Why Science Matters

[syrakusos]

How come the students of Einstein do not bomb the Bierstuben where Heisenberg's students hang out?

Michael,

Unfortunately, go broad and metaphorical a little and this happens all too often.

Get a bloody dictator to pay wages and grants to a "student of Einstein" and said student will invent massively destructive weapons, enhanced delivery mechanisms to increase mass death, delivery routines and procedures to make the intended death reliable, and, if needed, will help in the delivering.

A "student of Einstein" is easily capable of wreaking far more death than any suicide bomber. And some do.

That's an improvement over "savages" who try to follow a fictional storyline?

Michael

I was not being broad and metaphorical, but explicit and factual. I bring this there to Objectivist Ethics because small-o objectivism is the scientific method of rational-empiricism. Ayn Rand's Capital-O Objectivism is the best formulation and extension of the scientific method.

As Ayn Rand asserted about classical Greece, the Renaissance, and American capitalism, the commonly accepted scientific method is not a fully consistent Objectivism. We are dismayed when scientists such as Richard Dawkins, Richard Feynman, and Carl Sagan endorse wrongheaded political ideas. The fact remains that ethically, the culture of science is compatible and consonant with the merchant ethos of reason, fact, honesty, integrity, and (significantly) a laissez-faire willingness to let other people go their own way when we cannot agree.

The use of force is prohibited to scientists and merchants. It is allowed, encouraged, justified, and advocated for both religion and politics. Faith and force are complementary. Neither has any place in science.

That is why physicists argued the Copenhagen model without resorting to murder and martyrdom. Even the worst cases in science, such as the rejection of continental drift, involved no imprisonments or executions. Even when Thomas Edison propagandized against alternating current, he killed dogs, not other engineers.

Would a scientist who followed a fully consistent objectivist morality work for a dictator? We like to say no. We want other people to find the prospect so horrible that they would rather die - or at least work as trash collectors. On the Galt's Gulch board, as a point for discussion, I once suggested that we should shun anyone who works for the government. I got an immediate reply from someone who works for an appellate court whose judge upholds the Constitution (or so it was said). Ultimately, what if you were a bright kid in North Korea, given the "hunger games" opportunity to work at some research facility - and how is that essentially different from being a public school teacher in America?

My reply to the paragraph above, is that you can judge them as you choose, but you cannot make the choice for them.

Those contrary arguments only place limits on the general truth that the scientific method of rational-empiricism - objectivism; and Objectivism - is a better ethos, with a better outcome.

[BaalChatzaf]

How come the students of Einstein do not bomb the Bierstuben where Heisenberg's students hang out?

Michael,

Unfortunately, go broad and metaphorical a little and this happens all too often.

Get a bloody dictator to pay wages and grants to a "student of Einstein" and said student will invent massively destructive weapons, enhanced delivery mechanisms to increase mass death, delivery routines and procedures to make the intended death reliable, and, if needed, will help in the delivering.

A "student of Einstein" is easily capable of wreaking far more death than any suicide bomber. And some do.

That's an improvement over "savages" who try to follow a fictional storyline?

Michael

I was not being broad and metaphorical, but explicit and factual. I bring this there to Objectivist Ethics because small-o objectivism is the scientific method of rational-empiricism. Ayn Rand's Capital-O Objectivism is the best formulation and extension of the scientific method.

As Ayn Rand asserted about classical Greece, the Renaissance, and American capitalism, the commonly accepted scientific method is not a fully consistent Objectivism. We are dismayed when scientists such as Richard Dawkins, Richard Feynman, and Carl Sagan endorse wrongheaded political ideas. The fact remains that ethically, the culture of science is compatible and consonant with the merchant ethos of reason, fact, honesty, integrity, and (significantly) a laissez-faire willingness to let other people go their own way when we cannot agree.

The use of force is prohibited to scientists and merchants. It is allowed, encouraged, justified, and advocated for both religion and politics. Faith and force are complementary. Neither has any place in science.

That is why physicists argued the Copenhagen model without resorting to murder and martyrdom. Even the worst cases in science, such as the rejection of continental drift, involved no imprisonments or executions. Even when Thomas Edison propagandized against alternating current, he killed dogs, not other engineers.

Would a scientist who followed a fully consistent objectivist morality work for a dictator? We like to say no. We want other people to find the prospect so horrible that they would rather die - or at least work as trash collectors. On the Galt's Gulch board, as a point for discussion, I once suggested that we should shun anyone who works for the government. I got an immediate reply from someone who works for an appellate court whose judge upholds the Constitution (or so it was said). Ultimately, what if you were a bright kid in North Korea, given the "hunger games" opportunity to work at some research facility - and how is that essentially different from being a public school teacher in America?

My reply to the paragraph above, is that you can judge them as you choose, but you cannot make the choice for them.

Those contrary arguments only place limits on the general truth that the scientific method of rational-empiricism - objectivism; and Objectivism - is a better ethos, with a better outcome.

One has to live. Therefore one make the most comfortable deal with the Devil that one can.

[Brant Gaede]

One has to live. Therefore one make the most comfortable deal with the Devil that one can.

Sounds like a profitable gig.

Where do I sign up for Devil School?

--Brant

will I have to join a union--get certified--you know, to protect the public from being bedevilled by bad devilling?

[Guyau]

Michael Marotta, this is only a detail, but why do you say the rejection of continental drift was among “worst cases” in science. When I took a geology course in the late ’60’s, the conjecture was not in our textbook as I recall, but our professor introduced us to the proposal. The status portrayed was as a conjecture with growing evidence, which as you know continued to grow and brought the thesis to becoming accepted as fact of geological history in the profession. Are you saying that that status was delayed by some sort of unscientific or irrational resistance? Do you think a conclusive set of evidence had been available much earlier?

[syrakusos]

As so often, Stephen, you sent me back to square one. I had always accepted the general claim that Wegener was ridiculed - physically and in person - when he attempted to deliver a paper stating his theory. I find that that is just myth.

Lingering anti-German sentiment no doubt intensified the attacks, but German geologists piled on, too, scorning what they called Wegener’s “delirious ravings” and other symptoms of “moving crust disease and wandering pole plague.” The British ridiculed him for distorting the continents to make them fit and, more damningly, for not describing a credible mechanism powerful enough to move continents. At a Royal Geographical Society meeting, an audience member thanked the speaker for having blown Wegener’s theory to bits—then thanked the absent “Professor Wegener for offering himself for the explosion.”
But it was the Americans who came down hardest against continental drift. A paleontologist called it “Germanic pseudo­-science” and accused Wegener of toying with the evidence to spin himself into “a state of auto-intoxication.” (Smithsonian Magazine online here.)

The theory of continental drift goes back to the 16th century (Wikipedia here). And we might say "Well, OK, nice theory, but there was no proof." However, there was no proof that the Earth revolves on its axis and that the Earth orbits the Sun (generally), until the 1830s, even though those were accepted as scientific fact without ridicule for Copernicus, Galileo, and all of the others.

On the other hand, even though the microscope showed "animalcules" they were considered consequences of disease, not causes, until the 1850s. (In the USA John Leonard Riddell argued for the germ theory against the miasma theory. On my blog here.) As late as the 1880s, Joseph Lister had to fight for sterile surgery.

So, science is not all neat and rational - but we know that. What is missing from all of those are assassinations, persecutions, slaughters, kidnapping, and terrorism. Geologists ridiculed Wegener, but they did nothing more. That would have crossed the bounds of proper action. For religion and politics, those bounds do not exist.

[Brant Gaede]

In my freshman geology class in college ('62-'63), continental drift was posited as a possibility. You only get "worst" cases in science when science is combined with politics and a politics that is combined with religion. This religion may even be secular as in the religion of recycling and AGW. There's a lot of money bucking up this secular orientation--money which corrupts science, especially the "science" generated by academia. It's otherwise known as federal grant seeking.

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

As Ayn Rand asserted about classical Greece, the Renaissance, and American capitalism, the commonly accepted scientific method is not a fully consistent Objectivism.

Michael,

Then what are you talking about?

A science that doesn't exist?

You can't have it both ways. In one instance, you wax poetic about how science is inherently superior to religion and politics because it eschews force, then you say science doesn't exist except as an ideal.

I'm extrapolating conclusions a bit from what you say, but I like comparing things that exist against things that exist to make sure the foundation of the reasoning behind the comparisons is consistent.

On another note, the last I saw, scientists are human beings. I agree that the scientific method is to always have doubt and be open to constant testing and peer review, so force does not fit that model, but since scientists are so deeply in bed with governments, I will not let them off the hook and call them morally superior.

Others may excuse the fact that the bad guys fund them and do their dirty work when they need muscle, but I won't.

It's an appearance vs. reality thing.

What's more, I believe they know what they do.

When scientists start talking about being in charge of morality, I start worrying about eugenics and government technocrats...

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

"Proof" in science is adducing evidence for a falsifiable theory. Experiments confirm theory but do not prove it. Disproof is falsification. Technology does an excellent job of confirming science, but even then confirmation isn't the same as "proof." If they aren't quite basic and simple all scientific proofs are working propositions. When they stop failing to perform in logical extension to other applications they need serious re-examination. "Proofs" are final and science is never final so they are final only unto themselves. "Proofs" are essentially tautological. A falsifiable theory justifies their existence. The wild card is always data. The logic of a proof is very easy because it uses limited, stated data. Ironically, that data can be garbage

--Brant

that's all I "know" about this from my layman's perspective--I simply got extremely hard-nosed about "proof" and generous about data: if you change the proof-data ratio from the proof side the idea of the proof will of course have to change with it (by loosening up, but the valid data never changes--that is, more is just accumulated [although facts that turn out not to be facts are discarded; the great irony of a valid proof is the data can all be garbage])

[Guyau]

.

MM, thanks for the great link on Wegener's story. "I will accomplish it or die."

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Incidentally, I just saw a long video by Steven Pinker that illustrates why we have to keep an eye on scientists at all times when they talk about morality.

And power.

Some background. I bought Pinker's most recent book, The Sense of Style, and am around page 100 so far. This is the best book on nonfiction writing I have encountered. I like to study the same material through different inputs when I really want to nail a topic, so I am fortunate that there are several lectures online where Pinker gives a discourse on style and plugs his book. I can read and watch the same material and, hopefully, some of it will stick in this stubborn skull of mine.

(Pinker doesn't say it, but he is confining his lectures to the first three chapters--at least, the ones I have seen. There are more lectures I have not seen, so maybe he will expand in another, but I doubt it. He's telling all the same jokes with all the same pauses, asides, emotional tones, etc. It's the same across the board--and everything is straight out of his book, even the jokes and minor quips. )

But back to point. At 1:52:00 in the video, during the Q&A, a young man asked Pinker what he though about, at some time in the future, criminalizing science-denial.

Man did my ears pick up.

He actually asked about criminalizing what people think in the name of science.

To Pinker's credit, he gave a nervous laugh, said no and gave some semblance of an explanation.

But I started wondering. If science were supposed to be such a morally pristine environment, that kind of question should have been condemned in much stronger terms. Not just by Pinker, but the people around, too. Where were the collective groans? The fact that this was absent is an indication that this young man's musing is not an anomaly.

This stuff is in the air. And people think it's normal.

Pinker's next book is going to be on "scientism" and he fully intends to defend it, so I am interested to see how he is going to handle the result of the core story it will promote in the scientific community, especially among the young. The fact is a lot of conceit (I mean the low cheap petty vanity kind of conceit, not simple selfishness) is built into the attitudes of those who hold science up as some kind of religion. They are the keepers of The One True Way and everyone else is supposed to sit down and shut up when they speak. They love sniggering, too.

We all know where that leads. You don't need a God to get massive disasters out of humans. Science will do just fine. Look at the mess atheistic politics has created and the mass murders it has produced--while touting science as its method.

I say keep morality to people who study morality. If religions want to teach morality through mythological stories, fine. If science wants to study morality with scientific tests and analysis of historical data, fine. People like Jonathan Haidt (who I am also reading right now, i.e., The Righteous Mind) are doing a pretty good job.

But he, at least, is not on a crusade to slay any monsters (like the New Atheists are). And his decision did not come from analyzing anything under a scientific lens. He made a moral commitment as an individual and kept to it. Science doesn't teach you to do that.

This may be inherent to the scientific method in theory, but how to choose objectivity as a moral guide when your 'scientific method' peers are acting in an irrational manner and sending barrages of peer pressure against you can only come from a moral commitment.

Haidt's moral commitment was to accept as reality what the data told him him irrespective of his political and moral beliefs and irrespective of what the scientific community believed--and to overhaul those beliefs if the data went contrary. When you look at his early work (when he was about as progressive as they come) as opposed to later, you see him changing by metaphorical kicking and screaming (all right, all right, he was not that loud ), but he changed and is changing more.

I admire him for this, but not as a scientist. I admire him as a man. A moral man who chose to base his morality on right and wrong according to the best his honest thinking could lead him instead of "I'm superior to other humans because I'm a scientist" and "They're inferior human beings because they're not scientists."

It takes balls to do what he's doing.

It takes no balls to say, "Hey, let's criminalize science-denial." All you need for that is a mob.

Michael

[anthony]

Falsifiability, falsification -- this is more of Popper's doing I believe: Some proposition is only scientific if it can be falsified. (I think I have it right).

IOW, to verify, first falsify. (Hmm).

It seems akin to playing Devil's Advocate with oneself. But a scientist of integrity would anyhow be constantly asking of himself "Can I be wrong?" "If I did this a different way, would it turn out different results?".

So at best, the theory of falsification is self-evident (to honest scientists) - at worst, it erodes certainty.

[BaalChatzaf]

Falsifiability, falsification -- this is more of Popper's doing I believe: Some proposition is only scientific if it can be falsified. (I think I have it right).

IOW, to verify, first falsify. (Hmm).

Not quite. When formulating a hypothesis see how one might devise an experiment that would falsify it. That way all experiments would be potential attacks on the hypothesis and would reveal if it were wrong. It is a way of avoiding "bullet proof" hypotheses.

And scientific theories are never certain. Newton's Law of Gravity that was once strongly corroborated in th 1700s were undone by advanced telescope technology. It was clear by 1850, using Fraunhoffer Lenses that the planet Mercury had an anomalous orbit. This was not clarified until 1915 when Einstein proposed his General Theory of Relativity.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

Falsifiability, falsification -- this is more of Popper's doing I believe: Some proposition is only scientific if it can be falsified. (I think I have it right).

IOW, to verify, first falsify. (Hmm).

It seems akin to playing Devil's Advocate with oneself. But a scientist of integrity would anyhow be constantly asking of himself "Can I be wrong?" "If I did this a different way, would it turn out different results?".

So at best, the theory of falsification is self-evident (to honest scientists) - at worst, it erodes certainty.

There are two practical justifications for formal epistemology. One is scientific and the other what's left over. Rand's work may have confirmed standard scientific methodology but in no ways expanded on it. That's my understanding of her work and what I understand Popper did with falsification. It seems, however, that falsification in some form must have seriously preceded Popper.

In regard to ITOE, it seems valid enough descriptively but what innovation did she really do in the field? Logic as "the art of non-contradictory identification"? (Did I quote her right?) Aristotle must have said something like that. My impression of ITOE is it's a good input in studying thinking but intellectual ballast for Rand whose philosophy centered as it is/was on morality and ethics (or vice versa) was too much at sea and top heavy in rough waters. Then came Kelley also with "Evidence of the Senses." Is that not more of the same? Philosophy in one sense is innovating your way to the truth--with many, many innovators over time--and summing it all up descriptively ending the seeming need for more innovation, at least until the appearance of a problem. Objectivism is essentially four basic propositions vertically and logically integrated one to the next starting with metaphysics and ending in politics. Application of Objectivism means moving off those propositions into various fields we can call "professions"--such as esthetics, chemistry, medicine, etc., even ethics. The result is not Objectivism this or that but only this and that as congruent with Objectivism. Wait a minute! What then such a statement as "Objectivism sees man as a heroic being," etc. Nope. Objectivism sees nothing. That's Objectivism applied in a personal way keeping the name and discarding the philosophical substance or essence and trying to generalize a personal philosophy off the basic one, a contradiction right there, in this case the have your cake eat it too philosophy of Ayn Rand. Ayn Rand sees, you see. What do you see? There is a Randian esthetics. There is no such thing as an Objectivist esthetics. While we can have an Objectivist ethics it's only because it's directly off one the basic Objectivist propositions or basic principles. As a field of study, however, ethics is unto itself which can refer to Objectivism and use Objectivism--it surely should--but back to Objecivism as a point of reference much more than content.

Now we (and Rand, of course) can (and did) add substantial things to Objectivism and its principles. What these things have in common with science, however, is the tentativeness of knowledge. I call them cultural--now I think I'll call them cultural-intellectual--as opposed to the purely intellectual. The problem then for Objectivism is its Randian absolutism which contradicts tentativeness.

--Brant

[anthony]

Falsifiability, falsification -- this is more of Popper's doing I believe: Some proposition is only scientific if it can be falsified. (I think I have it right).

IOW, to verify, first falsify. (Hmm).

Not quite. When formulating a hypothesis see how one might devise an experiment that would falsify it. That way all experiments would be potential attacks on the hypothesis and would reveal if it were wrong. It is a way of avoiding "bullet proof" hypotheses.

And scientific theories are never certain. Newton's Law of Gravity that was once strongly corroborated in th 1700s were undone by advanced telescope technology. It was clear by 1850, using Fraunhoffer Lenses that the planet Mercury had an anomalous orbit. This was not clarified until 1915 when Einstein proposed his General Theory of Relativity.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Way I understand it, the point of the theory is then, that both the verifiable and the falsifiable must have referents to reality.

Which is how the falsifiying experiment (or statement) would verify the original . Not so?

Simple example, 'I have Faith in God' is unfalsifiable, therefore that statement is not a scientific proposition, and cannot be verified.

Like some scientist exclaimed about some hypothesis, "This is not only untrue - it is not even wrong!"

(If I recall right). Shades of Peikoff's "arbitrary assertion".

Still, it looks like much ado about little, since good scientific method should be self-referencing and have, in-built, the constant possibility of error.

(I read now that Popper apparently "...proposed falsifiability as a solution to the 'problem of induction'". It is enough to make me extra wary of his theory...)

[anthony]

There are two practical justifications for formal epistemology. One is scientific and the other what's left over. Rand's work may have confirmed standard scientific methodology but in no ways expanded on it. That's my understanding of her work and what I understand Popper did with falsification. It seems, however, that falsification in some form must have seriously preceded Popper.

Now we (and Rand, of course) can (and did) add substantial things to Objectivism and its principles. What these things have in common with science, however, is the tentativeness of knowledge. I call them cultural--now I think I'll call them cultural-intellectual--as opposed to the purely intellectual. The problem then for Objectivism is its Randian absolutism which contradicts tentativeness.

--Brant

Brant: Scientists can have the luxury to pass on the baton, but in life we don't have time for "tentativeness".

:-]

[Brant Gaede]

There are two practical justifications for formal epistemology. One is scientific and the other what's left over. Rand's work may have confirmed standard scientific methodology but in no ways expanded on it. That's my understanding of her work and what I understand Popper did with falsification. It seems, however, that falsification in some form must have seriously preceded Popper.

Now we (and Rand, of course) can (and did) add substantial things to Objectivism and its principles. What these things have in common with science, however, is the tentativeness of knowledge. I call them cultural--now I think I'll call them cultural-intellectual--as opposed to the purely intellectual. The problem then for Objectivism is its Randian absolutism which contradicts tentativeness.

--Brant

Brant: Scientists can have the luxury to pass on the baton, but in life we don't have time for "tentativeness".

:-]

AKA calculated risks: that's what we do in life.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

Still, it looks like much ado about nothing, since good scientific method should be self-referencing and have, in-built, the possibility of error.

(I read now that Popper apparently "...proposed falsifiability as a solution to the 'problem of induction'". It is enough to make me extra wary of his theory...)

If makes sense. Showing a theory is false is the only sure conclusion. Everything else is a maybe. We can prove theories are false. We cannot prove theories are true.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Guyau]

. . .

. . . But what innovation did she really do in the field? Logic as "the art of non-contradictory identification"? (Did I quote her right?) Aristotle must have said something like that. . . .

Pertinent points to your suggestion about Aristotle, excerpts from my book:

To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of non-existence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. Centuries ago, the man who was—no matter his errors—the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification. (AS 1016)

. . .

By “greatest of your philosophers,” Rand meant Aristotle. Unlike moderns such as Leibniz, Baumgarten, Kant, and Rand, Aristotle did not connect a “law of identity,” in so many words, with his principle of noncontradiction.[1] And he did not connect the law of identity that speaks to the distinctive natures of things with a formula such as “A is A” or “A thing is itself.” Aristotle would say “A thing is itself” is nearly empty and useless, and he would not connect that proposition to “A thing is something specifically,” which he thought substantive and important.[2]

Aristotle was the founder of logic, and his great contribution thereto was his theory of correct inference, which is his theory of the syllogism. Though he did not realize it, the formula “A is A” in the form “Every A is A” can be used to extend the kingdom of the syllogism. By about 1240, Robert Kilwardly was using “Every A is A” to show conversions such as the inference “No A is B” from the premise “No B is A” can be licensed by syllogism (first mood of the second figure).[3]

There are places in which Aristotle connects (what we call the law of identity) “A thing is something specifically” or “A thing is what it is” with the principle of noncontradiction: “The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject in the same respect” (Metaphys. 1005b19–20). Though not given the pride of place given it by Rand, there is some recognition that Existence is identity in Aristotle: “If all contradictories are true of the same subject at the same time, evidently all things will be one . . . . And thus we get the doctrine of Anaxagoras, that all things are mixed together; so that nothing exists” (1007b19–26).[4] Aristotle realized too that any existent not only is, but is a what.[5]

Rand acknowledges the greatness of Aristotle particularly for his laws of logic, as they are called in elementary logic texts today and the last few centuries: the laws of noncontradiction,[6] excluded middle,[7] and identity. Those are important principles of logic, though, as we have seen, Aristotle was not securely on board with that last one. It is not clear that Rand was cognizant of the even greater importance for logic of the theory of correct inference that Aristotle invented with his theory of syllogism. . . .

Notes

[1] Leibniz 1678; Baumgarten 1757 [1739], §11; Kant 1755, 1:389; 1764, 2:294.

[2] Aristotle, Metaph. 1041a10–24.

[3] Kneale and Kneale 1962, 235–36; see also Kant 1800, §44n2.

[4] See also Aristotle, Metaph. 1006b26–27, 1007a26–27.

[5] Metaph. 1030a20–24.

[6] De Int. 17a33–35; Metaph. 1011b26–27; Plato, Rep. 436b.

[7] De Int. 17b27–29; Metaph. 996b26–30.

It would take some explaining to Aristotle for him to see what was meant by defining logic as "the art of noncontradictory identification." He certainly viewed the principle of noncontradiction as a pervasive rule of right thinking because it is a fundamental truth of anything real. But he would not accept it as the fundamental principle of inference (contra Harriman/Peikoff on Aristotle). For that he would point to one form of syllogism* in which we grasp directly the necessary correctness of the inference and with reference to which the correctness of all the other forms of syllogism can be shown to depend (see further and more precisely in Jonathan Lear's Aristotle and Logical Theory). With the more general view that logic is the art of some sort of identification, Aristotle should come along, for it is identity in Rand's specific-nature sense of the concept that is basis of the rightness of inference in that premier syllogism (identity, but not causality, Roger).

[BaalChatzaf]

. . .

. . . But what innovation did she really do in the field? Logic as "the art of non-contradictory identification"? (Did I quote her right?) Aristotle must have said something like that. . . .

Pertinent points to your suggestion about Aristotle, excerpts from my book:

To exist is to be something, as distinguished from the nothing of non-existence, it is to be an entity of a specific nature made of specific attributes. Centuries ago, the man who was—no matter his errors—the greatest of your philosophers, has stated the formula defining the concept of existence and the rule of all knowledge: A is A. A thing is itself. You have never grasped the meaning of his statement. I am here to complete it: Existence is Identity, Consciousness is Identification. (AS 1016)

. . .

Aristotle was the founder of logic, and his great contribution thereto was his theory of correct inference, which is his theory of the syllogism. Though he did not realize it, the formula “A is A” in the form “Every A is A” can be used to extend the kingdom of the syllogism. By about 1240, Robert Kilwardly was using “Every A is A” to show conversions such as the inference “No A is B” from the premise “No B is A” can be licensed by syllogism (first mood of the second figure).[3]

]

It would take some explaining to Aristotle for him to see what was meant by defining logic as "the art of noncontradictory identification." He certainly viewed the principle of noncontradiction as a pervasive rule of right thinking because it is a fundamental truth of anything real. But he would not accept it as the fundamental principle of inference (contra Harriman/Peikoff on Aristotle). For that he would point to one form of syllogism* in which we grasp directly the necessary correctness of the inference and with reference to which the correctness of all the other forms of syllogism can be shown to depend (see further and more precisely in Jonathan Lear's Aristotle and Logical Theory). With the more general view that logic is the art of some sort of identification, Aristotle should come along, for it is identity in Rand's specific-nature sense of the concept that is basis of the rightness of inference in that premier syllogism (identity, but not causality, Roger).

Aristotle was -a- founder of logic. The stoics originated the logic of conditional statements which differed from Aristotle's logic of categorical statements. Chrysipus founded Stoic logic. It turned out in the long run that logic based on conditional statements is more powerful and more flexible than is categorical logic.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[anthony]

There are two practical justifications for formal epistemology. One is scientific and the other what's left over. Rand's work may have confirmed standard scientific methodology but in no ways expanded on it. That's my understanding of her work and what I understand Popper did with falsification. It seems, however, that falsification in some form must have seriously preceded Popper.

Now we (and Rand, of course) can (and did) add substantial things to Objectivism and its principles. What these things have in common with science, however, is the tentativeness of knowledge. I call them cultural--now I think I'll call them cultural-intellectual--as opposed to the purely intellectual. The problem then for Objectivism is its Randian absolutism which contradicts tentativeness.

--Brant

Brant: Scientists can have the luxury to pass on the baton, but in life we don't have time for "tentativeness".

:-]

AKA calculated risks: that's what we do in life.

--Brant

Certainly, risks come with the territory. We are not omniscient, so in order to "calculate" them - the method of identification - is a matter for epistemology ('the how?') which informs science in finding 'the what?' Scientific method conforms to a philosophy, whatever scientists may claim. Horse before cart.

There isn't anything more absolute to each individual than being in the game for a while, then being out of it for always. Nothing but 'absolutism' fits that absolute, and unlike scientific knowledge which progresses (if in fits and starts) over generations, each person's concepts of consciousness end with him.

[syrakusos]

You should not comment on Karl Popper and falsifiability until you read The Logic of Scientific Discovery. First published in German in 1959, it appeared in English in 1968 and is now in its 14th printing (at least). It is available online as an ebook, in case no library near you has one or two copies.

Stephen, thanks for the elucidation. I look forward to the book.

Michael, Then what are you talking about? A science that doesn't exist? … then you say science doesn't exist except as an ideal. I'm extrapolating conclusions a bit from what you say, but ….

I said no such thing. I said that as rational-empiricism, the scientific method is small-o objectivism, not a complete and consistent Capital-O Objectivism. By analogy, a purely consistent laissez-faire capitalism never existed, but we can tell that free enterprise is better than socialism. Do you have a problem with that?

On another note, the last I saw, scientists are human beings. I agree that the scientific method is to always have doubt and be open to constant testing and peer review, so force does not fit that model but since scientists are so deeply in bed with governments, I will not let them off the hook and call them morally superior.

You confuse science as a method for gaining knowledge with scientists. Show me the perfect Objectivist capitalist. Show me the perfect Objectivist. Science as a method, and science as a culture, is superior to religion and politics. Do you disagree with that?

The best scientists are those who most consistently integrate the scientific method into their lives. But that also describes the best people in any profession. The best people are those who are most consistently rational and empirical.

Scientists are not the only ones “deeply in bed with governments.” School teachers are all the moreso, but we do not dismiss education, claiming it to be no better than ignorance just because it is publicly funded. Do you deny the value of green space in a city just because the parks are public?

Incidentally, I just saw a long video by Steven Pinker that illustrates why we have to keep an eye on scientists at all times when they talk about morality.

He actually asked about criminalizing what people think in the name of science.

To Pinker's credit, he gave a nervous laugh, said no and gave some semblance of an explanation. … This stuff is in the air. And people think it's normal.

One person says something stupid and no one else contradicts him. So what? Now, if Neil Degrasse Tyson said that on national television or in a book, well, you might have cause for complaint. Lots of silly ideas are “in the wind.”

Falsifiability, falsification -- this is more of Popper's doing I believe: Some proposition is only scientific if it can be falsified. (I think I have it right).

You need to read Popper for yourself before you go interpreting him for those of us who have read him. The personal honesty you speak of – “It seems akin to playing Devil's Advocate with oneself. But a scientist of integrity would anyhow be constantly asking of himself "Can I be wrong?" …” - is indeed fundamental to good science and to good living. You certainly must know Richard Feynman on “Cargo Cult Science.”

Not quite. When formulating a hypothesis see how one might devise an experiment that would falsify it. That way all experiments would be potential attacks on the hypothesis and would reveal if it were wrong.

Not quite not quite. You need to read Popper to know what he said. A scientific theory can be refuted or disproved or just challenged with new or different facts or a better theoretical explanation of those. Popper’s claim was that astrology and Freudian psychology are a pseudo-sciences because they never can be refuted. They just keep piling on more explanation. Popper said that they have “explanatory validity” or “explanatory power” but that is not enough for science. Falsifiability just means that you can prove a scientist wrong.

And scientific theories are never certain. Newton's Law of Gravity that was once strongly corroborated in th 1700s were undone by advanced telescope technology. It was clear by 1850, using Fraunhoffer Lenses that the planet Mercury had an anomalous orbit. This was not clarified until 1915 when Einstein proposed his General Theory of Relativity.

Again, not quite. Scientific theories are not absolute. An oak is a plant. A lion is an animal. A euglena has characteristics of both plant and animal. A is A, the euglena is what it is. What of Pluto changed to cause it to no longer be a planet? But however we classify it, it is what it is quite certainly.

Newton’s theory allowed the search for and discovery of Neptune. We still do orbital reductions to find the paths of new comets. If you want an example of what the Fraunhoffer Lens did to the theories of Newton, start with light. If light were a particle, as Newton claimed, diffraction would not work as it does. However, if light were only a wave, it could have no pressure.

So, yes, uncertainties do exist; science explores them. But we know what we know. We are not teetering on the precipice of total ignorance.

There are two practical justifications for formal epistemology. One is scientific and the other what's left over. Rand's work may have confirmed standard scientific methodology but in no ways expanded on it. That's my understanding of her work and what I understand Popper did with falsification. It seems, however, that falsification in some form must have seriously preceded Popper.

You need to read Popper for yourself. He did not invent falsification; he did not discover it. Popper only pointed out that it has always been an important aspect of all true science, and is lacking from pseudo-science.

In regard to ITOE, it seems valid enough descriptively but what innovation did she really do in the field? Logic as "the art of non-contradictory identification"? … Then came Kelley also with "Evidence of the Senses." ….

Have you actually read either of those? If there is just one truth in ITOE that typifies it, it is this: “Conceptualization is a method of explanding man’s consciousness by reducing the number of its content’s units – a systematic means to an unlimited integration of cognitive data.” (page 85 Mentor ppb 1^st edition). She makes the same point repeatedly. Page 15: “A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements excluded.”

The book is only 116 pages. I marked mine up three times in 20 years, most recently in April 2014. (I never read Kelley.)

”There is no such thing as an Objectivist esthetics. While we can have an Objectivist ethics it's only because it's directly off one the basic Objectivist propositions or basic principles.”

Rand says the same thing. There is no such thing as Objectivist esthetics; there is only esthetics.

"Proof" in science is adducing evidence for a falsifiable theory. Experiments confirm theory but do not prove it. Disproof is falsification. Technology does an excellent job of confirming science, but even then confirmation isn't the same as "proof." …

As Ba’al is fond of pointing out, GPS works because it takes relativity into account. (See this from the Astronomy Department at Ohio State.) http://www.astronomy.ohio-state.edu/~pogge/Ast162/Unit5/gps.html So, that is one example of technology confirming science. Generally, science follows technology.

The ancients mixed artificial electrum from gold and silver and considered it a separate element. Later, salt (sodium chloride) was considered an element. “Salt petre” could be either sodium nitrate or potassium nitrate. Brandy is a “spirit” because it is the essence of wine, from which the element of fire releases the “ghost” (or “gas”) which is then distilled. We had steam engines 150 years before we had thermodynamics. We had the telegraph, telephone, and radio before the electron was theorized by Thompson to be like a raisin within the pudding of the atom. In every case science attempted to explain what technology discovered and developed.

Overall, you have a simplistic view of science.

Showing a theory is false is the only sure conclusion. Everything else is a maybe. We can prove theories are false. We cannot prove theories are true.

Ba'al Chatzaf

You use the word “true” ambiguously. You need “valid” and “confirmed” to speak more clearly.

Can you cross the street safely? You do look to see if any cars are coming. If you see a car, you falsify the theory that it is safe to cross. But you might not see a car, think it safe, and still get struck anyway. Nonetheless, we accept that looking both ways, and not seeing a car validates the theory that it is safe to cross. Successfully crossing the street confirms the hypothesis. It remains true that when there are no on-coming cars, then it is safe to cross the street.

[Brant Gaede]

I have read ITOE.

I have a good, basic view of science.

You should not comment on Karl Popper and falsifiability until you read The Logic of Scientific Discovery. First published in German in 1959, it appeared in English in 1968 and is now in its 14th printing (at least). It is available online as an ebook, in case no library near you has one or two copies.

You used the wrong word. "Comment" when "critique" is more appropriate. Who, btw, is this "you"? If you meant a bunch of us, "one" is the correct word for the context. If not, then tell us who/whom "you" is.

--Brant

one should not write English unless one has read a good book on writing--and, no, I won't tell you why

[Brant Gaede]

You need to read Popper for yourself. He did not invent falsification; he did not discover it. Popper only pointed out that it has always been an important aspect of all true science, and is lacking from pseudo-science.

If that is what "Popper only pointed out" then there's no need to read him. Thanks.

--Brant

Happy New Year!

[Brant Gaede]

MM: "Falsifiability just means you can prove a scientist wrong."

But if you can't prove a scientist wrong that doesn't mean his theory escapes falsifiability, so your statement is wrong, for falsifiability is more than what you say. And if you can't falsify the theory qua theory sans scientist falsifiability still remains regardless if the theory is correctly constructed. Falsifiability is not the work of falsification. You keep mixing up structure with content calling structure, by implication, "simplistic," when I was only seeking or positing clarity.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

You should not comment on Karl Popper and falsifiability until you read The Logic of Scientific Discovery. First published in German in 1959, it appeared in English in 1968 and is now in its 14th printing (at least). It is available online as an ebook, in case no library near you has one or two copies.

Stephen, thanks for the elucidation. I look forward to the book.

Michael, Then what are you talking about? A science that doesn't exist? … then you say science doesn't exist except as an ideal. I'm extrapolating conclusions a bit from what you say, but ….

I said no such thing. I said that as rational-empiricism, the scientific method is small-o objectivism, not a complete and consistent Capital-O Objectivism. By analogy, a purely consistent laissez-faire capitalism never existed, but we can tell that free enterprise is better than socialism. Do you have a problem with that?

On another note, the last I saw, scientists are human beings. I agree that the scientific method is to always have doubt and be open to constant testing and peer review, so force does not fit that model but since scientists are so deeply in bed with governments, I will not let them off the hook and call them morally superior.

You confuse science as a method for gaining knowledge with scientists. Show me the perfect Objectivist capitalist. Show me the perfect Objectivist. Science as a method, and science as a culture, is superior to religion and politics. Do you disagree with that?

The best scientists are those who most consistently integrate the scientific method into their lives. But that also describes the best people in any profession. The best people are those who are most consistently rational and empirical.

Scientists are not the only ones “deeply in bed with governments.” School teachers are all the moreso, but we do not dismiss education, claiming it to be no better than ignorance just because it is publicly funded. Do you deny the value of green space in a city just because the parks are public?

Incidentally, I just saw a long video by Steven Pinker that illustrates why we have to keep an eye on scientists at all times when they talk about morality.

He actually asked about criminalizing what people think in the name of science.

To Pinker's credit, he gave a nervous laugh, said no and gave some semblance of an explanation. … This stuff is in the air. And people think it's normal.

One person says something stupid and no one else contradicts him. So what? Now, if Neil Degrasse Tyson said that on national television or in a book, well, you might have cause for complaint. Lots of silly ideas are “in the wind.”

Falsifiability, falsification -- this is more of Popper's doing I believe: Some proposition is only scientific if it can be falsified. (I think I have it right).

You need to read Popper for yourself before you go interpreting him for those of us who have read him. The personal honesty you speak of – “It seems akin to playing Devil's Advocate with oneself. But a scientist of integrity would anyhow be constantly asking of himself "Can I be wrong?" …” - is indeed fundamental to good science and to good living. You certainly must know Richard Feynman on “Cargo Cult Science.”

Not quite. When formulating a hypothesis see how one might devise an experiment that would falsify it. That way all experiments would be potential attacks on the hypothesis and would reveal if it were wrong.

Not quite not quite. You need to read Popper to know what he said. A scientific theory can be refuted or disproved or just challenged with new or different facts or a better theoretical explanation of those. Popper’s claim was that astrology and Freudian psychology are a pseudo-sciences because they never can be refuted. They just keep piling on more explanation. Popper said that they have “explanatory validity” or “explanatory power” but that is not enough for science. Falsifiability just means that you can prove a scientist wrong.

And scientific theories are never certain. Newton's Law of Gravity that was once strongly corroborated in th 1700s were undone by advanced telescope technology. It was clear by 1850, using Fraunhoffer Lenses that the planet Mercury had an anomalous orbit. This was not clarified until 1915 when Einstein proposed his General Theory of Relativity.

Again, not quite. Scientific theories are not absolute. An oak is a plant. A lion is an animal. A euglena has characteristics of both plant and animal. A is A, the euglena is what it is. What of Pluto changed to cause it to no longer be a planet? But however we classify it, it is what it is quite certainly.

Newton’s theory allowed the search for and discovery of Neptune. We still do orbital reductions to find the paths of new comets. If you want an example of what the Fraunhoffer Lens did to the theories of Newton, start with light. If light were a particle, as Newton claimed, diffraction would not work as it does. However, if light were only a wave, it could have no pressure.

So, yes, uncertainties do exist; science explores them. But we know what we know. We are not teetering on the precipice of total ignorance.

There are two practical justifications for formal epistemology. One is scientific and the other what's left over. Rand's work may have confirmed standard scientific methodology but in no ways expanded on it. That's my understanding of her work and what I understand Popper did with falsification. It seems, however, that falsification in some form must have seriously preceded Popper.

You need to read Popper for yourself. He did not invent falsification; he did not discover it. Popper only pointed out that it has always been an important aspect of all true science, and is lacking from pseudo-science.

In regard to ITOE, it seems valid enough descriptively but what innovation did she really do in the field? Logic as "the art of non-contradictory identification"? … Then came Kelley also with "Evidence of the Senses." ….

Have you actually read either of those? If there is just one truth in ITOE that typifies it, it is this: “Conceptualization is a method of explanding man’s consciousness by reducing the number of its content’s units – a systematic means to an unlimited integration of cognitive data.” (page 85 Mentor ppb 1^st edition). She makes the same point repeatedly. Page 15: “A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements excluded.”

The book is only 116 pages. I marked mine up three times in 20 years, most recently in April 2014. (I never read Kelley.)

”There is no such thing as an Objectivist esthetics. While we can have an Objectivist ethics it's only because it's directly off one the basic Objectivist propositions or basic principles.”

Rand says the same thing. There is no such thing as Objectivist esthetics; there is only esthetics.

"Proof" in science is adducing evidence for a falsifiable theory. Experiments confirm theory but do not prove it. Disproof is falsification. Technology does an excellent job of confirming science, but even then confirmation isn't the same as "proof." …

As Ba’al is fond of pointing out, GPS works because it takes relativity into account. (See this from the Astronomy Department at Ohio State.) http://www.astronomy.ohio-state.edu/~pogge/Ast162/Unit5/gps.html So, that is one example of technology confirming science. Generally, science follows technology.

The ancients mixed artificial electrum from gold and silver and considered it a separate element. Later, salt (sodium chloride) was considered an element. “Salt petre” could be either sodium nitrate or potassium nitrate. Brandy is a “spirit” because it is the essence of wine, from which the element of fire releases the “ghost” (or “gas”) which is then distilled. We had steam engines 150 years before we had thermodynamics. We had the telegraph, telephone, and radio before the electron was theorized by Thompson to be like a raisin within the pudding of the atom. In every case science attempted to explain what technology discovered and developed.

Overall, you have a simplistic view of science.

Showing a theory is false is the only sure conclusion. Everything else is a maybe. We can prove theories are false. We cannot prove theories are true.

Ba'al Chatzaf

You use the word “true” ambiguously. You need “valid” and “confirmed” to speak more clearly.

A universally quantified predicate cannot be proved empirically if its domain is indefinitely extended or infinite.

To do so would require an infinite number of observations and operations.

On the other hand all it takes to falsify a universally quantified predicate is to produce a single counter example.

How does one prove not all crows are black. By coming up with a non-black crow. Just one will do fine

Ba'al Chatzaf