How We Know - Harry Binswanger's New Book


Neil Parille

Recommended Posts

Got the book and its pretty good. (I’m on page 150.)
The tone is actually surprising. Although he disagrees with other views, it’s not in the snarky tone of something like OPAR.
He generally says “Rand” and not “Ayn Rand,” which was quite a relief.
No mention of Branden, Kelley or any published criticisisms of Rand. I guess that’s not a surprise.
The price keeps bouncing around on Amazon. I got mine at 38 but I saw it the other day as low as 28. Today it’s 31.
Link to comment
Share on other sites

  • Replies 115
  • Created
  • Last Reply

Top Posters In This Topic

Does the book address an neurophysiological issues or questions. If one does not know the brain, one does not know how we know.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

He makes some references to these topics.

He "mentions" some of these topics? Why am I underwhelmed. The problem of how we know is precisely the problem of how our brains work, right down to the molecular level. Our brains are squooshy electrochemical machines. To know how we know we must know our brains and their workings in detail.

Modern medicine can treat and sometimes cure diseases because we know how some of the organs work and how they interact with chemicals at the molecular level.

The current pop-psyche theories of how we think are where medicine was when we attributed our dysfunctions to "bad humors" or when we believed we were possessed by demons.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It seems to be out of stock on Amazon today?

http://www.amazon.com/How-We-Know-Harry-Binswanger/dp/0985640618

Wonder why there are no reviews on Amazon?

Wonder why there is no kindle version?

Wonder why it is not available for sale on Harry's email list site?

http://www.hblist.com/

I guess his marketing strategy is to make it hard to get.

PS: It seems to be available directly from Harry for $39.99 with FS.

http://www.how-we-know.com/

http://www.tofpublications.com/

But his web pages are rather hard to find with search engines due to lack of SEO.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

He makes some references to these topics.

He "mentions" some of these topics? Why am I underwhelmed. The problem of how we know is precisely the problem of how our brains work, right down to the molecular level. Our brains are squooshy electrochemical machines. To know how we know we must know our brains and their workings in detail.

When scientists apply the scientific method (theory --> prediction), do they need to know at the electrochemical level how their brains work?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Baal: you might want to at least read the excerpts before making pronouncements about the book.

The excerpts are really a joy to read. Binswanger is using a velvet hammer here; very unlike what lapsed (and actual) Objectivists are used to reading.

Too bad all philosophy and/or theology weren't written so clearly. Too bad all Objectivist philosophers didn't write so evenly.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

How much neorophysiology is in his work? A lot. A little. None. Some??? If none or a little it is worthless. The way to know how we know is to study the brain in its natural mode of operation.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Ba'al, neurophysiology (the study of the brain and the nervous system) is not epistemology (the study of how we know), any more than auto mechanics or the study of internal combustion engines is driver's education--or than genetics or cellular biology is sex education--or than number theory or set theory is arithmetic. To know *how* to do those things, you need epistemology, driver's education, sex education, and arithmetic -- not neurophysiology.

It's absurd to say that a *description* of how we know is not a description of *how we know.*

Aristotle's Organon was not worthless. Nor was Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.

Knowledge of the brain processes, including the neurology and neurochemistry &c of the brain during cognition, is very worthwhile to pursue, and may someday be the basis of fixing the brains of people who have lost (or never acquired) the ability to know well. But it is not what we teach people *so that* they can know well.

I'm supposed to get my copy of Binswanger's book tomorrow. I have my own agenda in wanting to read it, but it is not to criticize it for "failing" to be sufficiently grounded in physical or biological science.

REB

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Ba'al, neurophysiology (the study of the brain and the nervous system) is not epistemology (the study of how we know), any more than auto mechanics or the study of internal combustion engines is driver's education--or than genetics or cellular biology is sex education--or than number theory or set theory is arithmetic. To know *how* to do those things, you need epistemology, driver's education, sex education, and arithmetic -- not neurophysiology.

Well said, except for including "number theory" (link).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

You don't need number theory in order to know how to do arithmetic, do you? Nor did the ancient Greeks, Egyptians, or Babylonians, did they? Didn't they discover arithmetic and codify it in a more or less experiential and inductive way?

I don't recall studying number theory in the lower elementary grades. I more or less discovered it as a senior in high school, when I was wondering what might lie on beyond algebra, geometry, and trigonometry and started perusing what few advanced math books we had in our school library.

REB

Link to comment
Share on other sites

I'm not dissing number theory, nor any of the other scientific disciplines I mentioned (except set theory). I *love* number theory.

If you're saying, Merlin, that it's analogous in its relation to arithmetic to epistemology's relation to our knowing in general -- sort of a "How We Compute" -- I could accept that, with some clarification from you. So, please enlighten me, if you would.

REB

Link to comment
Share on other sites

How much neorophysiology is in his work? A lot. A little. None. Some??? If none or a little it is worthless. The way to know how we know is to study the brain in its natural mode of operation.

Ba'al Chatzaf

How do you know this?

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Roger, I see two kinds of positions in your post #10. 1. X and Y are two very different topics. 2. One doesn't need to know X in order to write about or do Y. For X=number theory and Y=arithmetic, I agree with #2 but not with #1. Both number theory and arithmetic are about the relations of numbers, and as the page linked in #11 says, "The older term for number theory is arithmetic."

Link to comment
Share on other sites

How do you know this?

David,

Spontaneously activated meat running a self-contained temporary system?

:smile:

Not my view. Just guessing...

:smile:

Michael

Ha!

It fascinates me that Baal essentially believes we are advanced amoebas with trousers on...

Link to comment
Share on other sites

How much neorophysiology is in his work? A lot. A little. None. Some??? If none or a little it is worthless. The way to know how we know is to study the brain in its natural mode of operation.

Ba'al Chatzaf

How do you know this?

It is obvious. My brain knows what is it doing and it tells the rest of me.

I am making the assumption most people know what they know because their brain is doing what it is doing.

Pop Psyche has been around since at least the time of Aristotle. That is about 2300 years. We have most of what we know about knowing in that list 100 years without a smidgin of Aristotelian psychology or metaphysics. That sort of tells me 2200 years were wasted.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Ha!

It fascinates me that Baal essentially believes we are advanced amoebas with trousers on...

David,

That's the materialistism end. On the other end (philosophy or mind), Robert Bidinotto used to criticize over-rationalistic Objectivists for believing we are premises with feet.

But even if we combine the two, all we get are barefoot advanced amoebas decked out in premises and trousers.

:)

Michael

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Ha!

It fascinates me that Baal essentially believes we are advanced amoebas with trousers on...

Who also ride bicycles and run particle accelerators too.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Got the book and its pretty good. (I’m on page 150.)
The tone is actually surprising. Although he disagrees with other views, it’s not in the snarky tone of something like OPAR.
He generally says “Rand” and not “Ayn Rand,” which was quite a relief.
No mention of Branden, Kelley or any published criticisisms of Rand. I guess that’s not a surprise.
The price keeps bouncing around on Amazon. I got mine at 38 but I saw it the other day as low as 28. Today it’s 31.

To me, the only relevant question is, is there anything of substance that is new in Binswanger's book? Is it just a retelling of Rand's ideas, or does it expand on them? Does it disagree with her in any way or correct any of her errors? Does it show any awareness of criticism of Rand's views? If it doesn't address the existence of criticisms directly (so as not to "sanction" them or give them attention), does it at least pretend to image what possible criticisms people might come up with, and then address them "preemptively"?

J

Link to comment
Share on other sites

It seems pretty much a retelling, but he goes beyond Rand. For example the discussion of direct realism is much more developed than Rand. There is a chapter on propositions, which is Binswanger's own theory. He says Rand was thinking of writing ITOE II: Propositions. I hadn't heard that before.

I was a little disappointed that he didn't make much of an effort to prove that Rand's theory of concept formation is true.

Link to comment
Share on other sites

The measurement account of similarity and comparative similarity showcased by Rand, then her theory of concepts as by measurement omissions are covered on pages 110–28. Binswanger counts ordinal rankings as a form of measurement, like Rand, and like I with Suppes et al., contra you with Michell. Binswanger uses my well-known physical example of scratch-hardness for his illustration of ordinal measurement. There is here no sophisticated treatment of measurement, such as the JARS writings by me or you on measurement and its incorporation into Rand’s theory of concepts. That’s not the level at which the book is pitched.

Use of the physical example of scratch-hardness speaks an understanding of ordinal measurement an inch improved over Rand’s understanding back in the day; she was stuck on mentality and valuation as sole realm of ordinal scaling. Binswanger does not continue, as I did not continue, Rand’s presumption that with enough understanding, all measurement of a magnitude can be brought under ratio-scaling; that use of other scaling is a reflection only of our ignorance. However, Binswanger does not go so far as to adopt my 2004 embrace of there being different types of magnitude structures to which scales must be appropriate (which I took from modern measurement theory and from the concept of appropriate mathematization in mathematical physics – Geroch).

Link to comment
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!

Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.

Sign In Now