Objectivist and Popperian Epistemology


curi

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Points Popperian epistemology and Objectivist epistemology have in common. In Popperian epistemology I include additions and improvements by David Deutsch and myself:

I'm curious about the reference to David Deutsch. Were you or are you a student of his, or an acquaintance or friend? Or are you just referring to writings of his with which you're familiar?

Ellen

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Ellen,

Are you willing to stick your neck out, like Michael was not? Will you say "this post is right" -- and rethink things if it's refuted? Will you assert anything and risk criticism, as I have done?

At the moment I'm not willing to read the whole thing, being occupied with other matters, including preparations for a departure to Europe (symmetry conference).

Epistemology is, however, a big interest of mine, and I have read some major works by Popper, though I still have others to read.

And, just to let you know, I'm not an Objectivist and have never considered myself an Objectivist. I've thought from the beginning of my acquaintance with Rand's views, many years ago, that there were logical, epistemological, and factual flaws, although I'm strongly sympathetic with the goal of an ethics of rational individualism.

You can find numerous posts of mine in the threads which you can get to via the Barnes search link. One thing I later concluded as a result of some subsequent discussion - on ARCHN - is that Daniel doesn't share Popper's own strong commitment to realist metaphysics. However, I also think that Popper unfortunately shot himself in the foot on that issue - in his book Objective Knowledge and maybe elsewhere - by not realizing that proof can only rest on a basis of realist metaphysics, that there isn't any possibility of falsifying realism.

EDIT: I didn't put that last phrase right. What it should say is that the very possibility of falsification requires a realist metaphysics

Long subject, and maybe I'll have time for discussion toward the end of summer, but I don't have time for a proper job of it now.

Ellen

Edited by Ellen Stuttle
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"I'm always amused by the Popper argument that excuses the "absolutely certain knowledge" about falsification from the rest of uncertain knowledge, which means all the rest of human knowledge."

You don't seem to be familiar with Popper's actual position. In Section 9 of Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper writes:

"In point of fact, no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable, or that the discrepancies that are said to exist between the experimental results and the theory are only apparent and that they will disappear with the advance of our understanding."

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... no conclusive disproof of a theory can ever be produced; for it is always possible to say that the experimental results are not reliable...

Alanf,

Popper sounds pretty certain of that to me. And it sounds like "absolutely certain knowledge" about falsification.

Or does "can ever" not mean "can ever, or "always" not mean "always" to Popper?

I read Popper saying it's always possible to falsify something. He's certain of that, 100% certain, but not of anything else.

And that is predicting the future with allegedly 100% accuracy.

(Welcome to OL.)

Michael

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the very possibility of falsification requires a realist metaphysics

and popper had one. i don't get the point.

It's a context where Popper allows legitimacy to non-realist metaphysics - it might all be a dream, that kind of statement - on the grounds this can't be falsified, thus losing the contest instead of recognizing the illegitimacy of speaking of falsification outside the frame of a realist metaphysics. I.e., there has to be a realist metaphysics as the basis for falsification to be operative. Trying to apply a falsification test TO a realist metaphysics is, in Objectivese, a stolen concept situation.

Ellen

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That stuff like solipsism can't be falsified doesn't grant it legitimacy. It grants it the status of non-scientific. (And it still can be, and is, refuted by criticism.)

Substitute "realism" for "solipsism" in your statement, and maybe you'll see the point. ;-)

Ellen

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Trying to apply a falsification test TO a realist metaphysics is, in Objectivese, a stolen concept situation.

Ellen,

It pains me to say this, but I agree with you. :smile:

I've always had difficulty getting Popper people to see how they take their own agency for granted and promptly ignore it in their formulations, even as it "falsifies" them out of existence. :smile:

Michael

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No finite number of corroborating observations will -prove- a theory with a universally quantified postulate is true. However one pesky contrary fact will prove theory false. Think of the pesky fact as David's sling and the Theory it falsifies as Goliath. One well placed stone and Goliath is dead. No finite set of corroborations will prove a theory true.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Hi Robert,

I don't think anyone is arguing with your statement, which is really Hume's statement. But, perhaps there are ways of knowing whether some universally quantified statements are true or not without simply logging more observations.

Do you think perpetual motion machines are possible?

Darrell

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Watch it Michael, that is twice! Soon you will be agreeing with everyone on your forum and going on dangerous water fasts!

Carol,

Dayaamm!

I used to have an edge...

Gettin' dull and can't cut worth jack anymore..

:smile:

Michael

lol Just cut your water with mustard and you will be OK

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According to his methodology, one devises a hypothesis and if it is supported by the evidence

No, Popperian epistemology rejects the possibility of support.

the purpose of Popper's methodology is to counter the problem of induction as stated by David Hume

No, the purpose is to understand epistemology, reality, etc... Dealing with induction was one of Popper's accomplishments, towards that goal.

Popper attempts to avoid the trap by arguing that as a theory matures and handles more and more cases and numerous attempts at refutation, it is more likely to be correct or nearly correct.

No, it does not make it more likely. Popperian epistemology, like Objectivist epistemology, is not probabilistic.

What does it make it? A better idea. Each time we correct some error we improve it. If we know of no errors, then it's the best knowledge we have, and we should use it for now (pending new ideas, new criticisms, etc) This needs no special justification. What else would we use?

When Rand says that "your mind is fallible," I don't think she is referring to fallibilism. She is simply referring to the possibility of making a logical error --- an error which can ultimately be corrected.

What do you think fallibilism means? Fallibilism means error is possible. Rand is agreeing with it. (BTW she says similar things elsewhere.)

insist that certainty is possible

Rand only insists that "contextual" certainty is possible. Contextual certainty is fallible. It accepts the possibility of improving our ideas later, or even rejecting them and replacing them with different ideas.

She sees that as the root cause of the rejection of objective morality.

FYI, Popper does not reject objective morality.

How can one say what is right and wrong with any sort of certainty if one cannot say what exists or does not exist or what the laws of nature are with any sort of certainty?

Because, instead of certainty, what we can have is (fallible) knowledge. This lets us speak of reality. It's not something to arbitrarily ignore.

My view is that we clearly possess knowledge, though I'm not sure I can say exactly how, but that fact is sufficient to safely ignore the issue when considering ethics.

The problem here is a package deal. Don't package together knowledge and "certainty" (infallibility). That is a mistake that basically every philosopher since Aristotle has made, and which Popper corrects.

Elliot, you said, "What does it make it? A better idea. Each time we correct some error we improve it."

How do we know it's a better idea? In what sense is it improved if we have no way of knowing whether it is more likely to be correct or that it is somehow more correct than it was before?

Elliot: "What do you think fallibilism means? Fallibilism means error is possible. Rand is agreeing with it. (BTW she says similar things elsewhere.)"

But, there are different kinds of errors. If I say A implies B. B is false. Therefore, A is true, I have committed a logical error. Humans sometimes commit logical errors and are therefore fallible. But, those types of errors can be corrected and I believe that is the kind of error to which Rand was referring.

The example might be too simple, but imagine something else. For example, someone might make a math error and based on that error conclude that within three years humans will run out of food if they don't plant a lot more food. The reasoning might be sound other than for the math error. A math error could be considered a logical error. It's an error of deductive reasoning.

In my view, there are situations that are nothing like that kind of logical error. For example, a person might make a generalization error. The kind of error that Popper talks about (or that Robert keeps bringing up) where a person draws a conclusion about all cases based on a relatively small number of observations. One relies upon induction to reach a conclusion and later finds out that there was something wrong with the generalization.

One might conclude that the world was flat based on one's observation that it looks flat to the human eye of an earthbound observer. There is nothing inconsistent about such a conclusion. It might be unwarranted, but it doesn't involve an error of deduction. So, the conclusion is that humans are fallible in another sense. They can reach wrong conclusions even if they haven't committed an error of deduction.

One might scoff at the conclusion that the Earth was flat, but consider the Galilean (or Newtonian) transformation equations. If velocity, 'v' is the rate of change of position, 'x', and 'a' is the rate of change of 'v', then it stands to reason that if one accelerates at a constant rate for time, 't', then one's velocity should be given by v = at. That seems like an irrefutable, logical conclusion. But, then, Einstein comes along and says a stationary observer isn't going to see the moving object moving at the velocity implied by the foregoing reasoning and appearance is reality, so the above equations aren't really accurate. One could argue about the true implications of relativity, but my point is that examples like this seem to imply a much deeper possibility for fallibility than simply making a logical mistake.

Elliot: "Because, instead of certainty, what we can have is (fallible) knowledge. This lets us speak of reality. It's not something to arbitrarily ignore."

But, how would you know if someone did something bad purposefully or was just made a mistake because he or she was fallible in the deep sense? That is, you couldn't even say the person necessarily failed to put forth enough effort to understand what he was doing. Perhaps, he did everything right but was still wrong.

Elliot: "The problem here is a package deal. Don't package together knowledge and "certainty" (infallibility). That is a mistake that basically every philosopher since Aristotle has made, and which Popper corrects."

What is knowledge without certainty?

I don't think Popper succeeds in "correcting" that problem.

Darrell

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Here's another problem I have with Popper. He calls Aristotle "theory-laden," yet his stuff is totally "jargon-laden." That can become quite a smokescreen to cover the hole. (On top of being boring.)

The problem is, no matter what system of thought you wish to devise, you have to start with metaphysical assumptions.

Ellen mentioned "realist metaphysics." If called on, I'm pretty sure she could come up with a good definition or explanation.

A religious person starts with "God metaphysics."

Popper claims that these kinds of assumptions cannot be quantified, thus they cannot be falsified. Yet his entire system is based on the existence of quantity as an axiom (for just one). Note that this axiom is nothing more than an assumption in his system that can neither be proven nor disproven.

Based on that, I have yet to see the fundamental knowledge difference between Popper's metaphysical assumptions and the fundamentalist Christian's. Apparently both have to be accepted on faith.

Rand at least makes the observation that a fundamental axiom needs to be used by the person who is trying to deny it in order to even try. That is one way to test the validity.

Claiming that science is the only valid basis for knowledge, then putting the base of science outside of science in the only "true" scientific method is not very encouraging.

Michael

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Ellen mentioned "realist metaphysics." If called on, I'm pretty sure she could come up with a good definition or explanation.

A realist metaphysics is that there's an external reality which is what it is, basically Rand's slant on metaphysics.

Popper is very strong in his belief that realist metaphysics is correct and that what he calls subjectivist metaphysics is nonsense, but he loses the main chance through not recognizing that realist metaphysics has to be accepted as prerequisite to any such ideas as proof and falsifiability.

If I get time in the next few days, I'll quote illustrative passages from Objective Knowledge.

Ellen

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... but he loses the main chance through not recognizing that realist metaphysics has to be accepted as prerequisite to any such ideas as proof and falsifiability.

If I get time in the next few days, I'll quote illustrative passages from Objective Knowledge.

Ellen,

That is precisely the part I am referring to when I say the Popper people don't accept their own agency as part of their formulations. Not only does external "realist" reality exist, but they, the people themselves, exist within that reality, as do we all.

That has to be the premise for integrating mind and reality.

Everything I have read so far from Popper and his defenders treats this issue as if reality were some kind of image they observe to be narrated in a distant third person omniscient voice (the "god perspective" so to speak), with them being the third person disconnected from reality--albeit able to observe it--and operating according to separate made-up rules.

To continue with the literature metaphor, their backstory for reality is one thing and the backstory for their science methodology is another--and both are severed at the root.

I am very interested in the quotes.

Michael

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The severance is required to keep the amount of the subjective that gets into science to a decent minimum. Scientists, who when they look at the world, look at it from a certain point of view, are trying to create another view of the world. The view from nowhere in particular. What is invariant under the transformation from one subjective observer to another? That is the central question

Ba'al Chatzaf

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The severance is required to keep the amount of the subjective that gets into science to a decent minimum. Scientists, who when they look at the world, look at it from a certain point of view, are trying to create another view of the world. The view from nowhere in particular. What is invariant under the transformation from one subjective observer to another? That is the central question

Ba'al Chatzaf

Bob,

Your severance leads only to the dogma and vanity of scientists.

It's not the reason science works. (The invariant thing only works when you connect it to reality, not when you sever it from reality. The fundy Christian's God is invariant, too.)

I have to admit, it feels good to imagine you are a god, though.

Michael

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The severance is required to keep the amount of the subjective that gets into science to a decent minimum. Scientists, who when they look at the world, look at it from a certain point of view, are trying to create another view of the world. The view from nowhere in particular. What is invariant under the transformation from one subjective observer to another? That is the central question

Ba'al Chatzaf

Bob,

Your severance leads only to the dogma and vanity of scientists.

Oh vain and dogmatic scientists who gave your your GPS and your computer network. Aren't they awful? As long as they keep delivering the goodies,(which is the real -cash value- of science) I have no issue with them.

The philosophers have been belching hot air for 3000 years. What have they given us? Answer: more hot air.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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The philosophers have been belching hot air for 3000 years. What have they given us?

Science, for one thing.

They have hindered as much as they have helped so it is net zero. Aristotle (who never checked his conclusions) and his friends retarded the development of physics nearly 1500 years. If the Ionians had triumphed rather than the Athenians our astronauts would be visiting Alpha Centuri in Star Ships by now.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Bob,

Bullshit.

Without philosophy, there would be no capitalism to sell you precious goodies.

I could go on and on.

Your arguments are what happens when a person divorces the human mind from the rest of existence.

Science does not produce stuff because of that. It produces it in spite of it.

I have yet to see a goody produced from the big bang, for instance.

Theoretical science and practical science are about as far apart goody-wise as a toy cap gun is from a bazooka in shooting explosive rockets.

Michael

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