good is an aspect of reality in relation to man. (WC 21–22)

By the following year, it was clear that Rand envisioned a broadened role for the intrinsicist-subjectivist-objectivist way of locating her philosophic theories in relation to others. She applied the tripartition to the theory of concepts and universals. Concepts, for Rand, can be objective and should be objective. Such concepts are "produced by man's consciousness in accordance with the facts of reality, as mental integrations of factual data computed by man—as products of a cognitive method of classification whose processes must be formed by man, but whose content is dictated by reality" [ITOE 54]. Rand's conception of concepts (and definitions and essence and . . .) and her conception of the good can be rightly characterized as (i) objective with Rand's metaphysical-epistemological faces of the objective relation and, at the same time, as (ii) objective within Rand's intrinsicist-subjectivist-objectivist tripartition.

At this time (1966–67), Rand thinks that (as Roger has stressed) "the dichotomy of 'intrinsic or subjective' has played havoc with this issue [of universals] as it has with every other issue involving the relationship of consciousness to existence" [ITOE 53]. That would certainly seem to include the relationship of sensory perception to existence. In what ways has the dichotomy of intrinsic-or-subjective played havoc in understanding the nature of perception? Should perception have the status objective in Rand's tripartition? There is fertile ground here, waiting for growers.

−An Objectivity in Perception−

Rand's metaphysical sense of objectivity proclaims the recognition of the mind-independence of existence in the relationship of existence and consciousness. Her epistemological sense of objectivity proclaims recognition of the mind's dependence on logical identification and integration of the evidence of the senses to acquire knowledge of existence [FAE 18]. Both of these senses of objectivity proclaim epistemological and moral norms of volitional, conceptual consciousness.

Like Rand, Roger stresses that every occasion of consciousness has a content. He takes the content to be an aspect of existence insofar as it is held as the object of the action of consciousness. Call that facet of the objective ontological objectivity. A second facet, which Roger's calls cognitive objectivity, is the action of consciousness insofar as it holds as its object an aspect of existence.

Roger's ontological and cognitive senses of the objective relation differ from Rand's metaphysical and epistemological senses of objectivity in three ways. I'll mention two of them.

Firstly, the forms of consciousness to which Roger's ontological and cognitive aspects of the objective relation apply are wider. These aspects apply to all varieties of consciousness, whether or not they are volitional types of consciousness.

Secondly, Roger's ontological and cognitive aspects of the objective are not necessarily norms for conscious rule-following. They are, however, related to norms in the more general engineering-performance sense. Any system having a function has performance norms. Human perception, pleasure and pain, memory, dreams (perhaps), imagination, judgment-level evaluations, and emotions all have functions and performance norms in the human being. Roger's ontological and cognitive aspects of the objective figure into the performance norms of the volitional forms of consciousness, and they figure into the performance norms of perception, of pleasure-pain evaluations, of memories, and, perhaps, of dreams.

. . .

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

PS

Objectivity is a norm of conceptual awareness, of judgments and rational beliefs. But that does not exhaust the normative character of those cognitions. They are also normative in that one ought to act by their light, which is part of the norm of objectivity in deliberate actions. Strictly speaking, one does not have to act by their light, so here too, their normative character pertains to volition. (Perhaps defiance would have to proceed in a roundabout way with oneself---Leibniz smiles, Rand smiles---for I can't imagine someone sincerely trying to walk on water that she sincerely believes is liquid.) In contrast the objectivity of percepts as providing reasons for certain judgments and actions and not others is respected uniformly and without volition in a normally functioning sufficiently mature adult brain.

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  • 1 year later...

UPDATE***UPDATE***UPDATE***UPDATE***UPDATE***UPDATE***UPDATE***UPDATE***UPDATE

Since my last announcement of published essays three years ago, I have had the following pieces published:

1. "The Logic of Liberty: Aristotle, Ayn Rand, and the Logical Structure of the Political Spectrum" - published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Volume 12, No. 1 - Issue 23, August 2012. Here's the abstract of the article: "Analyzing various false alternatives using a technique based on Aristotle's Law of Excluded Middle, the author shows how a system of individual rights and laissez-faire capitalism relates logically to other politico-economic systems and ideologies. He gives special attention to Nolan's two-dimensional diagram of the political spectrum, Rand's critique of conservatism and liberalism, and Rothbard's work on the historical phenomenon of Salutary Neglect and its relationship to fascism, socialism, and laissez-faire. The author also assesses current prospect for liberty, as reflected in such policies as Obamacare and education vouchers."

2. "Rejoinder to Dennis C. Hardin: A Guide for the Perplexed" - published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Volume 13, No. 1 - Issue 25, July 2013. Abstract: "The author reiterates his thesis that the motivation for power lust in liberals, conservatives, and totalitarians cannot be explained by "metaphysical importance" (or even, as per Hardin's suggestion, "superior metaphysical importance") of economic or noneconomic activity per se, but only by the metaphysical fear that voluntary action in one or both of these realms evokes in statists of whatever stripe. Rand actually made both of these arguments, but only the latter has psychological explanatory power and plausibility in terms of Rand's discussion of the benevolent and malevolent universe premises, and thus is to be preferred over the former."

3. "Beneath The DIM Hypothesis: The Logical Structure of Leonard Peikoff's Analysis of Cultural Evolution" - published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies, Volume 13, No. 2 - Issue 26, December 2013. Abstract: "Dismissing criticisms that Leonard Peikoff's book, The DIM Hypothesis, is unscientific, deterministic, or rationalistic, this essay focuses on problems with the logical framework of Peikoff's study of Western culture. In particular, Peikoff has conflated two different kinds of rationalists and empiricists and has completely overlooked combinations of the Platonist and so-called "Kantian" modes. As a result, his three pure integration "modes" actually produce not just two "mixtures" but a total of six. Furthermore, without absolving Kant of very serious philosophical errors, the author marshals evidence that the real culprit responsible for the culturally disastrous "Disintegration" mode was one of Kant's predecessors.

I have *three more* essays in the pipeline, which I will formally announce in a followup post later this year. One is a bibliographical essay about Barbara Branden, which is due out this summer in Volume 14, No. 1 of JARS, which will be followed by an essay on proposition theory in December in Volume 14, No. 2 of JARS. In addition, I submitted to Reason Papers for their symposium an essay entitled "The 'Metaphysical' Nature of Emergency Situations and its Manifestation in Ethics and Politics." It is related to my Logic of Liberty essay in JARS, but also to numerous online discussions over the years about "disappearing rights."

More soon...REB

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  • 5 months later...

Roger, congratulations on the vista you have reached in your very substantial essay “What’s in Your File Folder?” in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (Dec. 2014). I hope to make a few short remarks, in this thread, on the first two Parts of your essay in the coming days or weeks. For now I thought you might like to hear remarks of Allan Gotthelf in a letter to me, in April 1992, which pertain to your endnote 16. He is remarking on my essay “Capturing Concepts” in Objectivity (1990) when he writes:

I would question only your treatment of descriptive phrases as standing for concepts, e.g. “the prime numbers among the counting numbers from 1 to 1000,” rather than as Rand called them “qualified instances.” If concepts are mental units in a primary way, and mental units can be retained (at this level of abstraction) only by means of verbal units that can be held and manipulated as units, the parts of which do not signify parts of the mental unit, then a descriptive phrase would need to be condensed to a small manageable unit—effectively a word or very short phrase that functions as a word—for one to have retained a concept. Rand used to give the example of how the description “Conceptual Common Denominator” became a concept when it came to be abbreviated “CCD.” (See ITOE, 2nd ed., p.177. [i was in fact Professor B.]) Introspectively, that seems absolutely right to me.

I would caution that CCD could evoke its concept for one only when it has come to evoke the same engaged meaning of Conceptual Common Denominator in use in statements one is fully comprehending. It would not be enough to have become skilled in actually thinking right meaning when using Conceptual Common Denominator, but to doze away from that same meaning when using CCD, in effect using CCD not with the same engaged meaning, but as a marker for a meaning one knows one could get to if one thought the words behind the acronym. This delicacy is special to economy through acronyms; I don't think it is such a problem for word phrases condensed to shorter phrases.

Thinking of it these years later, I imagine the condensation of my specification prime numbers among the counting numbers from 1 to 1000, which I had counted as a concept in "Capturing Concepts," to a concept verbally terse enough for Rand would be simply primes to 1000 or prime1000 or P1000 (for the kids who have gotten handy with the concept of prime anyway).

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  • 1 month later...

Stephen, I don't know how I missed this post until just now, but thank you for the kind words, and I look forward to reading your comments on my essay. Your thoughts and suggestions are always welcome.

BTW, since "What's in Your File Folder?" was published in December, I have turned in a manuscript entitled "Where There's a Will, There's a "Why?" - A Critique of the Objectivist Theory of Volition" for the July 2015 issue of JARS -- and I'm about 40 pages into the manuscript of Part II of "What's in Your File Folder?", which focuses on the dual-aspect of the "objective" and how it applies throughout Rand's epistemology, including perception, introspection, concepts, propositions, and arguments. I think that once I'm done shepherding these three pieces through publication, I will turn my attention back to aesthetics, focusing mainly on music.

Best,

REB

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  • 1 month later...

I just finished the manuscripte of Part II of "What's in Your FIle Folder?" and it topped out at 125 pages. Before submitting it to JARS early next month, I'm going to give it a good working-over, with the able assistance of my brainy wife, and maybe whittle it down a bit, plus get rid of some of the jargon and longish sentences I tend to use. :-/

I'm being told that I have more things to write before returning to music aesthetics, in particular a sequel to the volition essay, which has the working title of "None Dare Call It Sacrifice." As might be apparent from the title, I am going to explore some of the logical and semantic issues with Rand's use of the term "sacrifice," based on my assessment that the use of the term by her and others makes no sense, based on her official definition of "value" (that which one acts to gain and/or keep).

REB

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