Another view of Leonard Peikoff


Paul Mawdsley

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I stumbled across this review of Leonard Peikoff's Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand by Nicholas Dykes. I have not read the book but Nick's assessment of Peikoff's place in the Objectivist movement, and of Peikoff's contribution to Objectivism, fits my own sense of things. I haven't been able to stomach the idea of reading Peikoff since I read Ominous Parallels over 20 years ago (it was required reading in Ridpath's course).

For me, the spirit of the principles of Objectivism continue through Nathaniel Branden's work (I am not familiar with David Kelly's), not with Peikoff. Branden takes Objectivist principles into new territory. I also like what I see with Chris Sciabarra's work integrating dialectics with Objectivism (though I have only read a couple of essays I have found online). Peikoff has always struck me as a puppet, controlled by the principles of Objectivism, but lacking the passion and creativity that comes with an authentic and personal vision. I base this on very little information (I guess some of my perspective came from Barbara's and Nathaniel's books) but I find it interesting that Nick's review supports my sense of things.

Paul

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I stumbled across this review of Leonard Peikoff's Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand by Nicholas Dykes. I have not read the book but Nick's assessment of Peikoff's place in the Objectivist movement, and of Peikoff's contribution to Objectivism, fits my own sense of things. I haven't been able to stomach the idea of reading Peikoff since I read Ominous Parallels over 20 years ago (it was required reading in Ridpath's course).

For me, the spirit of the principles of Objectivism continue through Nathaniel Branden's work (I am not familiar with David Kelly's), not with Peikoff. Branden takes Objectivist principles into new territory. I also like what I see with Chris Sciabarra's work integrating dialectics with Objectivism (though I have only read a couple of essays I have found online). Peikoff has always struck me as a puppet, controlled by the principles of Objectivism, but lacking the passion and creativity that comes with an authentic and personal vision. I base this on very little information (I guess some of my perspective came from Barbara's and Nathaniel's books) but I find it interesting that Nick's review supports my sense of things.

Paul

David Kelley's main work (in relation to Objectivism) is -The Evidence of the Senses-. Kelley makes a strong case that when we perceive, we perceive actual objects Out There and not mind made representations of what is Out There.

Kelley is a genuine PhD in philosophy and did his thesis under Rortey. His book -Evidence of the Senses- is in the tradition of Ontological Realism. The book is NOT an easy read. It is very detailed, closely reasoned and heavily footnoted.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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.......puppet, controlled by the principles of Objectivism, but lacking the passion and creativity that comes with an authentic and personal vision. I base this on very little information (I guess some of my perspective came from Barbara's and Nathaniel's books) but I find it interesting that Nick's review supports my sense of things.

Paul

The word "hack" comes readily to mind. I had two encounters is Pope Leonard on the David Brudnoy talk show several years ago. I was, to say the least, underwhelmed and somewhat appalled.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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I think David Ramsey Steele was quoted in Walker's book to the effect that "if Peikoff has seriously wrestled with a philosophic problem since graudate school, there is no evidence of it here [in OPAR]."

I'll quote myself concerning one example of Peikoff's scholarship:

(Quote: Parille) Objectivists make frequent use of what they call the “stolen concept fallacy.” According to Peikoff, “The ‘stolen concept’ fallacy, first identified by Ayn Rand, is the fallacy of using a concept while denying the validity of its genetic roots, i.e, of an earlier concept(s) on which it logically depends.” He explains in more detail:

“Observe that Descartes starts his system by using ‘error’ and its synonyms or derivatives as ‘stolen concepts.’"

“Men have been wrong, and therefore, he implies, they can never know what is right. But if they cannot, how did they ever discover that they were wrong? How can one form such concepts as ‘mistake’ or ‘error’ while wholly ignorant of what is correct? ‘Error’ signifies a departure from truth; the concept of ‘error’ logically presupposes that one has already grasped some truth. If truth were unknowable, as Descartes implies, the idea of a departure from it would be meaningless.”

“The same point applies to concepts denoting specific forms of error. If we cannot ever be certain that an argument is logically valid, if validity is unknowable, then the concept of ‘invalid’ reasoning is impossible to reach or apply. If we cannot ever know that a man is sane, then the concept of ‘insanity’ is impossible to form or define. If we cannot recognize the state of being awake, then we cannot recognize or conceptualize a state of not being awake (such as dreaming). If man cannot grasp X, then ‘non-X’ stands for nothing.”

(Binswanger, ed., Ayn Rand Lexicon, pp. 478-79)

Wilhelmsen’s description of this “fallacy” is almost identical. He writes:

“At this point the idealist and the skeptic . . . usually advance the problem of hallucinations, pathological sense states, and dreams. Because there are false perceptions such as hallucinations, so goes the objection, I could never be certain that there were any true perceptions. How can I know that what I perceive really does exist and that I am not dreaming or imagining, etc. This position . . . . is a painful sophistry. How can I even speak of false perceptions unless I can measure their falsity by a true perception? . . . . The fact that I can even raise the problem of false perceptions indicates that there are true perceptions and I know them to be true. The false can only be measured by the true.” (Wilhelmsen, Man’s Knowledge of Reality, pp. 31-32.)

The stolen concept fallacy didn’t begin with Wilhelmsen either. He acknowledges his indebtedness to a 1947 work of Etienne Gilson (1884-1978).

Rand didn't "first identif[y]" the stolen concept fallacy, and I'm sure Peikoff knows better.

-NEIL

____

Edited by Neil Parille
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Neil, this remark which you quote from someone named Wilhelmsen is an -instance- of identifying and critiquing a *particular* stolen concept : "the problem of hallucinations, pathological sense states, and dreams. Because there are false perceptions such as hallucinations, so goes the objection, I could never be certain that there were any true perceptions. . . . . The fact that I can even raise the problem of false perceptions indicates that there are true perceptions and I know them to be true".

But grasping the mistake in one case, is not the same as identifying the fact that this is a general mistake and naming it.

So, based on just this one identification, you are not justified in saying "Rand didn't "first identif[y]" the stolen concept fallacy".

And, to be fair to Peikoff and Binswanger, I'm not quite sure why you say "I'm sure Peikoff knows better". Is "Wilhelmsen" a major figure? Are they supposed to comb through every statement by every thinker in history to be sure no one every said anything which even -resembles- a logical fallacy of this nature? Has it been identified in logic textbooks that everyone including P and B should have read or known about?

.......

I make the same comment to you that I made to Roger Bissell on another issue this week:

In your disenchantment with "Orthodox" Objectivism (or maybe even Objectivism as a whole), identify and mostly stick to the MAJOR ISSUES where you think it is wrong. As opposed to giving the sense that you - or he or others - may be combing through the whole history of ideas to find anyone who anticipated any statement or terminology or formulation or aspect of Rand’s as a tool to discredit her or her popularizers and explainers. No matter how peripheral or (comparatively) small.

Above all, bend over backwards to be fair to and offer charitable readings. Even to your opponents or to those you feel antipathy toward or wish to discredit.

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Phil,

Wilhelmsen gives a couple other examples (the concept of truth and the existence of the external world) where he uses this type of argument, so I'm sure he thought it was all of a piece. After all, in the excerpt I quoted, he said "[t]he false can only be measured by the true," which is pretty much how Peikoff describes the stolen concept fallacy.

If you want to say that Rand first called "presupposing what you deny" the "stolen concept fallacy" then I'll grant you she was the first.

I have no idea how well-known Wilhelmsen was, but Gilson (whom he cites) certainly was famous (even Rand read him). Since Gilson was one of the twentieth century's best-known Aristoteleans, I think Peikoff must have read him.

-NEIL

___

Edited by Neil Parille
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> Since Gilson was one of the twentieth century's best-known Aristoteleans, I think Peikoff must have read him. [Neil]

That's a bit of a stretch.

Next, we move from Mr. W's additional (uncited) passages to Mr. Gilson. . . .

And I also note you haven't quoted where Gilson -states- the actual stolen concept doctrine (not merely something vaguely similar or consistent on -some- aspects).

Unless we are supposed to take your word for it? And add it, uncorroborated, to our mental list of instance where someone claims Rand/Peikoff borrowed some major insight and didn't give credit?

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Phil,

I have the Gilson book cited, but it isn't handy.

These types of arguments are so common that I don't think it's possible that Peikoff never heard of them. Fred Seddon says somewhere that (as I recall) Augustine made a similar argument and that the "stolen concept fallacy" may have entered the Objectivist world by Nathaniel Branden.

-NEIL

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Phil,

BTW, I'm not saying that Rand (or Branden) got the idea from Gilson or Willhelmsen or whomever. Maybe Rand came up with it all on her own. However, the idea isn't original to her and she wasn't the first to come up with it.

Interesting point Chris.

-NEIL

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> the idea isn't original to her and she wasn't the first to come up with it.

Just repeating your claim isn't a demonstration. The 'stolen concept fallacy' has several elements to it, is very precise, and integrates a number of issues. Plus the breadth of applicability - your quote from Mr. W doesn't sound as if he appreciated that.

Your breezy and somewhat omniscient claim that it is 'common' is strange -- still sounds like "hand waving". Someone is asked for proof and he seems to be saying "Oh, it's just so common I don't even have to offer any."

Are you an expert in epistemology? And also widely read in all the previous thinkers who might have commented on an issue such as this?

There ought to be a fallacy named for hand waving.

Sorry, Neil.

No sale yet. B)

But I certainly don't deny the *possiblity* -- given the shameful unwillingness of Rand and Peikoff to name *any* sources (or precursors) other than Aristotle for almost anything.

And you're certainly free to offer a smoking gun, when and if you find where you misplaced your artillery. :)

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I remember that the Wilhemsen book was recommend by NBI in the 60ths.

Chris, I believe you must be thinking of the history of philosophy book by Wilhelm Windelband.

Wilhemsen (sp?) is a new name to me. It does not ring a bell from any of my reading, let alone my O'ist reading.

REB

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Roger; You are probably right.

This is not actually on point but I remember being told that Kant had anticipating Branden's knowledge argument for free will. The argument that without free will no knowledge is possible.

Edited by Chris Grieb
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Leonard Peikoff's book has its limitations but Dykes' review is overboard. Peikoff's book is meant to be a summary and exposition/clarification of Rand's works, not a review, examination or analysis of her philosophy. In this respect, he does reasonably well in some places and not so well in others. I have read about half the book, and I must say that it has helped me understand a number of concepts that I did not understand very well after having read most of Rand's non-fiction (not including her journal articles). Some of it is a boring rehash of things that I had read in her books, following her exposition almost word for word. In other places, he is dismissive of opponents and some things are either not well understood by him or were never well understood by Rand in the first place.

Now to Dykes review:

In fact no biographical information about Rand is provided whatsoever. Her education during and after the Bolshevik revolution in Russia; her carefully contrived escape; her arrival in the United States as a penniless immigrant with barely a word of English; her bitterness at the lack of respect accorded her by the American intellectual establishment after her dramatic success: all these experiences coloured her thought, style and behaviour, and should therefore feature in a discussion of her ideas.

All that information would be interesting and useful, but that was not the purpose of Peikoff's book, as stated above.

It seems like the thing that really got Dykes was Peikoff's out-of-hand dismissal of anarchy as a viable political system. One wonders whether that is one of Dykes' pet projects, so to speak. There are good reasons for dismissing anarchy, some of which were alluded to by Peikoff. Dykes apparent disagreement with that view are not a good reason for lambasting Peikoff's book, yet one wonders whether that view clouded Dykes' opinion of the entire book.

Darrell

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Seconding what Coates and others have said - that other philosophers pointed out instances of the stolen concept before Rand, but but she identified the pattern - the most famous example is Aristotle's defense of the law of contradiction in Metaphysics Gamma, which she quotes in the last chapter of Atlas Shrugged. As I vaguely recall, Locke, too, did this in his attack on innate ideas. Wittgenstein's On Certainty was at least a few years before Rand.

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Neil,

In your quotation from David Ramsay Steele's review, above, the quotation from Leonard Peikoff about the stolen concept is an example of good old-fashioned airbrushing.

The definition of "stolen concept" is very similar to the one given by Nathaniel Branden in his article on that topic, but, of course, the article is uncitable from Dr. Peikoff's standpoint.

The notion of the stolen concept has obvious predecessors. It would take some digging to determine whether someone stated it in general form before Dr. Branden did—in fact, it would make a good research question. (I don't think it's a good idea to attribute parts of the Objectivist corpus to Ayn Rand if she did not publish them in her lifetime; it serves the interests of the orthodox to maintain that Ayn Rand spoke, and others merely took notes, but in fact she left much of the work of systematizing Objectivism to others.)

Robert Campbell

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As a recently joined member, I'm not sure what the etiquette is on OL, but I'd just like to point out to Darrell that I'm usually Nicholas or Nick among friends.

I also think one should in general be a bit more cautious about accusations of biased writing or prejudice. My review of Peikoff's book was one of the early things I wrote after a long absence from O'ism. I would probably write it very differently today. However, I think my criticisms were fair. If you'll excuse the name-dropping, David Kelley certainly thought so, he wrote to me on the matter at the time. I also think I was fair to Peikoff. His book is an excellent summary of Rand's thought and a very useful reference book. I would recommend it to Paul and to anybody else.

As to anarchism, calling it a form of statism popularised by Karl Marx, as Peikoff did, is remarkably silly. I said so then and think so now. My judgement had nothing to do with any convictions of my own. When I wrote the Peikoff review I had not long started to read about anarchism and had no convictions about it, merely that sense of excitement which comes to all explorers when they come across something new. As it was, at the time, I was too busy exploring the work of Karl Popper -- about whom I published a major study in 1996 -- to think about anarchism.

If Darrell or anybody else would like a debate, I've been waiting ten years for an O'ist to tell me what is wrong with my essay 'Mrs Logic and the Law'. I love Ayn Rand, and have done since 1963. But love and admiration should not stop one from thinking.

One last point, I suffer from chronic pain due to a medical mistake. Managing the pain absorbs a lot of energy. I mention this merely to apologise for the over-critical tone, or sharpness, which sometimes creeps into my writing unawares.

Nicholas (Dykes)

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Note on #16:

Rand introduced the phrase at fair length in Galt's radio speech. Branden himself had devoted a lecture in his Basic Principles course before his Objectivist Newsletter article.

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Neil,

In your quotation from David Ramsay Steele's review, above, the quotation from Leonard Peikoff about the stolen concept is an example of good old-fashioned airbrushing.

The definition of "stolen concept" is very similar to the one given by Nathaniel Branden in his article on that topic, but, of course, the article is uncitable from Dr. Peikoff's standpoint.

The notion of the stolen concept has obvious predecessors. It would take some digging to determine whether someone stated it in general form before Dr. Branden did—in fact, it would make a good research question. (I don't think it's a good idea to attribute parts of the Objectivist corpus to Ayn Rand if she did not publish them in her lifetime; it serves the interests of the orthodox to maintain that Ayn Rand spoke, and others merely took notes, but in fact she left much of the work of systematizing Objectivism to others.)

Robert Campbell

The first mention I have found by Ayn Rand of the "stolen concept" fallacy is in her journal entry of June 20, 1958, where she is making notes for a book (never written) on Objectivism. She wrote:

The philosophy which I now will have to present is, in essence, the "rules of thinking" which children should be taught in the proper society (which the Wet Nurse needed). It is fundamental epistemology--plus psychological "epistemology."....Mankind as a whole seems to be caught in the trap of the natur eof its own epistemology: men cannot think until they have acquired the power of abstractions and language, but having one so, they do not know how they got there and are vulnerable to any attack on their means of knowledge. Like the disovery of "A is A," their epistemology is implicit in their thinking, but unidentified. This will be the main part of my job: my theory of universals--the hierarchical nature of concepts--the "stolen concept" fallacy--the "context-dropping" and the "blank-out" (the refusal to identify)--the "Rand's Razor" ("state your irreducible primaries")--the rules of induction (and definitions)--the "integration into the total sum of your knowledge"--the proof that "that which is empirically impossible is also logically impossible (or false)"--etc.

She elaborated on the "stolen concept" fallacy a bit in her journal entry of December 15, 1960.

Re: fallacies. The two most important fallacies which I must define thoroughly are, in effect, extensions of two of the fallacies defined by Aristotle: "context-dropping" is really the wider (and more modern) name for Aristotle's "ignoratio elenchi"; and "the stolen concept" is the other wide, the reverse, of "petitio principii." If this last is "begging the question" or "assuming that which you are attempting to prove," then "the stolen concept" is "begging the answer" or "assuming that which yuou are attempting to disprove." (Many instances of "the stolen concept" are, in fact, instances of "petitio principii," such as [bertrand] Russell's attempt to derive the concept "unit" from [the concept] "group," which, throughout the whole reasoning, presupposes knowledge of the concept "unit." But such instances are merely fraudulent attempts to prove something; the most important part of "the stolen concept" is its application to the fraudulent attempts to disprove something, particularly to disprove basic axioms. This is the worst of the fallacies in modern philosophy.

Now, we might want to quibble over whether these journal entries preceded, or anteceded, or were contemporaneous with Nathaniel Branden's lecture material on the Stolen Concept, which he first formulated probably in 1958. However, I think that the clear source of ~all~ of this is not Nathaniel's lectures or articles, but Galt's Speech in Atlas Shrugged. The following passage is replete with examples of the fallacy, as well as the rudiments or essential elements of the definition Branden later offers in his lectures and his article for the Objectivist Newsletter.

As they [i.e., the mystics of muscle] feed on stolen wealth in body, so they feed on stolen concepts in mind, and proclaim that honesty consists of refusing to know that one is stealing. As they use effects while denying causes, so they use our concepts while denying the roots and the existence of the concepts they are using. As they seek, not to build, but to
take over
industrial plants, so they seek, not to think, but to
take over
human thinking.

As they proclaim that the only requirement for running a factory is the ability to turn the cranks of the machines, and blank out the question of who created the factory--so they proclaim that there are no entities, that nothing exists but motion, and blank out the fact that
motion
presupposes the thing which moves, that without the concept of entity, there can be no such concept as 'motion.' As they proclaim their right to consume the unearned, and blank out the question of who's to produce it--so they proclaim that there is no law of identity, that nothing exists but change, and blank out the fact that change presupposes the concepts of what changes, from what and to what, that without the law of identity no change is possible. As they rob an industrialist while denying his value, so they seek to seize power over all of existence while denying that existence exists.

'We know that we know nothing,' they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are claiming knowledge--'There are no absolutes,' they chatter, blanking out the fact that they are uttering an absolute--'You cannot
prove
that you exist or that you're conscious,' they chatter, blanking out the fact that
proof
presupposes existence, consciousness, and a complex chain of knowledge: the existence of something to know, of a consciousness able to know it, and of a knowledge that has learned to distinguish between such concepts as the proved and the unproved.

When a savage who has not learned to speak declares that existence must be proved, he is asking you to prove it by means of non-existence--when he declares that your consciousness must be proved, he is asking you to prove it by means of unconsciousness--he is asking you to step into a void outside of existence and consciousness to give him proof of both--he is asking you to become a zero gaining knowledge about a zero.

When he declares that an axiom is a matter of arbitrary choice, and he doesn't choose to accept the axiom that he exists, he blanks out the fact that he has accepted it by uttering that sentence, that the only way to reject it is to shut one's mouth, expound no theories, and die.

An axiom is a statement that identifies the base of knowledge and of any further statement pertaining to that knowledge, a statement necessarily contained in all others, whether any particular speaker chooses to identify it or not. An axiom is a proposition that defeats its opponents by the fact that they have to accept it and use it in the process of any attempt to deny it. Let the caveman who does not choose to accept the axiom of identity, present his theory without using the concept of identity or any concept derived from it--let the anthropoid who does not choose to accept the existence of nouns, try to devise a language without nouns, adjectives, or adverbs--let the witch-doctor who does not choose to accept the validity of sensory perception, try to prove it without using the data he obtained by sensory perception--let the head-hunter who does not choose to accept the validity of logic, try to prove it without using logic--let the pygmy who proclaims that a skyscraper needs no foundation after it reaches its fiftieth story, yank the base from under
his
building, not yours--let the cannibal who snarls that the freedom of man's mind was needed to
create
an industrial civilization, but not to
maintain
it, be given an arrowhead and bearskin, not a university chair of economics. [pp. 955-7]

This is first-rate, kick-ass stuff. Yay, Rand! :cheer:

So, while Rand did not write a rigorous essay on the Stolen Concept fallacy, it's clear to me that she--not Branden--was the person who coined the name for the fallacy and first discussed it publicly (with examples).

REB

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I want to mention that when Leonard Peikoff began to work in 1968 on "The Ominous Parallels" there were great predictions by certain DC Objectivists that that book would sweep the world for Objectivism. It was also predicated it would be out within a year.

Fourteen years later it was published. I must also add that from my memory of the four lecture course that Leonard taught in 1968 that was little new material in the book itself.

I have heard stories that Ayn Rand was never satisfied with the book which lead to the long delay.

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Peikoff said in OPAR that he was working on a book on advanced epistemology. Based on his track record, I wonder if the DIM book will appear.

I'm not sure why he didn't write his lecture courses with an eye toward turning them into books. Tons of books have started as lectures (the Gifford Lectures for example).

-NEIL

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> I'm not sure why he didn't write his lecture courses with an eye toward turning them into books. Tons of books have started as lectures

Excellent point, Neil!

This has long been a major mistake on his part (not just Leonard, but same thing applies to many other Oists than him: hiding their light under a tape recorder.)

I remember asking him about this at his house in Laguna in the mid-80's after a seminar on thinking or communication [i forget which]. He just said something to the effect of, do you realize how -long- that would take to edit it to convert from informal/oral to formal/written. I think I might have said [at least I would now], well, just label it as 'informal transcript' but he didn't really want to pursue the issue. (And then his many nuggets of good stuff, his humorous informal way of discussing logic, grammar, history of philosophy, great plays would be known to everyone who is a 'Peikoff critic' but hasn't been exposed.)

The other advantage is getting credit: People might learn something from Peikoff verbally and then ten years later, it's gotten encrusted over, and without cold, hard print, you don't remember which came from you and which from him...and you don't give sufficient credit (or untangle the exact amount of credit.)

I suspect OPAR would have benefited if he had previously turned a number of lectures into books, or at least anthologies, or at least articles. Smoothing out rough edge of prose style...transtition from lecturer to writer.

Different skills, in some respects.

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I remember asking [Peikoff] about this at his house in Laguna in the mid-80's after a seminar on thinking or communication [i forget which]. He just said something to the effect of, do you realize how -long- that would take to edit it to convert from informal/oral to formal/written. I think I might have said [at least I would now], well, just label it as 'informal transcript' but he didn't really want to pursue the issue.

This is one of those things about the pedagogy of Objectivism that I do not understand. Leave the teachings available only in tape/CD form because it will take too much time and effort to render it into print form? What a feeble rejoinder -- if the lectures give a deeper, deepest, profounderest understanding of Objectivism, and are valuable in their own right, then why not shunt some of the ARI budget towards putting them into a form that is, um, standard?

This aural tradition is one of those things that strikes me as bizarre. A lecture can be turned into a book without a lot of deadly squirming and horrifying labour if the original text is good (or if the work is planned for book releases, as with Canada's Massey Lectures**).

Consider another philosopher I have mentioned here before, Susan Haack. One of her books is mostly a collection of essays rendered from varied academic & conference presentations.

Surely Peikoff has a few lectures that are crisp, thoughtful and coherent, maybe enough to tidy up and put between covers? This is supposed to be a world class intellectual. What the heck is wrong with his talks that you can't remove the ahs and ums and coughs and take it to press with some further revisions? Is there some awful secret here that I am not aware of -- that he doesn't speak in complete sentences, or is unable to marshal an argument that could be translated to paper? Crikey.

Mind you, if it takes Peikoff 20 years to get a book out, one can imagine how long it would take to tidy up his lectures for publication.

Think of the area in the library devoted to Rand and Randian works -- no library I have yet seen purchases recordings and shelves them alongside the corpus. Some possible reasons why: they are too expensive, they are not packaged or promoted to libraries, they are more like scriptural commentary than original materials -- only for devotees.

This reminds me of the 1200 dollars one is expected to spend for David Harriman's high-school physics lectures -- " . . . a one-of-a-kind science teaching methodology available in no other course or textbook."

Blargh

That said, I can commend the mucky-mucks at Mount Ari for some of the content at their newish site. The aural delights include a selection of Rand's Ford Hall speeches and Q&As (which makes me wonder - how many of these made it into print?).

And there are strange and wonderful podcasts from the good doctor. I am a regular listener, even though he has become a braying, hooting caricature of a public speaker (or maybe because he has become a braying, hooting caricature -- has no one ever suggested to him that he get voice coaching to smooth out his delivery? It worked for Preston Manning and Margaret Thatcher).

__________

** The Massey Lectures are superbly recorded for broadcast, and many of them are availabe in CD as well as book form in addition to online archives at the CBC.

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William,

In the blurb for Peikoff's course Induction in Philosophy and Physics, we are told

These historic lectures present, for the first time, the solution to the problem of induction—and thereby complete, in every essential respect, the validation of reason.

Shouldn't such an epoch making discovery be published? I think Peikoff and Harriman were working on a book about this, but Peikoff has apparently dropped out of this project.

-NEIL

____

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William,

In the blurb for Peikoff's course Induction in Philosophy and Physics, we are told

These historic lectures present, for the first time, the solution to the problem of induction—and thereby complete, in every essential respect, the validation of reason.

Shouldn't such an epoch making discovery be published? I think Peikoff and Harriman were working on a book about this, but Peikoff has apparently dropped out of this project.

-NEIL

____

I am curious how L.P. could claim induction is a valid mode of reasoning (correct in every instance) when it is not. The discovery of white crows, black swans and the falsification of the the caloric theory of heat is sufficient to show that induction on a finite set of facts sometimes leads to hypotheses which are not generally true.

Induction is a nifty way of producing general hypotheses from particular facts, but there is no guarantee that these hyp;otheses (general statements) are true. Induction and Abduction are the among the means we have to get beyond a finite collection of facts. They are essential for the discovery phase of science. But neither are guaranteed to produce generally true hypotheses.

In effect, L.P. has "proved" that the square root of two is rational, which it is not. The general logical invalidity of induction has been known for hundreds of years (at least) and certainly since the time of David Hume.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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