Trying to elucidate Rand's attributes

[Kallikanzarid]

tmj, before you said: "All attributes do really exist, or at least they do in my version. I believe in the existence of mental constructs , mine and others'." Didn't you mean that attributes are mental constructs? What did you mean? Also, can you explicitly answer questions in my first post in the thread, please?

[tmj]

tmj, before you said: "All attributes do really exist, or at least they do in my version. I believe in the existence of mental constructs , mine and others'." Didn't you mean that attributes are mental constructs? What did you mean? Also, can you explicitly answer questions in my first post in the thread, please?

Sure , but as long as my forementioned disclaimer applies. When I stated that attributes really do exist, I meant that attributes qua attributes are mental constructs. a conceptual consciousness is capable of 'separating' a property of an entity and focusing on that property in such a way as to consider the property as such apart from its existential existence or rather apart from the fact that that property is a nonseparable aspect of the entity that possesses it, eg length as opposed to physical extension of a particular entity. The physicl extension of the entity is an aspect of the entity that is part of or bound up/in the entity, without an entity that has physical extension there would be no physical extension. The attribute 'length' is a concept, a mental construct, that isolates and describes the physical extension of entities. Entities can exist possessing physical extension without a consciousness being aware of their existence. The fact of physical extension would still exist, but with no consciousness being aware of that particular aspect in an isolated or conceptual manner.

A twig of ten inches in length is a way to look at the twig, but it really only means that the twig has a certain 'amount' of physical extension that I describe as an amount in inches. When I say or realize this, I am not saying that the twig has length that is in anyway separable from the fact that at the same time it has bark on it. Length, in this sense, is just a way to focus on a particular aspect of the twig as an entity, that being its physical extension . The properties of the twig are what they are , as are all properties of all other entities. Isolating certain aspects and defining them as properties that exist in, but are not existentially separable, from the entities that possess them, is what I meant by attributes are epistemologic and not metaphysic. Make sense?

[Kallikanzarid]

tmj, so you *do* believe that in some form attributes exist even when minds don't? Can you answer the questions I posed about such attributes in the first message of the thread?

[tmj]

tmj, so you *do* believe that in some form attributes exist even when minds don't? Can you answer the questions I posed about such attributes in the first message of the thread?

Nope attributes are solely the products of consciousness.

[Kallikanzarid]

tmj, ok, I got your position.

[tmj]

tmj, ok, I got your position.

Great , now just out of curiousity do you recognize ,in the context of our conversation ,a distinction between attributes and properties?

[tmj]

in OP

What are attributes? Suppose we have an entity X, and an attribute P. How does P work? Is it akin to a logical predicate that we can evaluate at X to get some truth value P(X)?

1. If so, can we apply it to another entity, some Y, to get P(Y)? From Rand's description it seems that we shouldn't be able to. Firstly, P is something X has, but this description suggests that P exists independently of X; for example, should X cease to exist, P may still exist if it is applicable to some Y. Secondly, if P is applicable to more than just X, then the sum of all entities to which P is applicable - what is it? Is it a concept? But we haven't described epistemology yet. Is it a Platonic ideal? Rand doesn't describe such a thing. Is it yet another entity? And is P then an entity in and of itself? Does it, in turn, have attributes?
2. Suppose, on the other hand, P is not something that can be applied to other entities (we'll denote it X.P then). Then what is it? Consider two attributes of X: X.P and X.Q. What distinguishes them?

An attribute is a concept( a mental construct, an abstraction) of a specific aspect of an entity, entities exist as 'wholes' not as conglomerations of aspects. The aspects are only separable as pertains the awareness of a conceptual consciousness, and only as products of a conceptual consiousness. There is no quality of length that exists existentially apart from physical extension , except as an abstraction which is a product of a specific type of consciousness.

It is not logically consistent to try and apply an attribute of one entity to another entity unless you know that both entities in question can be compared on the basis of the specific attribute in question. The attribute is not exhibited in an entity that does not possess the characteristic that the attribute is an absctraction of. You can not state that an attribute exists apart from an entity that exhibits that attribute.

At room temperature water is wet, gasoline is also. The attribute wet is a concept based on a tactile perception of a specific entity , in this case both entities exhibit this property that the attribute 'wet' refers to, but without a wet concrete there is no 'wet'. Taking wet as an attribute and applying the term X to it, does not in itself allow logical consistency if you were to ask if P(pebble) R(work) or Q(slowness) have some X.

[Kallikanzarid]

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

[tmj]

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

Gotcha. Didn't mean to come across as belaboring the point in a nonconversational tone. And like I said my understanding of O'ist epistemology is just that I may not be correct, but I think Rand made a distinction to show how identity is tied to existents , and that treating attributes as somehow separable , other than as abstractions can lead to ideas like Plato's form and such like.

[Kallikanzarid]

tmj, so when talking about metaphysical properties, how do you answer questions that I raised in the OP? It seems that your version of metaphysics is too barebone to be a useful foundation for anything.

[anthony]

.

Heretical question: is the squishy term "metaphysical" needed anymore in present-day philosophical discussions?

You are way too late. Peikoff writing in 1967, on "neo-Kantianism":

"Metaphysics has been all but obliterated: its most influential opponents have

declared that metaphysical statements are neither analytic nor synthetic,

and therefore are meaningless."

Xray, by "present-day" you imply that philosophy and so, mankind, has advanced past the necessity of studying the nature of existence and man...?

Now, more than ever is it needed.

I'm hearing from you the fatal assumption that the clamped-down societies we all experience to some degree, represent the height of ideology and 'civilisation.'

I'm all for studying the nature of man and existence. My question was why the term 'metaphysical' is still needed for doing so?

In other words: what speaks against weeding out the 'terminological (phiosophical) closet' a bit? Are such terms here to stay for all time?

As long as the terms relate to ideas which relate to reality, how can they be

weeded out? Can you think of any which are superfluous now?

[tmj]

tmj, so when talking about metaphysical properties, how do you answer questions that I raised in the OP? It seems that your version of metaphysics is too barebone to be a useful foundation for anything.

I'll apologize for being hopelessly concrete bound. Could you give me a specific metaphysical property and a specific question in the OP to relate it to?

[anthony]

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

Gotcha. Didn't mean to come across as belaboring the point in a nonconversational tone. And like I said my understanding of O'ist epistemology is just that I may not be correct, but I think Rand made a distinction to show how identity is tied to existents , and that treating attributes as somehow separable , other than as abstractions can lead to ideas like Plato's form and such like.

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

Gotcha. Didn't mean to come across as belaboring the point in a nonconversational tone. And like I said my understanding of O'ist epistemology is just that I may not be correct, but I think Rand made a distinction to show how identity is tied to existents , and that treating attributes as somehow separable , other than as abstractions can lead to ideas like Plato's form and such like.

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

Gotcha. Didn't mean to come across as belaboring the point in a nonconversational tone. And like I said my understanding of O'ist epistemology is just that I may not be correct, but I think Rand made a distinction to show how identity is tied to existents , and that treating attributes as somehow separable , other than as abstractions can lead to ideas like Plato's form and such like.

(How long is a piece of string?)

It may be useful to interject that Rand disagreed with Aristotle on 'Essence' - which he thought pertained to metaphysics, she, epistemology.

[tmj]

that was my first comment

[tmj]

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

Gotcha. Didn't mean to come across as belaboring the point in a nonconversational tone. And like I said my understanding of O'ist epistemology is just that I may not be correct, but I think Rand made a distinction to show how identity is tied to existents , and that treating attributes as somehow separable , other than as abstractions can lead to ideas like Plato's form and such like.

>

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

Gotcha. Didn't mean to come across as belaboring the point in a nonconversational tone. And like I said my understanding of O'ist epistemology is just that I may not be correct, but I think Rand made a distinction to show how identity is tied to existents , and that treating attributes as somehow separable , other than as abstractions can lead to ideas like Plato's form and such like.

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

Gotcha. Didn't mean to come across as belaboring the point in a nonconversational tone. And like I said my understanding of O'ist epistemology is just that I may not be correct, but I think Rand made a distinction to show how identity is tied to existents , and that treating attributes as somehow separable , other than as abstractions can lead to ideas like Plato's form and such like.

(How long is a piece of string?)

It may be useful to interject that Rand disagreed with Aristotle on 'Essence' - which he thought pertained to metaphysics, she, epistemology.

From the perspective of the OP, the question would be ,how much long is there in a piece of string

[Xray]

As long as the terms relate to ideas which relate to reality, how can they be

weeded out? Can you think of any which are superfluous now?

I was speaking of weeding out 'fudgy' terms that cause far more confusion than clarity.

Isn't the phrase "ideas that relate to reality" far clearer than "metaphysical" (which sounds about as outdated as 'ontological').

[tmj]

As long as the terms relate to ideas which relate to reality, how can they be

weeded out? Can you think of any which are superfluous now?

I was speaking of weeding out 'fudgy' terms that cause far more confusion than clarity.

Isn't the phrase "ideas that relate to reality" far clearer than "metaphysical" (which sounds about as outdated as 'ontological').

I think clarity of word usage is highly contextual. Why throw a perfectly valid term out, just cause you don't like the color of liquid in the basin?

[Xray]

I think clarity of word usage is highly contextual. Why throw a perfectly valid term out, just cause you don't like the color of liquid in the basin?

Here's a dictionary definition of the "perfectly valid" term metaphysical :

met·a·phys·i·cal (mt-fz-kl)adj.

1. Of or relating to metaphysics.

2. Based on speculative or abstract reasoning.

3. Highly abstract or theoretical; abstruse.

4.

a. Immaterial; incorporeal. See Synonyms at immaterial.

b. Supernatural.

"Abstruse, immaterial, incorporeal, supernatural" -- isn't that the very opposite of "ideas related ot reality"?

If the use of the term is 'highly contexual' though - does this mean each philosopher is free to use the term metaphysical in the meaning he/she prefers?

[tmj]

I think clarity of word usage is highly contextual. Why throw a perfectly valid term out, just cause you don't like the color of liquid in the basin?

Here's a dictionary definition of the "perfectly valid" term metaphysical :

>

met·a·phys·i·cal (mt-fz-kl)adj.

1. Of or relating to metaphysics.

2. Based on speculative or abstract reasoning.

3. Highly abstract or theoretical; abstruse.

4.

a. Immaterial; incorporeal. See Synonyms at immaterial.

b. Supernatural.

"Abstruse, immaterial, incorporeal, supernatural" -- isn't that the very opposite of "ideas related ot reality"?

If the use of the term is 'highly contexual' though - does this mean each philosopher is free to use the term metaphysical in the meaning he/she prefers?

So in the context of this thread on attributes, would you say they are epistemologic or of ideas related to reality? (For clarity's sake in this context)

[Kallikanzarid]

tmj, for example, consider X = some piece of paper, Y = some piece of wood, P = combustible, Q = solid.

[tmj]

tmj, for example, consider X = some piece of paper, Y = some piece of wood, P = combustible, Q = solid.

I see in your interests you list analytical philosophy, and given the OP I do not think I can provide an explanation(beyond which I have aleady) that you will find appropriate.

[Kallikanzarid]

whYNOT, truth-valued attributes should be sufficient. My problem with Objectivist metaphysics is that "identity" as posited by Rand is incredibly vague, too vague to be useful in discourse of any rigor. I hoped to elucidate it by reducing it to attributes (or properties, as tmj likes to call them), but there was a problem of their ontological status, their applicability, and (as a consequence) reasoning about counterfactuals, without which I can't imagine a way to draw necessary/contingent distinction, and thus apply logic to reason about existents (as opposed to our observations).

OP was a result of there being a choice. We can recognize attributes as predicates existing independently of existents they can be applied to, which AFAIK is a path well-trodden by Plato, Aristotle, Kant etc. Or we can try to somehow avoid this, in which case even distinguishing attributes which are both true for the existent becomes an issue: you can try and label them, but depending on how you do it, it's either equivalent to introducing predicates, or it reduces identity to a bit string, which need not be unique, and if it's unique, it's essentially meaningless, because if you posit that comparing n-th bits of different strings is meaningful, you're back to predicates. Counterfactuals then also become meaningless, because you can't compare an existent to the existent you're replacing it with.

To my knowledge, Rand never addressed these issues, but I haven't read much of her work, so I decided to ask the question on some public forum.

[anthony]

whYNOT, truth-valued attributes should be sufficient. My problem with Objectivist metaphysics is that "identity" as posited by Rand is incredibly vague, too vague to be useful in discourse of any rigor. I hoped to elucidate it by reducing it to attributes (or properties, as tmj likes to call them), but there was a problem of their ontological status, their applicability, and (as a consequence) reasoning about counterfactuals, without which I can't imagine a way to draw necessary/contingent distinction, and thus apply logic to reason about existents (as opposed to our observations).

OP was a result of there being a choice. We can recognize attributes as predicates existing independently of existents they can be applied to, which AFAIK is a path well-trodden by Plato, Aristotle, Kant etc. Or we can try to somehow avoid this, in which case even distinguishing attributes which are both true for the existent becomes an issue: you can try and label them, but depending on how you do it, it's either equivalent to introducing predicates, or it reduces identity to a bit string, which need not be unique, and if it's unique, it's essentially meaningless, because if you posit that comparing n-th bits of different strings is meaningful, you're back to predicates. Counterfactuals then also become meaningless, because you can't compare an existent to the existent you're replacing it with.

To my knowledge, Rand never addressed these issues, but I haven't read much of her work, so I decided to ask the question on some public forum.

Alexei, I think tmj put it over well, and for further research Rand's 'Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology' is worth your time.

(I am far from a true-blue scholar like Stephen, so must refer you there.)

Also, though you don't think much of Peikoff on "modern philosophy", he has an essay in ItOE - 'The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy', which I suspect is relevant to your concerns. It is a rather, um - labored - work, in my opinion (perhaps my excuse for not understanding its full import for years) maybe as a result of Rand peering over LP's shoulder and criticising it until she found it acceptable - as I gather. Which could put anyone off their stroke, certainly. ;)

I'm interested in your "trivial" remark earlier. The inductive may appear "trivial", it strikes me.

Do you hold much store in induction, that pillar of O'ist epistemology?

[Kallikanzarid]

Alexei, I think tmj put it over well, and for further research Rand's 'Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology' is worth your time.

(I am far from a true-blue scholar like Stephen, so must refer you there.)

Also, though you don't think much of Peikoff on "modern philosophy", he has an essay in ItOE - 'The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy', which I suspect is relevant to your concerns. It is a rather, um - labored - work, in my opinion (perhaps my excuse for not understanding its full import for years) maybe as a result of Rand peering over LP's shoulder and criticising it until she found it acceptable - as I gather. Which could put anyone off their stroke, certainly. ;)

I really don't want to invest time and money into this book. I'll be satisfied with a relevant quote.

I'm interested in your "trivial" remark earlier. The inductive may appear "trivial", it strikes me.

Do you hold much store in induction, that pillar of O'ist epistemology?

I assume you mean the remark on how your version of metaphysics is trivial. What I meant is that if you claim that "existence is identity", but neglect to state precisely what identity is, then what you're saying is meaningless, you're doing nothing more than introducing a synonym into your vocabulary. And I don't see how induction comes into play here: induction is a method of acquiring knowledge, I can't see how you can tie it to metaphysics.

[Xray]

tmj, I guess I call attributes what you call properties or characterisitcs.

Rand too uses "attributes" in the meaning of properties/characteristics.