Objectivist Fundamentalism,


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LAON April Salon: Objectivist Fundamentalism

Hosted By: Bob Balocca and Scott Schneider

Mark your calendars for the second LAON salon of the year on Sunday, April 11th. Barbara Branden will present on "Objectivist Fundamentalism."

Date & Time:

Sunday, April 11. Time TBD

Location:

Bob's Mansion

3719 Beverly Ridge Drive

Sherman Oaks, CA

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Is there any way to get this talk recorded? It would be easy to put up the audio if this is interesting.

Michael

Geez:

With the technology we have now, if permission were achieved, you could podcast it.

Adam

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Good to hear of this. I'll be looking forward to hopefully seeing the text of the speech on OL.

Bill P

Becky, Rachel, and I motored up to Sherman Oaks this evening to hear Barbara speak, and it was well worth the aggravation of L.A.'s perenially turgid traffic. Wonderful speech!

Duncan Scott videotaped the presentation (possibly also the question-answer period), and I expect it will be made commercially available before long as part of his Objectivist History project.

I'm not going to summarize the talk here, just say that Barbara's thoughts were clear, well-organized, and sobering. This talk and her recent one "Objectivism and Rage" ought to be included in any anthology of her best writing/thinking.

REB

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Good to hear of this. I'll be looking forward to hopefully seeing the text of the speech on OL.

Bill P

Becky, Rachel, and I motored up to Sherman Oaks this evening to hear Barbara speak, and it was well worth the aggravation of L.A.'s perenially turgid traffic. Wonderful speech!

Duncan Scott videotaped the presentation (possibly also the question-answer period), and I expect it will be made commercially available before long as part of his Objectivist History project.

I'm not going to summarize the talk here, just say that Barbara's thoughts were clear, well-organized, and sobering. This talk and her recent one "Objectivism and Rage" ought to be included in any anthology of her best writing/thinking.

REB

Good to hear!

Regards,

Bill P

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Here's the link to the text of Barbara's excellent talk at the 2006 Summer Seminar on "Objectivism and Rage." Enjoy!

What an excellent essay! Brava Barbara!

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Barbara,

That was absolutely wonderful, spot-on, and, of course, rage-free... smile.gif

I cannot think of anyone else who could have done it so well.

Best,

Rich Engle

Edited by Rich Engle
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Here's the link to the text of Barbara's excellent talk at the 2006 Summer Seminar on "Objectivism and Rage." Enjoy!

In "Objectivism and Rage," Barbara Branden said/wrote:

"An idea, like an emotional reaction, is not a moral agent. Only men and woman are moral agents; only they can be good or evil."

This is only a brief excerpt from a much longer discussion by Barbara, so everyone should read the entire piece, but I want to register a note of dissent, if a rather technical one.

I agree that it is incorrect to label ideas per se as morally evil (or good), but the term "evil" is frequently used to mean "causing ruin, injury, or pain; harmful" (American Heritage Dictionary).

This kind of evaluation of ideas is perfectly legitimate, in my view. Harmful ideas are deemed "evil" because of their consequences when implemented, but this is a nonmoral use of the term. I would not hesitate, for example, to call many of the ideas of communism and fascism "evil" in this sense.

Ghs

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Here's the link to the text of Barbara's excellent talk at the 2006 Summer Seminar on "Objectivism and Rage." Enjoy!

In "Objectivism and Rage," Barbara Branden said/wrote:

"An idea, like an emotional reaction, is not a moral agent. Only men and woman are moral agents; only they can be good or evil."

This is only a brief excerpt from a much longer discussion by Barbara, so everyone should read the entire piece, but I want to register a note of dissent, if a rather technical one.

I agree that it is incorrect to label ideas per se as morally evil (or good), but the term "evil" is frequently used to mean "causing ruin, injury, or pain; harmful" (American Heritage Dictionary).

This kind of evaluation of ideas is perfectly legitimate, in my view. Harmful ideas are deemed "evil" because of their consequences when implemented, but this is a nonmoral use of the term. I would not hesitate, for example, to call many of the ideas of communism and fascism "evil" in this sense.

Ghs

George, let me offer a point of clarification here...

Conta Peikoff, there are no inherently immoral ideas, just as there are no inherently immoral material objects. (E.g., socialism and atom bombs.)

There are moral and immoral uses of ideas, just as there are moral and immoral uses of material objects. A hammer can be used to drive a nail in building one's home--or it can be used in an unprovoked assault on another person. The idea of socialism can be used as a guideline for imposing tyranny on innocent people in a country--or it can be used in a classroom as an illustration (which would presumably be a good thing) of irrational social-political thinking.

I would further argue that there are no inherently evil ideas, in the sense you described--as having harmful or ruinous consequences when put to use. It all depends on ~how~ they are put to use. For instance, the idea of socialism, as I said above, can have beneficial, constructive consequences, if used properly in a classroom.

In terms of Rand's trichotomy, the Peikovian notion of "inherently evil ideas" (whether morally evil or practically evil aka ruinous, harmful) is an intrinsic notion and needs to be purged from Objectivism.

REB

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Harmful ideas are deemed "evil" because of their consequences when implemented, but this is a nonmoral use of the term. I would not hesitate, for example, to call many of the ideas of communism and fascism "evil" in this sense.

Ghs

George, let me offer a point of clarification here...

Contra Peikoff, there are no inherently immoral ideas, just as there are no inherently immoral material objects. (E.g., socialism and atom bombs.)

I agree with this. My point was that there is a nonmoral use of term "evil" to which Barbara's strictures don't apply. "Evil" in the nonmoral sense can mean "pernicious," for example. When we speak of a "pernicious idea," we mean an idea that tends to cause harm; we don't mean that the idea itself is "immoral." If a person implemented a pernicious idea -- i.e., an idea that is "evil" in this sense -- then we might judge that person "immoral," depending on the circumstances, but that is a different issue.

There are moral and immoral uses of ideas, just as there are moral and immoral uses of material objects. A hammer can be used to drive a nail in building one's home--or it can be used in an unprovoked assault on another person. The idea of socialism can be used as a guideline for imposing tyranny on innocent people in a country--or it can be used in a classroom as an illustration (which would presumably be a good thing) of irrational social-political thinking.

I would further argue that there are no inherently evil ideas, in the sense you described--as having harmful or ruinous consequences when put to use. It all depends on ~how~ they are put to use. For instance, the idea of socialism, as I said above, can have beneficial, constructive consequences, if used properly in a classroom.

Your point is well taken, but there is an ambiguity that needs to be cleared up. Normally, when we speak of an "evil" idea, we don't simply mean that idea qua pure abstraction. Rather, we are referring to that idea when held as a belief. A belief is not merely an abstract idea. A belief is conviction, a mental assent to the truth, goodness, and/or desirability of an idea. (I here use "idea" in a very broad sense to include propositions.)

Considered historically, to discuss the moral status of ideas per se is a little odd; the focus has always been on the moral status of beliefs. Even those many Christian theologians who condemned positive atheism (the belief in the nonexistence of God) as immoral did not claim that the mere idea of atheism is immoral, for this would have implied that even thinking or talking about atheism would be immoral, even if one's purpose were to criticize it.

I don't recall offhand what the Ortho position on this subject is, but I seriously doubt if even Peikoff would condemn abstract ideas per se as morally evil. He might regard some ideas as pernicious -- i.e., as harmful when implemented -- as therefore as "evil" in this nonmoral sense, but I suspect that his moral condemnation is reserved for certain beliefs and wouldn't apply to ideas per se.

As to whether beliefs, in contrast to pure ideas, can be morally evil, I devoted an entire chapter to this problem, as it was treated by Aquinas, Locke, and other philosophers, in Why Atheism? And I still haven't arrived at a definitive answer in my own mind.

In terms of Rand's trichotomy, the Peikovian notion of "inherently evil ideas" (whether morally evil or practically evil aka ruinous, harmful) is an intrinsic notion and needs to be purged from Objectivism.

Does Peikoff actually use the expression "inherently evil idea"? I ran a search on my Objectivism Research CD-ROM for "evil idea" and could find no hits in OPAR. And "evil idea" yielded only two hits in all of Rand's writings (and in both of those cases there was nothing especially objectionable about her usage).

Ghs

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Does Peikoff actually use the expression "inherently evil idea"? I ran a search on my Objectivism Research CD-ROM for "evil idea" and could find no hits in OPAR. And "evil idea" yielded only two hits in all of Rand's writings (and in both of those cases there was nothing especially objectionable about her usage).

Not that I know about verbatim. However, in Fact and Value he writes about "inherently dishonest ideas." Along with more of his essay, "inherently evil ideas" is not much of a stretch.

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Does Peikoff actually use the expression "inherently evil idea"?

See Fact and Value. http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pagename=objectivism_fv

He uses "inherently dishonest ideas", then a few paragraphs later discusses evaluating an idea morally.

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Does Peikoff actually use the expression "inherently evil idea"? I ran a search on my Objectivism Research CD-ROM for "evil idea" and could find no hits in OPAR. And "evil idea" yielded only two hits in all of Rand's writings (and in both of those cases there was nothing especially objectionable about her usage).

Not that I know about verbatim. However, in Fact and Value he writes about "inherently dishonest ideas." Along with more of his essay, "inherently evil ideas" is not much of a stretch.

Thanks for the link. I wasn't familiar with this essay, so I read it quickly and will read it more carefully later on.

The following passage by Peikoff is more pertinent to the subject at hand than the one you cite, since it expressly refers to "evil" ideas.

"There is only one basic issue in philosophy and in all judgment, cognitive and evaluative alike: does a man conform to reality or not? Whether an idea is true or false is one aspect of this question—which immediately implies the other aspects I mentioned: the relation to reality of the mental processes involved and of the actions that will result. Truth is a product of effort and leads in action to value(s); hence, one says, the true idea is not only true: it is also good. Falsehood, assuming it reaches a certain scale, is a product of evasion and leads to destruction; such an idea is not only false; it is also evil."

Here, Peikoff clearly means "evil" in a moral sense, but I don't think it would be correct to construe his remarks as meaning inherently evil. The "evil" he speaks of is not inherent in the idea itself but is imputed to the idea from the (supposedly) irrational mental process that produced it.

I am not defending Peikoff's position; at this stage, I am simply attempting to understand what it is. I always try to read a philosopher sympathetically at first, in order to get an accurate understanding of what his basic points are.

I'll probably have more to say about Peikoff's article later on, after I read it a few more times. Even at this stage, however, I see a lot that I don't agree with.

Ghs

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I've recently posted on Objectivist Fundamentalism at the ARCHNblog, linking to this excellent article by evolutionary scientist David Sloan Wilson. He analyses and compares the text of books like The Virtue of Selfishness with a Hutterite epistle of faith, and finds they are both as fundy as each other, in that they exclude complex trade-offs and only discuss simple win-win or lose-lose in their arguments.

On that basis he calls fundamentalism "a system of beliefs that alleviates serious decision-making on the part of the believer", and looks at the pluses and minuses of such systems.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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I've recently posted on Objectivist Fundamentalism at the ARCHNblog, linking to this excellent article by evolutionary scientist David Sloan Wilson. He analyses and compares the text of books like The Virtue of Selfishness with a Hutterite epistle of faith, and finds they are both as fundy as each other, in that they exclude complex trade-offs and only discuss simple win-win or lose-lose in their arguments.

On that basis he calls fundamentalism "a system of beliefs that alleviates serious decision-making on the part of the believer", and looks at the pluses and minuses of such systems.

"Fundamentalism" is not fundamental. Being fundamental merely means building your house upon a foundation. The real question then is it a proper foundation.

--Brant

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Barbara's talk has a great title. "Fundamentalism" names a lot about one of two opposite types of error one can make in one's apprehension/practice of Objectivism.

And being a 'fundamentalist' is -not- the same thing as being in complete (reasoned, carefully applied) agreement with Objectivism.

I'll look forward to reading this when it comes out.

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I've recently posted on Objectivist Fundamentalism at the ARCHNblog, linking to this excellent article by evolutionary scientist David Sloan Wilson. He analyses and compares the text of books like The Virtue of Selfishness with a Hutterite epistle of faith, and finds they are both as fundy as each other, in that they exclude complex trade-offs and only discuss simple win-win or lose-lose in their arguments.

Dan,

I'm judging from a fairly brief article by David Sloan Wilson, whose broader corpus I'm not familiar with, but I don't think he is actually analyzing fundamentalism in the examples he gives.

His analysis is done in terms of what's good for the self vs. what's good for others, and the degree to which they conflict. In carrying out this exercise, he's making his own presuppositions (I'm not entirely sure what these are) about the degree to which each of the boxes is filled.

How, for instance, does he deal with dichotomous categories of sheep and goats, Sons of Light and Sons of Darkness, Muslims and kuffaar, Peikovians and persons in the grip of "inherently dishonest ideas," etc.?

Also, if fundamentalism means giving yourself over to pre-established rules, so as not to have to make decisions of your own, then a strict Kantian, doing his or her duty by the Categorical Imperative, is a fundamentalist. Hmm...

For that matter, does The Virtue of Selfishness provide so many rules as to make any further thinking unnecessary, on the part of anyone who tries to live by its precepts? Complaints that VOS is too sketchy have actually been heard from time to time...

Analyses of religious fundamentalism that I've found useful come from a couple of places. Karen Armstrong, in The Battle for God, considers fundamentalism to be a rather recent development in several religions, in reaction to the fear of losing believers from the religious community to what has become the surrounding secular society. Pascal Boyer, in his book Religion Explained, sees fundamentalism as based on a strategy of increasing the costs (in ostracism, public condemnation, and so forth) attendant on leaving the religious community.

Robert Campbell

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There was a time when "fundamentalism," when used in a religious context, didn't mean what it does today. Today, when we speak of a Protestant Fundamentalist, we usually mean a biblical literalist who toes the orthodox line in every particular.

In 17th century England, however, "fundamentalist" could refer to a Christian who believed that only the most fundamental beliefs of Christianity, especially the belief that Jesus is the Christ, should be relevant in deciding who and who is not an orthodox Christian. This position was important in debates about religious toleration, such as the persecution of Socinians (later called Unitarians) who rejected the Trinity. The fundamentalists maintained that the Trinity and other traditional doctrines of Christianity, such as original sin, were not truly fundamental to Christianity, so the "heretics" who denied these doctrines should not be persecuted or suffer other legal disabilities.

Ghs

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I've recently posted on Objectivist Fundamentalism at the ARCHNblog, linking to this excellent article by evolutionary scientist David Sloan Wilson. He analyses and compares the text of books like The Virtue of Selfishness with a Hutterite epistle of faith, and finds they are both as fundy as each other, in that they exclude complex trade-offs and only discuss simple win-win or lose-lose in their arguments.

Dan,

I'm judging from a fairly brief article by David Sloan Wilson, whose broader corpus I'm not familiar with, but I don't think he is actually analyzing fundamentalism in the examples he gives.

His analysis is done in terms of what's good for the self vs. what's good for others, and the degree to which they conflict. In carrying out this exercise, he's making his own presuppositions (I'm not entirely sure what these are) about the degree to which each of the boxes is filled.

How, for instance, does he deal with dichotomous categories of sheep and goats, Sons of Light and Sons of Darkness, Muslims and kuffaar, Peikovians and persons in the grip of "inherently dishonest ideas," etc.?

Also, if fundamentalism means giving yourself over to pre-established rules, so as not to have to make decisions of your own, then a strict Kantian, doing his or her duty by the Categorical Imperative, is a fundamentalist. Hmm...

For that matter, does The Virtue of Selfishness provide so many rules as to make any further thinking unnecessary, on the part of anyone who tries to live by its precepts? Complaints that VOS is too sketchy have actually been heard from time to time...

Analyses of religious fundamentalism that I've found useful come from a couple of places. Karen Armstrong, in The Battle for God, considers fundamentalism to be a rather recent development in several religions, in reaction to the fear of losing believers from the religious community to what has become the surrounding secular society. Pascal Boyer, in his book Religion Explained, sees fundamentalism as based on a strategy of increasing the costs (in ostracism, public condemnation, and so forth) attendant on leaving the religious community.

Robert Campbell

I read David Sloan Wilson's book, "Evolution for Everyone" when it first came out because I realized that I didn't know much about how it was being used since Darwin first wrote "Origin of the Species." His book reminded me of Julian Jaynes' book "The Orign of Consciousness in the Breakdown of the Bicameral Mind" (I can actually say that from memory!). Wilson's book is helpful in understanding where the science of biology is right now and that should be of great interest to Objectivists because of Our Metaphysics and Epistemology being somewhat under attack.

I would be interested in what those of you who do a good job of writing clearly about science think about Wilson's book.

Mary Lee Harsha

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