The Exclusivity of Physical Existence


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The Exclusivity of Physical Existence

by Rafael Eilon

Undoubtedly many subscribers to this forum -- perhaps most -- have gone through a phase when Rand's teaching had dominated their thinking; a phase when they thought that she had all the right answers, and all one had to do was study what she taught. I myself have gone through such a phase, which lasted more than a decade in my case. During that time, my admiration of Rand strongly affected my judgment; and I now think this resulted in a certain degree of blindness.

Such a state of admiration-induced partial blindness is very common, caused by the idolization of an admired teacher. In most cases, however, the teachings of admired teachers have flaws; and gradually, with time, the eyes of even the most ardent admirer usually open to see those flaws.

It took decades, as I said, for my eyes to open to what I consider the most significant flaw in Rand's teaching. At first, I only felt a vague uneasiness when reading her formulation of fundamentals; but with time and learning, my own view gradually took form with increasing clarity and certainty. Let me then get more specific and introduce my subject.

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of Rand's philosophical system is the "Primacy of Existence" principle. The meaning of this principle is supposed to be very simple and axiomatic; in other words, such a key principle is supposed to be a clear and meaningful observation of a self-evident fact. Does the PoE principle answer such a description? I don't think so. (By PoE I mean here the Primacy of Existence principle, not either of Einstein's Principles of Equivalence.) Let me ask you this: when Rand taught us to "check our premises", did she expect us to keep a fundamental premise such as this one immune from checking?

I am quite sure that Rand considered NO premise immune from checking. It is therefore rather alarming to discover how many difficulties arise when this particular premise is exposed to even the simplest logical query. Let me outline some of these difficulties.

1) Primacy in relation to what, and in what sense?

Of course, everyone knows that the primacy is in relation to consciousness. But while it is natural for a believer in the primacy of consciousness to hold that consciousness is external to existence and separate from it, this is not the case for a believer in the primacy of existence. consciousness is a fact _of_ existence ("consciousness has identity", wrote Ayn Rand, who also wrote that "existence is identity; consciousness is identification"), so that "primacy" of existence in relation to consciousness does not mean that consciousness came as an _external_ result of existence, but that it emerged, at some stage of the evolution of existence, as a part of existence itself. Perhaps some forms of the primacy of consciousness are the exact inverse of this (namely, that existence appeared at some stage of the evolution of consciousness); but in both cases, the word "primacy" is not sufficient to describe such a relation.

Appending this clarification to the PoE principle would, I am fairly sure, have met with Rand's agreement (and perhaps its equivalent can be found in OPAR or Peikoff's other presentations, if you look for it specifically). But the axiom raises further questions which readily carry us into "foreign territory"; i.e., they point the way down a logical path that leads away from Objectivism, to views that Rand would (apparently) not endorse. Consider the following:

2) How does consciousness relate to _physical_ existence?

To Rand, consciousness is (apparently) the _antithesis_ of physical existence. Physical existence is causally determined by physical antecedents; consciousness (as Rand has it) is not. Physical existence can be analyzed in terms of basic physical constituents; consciousness (as Rand has it) cannot. Consciousness can study physical existence; physical existence (as Rand has it) cannot study consciousness (or itself). Etc.

This is a form of dualism -- denials notwithstanding. What does this dualism mean when applied to the PoE principle? To understand this, I propose a simple thought experiment. Let us modify the principle by substituting "Physical Existence" for the more general "Existence"; thus we get a principle of the "Primacy of Physical Existence." In the context of such a modified principle, the Objectivist dualism means that the primacy is an _external_ primacy; in other words, it implies that physical existence preceded, and then "gave rise" to, something that is foreign and external to it (namely consciousness); something that arose from physical existence like "a Phoenix from the ashes", and somehow gained a _non-physical_ existence of its own.

3) Isn't it a form of mysticism to believe in any kind of non-physical existence?

Apparently, according to Rand and her avowed followers, it is not. While Rand purports to oppose any form of mysticism, her definition of the term "mysticism" is far from clear; a belief that the "mind" is a non-physical entity certainly doesn't fall under that definition. As far as I can ascertain, Rand believed that the existence of the mind as a non-physical entity was self-evident and irrefutable.

It is at this point that Objectivism and I part ways. To me, the definition of mysticism has become ontological, not merely logical or epistemological: I consider a belief in anything non-physical as mysticism. Consciousness (or "the mind") exists, of course; it is an active capacity of certain physical systems. It evolved physically and it remains physical.

The metaphysical axiom thus loses its hazy appeal and becomes drily clear and simple: "Primacy of Existence" becomes "Exclusivity of Physical Existence." Ever since I became aware of this option, I have been unable to think otherwise. I think an educated person of our day has no excuse for believing otherwise -- and most don't.

I shall leave the logical defense of this position for further discussion. Your comments are welcome.

Rafael Eilon

Edited by Rafael Eilon
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Yes, we can always use a good challenge to our fundamentals, and to our intellectual independence....

First, let's be sure we are talking the same language. In Objectivese, "primacy of existence" is not a chronological primacy, what emerges from what, or the undeniable dependence of consciousness on a living physical brain.

Rand's standing-on-one foot formulation is "wishing won't make it so". The issue is whether our wishes, feelings, doctrines, self-deceptions have direct power to effect existence or achieve knowledge of existence. We know they don't, but sometimes forget. Explicit axioms are there to remind us.

The fact that you can't rebut or question some fundamental without implicitly accepting it does not necessarily show that you're stuck in some blind dogma.

Chuck

Undoubtedly many subscribers to this forum -- perhaps most -- have gone through a phase when Rand's teaching had dominated their thinking; a phase when they thought that she had all the right answers, and all one had to do was study what she taught. I myself have gone through such a phase, which lasted more than a decade in my case. During that time, my admiration of Rand strongly affected my judgment; and I now think this resulted in a certain degree of blindness.

Perhaps the most fundamental principle of Rand's philosophical system is the "Primacy of Existence" principle. The meaning of this principle is supposed to be very simple and axiomatic; Rand considered NO premise immune from checking. ... consciousness is a fact _of_ existence ("consciousness has identity", wrote Ayn Rand, who also wrote that "existence is identity; consciousness is identification"), so that "primacy" of existence in relation to consciousness does not mean that consciousness came as an _external_ result of existence, but that it emerged, at some stage of the evolution of existence, as a part of existence itself.

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Yes, we can always use a good challenge to our fundamentals, and to our intellectual independence....

First, let's be sure we are talking the same language. In Objectivese, "primacy of existence" is not a chronological primacy, what emerges from what, or the undeniable dependence of consciousness on a living physical brain.

Rand's standing-on-one foot formulation is "wishing won't make it so". The issue is whether our wishes, feelings, doctrines, self-deceptions have direct power to effect existence or achieve knowledge of existence. We know they don't, but sometimes forget. Explicit axioms are there to remind us.

The fact that you can't rebut or question some fundamental without implicitly accepting it does not necessarily show that you're stuck in some blind dogma.

Chuck

Hello Chuck,

Thank you for your comment. It is not always possible or desirable to discuss things "on one foot." I suggest that we keep both feet down. Your comment deals only with the everyday implications of the Primacy of Existence principle, not with its meaning in a broader philosophical context. The fact that "wishing won't make it so" is only an end consequence; it might be enough if you use the principle to rebut a "wishful thinker," but not when you deal with systematic approaches such as religious creationism, or the Idealism of Bishop Berkeley, or Kant's Categories.

In such broader contexts, we must ask why "wishing won't make it so"; and a satisfactory answer must involve a discussion of causal relations between parts of existence. In such contexts, the PoE principle also does relate to which part preceded which and how the second part came into being.

My point in starting this discussion is not so much to re-formulate the Primacy of Existence principle; it is to understand the essentials about how physical existence and human consciousness relate to one another; which is not an "on one foot" endeavor.

If "wishing won't make it so" were the whole content of the Objectivist view of the relation between existence and consciousness, I would make no comment. As it happens, the Objectivist literature contains much more on this subject; I am trying to address the more technical aspects of this content. In particular, I challenge the doctrine that consciousness involves anything non-physical.

I enjoyed reading your comment.

Rafael

Edited by Rafael Eilon
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2) How does consciousness relate to _physical_ existence?

To Rand, consciousness is (apparently) the _antithesis_ of physical existence. Physical existence is causally determined by physical antecedents; consciousness (as Rand has it) is not. Physical existence can be analyzed in terms of basic physical constituents; consciousness (as Rand has it) cannot.

Where does Rand state this dualism? This does not fit Rand's view of the relation between consciousness and physical existence as I understand it. I think she might have said that consciousness and physical existence share a common foundation, a common underlying reality. They might be considered different integrations of a common stuff. See Roger's post here.

Roger quotes NB: "Rand shared my view, as expressed in the brief passage in Living Consciously, and she called that "underlying reality" by the name of 'little stuff.'"

As Roger notes, in The Art of Living Consciously NB writes:

Metaphysically, mind and matter are different. But if they are different in every respect, the problem of explaining their interaction seems insuperable. How can mind influence matter and matter influence mind if they have absolutely nothing in common? And yet, that such reciprocal influence exists seems inescapable...Without going into details, I will suggest a possible way out. There is nothing inherently illogical—nothing that contradicts the rest of our knowledge—in positing some underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations. The advantage of such a hypothesis is that it provides a means to resolve a problem that has troubled philosophers for centuries—"the mind-body problem," the problem of accounting for the interaction of consciousness and physical reality. If they have a common source, then they do have a point of commonality that makes their ability to interact less puzzling. How we would test this hypothesis, or provide justification for it, is another question.' (Branden 1997, 201-2)

For my part, I am in agreement with this view. And I see no reason to believe Rand would disagree with what NB says.

Paul

(Edit: It would be more precise to compare matter and consciousness. While matter and mind are clearly distinct, an underlying physical reality common to both cannot currently be ruled out.)

Edited by Paul Mawdsley
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2) How does consciousness relate to _physical_ existence?

To Rand, consciousness is (apparently) the _antithesis_ of physical existence. Physical existence is causally determined by physical antecedents; consciousness (as Rand has it) is not. Physical existence can be analyzed in terms of basic physical constituents; consciousness (as Rand has it) cannot.

Where does Rand state this dualism? This does not fit Rand's view of the relation between consciousness and physical existence as I understand it. I think she might have said that consciousness and physical existence share a common foundation, a common underlying reality. They might be considered different integrations of a common stuff. See Roger's post here.

Roger quotes NB: "Rand shared my view, as expressed in the brief passage in Living Consciously, and she called that "underlying reality" by the name of 'little stuff.'"

As Roger notes, in The Art of Living Consciously NB writes:

Metaphysically, mind and matter are different. But if they are different in every respect, the problem of explaining their interaction seems insuperable. How can mind influence matter and matter influence mind if they have absolutely nothing in common? And yet, that such reciprocal influence exists seems inescapable...Without going into details, I will suggest a possible way out. There is nothing inherently illogical—nothing that contradicts the rest of our knowledge—in positing some underlying reality of which both matter and consciousness are manifestations. The advantage of such a hypothesis is that it provides a means to resolve a problem that has troubled philosophers for centuries—"the mind-body problem," the problem of accounting for the interaction of consciousness and physical reality. If they have a common source, then they do have a point of commonality that makes their ability to interact less puzzling. How we would test this hypothesis, or provide justification for it, is another question.' (Branden 1997, 201-2)

For my part, I am in agreement with this view. And I see no reason to believe Rand would disagree with what NB says.

Paul

(Edit: It would be more precise to compare matter and consciousness. While matter and mind are clearly distinct, an underlying physical reality common to both cannot currently be ruled out.)

Hello Paul,

Thank you for your post and for the very valuable pointers. I am working (part time) on my reply. Please expect it in a day or two. I appreciate your interest.

Best regards,

Rafael

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Checking Rand’s Axioms

Rafael,

You write: “Perhaps the most fundamental principle of Rand’s philosophical system is the ‘Primacy of Existence’ principle. The meaning of this principle is supposed to be very simple and axiomatic; in other words, such a key principle is supposed to be a clear and meaningful observation of a self-evident fact. . . . I am quite sure that Rand considered NO premise immune from checking . . . [even] this particular premise.”

The earliest place in which I find Rand using the expression primacy of existence is in her 1973 essay “The Metaphysical v. The Man-Made.” She introduces the notion in this way: “The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists, i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity” (24). Rand had introduced her most fundamental axiom “Existence exists” and its development “Existence is Identity” in the 1957 statement of her philosophy (AS 1015–16). She considered axioms to be checkable premises. They have to be subjected to two particular sorts of checks and be found to pass every occasion of these checks in order to continue to stand as axioms, in her sense of a philosophical axiom: (i) Any attempt to deny the premise must result in use of the premise, and (ii) the premise must be demonstrably implicit in any claim of knowledge (AS 1015–16, 1039–40).

Rand introduces her axiom “Existence exists” as a first moment in a continuous thought that introduces two more axioms, which are cohorts of the first: “Existence exists—and the act of grasping that statement implies two corollary axioms: that something exists which one perceives and that one exists possessing consciousness, consciousness being the faculty of perceiving that which exists” (AS 1015).

Rand then exhibits a check of the sort (i) to show these premises can pass for axioms: “If nothing exists, there can be no consciousness: a consciousness with nothing to be conscious of is a contradiction in terms. A consciousness conscious of nothing but itself is a contradiction in terms: before it could identify itself as consciousness, it had to be conscious of something” (AS 1015).

This sort of checking of Rand’s axioms presupposes and is continuous with acceptance of the standard of checking that is the principle of noncontradiction. However, it is clear that the range of what counts as contradiction for Rand’s foundational purposes is sufficiently broad to include exclusionary physical actions such as making referential utterances or gestures.*

The philosophic-axiom business of Rand’s trucks and trades in everyday physical and perceptual common experience from the get-go. That is fine, and you are surely correct to say . . . .

[To be continued in this thread in a remark with the heading Physicality of Consciousness.]

*Readers can confirm this from the specific texts of Rand that I have cited so far, where my page numbers are for the first-edition hardback of AS. See further Tibor Machan’s “Evidence of Necessary Existence” in Objectivity 1(4):31–62, which was made into Chapter 2 of his 1999 book Ayn Rand (Peter Lang). See also the survey of recent work in this area in an Article of mine over at the site Rebirth of Reason: “Ayn Rand Society 2005 – Paper 1”.

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I think I've learned more in this thread than I did all semester so far.

Thank you, Jeff, for this encouraging remark.

Hi Paul, Stephen, and Jeff,

I hope it is OK to address my next instalment to all three of you. Here goes:

As it happened, Ayn Rand tended to avoid technicalities, so most of the relevant material is by NB and LP. By some incredible mishap, I cannot find my volume of The Objectivist Newsletter, so I will have to summarize NB's first relevant articles -- which set the scene for all that would follow -- rather than quote them exactly. I am referring to NB's article entitled "The Contradiction of Determinism," and perhaps one other article which deals with the free will issue. He then continued discussing this subject in two articles in The Objectivist, entitled "The Objectivist Theory of Volition" and "Volition and the Law of Causality." The gist of what NB says in these articles is that physical causation cannot account for human freedom, and therefore human conscious processes must involve some exemption from physical causation. He then narrows the field and locates this non-physical causation in the human capacity to consciously control the mind's degree of focus. It is this particular capacity for controlling the focus of mental processes that receives the title "volition." LP later repeated much the same line of presentation in OPAR.

As I see this theoretical construct, it is thoroughly deficient in evidence, and is motivated by a host of logical fallacies. But most importantly, as a theoretical move it is like letting dualism set a foot in the door; and dualism, of course, rushes in.

Paul, you quote NB as positing that matter and consciousness have some kind of "common ground." I think the search for some unknown common ground is ample evidence of dualism (see below for further explanation of this point). It is small wonder that REB further quotes NB as doubting that the mind cannot exist outside the body...

The problem with such lines of reasoning is that their background science is archaic. Aristotle can be excused, because of the state of scientific knowledge at his time, for thinking in terms of a physical body and a non-physical soul; but even in such times he was wise enough to hold that the soul was a form --an attribute -- of the living entity (as REB observes). Other ancient Greek philosophers such as Democritus can also be excused, on similar grounds, for proposing a model of material particles composing physical entities and of mental particles composing souls... But we live in another era, in which science flourishes; so we are supposed to have some idea about the elements of physical reality: elementary particles, atoms, molecules, energy and energy fields, chemical bonding and other reactions, catalysed processes, bio-physics, bio-chemistry, the nervous system, etc., etc. Therefore we are in a position to know enough to realize that the common ground for all real entities is physical existence -- nothing more, nothing less.

What then of human volition? As I said, the view that freedom of choice requires a non-physical kind of causation is unwarranted. I will discuss why this is so in a later instalment. But as a hint, I would like you to note that discussing causality in terms of either an event-event (a codename for: physical) or an entity-event (a codename for: non-physical) model is logically crude and contextually -- as before -- archaic.

To be continued.

Best regards,

Rafael

Edited by Rafael Eilon
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Physicality of Consciousness

Rafael,

You are surely correct to say that there are more relations between consciousness and existence than the relation of primacy of the latter in respect of the former. You are surely correct, too, in saying that Rand would concur in that verdict. She takes as an axiomatic cohort of “existence exists” that in the act of grasping the statement “existence exists” one perceives another fact: “that one exists possessing consciousness of . . . that which exists” (AS 1015). The exists in the phrase “one exists possessing consciousness” is a physical and living existence.

Rand goes on to affirm (in AS, in “The Objectivist Ethics,” and elsewhere) that consciousness is a phenomenon arising in living animals with nervous systems. She even attributes consciousness to insects (ITOE 80). That is probably too liberal, for reasons we can go into later if anyone wishes to pursue it. For any animals that do possess consciousness (sponges are excluded for sure), it is the principal means of their distinctive form of physical survival. That view is Rand’s, and it is pervasive in her writings on ethics and on epistemology.

You write that “to Rand, consciousness is (apparently) the antithesis of physical existence.” You say that “physical existence can be analyzed in terms of basic physical constituents; consciousness (as Rand has it) cannot.” Paul Mawdsley asks (#4) where one finds Rand stating such a dualism between consciousness and physical existence.

One statement of Rand’s that could be taken as leaning towards such a dualism is her statement that “these two—existence and consciousness— . . . are the irreducible primaries implied in any action you undertake” (AS 1015–16). Rand maintains that these axiomatic concepts (existence and consciousness and identity too) designate fundamental metaphysical facts standing with every bit of one’s knowledge and the whole of one’s knowledge (AS 1016, ITOE 56–59). The concept consciousness, as axiomatic concept, underscores “the primary fact that one is conscious” (ITOE 59).

That much is consistent, however, with Rand’s physicalist conception of consciousness in the following statement: “Consciousness is an attribute of certain living entities, but it is not an attribute of a given state of awareness, it is that state” (ITOE 56). Consciousness as a state of awareness is an attribute of a certain physical, living organism in Rand’s view.

There is another statement of Rand’s that is at first blush contrary to a physicalist conception of consciousness. Rand writes that axiomatic concepts such as consciousness identify “a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts” (ITOE 55). Of course Rand does divide consciousness into sensation, perception, conception, evaluation, and so forth. These can be components in some conscious episode. A reductive analysis of an episode into such elements as these does not reduce conscious living activity to nonconscious living activity. So if Rand or anyone else does not think consciousness can be reduced to the nonconscious living activities from which it arises, they have not contradicted that thesis by such a division of consciousness into species such as perception and conception.

The first blush fades as Rand continues. She writes that “one can study what exists and how consciousness functions; but one cannot analyze (or ‘prove’) existence as such, or consciousness as such” (ITOE 55). One cannot analyze or “prove” the fact of consciousness as such in terms of nonconsciousness without an underground circularity, and circularity shows failure of logical reduction. That is what Rand is saying here in ITOE and in AS. Rand’s physicalist conception of consciousness contained in the quotation paragraph before last is harmonious with her statements concerning the nonanalyzability and irreducibility of consciousness.

There is one more statement of Rand’s that I would like to mention which leans towards a dualism in which consciousness cannot possibly be a physical process. This occurs in the course of Rand’s treatment of the nature of perceptual illusions. She writes that one’s “organs of perception are physical,” that they have no power to distort, that the evidence they present “is an absolute,” but that one’s mind “must discover the nature, the causes, the full context” of one’s sensory material (AS 1041). There is a suggestion here that although one’s sensory organs are physical, one’s mind is able to understand perceptual illusions because it is not physical—or anyway not only physical—and that if the mind were physical there could be no such thing as illusions nor the ability to diagnose them.

Any leaning towards a dualism in which consciousness cannot be a physical process seems to evaporate when Rand writes in ITOE (1966–67) that all episodes of consciousness are measurable (7, 11–17, 25, 29–33), that a thing not measurable would be without identity, without existence (39), and that cognitive systems are measurement systems (11–15, 21–24).* Every aspect of a measurement system is itself measurable. Consciousness is required for making measurements, but measurability of consciousness itself strongly suggests that there is no residual nonphysical ghost in the biological system that is consciousness.

*[For more on this, the interested reader should see my essay “Universals and Measurement” in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 5(2):271–305.]

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Rafael,

While I have asked where Rand made statements about substance dualism, I want you to know I am not opposed to what you are suggesting. I have suggested elsewhere (I will have to look up the posts over the next day or so) that I think both AR and NB's work describe a causal dualism that parallels substance dualism. I just don't think either would say substance dualism is at the root of existence. One quick thought: What happens to physical existence and dualism if we consider matter to have both wave and particle properties and how might this relate to the mind and body? Or how is the relationship between mind and body different to the relationship between the material and plasma properties of celestial structures when considered from the perspective of physical existence?

Stephen,

You clearly have strengths that are my weaknesses. Thank-you for the citations. I am no Rand scholar. I can learn a lot from posts such as yours. I am sneaking away from Christmas at the inlaws to catch up. I'll have more time over the next few days to respond.

Paul

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Stephen,

Thank you very much for all those very valuable quotes and pointers; but please allow me to summarize: if we look at the cumulative whole of what Rand, NB, and LP had to say about whether or not consciousness involves anything non-physical, I think it would be safe to conclude that Objectivism equivocates on this issue. My point is, of course, that the issue is quite important enough to justify an effort to achieve a firm and unequivocal position; which, in my judgment, should consist of a decisive and explicit denial of the existence of any non-physical entities or processes.

As to what the chief proponents of Objectivism would say if put on the spot to take an explicit stand, I suspect that their respective positions would depend on who we ask: NB would probably say that consciousness must involve something non-physical; LP would probably say that the matter should be left to scientists and does not concern philosophers; and as to Ayn Rand... it is a great pity that she is not here to discuss this with us.

Paul,

You wrote:

One quick thought: What happens to physical existence and dualism if we consider matter to have both wave and particle properties and how might this relate to the mind and body? Or how is the relationship between mind and body different to the relationship between the material and plasma properties of celestial structures when considered from the perspective of physical existence?

Even the "duality" of matter and energy is reminiscent of the mind-body relation. The "duality" of hardware and software also comes to mind. But I am still under commitment to write more about volition, and I will then give the mind-body relation some more detailed consideration.

Thank you both for your interest.

Rafael

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Rafael, if your formulation is correct it is Objectivism, so why do you claim it is not?

Consciousness insofar as it can be explained (so far) is, of course, physical. But even though physical, consciousness is not primary in the sense that the rest of existence is because consciousness can be wrong in its identifications. It's a mixed bag: what it is is primary, what it does is not except in that primary (axiomatic) identification (if it is explicitly made). And this in turn implicitly validates rationality or the need for rationality.

You aren't saying your formulation is Objectivism because you implicitly recognize this. (?)

One needs to make reference to what makes an axiom an axiom. You can't step outside an axiom to prove or disprove it. You can't step outside reality to prove or disprove "Existence exists." You can't step outside your consciousness to prove you are conscious. Axioms are not provable. Your formulation is not demonstrable without consciousness as part of the axiomatic formulation. I submit you are using consciousness as a "stolen concept" simply because you are smothering it while using it. Or: a contradiction. You are trying to prove "Exclusivity of Physical Existence." Objectivism demonstrates only.

BTW, how does your formulation invalidate the rest of Objectivism: the ethics and politics, for instance? I'm not saying it does or doesn't.

--Brant

Edited by Brant Gaede
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Rafael, if your formulation is correct it is Objectivism, so why do you claim it is not?

Hi Brant,

If everything that is correct is Objectivism, as you seem to imply, and if any number (>=2) of people labor under that idea, then you would see different people with different opinions, each claiming: "My view is Objectivism!" Objectivism is the philosophy of Ayn Rand. I am saying that she, and her associates, equivocated on this issue.

Consciousness insofar as it can be explained (so far) is, of course, physical. But even though physical, consciousness is not primary in the sense that the rest of existence is because consciousness can be wrong in its identifications. It's a mixed bag: what it is is primary, what it does is not except in that primary (axiomatic) identification (if it is explicitly made). And this in turn implicitly validates rationality or the need for rationality.

I agree with what you say here, except that I cannot foresee any possibility that consciousness can someday be discovered to be non-physical. How would such a discovery be made? By non-physical means?

You aren't saying your formulation is Objectivism because you implicitly recognize this. (?)

I am not sure I understand everything you mean by this, but please bear in mind: Objectivism is not "Whatever is True," it is "The Philosophy of Ayn Rand."

One needs to make reference to what makes an axiom an axiom. You can't step outside an axiom to prove or disprove it. You can't step outside reality to prove or disprove "Existence exists." You can't step outside your consciousness to prove you are conscious. Axioms are not provable.

I have not challenged that existence exists or that consciousness exists, and I have not demanded proof. Please argue with what I said, not with things I did not say.

Your formulation is not demonstrable without consciousness as part of the axiomatic formulation. I submit you are using consciousness as a "stolen concept" simply because you are smothering it while using it. Or: a contradiction. You are trying to prove "Exclusivity of Physical Existence." Objectivism demonstrates only.

I am not trying to prove "Exclusivity of Physical Existence." I am offering it as an unambiguous axiom. (And I have never stolen anything, not even a concept :)).

BTW, how does your formulation invalidate the rest of Objectivism: the ethics and politics, for instance? I'm not saying it does or doesn't.

My formulation does not invalidate any of the rest of Objectivism, but it does put some of it in a different light; especially the natural limitations of human consciousness, even with regard to the control of mental focus.

Thank you very much for your interest.

Rafael

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I know that Rafael and other readers of Objectivity are familiar with this, but I think it would be good to let the others here know that although Rafael and I may have importantly different ideas about the character of physical processes, we both hold that consciousness is a form of the physical. I will quote from Part 1 of my 1994 essay "Volitional Synapes" (Objectivity 2(1):109-39).

"We read reports of the latest findings by neuroscientists in their fancy brain scans. Another mental process has been located or mapped in the brain. What is the relation between that mental process and its located brain activity we see illustrated in the latest issue of Nature? Typically, we say nowadays that the mental (m) is a function or a property of the located neural activity (n) or that n is the physical substrate of m. Substrate is a physical metaphor. Is the relation between n and m physical? In our use of substrate to characterize the m-n relation, I believe we usually leave ambiguous whether the real relation itself is physical, mental, both, or whatever."

"I want to make a rather radical suggestion. I want to suggest that the mental is a distinctive form of the physical. This suggestion will be resisted for serious reasons, and I shall touch on them. . . ."

"One strong resistance to my monism is linguistic custom. 'The physical is one thing, and the mental another. These are conjugate concepts; we cannot have one without the other. Mental and physical phenomena and being are so different we should have distinctive, opposed concepts and terms, mental and physical.' I admit we could not easily refrain from opposing the mental to the physical in our speech, but I suggest that in truth we could replace 'mental and physical' with 'mental-sort-of-physical and nonmental-sort-of-physical.' How then do we distinguish the mental from the nonmental? There may be others, but the distinctive traits that come overlapping to mind immediately are these: awareness, intentionality, subject-object sense, internal-external sense, and qualia (sense). Mentality is special indeed. Another resistance might stem from the idea of many philosophers---Aquinas, Descartes, possibly Kant, possibly Rand (ITOE 245-50)---that the most basic object of intellectual apprehension is being in general, not, more restrictedly, physical being. I am here disputing that there is any being other than physical being, even if attending to the mental is a different sort of experience than attending to the nonmental. The mind is real, and that means that the mind, including the conscious mind, is physical."

. . . .

"I am persuaded to largely adopt the theory of Ted Hoderich on the psychoneural relation. He calls his theory the Union theory. The mind is not altogether the same thing as its associated neural activities, but the relation between them is more tight than a causal relation. That is, the psychoneural relation is a physical identity relation somewhere between absolute numerical identity and causation."

". . . . [Honderich] denies that the relation between n and m is one of efficient causation. The correlative relation beween n and m is a physically necessary relation, a nomic relation. Precisely whenever there is an m, there is an n, together a psychoneural pair. They are jointly caused (efficient) by preceding pairs (and by bodily and environmental causes and causal circumstances). They jointly cause subsequent pairs (and bodily activities and actions)."

"Honderich was driven to this general scheme by the firm results we have gotten from neuroscience so far and by specific demerits of earlier theories of the psychoneural relation (e.g., Identity, Supervenience, Functional). The Union theory is designed to avoid their demerits . . ." (124-25).

Honderich's Union theory is set out in volume 1 of his book Mind and Brain (1988 Clarendon), which is what I was working from when writing the preceding quoted text in 1994. See also his superb On Consciousness (2004 U of Pittsburgh).

Notwithstanding the tightness of the m-n relation in the Union theory, Honderich leaves open the issue of whether the m in the m-n relation should be said to be physical. It would be possible, consistent with Rand's writings on the nature of consciousness, to adopt the Union theory yet resist taking the further step I take in saying---as Rafael also says---that consciousness is a form of the physical.

Altering a line in the text quoted from my essay, one could say simply: "The mind is real, and that means that the mind, including the conscious mind, is concrete." Rand should surely go for that formula because she takes all existents to be concretes. Rafael and I are asserting that all concretes are physical.

Edited by Stephen Boydstun
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There is much to digest in this thread. My first response is one of considerable resonance. I see consciousness as a flow in the stream of activity of a physical stuff of which brain scans measure some resultant effects. I tend to think brain scans, that mostly focus on the cerebral cortex and limbic system, do not so much measure awareness as they measure the activity we are aware of. The model of the psyche that has taken shape in my mind has a core of awareness that is separate to that which it aware. Again, I am very much in agreement with NB's description from Honouring the Self:

Ego (the Latin word for "I") is the unifying centre of consciousness, the irreducible core of self-awareness-- that which generates and sustains a sense of self, of personal identity. Our ego is not our thoughts, but that which thinks; not our judgements, but that which judges; not our feelings, but that which recognizes feelings; the ultimate witness within; the ultimate context in which all our narrower selves or subpersonalities exist.

Consciousness can be broken into parts: there is that which is aware and that which is the content of awareness. Both of these parts are required for consciousness. The contents of consciousness can be further subdivided into the broad categories of percepts, concepts, and emotions. But there is another side to consciousness. So far I have only mentioned the reception and processing components of consciousness. Consciousness can also be asserted. This is the will or volitional aspect of consciousness. Each of these elements, their actions and interactions, must be considered when thinking about the meaning of brain scans. Each can be located in particular activities of the brain.

I would place the "I," or the ego, in the reticular formation and the processes of the will as acting via the reticular activating system and the prefrontal cortex to affect actions of the motor area of the frontal lobe (for non-automated willed action), the cerebellum (for automated willed action sequences), and the temporal lobe (for willfully shaping the contents of imagination).

However, as I have said before, action-to-action causation cannot account for volition without assuming volition does not exist. Our "scientific" notion of causation cannot account for the initiation of actions without some external necessitating antecedent that transfers energy to the system. Volitional actions are defined precisely this way. A volitional action is one that is initiated without the transfer of energy from an external necessitating antecedent. For volition, the energy for initiating action must reside within the thing that acts. Since action-to-action causation does not allow for action to be initiated without the transfer of energy from one body to another, either volition must be thrown out or action-to-action causation must be thrown out. This is the core of the problem of dualism between consciousness and physical existence. I think action-to-action causation is mistaken and volition is real.

Paul

Edited by Paul Mawdsley
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  • 2 weeks later...

I don't think that thinking can figure it out, because thinking is thinking about and adding to what we thought about It is limited to what we already think we know or know. It insults our intelligence to think that the subconscious brain is smarter than we are, but it is. It manages the large amounts of data in it with pictures and symbols in the pictures. It spews out thoughts (words) and pictures (concepts). It has already calculated our thoughts and validated or invalidated them by it's huge data bank. The best use of the mind is like any data bank, by inquiries. We may not like that idea, as it has a leveling effect on the confused intellectual, but the subconscious is the master at figuring everything out. We can manipulate the data and put in more queries for detail and clarification. Our part can get quite sophisticate, it is true, but the subconscious does the vast majority of the work. They call the output of the subconscious, intuition.

Our manipulation of data is to answer a question or to effect our purposes. We couldn't possibly manipulate all the data the right brain can. Try it. The proof is a lot in the test. We can test propositions mentally by comparing with all the comparisons that come out of the mind from personal experience, history and even our perifrial vision, things we didn't even see clearly. When we try to control the whole process we interfere with the proper functioning of the mind. It also doesn't respond well to negatives as they usually block awareness of information. Judgmental words are not useful, but descriptive ones are. Descriptions are the most accurate we can get. Judgmental words are a conclusion before thinking. The easiest way to access the subconscious is to remain in the area between the question and the answer and continue observing for more information. Our questions are almost answered before we ask them. Nothing like testing folks, the inferior 'intellect' will not be able even to see the creative ideas as they are all outside of our reasonings. Our thought are just reworking of old ideas. Everyday and every problem requires fresh thought like the body needs fresh food. That is what keeps life fresh and exciting. You can think of ten million reasons why it isn't so, but check it out and you will see it is so, we just can't see it from here because we are in affect in the dark, locked in our conscious thought which only works a all because of intuition, you know ideas that come to us when we think. Where do you think they come from?

Our feelings are made up of the same junk our thoughts are. We have to use our consciousness from the mode or being the observer, our sense of watching our self. That self is, and should be kept, objective. Objectively observe our thoughts and you will be amazed at how the brain works. That's objective observation of our objective brain giving us objective answers. If that doesn’t satisfy anyone then I am sorry. I anticipate endless reasoning to prove anything one wants to, but once you see the process in action you can check it every way to Sunday and you will see that it is absolutely the fuel for the Conceptual Age and the economy for the foreseeable future.

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Hi Herb,

Welcome to OL. I appreciate the energy you put into your post. I would like to respond more fully but my attention is spread a little thin right now.

You seem to be of the school that says there is no such thing as new ideas. For me, this is an experience of synchronicity. My wife and I were talking this morning about causality and psychological/social dynamics. I was saying how I love the experience of the "Aha" moment when I create a new piece or a new connection in my models of existence that causes a cascade of integrations. We both remarked with disbelief that we remembered people from university who were convinced that there is no such thing as new ideas.

One of the reasons I speak of the "will and volition" when I speak of the actions of consciousness is because my own experience tells me I do more than just choose from a set of alternatives to set my consciousness in motion. I use will to creatively generate new entities in my imagination to build new models of existence that produce new integrations and new alternatives for setting my consciousness in motion. Yes, there is such a thing as new ideas. Your experience might tell you differently.

Paul

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There have to be at least somewhere at some time a new idea. Why? Because the first human had to have some sort of new idea about something in order to get it all started.
Jeff,

I find the idea of no new ideas to be odd but I do tend to be a reinvent the wheel kind of thinker. I think a lot of people tend to learn primarily from social instruction and process these ideas in their own ways. They produce new integrations but not new foundations. New foundations can be created by starting with perceptions rather than ideas. Perceptions can be broken into component qualities that can then be combined in ways to produce new entities in the imagination. This is how we can begin to explore the underlying nature of things beyond the surfaces we observe directly. This use of the imagination is fundamental to the way scientific knowledge has progressed. Our understanding of the underlying nature of things generally preceded our ability to observe it. Heisenberg's uncertainty principle dictates that there is an absolute limit to what can be observed in physics and we are told the imagination is impotent to penetrate this limit. I'm not so sure of this.

Do you have any interest in physics?

btw- I would also suggest that breaking perceptions into component qualities and combining them in ways to produce new entities in the imagination is also the foundation of how Rand would have created characters, settings and contexts, set them in motion, and produced her fictions. These too were new ideas.

Paul

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  • 1 year later...

Following on #9 and #15, a recent exchange I had with Fred Seddon:

http://www.solopassion.com/node/5602

SEDDON

Ever since Descartes theorized a substance dualism between mind and body, a problem arose as to how these two very different substances could interact. Some have pronounced the problem unsolvable.

Rand thinks she escapes this problem by rejecting substance dualism. As she writes in ATLAS SHRUGGED, “man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness, . . .”

We can call this “attribute dualism” to distinguish it from the “substance dualism” of Descartes. But does it solve the problem, or simply relocate it. I once asked Peikoff how does our mind affect out body and he said that while it was obvious that it did, he did not know how the mind moves the body. He conjectured that someday science may answer that question. But is this a problem that science can ever solve. Not if it is the case that attributes cannot affect each other. And it does seem that they can’t. Consider a red square piece of wood. How can the shape affect the color? If I cut all four corners and make an octagon, the color is unaffected. If I then paint the octagon blue, the shape of the wood is unaffected. It would appear that swapping a dualism of substances for a dualism of attributes does not solve this old metaphysical problem.

BOYDSTUN

Refining Options

For Rand the knowing subject is (i) essentially perceptive and (ii) essentially apperceptive. If (ii) were denied, some sort of monism might be favored, though not required. If (ii) is affirmed, monism might lose its first-glance favorability, but dualism is still not required. In Rand’s case, dualism would seem ruled out because moment (i) is given a temporal and logical priority over (ii).

ANDREW SHORTT

The red block example is poor though the color or shape could influence how the object is treated by an outside force (sun, predator etc.). Thus its partner is also affected (color causing rapid heating or eating).

SEDDON

The question is not can a body affect a body (sun and block of wood). The question is can consciousness affect body and if so how?

BOYDSTUN

Attributes Affecting

Some examples of attributes affecting each other would be: The temperature of the wood and the amount of infrared radiation it is emitting. The weight of the wood and its resistance to being slid along the surface on which it rests. My rate of metabolism and my weight. My addiction to chocolate and my weight. My glucose level and my hunger.

Note: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...amp;#entry54516

SEDDON

A thought provoking post. It invites us (or at least me) to reflect on exactly what we mean by "attribute." I was a little queasy about my own example of color. I have come to see it as a multi-valued relation rather than an attribute. I think the same applies to some of your examples. Is weight an attribute or a relation between the object, a gravitational field and perhaps even a scale? If it is, then it would not be an example of two attributes interacting. I'm also suspicious of the metabolism/weight example. If weight is a relation then the example fails; metabolism seems to be a process rather than an attribute. But remember, I just throwing these out. Sometimes I think "attribute" is not a concept that Objectivism has a right to (albeit for a good reason) if it includes a notion of substance that is unsustainable, e.g., a bare particular.

BOYDSTUN

Rich Timbers

The weight of an object is the attribute of it that we experience when we lift it. The resistance to sliding of the object is the attribute of it that we experience when we try to scoot it. With elementary physics, in the first course today, we learn how the former attribute affects the latter (and what other factors affect the latter).

Rand’s conception of an attribute was surely not the modern idea of a property being a monadic relation. I doubt she had ever heard of that idea as of 1957. Her ontological categories at that time seem to be entities, actions, and attributes. She addresses causal relations in that text, and it would be interesting to make a close study to see how she distributes them across her threesome.

Rand naturally takes consciousness to be both a process and an attribute.

SEDDON

"The weight of an object is the attribute of it that we experience when we lift it."

But that would make "weight" a concept of experience and hence a relation, not an attribute. And absent a gravitational field an object has no weight. If true, weight as you describe it would be a multi-valued relation with the object, the gravitational field, and the perceiver three of the relata.

Since you brought science in, let me put this grammatically. Attributes get expressed in subject-predicate sentences. But in science we use math equations instead of sentences, e.g., f = ma. Where is the attribute in that expression? Or for that matter, where is the subject?

BOYDSTUN

Union

The fact that in our scientific understanding color turns out to be activity and a bundle of relations does not show that it is not also an everyday molar property of things. Similarly for the weight of objects.

I expect Rand named her category attribute, rather than property, so as to include more than is commonly meant by the latter. Not all logical predicates will be attributes in Rand’s ontology, but some complex items will be included. Actions will be distinct from attributes, but items are not precluded from being both, at least at different levels of their constitution.

Every mathematical equation is short for a definite natural language sentence. The familiar equation in physics, F=ma, is the statement “Force equals mass times acceleration.” Knowing only that statement, the student will not be able to solve a single physics problem. She will need to know more about that statement. To start she will need to know that it means a body with mass m and undergoing an acceleration a is subject to some external resultant force F whose magnitude equals the product ma.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Ted Honderich writes in On Consciousness (2004):

“The terms ‘dualism’ and ‘monism’ or ‘materialism’ or ‘identity theory’, and variants of them are no longer of much use. One reason is that typical ‘monisms’ are in ways property-dualisms. Another is that some ‘dualisms’ are no more dualistic than typical ‘monisms’.” (99)

“The distinct and adequate conception of consciousness I have mentioned will in intent and in fact be correctly describable as entailing something or other like a property-dualism. That will not make it different from some contemporary ‘identity theories’, including Davidson’s. Like them, also, it will in certain senses be quite as correctly describable as ‘monist’. . . .

“There really are two different kinds of events that occur in our heads. There are two different kinds of events that are physical in the ordinary sense and hence involve space-occupants. Or, as we can as well say, there are two different kinds of physical properties of our brains. One kind of events or properties involves only neurons and the causal relations fundamental to neural functionalism. The other kind of events, events of consciousness, are such that each involves what may initially be spoken of as a subject-part and a content-part.”(100)

I remain convinced that Honderich’s Union theory is the best on the mind-body relationship and that his contemporary theory has the best fit with Rand’s various ideas on that relationship. (His determinism is dispensable, upon my details of the determinism in physics and biological processes: http://objectivity-archive.com/abstracts.html#23)

SEDDON

“The fact that in our scientific understanding color turns out to be activity and a bundle of relations does not show that it is not also an everyday molar property of things.”

Here I disagree with you and agree with David Kelley’s position in THE EVIDENCE OF THE SENSES, p.229ff. He insists that we must differentiate between an “intrinsic attribute from the form.” Color is not an ATTRIBUTE of an object but rather the FORM in which we perceive the intrinsic attribute, e.g., reflective surface.

“Every mathematical equation is short for a definite natural language sentence. The familiar equation in physics, F=ma, is the statement “Force equals mass times acceleration.”

My point is even in your English sentence, one no longer can answer the question, “What is the subject and what is the predicate?” In Aristotle’s logic qualities or attributes can never properly take the subject position, which is reserved for substances. His logic is asymmetric, i.e., if s is the subject and p is the predicate, you cannot replace s with p and vice versa. In math, f=ma is symmetric, i.e., it doesn’t matter which expression is the right or the left of the “=.” Modern physics is a mathematical physics, whereas Aristotle’s physics is a subject-predicate logical physics.

ELLEN STUTTLE

[Rand] did, however, use the wording "integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness."

There's no integrating into a unit something which is only one to begin with.

[Harry Binswanger] has (more or less) endorsed dualism, according to reports I've heard of a lecture he gave, but, I'm sorry, I don't know the details. I think the lecture is on tape. Does anyone else have the particulars?

BOYDSTUN

Integration

Harry Binswanger sets out some ideas here:

“The Metaphysics of Consciousness”

http://www.aynrandbookstore2.com/prodinfo.asp?number=CB56M

Diana Hsieh has made available some short papers, thoughtful and informed, on the following topics:

“Cartesian Substance Dualism”

http://www.dianahsieh.com/docs/dtd.pdf

“Non-Reductive Materialism”

http://www.dianahsieh.com/docs/mctc.pdf

Ellen,

Wouldn’t Rand say that at the perceptual level of consciousness, there is sound integration of the human body and its consciousness, but at the conceptual level, in broader strokes of action, integration requires a deliberate program? I mean, in the context (discussion in AS of integrity virtue), she seems to be talking about the susceptibility of normal higher consciousness to fall off the task of providing for the long term well-being of its body (and itself).

When a control system of any organism or machine goes haywire, it would seem sensible to say that the activities of the control system are no longer integrated with the organism life or machine function.

BOYDSTUN

Context

I have mention . . . the context of Rand’s statement “man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness, . . .” This statement is part of her characterization of the virtue she calls integrity.

On Rand’s view, perception is an automatic integration of sensory inputs by the brain. In one’s perceptions, one is necessarily an integrated unit of matter (physiological activity) and consciousness. Integration in conceptual consciousness will not occur automatically. Still, the brain activities coordinate to conceptual consciousness will be automatically integrated with it, whatever the level of integrations being performed across that consciousness by that consciousness.

But it is not the integration of brain activity and consciousness that Rand is talking about in this passage. She is urging integration between one’s higher consciousness and one’s actions. In speaking of man being an integrated unit of two attributes, matter and consciousness, man is the generic, normative-standard man, to which any particular individual may or may not conform. This is not a statement of the relation between brain activity and conscious mind.

This thread has been a worthwhile discussion nonetheless.

SEDDON

"This is not a statement of the relation between brain activity and conscious mind."

I agree, and that is why I have never brought up the topic of brain activity.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

More Seddon at OL

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...amp;#entry37517

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...amp;#entry52050

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...amp;#entry52065

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...amp;#entry52109

~~~~~~~~~~~~

You know, it would be helpful to have the Rand paragraph from which the topic line has been lifted before the reader:

(From page 1019 in the hardback first edition of AS)

Integrity is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake your consciousness, just as honesty is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake existence—that man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness, and that he may permit no breach between body and mind, between action and thought, between his life and his convictions—that, like a judge impervious to public opinion, he may not sacrifice his convictions to the wishes of others, be it the whole of mankind shouting pleas or threats against him—that courage and confidence are practical necessities, that courage is the practical form of being true to existence, of being true to truth, and confidence is the practical form of being true to one’s own consciousness.
Edited by Stephen Boydstun
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consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter, to wit, the matter of the brain and nervous system. Consciousness is one of the things the brain does. Ontologically, consciousness is reducible to brain-work. Wherever you have a fully functioning brain you have consciousness. Wherever you have consciousness you have a functioning brain. Consciousness has no existence independent of a working brain.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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The metaphysical axiom thus loses its hazy appeal and becomes drily clear and simple: "Primacy of Existence" becomes "Exclusivity of Physical Existence." Ever since I became aware of this option, I have been unable to think otherwise. I think an educated person of our day has no excuse for believing otherwise -- and most don't.

I shall leave the logical defense of this position for further discussion. Your comments are welcome.

Rafael Eilon

The best cure for being Rand-struck is paying attention to facts.

Facts rule, principles and theories serve (sometimes).

Ba'al Chatzaf

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consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter, to wit, the matter of the brain and nervous system. Consciousness is one of the things the brain does. Ontologically, consciousness is reducible to brain-work. Wherever you have a fully functioning brain you have consciousness. Wherever you have consciousness you have a functioning brain. Consciousness has no existence independent of a working brain.

Consciousness is the same thing as "mind." All the "primacy of existence" means is what you just stated. Consciousness can be destroyed. A building can be destroyed. Their physical constituent parts can only be transformed or reduced to rubble.

--Brant

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consciousness is an epiphenomenon of matter, to wit, the matter of the brain and nervous system. Consciousness is one of the things the brain does. Ontologically, consciousness is reducible to brain-work. Wherever you have a fully functioning brain you have consciousness. Wherever you have consciousness you have a functioning brain. Consciousness has no existence independent of a working brain.

Consciousness is the same thing as "mind." All the "primacy of existence" means is what you just stated. Consciousness can be destroyed. A building can be destroyed. Their physical constituent parts can only be transformed or reduced to rubble.

--Brant

That "rubble" enabled you to write the above. A mind is brain matter and function put together the right way. It has no independent existence. Mind is NOT a substance. We are all atoms correctly arranged in space-time.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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