How We Know - Harry Binswanger's New Book


Neil Parille

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What measurements are omitted when we form the concept "justice"? What measurements are omitted when we form the concept "concept"? I could go on and on.

Measurement omission is a superficially plausible theory, but doesn't hold up. I suspect that's why Rand talk about tables and chairs, where it does seem plausible.

-Neil

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Neil,

“When we form the concept, we do such-and-such” is one thing. “When the character of the concept can be analyzed as a such-and-such” is another. The former sort of thesis requires the latter sort of thesis. Rand asserted measurement–omission for the former for all concepts, which implies measurement-omission for the latter for all concepts. But the all of the latter could be true even without the all of the former, for the latter could be true even without being an implication of the former. And if the latter were true, it would be a substantive new position in the theory of universals, whatever the theory of concept formation.

Rand’s formation thesis, then, contained an analysis thesis. Figuring out whether that analysis thesis is correct is a very worthwhile endeavor (for me and some of my readers anyway) quite apart from her formation thesis. As you may recall, beginning in 1990 with “Capturing Concepts,”* and continuing through my essay last year “Capturing Quantity,”* I have discerned the extents to which Rand’s formation thesis does and does not square with findings of up-to-date research in developmental cognitive psychology. Then too, for logical reasons, I have trimmed somewhat the analysis thesis to a scope that still makes a very sweeping claim for theory of universals: I do not conjecture the thesis to apply to logical concepts such as and or not or or, nor to set-theoretic concepts (therefore, not to the membership relation of concepts), that are presupposed by the concept of measurement in its spartan form that is ordinal. On the concept thought, see here.

For justice or any other defined concept, the first step to measurement-omission analysis would be to suppose the dimensions in the definition and the dimensions in terms of which those dimensions are defined, . . . , are magnitude dimensions (at least ordinal in structure, not mere countability of instances). Then bring to bear whatever science and measurement theory we have for best discernment of measurement-omission magnitude structure (multidimensional for most concepts, certainly for justice). So far as I know, there is no profit to executing this further magnitude identification of the dimensions in definitions of our useful concepts in general. Well, perhaps the exercise could expose ambiguities in one’s definitions and help one to their improvement. Be that as it may, I expect there is some profit in having this pattern in mind for illuminating scientific progress (when informed by meticulous history of science, of course). And as I have argued in my 2004 “Universals and Measurement,”* the analysis thesis has implications for metaphysical structure, where we look not to structure of all concepts (not even only all concepts beyond logical concepts and set-theoretic concepts presupposed by our most informed concept of measurement), but to all concretes under the thesis that each, every one of them, can be placed under some concept or other of the Randian measurement-omission form (not formation process).

Stephen

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Neil, your question is a good one and the kind I asked myself long before I wrote Omissions and Measurements (JARS 7.2). Another important question is what goes in place of or outranks measurement omission, or quantitative differences, in the origin of concepts? The answer to that is qualitative differences.

In my view Ayn Rand tried to make concept formation appear more mathematical than it really is. Stephen and I also have different ideas about measurement, mine being more strict. I only accept ratio or interval measurement. Ranking is not measurement but at best pseudo-measurement. Ratio and interval measurement require and are based on uniform standard units (inch, ounce, hour, etc.) and an instrument (yardstick, weight scale, speed gun, etc.). Of course, the instrument and unit go together. Ranking does not meet either of these criteria. Using numbers is a necessary but not sufficient condition for measurement.

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Rand’s conception of similarity in terms of measure relations and her novel conception of concepts in terms of measurement relations expressly depend upon the existence of dimensions of things, actions, and attributes in the world and on our isolating those dimensions in childhood development and scientific advance. Rand took the different dimensions, which one could think of as a certain sort of quality, as basic for magnitudes and their measurement, and not reducible to magnitudes and their measurement.

Use of numbers in counting requires less magnitude structure than does ordinal measurement. Whether one fathoms the full character of ordinal measurement* or simply ends thinking of it upon thinking of it as order ranking, it pertains to relational structure beyond that required for counting, and a Randian thesis that all concretes can be placed under some concept or other having that level of relational structure is novel and substantive metaphysics and theory of universals.

The modern theory of linear order (Rosenstein*), the amount of geometric structure that is order geometry in synthetic geometry (#27), and the modern theory of ordinal measurement (Droste*) feed into this novel thesis in realizing its full import for metaphysics, which is to say for the character of all concretes. But perhaps we should get back to Dr. Binswanger’s text. For instance, his conception of how one measures shapes. How far, if any, does he pull himself free of Rand’s mistaken idea of how we do it? (#27)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Related

Rand thought, rightly I should say, that formation of any concept whatever requires differentiating two or more existents from other existents. She thought also that such differentiation requires comparative degrees of difference, measurable as such on a dimension(s) common to existents in the class and existents outside the class (Rand 1966–67, 13). What if Rand were right in this second doctrine? What if, in order to form any concept whatever, there had to be a dimension common to the concept class and its opponents and this had to be a dimension along which comparative closeness measurement is possible? What would that imply for metaphysics? It would imply that every concrete can be placed in concept classes whose linear measures are not only ordinal-scale, but interval- or ratio-scale as well.[43]

I avoid that extravagant implication as follows: I retain Rand’s assumption that formation of any concept requires differentiating two or more existents from other existents and her assumption that all concept classes are similarity classes and her measure-definitions, as amended above, of concepts and similarity. I reject the assumption that differentiation between existents included in and existents excluded from a concept class require comparative degrees of difference (beyond the comparative-difference-degree pretender that merely says a thing is less different from itself than it is different from things not itself).

Such differentiation may sometimes be based at least partly on fairly blunt sameness and difference. Spherical balls are the same with one another in that they roll regularly, and in this they are baldly different from floors. A dimension along which items in a concept class have various measure values need not be a dimension common with items in an opponent concept class.

Differentiation of existents included in or excluded from a concept class may enlist nontrivial comparative degrees of difference (or likeness). I see three forms of these. In one the comparative degrees are along dimensions common to both included and excluded existents, and those dimensions afford either ratio- or interval-scale measures. Along the dimensions of shape, a spherical ball can be distinguished from a football in that way. The sets of pairs of principal curvatures (ratio scaling) over the surfaces of spherical balls are less different from each other, from one ball’s set of pairs to another ball’s set of pairs, than they are from the sets of pairs of principal curvatures over the surfaces of footballs.

In light of my amendment to the measure-definition of similarity, we should allow also for a second nontrivial variety of comparative similarity. I observed earlier that hardness and tensile strength are two different measurable forms of a same characteristic (resistance to degradation under some sort of stress) that is different from the measurable characteristic (pairs of principal curvatures, which are spatial extension properties) shared by shapes. This second manner of decomposing a comparative similarity permits concepts based on comparative degrees of similarity without requiring that linear measures of the concept dimensions be anything beyond ordinal measures.

A third decomposition of nontrivial comparative similarity does not rely on shared and unshared dimensions of the relata. It relies simply on numbers of shared and unshared features.[44] Perhaps any concept based on this sort of comparative similarity can be recaptured in a more sophisticated way by ascertaining measurable dimensions on which to base the concept (Boydstun 1990, 31–33). I expect that is so. Notice, however, that the metaphysical implication drawn in the present study (uniform topological lattice structure) need not suppose that all concepts can be analyzed in terms of Rand’s measurement-omission formula; only that all concretes can be placed under one or more concepts analyzable in those terms.

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I posted a brief review of How We Know on Amazon:

Harry Binswanger is a philosopher who was associated with Ayn Rand in her later life. This is his long awaited book on epistemology written from the perspective of Rand's philosophy of Objectivism. It covers most of the major topics in epistemology, including some that Rand didn't comment on, such as propositions.

Generally speaking, I enjoyed this book. Although Binswanger is a rather dogmatic Objectivist, the tone is surprisingly mild. More than the typical Objectivist he tries to understand the ideas with which he disagrees and present them in a fair manner.

The heart of the book is an exposition of Rand's theory of concept formation, which her acolytes consider her greatest achievement. She developed an elaborate theory of "measurement omission" in her Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. I'm not persuaded that all concepts are formed on the basis of measurement omission (what measurements are omitted when we form the concept "justice"?), but Binswanger makes a decent effort. Unfortunately, he presents no evidence that the Objectivist theory of concepts is true. I'd like to see the psychological studies that children (much less adults) form concepts the way Rand and Binswanger claim. Indeed I suspect that we often form concepts without having two or more examples and a "foil." If I'm wandering in Borneo and see an animal that no one has seen before, do I need to see another one to conceptualize it?

On the negative side, Binswanger appears to believe the urban legend that people in the Middle Ages thought the world was flat. I was surprised that he doesn't mention David Kelley's The Evidence of the Senses, an important Objectivist work on epistemology.

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I bought the book yesterday on Amazon. I won't receive it until March 3 at the earliest.

That is close to two weeks. Why so long?

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I bought the book yesterday on Amazon. I won't receive it until March 3 at the earliest.

That is close to two weeks. Why so long?

The delay may be due to a game that Amazon is playing with folks who self-publish but do not use the Amazon self-publishing arm Createspace.

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The delay may be due to a game that Amazon is playing with folks who self-publish but do not use the Amazon self-publishing arm Createspace.

Krell,

Maybe.

But it might be a question of how many copies the self-publisher keeps in Amazon's warehouse.

Createspace printed book obviously have ready availability for delivery by Amazon.

Michael

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Baal wrote, That is close to two weeks. Why so long?

Krell responded:

The delay may be due to a game that Amazon is playing with folks who self-publish but do not use the Amazon self-publishing arm Createspace.

end quote

And Michael answered him, Maybe. But it might be a question of how many copies the self-publisher keeps in Amazon's warehouse. Createspace printed book obviously have ready availability for delivery by Amazon.

Darned if I know. I got Dan Lewiss book in a few days. Someone else mentioned delays in getting HBs book but then they went and got the book directly from Mr. Binswanger. I tried going to his web site but I could not find how to order. Even to join Harrys chat room you must jump thru hoops and agree to a ton of stuff.

On Amazon, I just ordered The New York Times Sunday Puzzle Omnibus, volumes 7, 8, 9 and 10, and I think those were originally from the late 70s and early 80s. You get 200 puzzles in each book for about 12 bucks a book. Excellent. Though some of the mentioned celebrities are not remembered by me, at the time the puzzle was written they were probably the easiest clues to answer.

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Peter,

I think you have to go here to order it directly. Just click on the "Order Now" button. That will take you to a shopping cart payment page.

I got that googling the title of the book, then looking at a discussion on another forum, then going to a link from there to Binswanger's Twitter page, then clicking on a link for a promotion of the book for autographed copies (which apparently is no longer valid), but I did land on that page. I imagine it is the official book page.

That's not the best sales funnel I've ever seen.

:)

Michael

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  • Hardcover: 416 pages
  • Publisher: TOF Publications, Inc. (November 30, 2013)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0985640618
  • ISBN-13: 978-0985640613
  • Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.1 x 0.9 inches

What is "TOF Publications, Inc."? I assume it stands for The Objectivist Forum, a journal which Binswanger published in the 80s. But I imagine it is less of a publishing house than Durban House.

Binswanger is well known in Objectivist circles and I'm surprised he couldn't get a major publisher to publish his book. Or perhaps he didn't want to.

-Neil Parille

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  • Hardcover: 416 pages
  • Publisher: TOF Publications, Inc. (November 30, 2013)
  • Language: English
  • ISBN-10: 0985640618
  • ISBN-13: 978-0985640613
  • Product Dimensions: 9.2 x 6.1 x 0.9 inches

What is "TOF Publications, Inc."? I assume it stands for The Objectivist Forum, a journal which Binswanger published in the 80s. But I imagine it is less of a publishing house than Durban House.

Binswanger is well known in Objectivist circles and I'm surprised he couldn't get a major publisher to publish his book. Or perhaps he didn't want to.

-Neil Parille

Yeah, it's really weird that Binswager's book was vanity/self-published. Is he in good standing with Peikoff and/or others associated with that irrational nest of vipers known as the ARI? Does his book contain any endorsements from Peikoff and pals/enemies? Or was Binswanger left out in the cold, without contacts, referrals, endorsements or assistance?

J

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Is he [binswanger] in good standing with Peikoff and/or others associated with that irrational nest of vipers known as the ARI?

Binswanger and Peikoff haven't been on speaking terms for years. I don't know what occasioned the dissension between them, or what Binswanger's relationship is to other ARI-connected persons, except that he was good friends with Allan Gotthelf.

Ellen

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Is he [binswanger] in good standing with Peikoff and/or others associated with that irrational nest of vipers known as the ARI?

Binswanger and Peikoff haven't been on speaking terms for years. I don't know what occasioned the dissension between them, or what Binswanger's relationship is to other ARI-connected persons, except that he was good friends with Allan Gotthelf.

Ellen

Well, that might explain it.

J

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Ellen wrote:

Binswanger and Peikoff haven't been on speaking terms for years. I don't know what occasioned the dissension between them, or what Binswanger's relationship is to other ARI-connected persons, except that he was good friends with Allan Gotthelf.

end quote

The money going into and then dispensed from Ayn Rand’s estate’s royalties has kept many objectivists from volitional action. The withdrawal of moral sanction has kept many objectivists from volitional action. Freedom from ARI’s payments, chafing at personally abrasive ARI members, the continued access to archives, the decreased benefits of close association, and the decrease of the need for psychological moral sanction have led to freedom from a cult like mentality. “The Mistress” is deceased, “The Master” is aging and “The Thumb” is lifting. Gasp! Will Objectivism survive? I would hate to see, TOC (The Atlas Society) suffer a similar fate.

It is time for a new Renaissance and “vanity press” may be one of the fountainheads. Advertising on Objectivist links may be the key to its success.

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Point of information: the estate and ARI are different entities with different revenue sources. Peikoff might or might not donate (does ARI publish this information?), but the royalties don't go to ARI. He did not provide the seed money to start the organization in 1985.

On the other hand I've heard that payments from the Speakers Bureau, which can be important income to an impecunious young scholar, are a weapon to keep people in line.

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Binswanger has a lot of praise for Peikoff in the book, but there are no endorsements from Peikoff or anyone else.

The book is good but it is pitched to an audience of Objectivists and readers who haven't studied epistemlogy. I guess that's fine, but considering that it took Binswanger probably as long to write it as it took Rand to write Atlas Shrugged, it's something of a disappointment.

-Neil Parille

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PDS quotes, "Where does the soul go when you die? To the same place as your heartbeat." (p.37) and then responds, “15 words to describe one side of the fault-line that has plagued and perplexed mankind for a very long time...”

To me Harry seemed to be mean and too curt. The concept *soul* need not be a religious concept accepted on faith. Will one’s last heartbeat cause an echo? Can’t one write a verse to the Universe? Would he say that at a graveside service for Ayn Rand? A bit more poetry is needed for the actuality of a *soul* because I feel a sense of reverence for certain departed souls.

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Neil Parille wrote:

Binswanger has a lot of praise for Peikoff in the book, but there are no endorsements from Peikoff or anyone else.

end quote

Harry acknowledges his debt to Ayn Rand and Leonard Piekoff but mentions that Doctor Peikoff, “. . . may well disagree with several of the positions I defend herein.” I received my book two days ago, well ahead of schedule and I am impressed after reading a few dozen pages. It is clear and well written. Though Ayn is not here to critique the book or praise it, she is not turning over in her grave, according to the seismograph placed near her (or so far. If anyone hears of a reaction from Doctor Peikoff please reveal them.)

Harry explains concepts from Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, much better than in the original. If I were to recommend either ITOE or “How We Know,” to a student of Objectivism, I would first go with Harry Binswanger’s book.

Some examples? Pg. 31, footnote no. 8:

Imagined content is usually compared to perceptual content, but it would seem to be more closely related to the content of memory. Imagining an absent friend’s face seems to have just the same inner quality or “feel” as remembering it, which is in line with the point that imagination is the ability to rearrange *stored* perceptual data.

page 38:

In general, animals have to move to get food; consciousness enables them to locate their food. It also enables them to avoid being eaten, but food is the fundamental: life is not fundamentally the avoidance of death but the gaining of the materials for self-sustenance. Consciousness does also enable animals to obtain other goals; e.g., to find mates for reproduction, but getting food is the fundamental.

In the preface Harry writes:

Mankind has existed for 400,000 years but 395,000 of those years were consumed by the Stone Age. The factor that freed men from endless toil and early death, the root cause of the elevated level of existence we now take for granted, is one precious value: *knowledge.* The painfully acquired knowledge of how to master nature, how to organize social existence, and how to understand himself is what enabled man to rise from the cave to the skyscraper, from warring clans to a global economy, from an average lifespan of less than 30 years to one approaching 80.

end quotes

Well said, Harry. Think about the essentials for conscious beings like ourselves. Food and shelter are primaries, as is a *happy* social existence, but we must rely on *stored information* to improve our stocks of food, shelter, and government. After personal needs are fulfilled and after freedom is secured homo sapiens needs to keep acquiring knowledge. And we need a full-proof way to deposit and save knowledge. It is essential that knowledge be in an accessible or readable form if there is a catastrophe. If only primitive humans are left after a comet strike they need a way to rebuild. Where is our “Library of Alexandria?” Electronic devices like computers may be useless after a catastrophe, but books written like Rosetta Stones, scattered across the globe could bring humans back to our level much more quickly.

Peter

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Jules wrote:

Archive vaults made from old missile silos would probably be excellent candidates for knowledge storage facilities.

end quote

Silos would be expedient but I worry that over time they would be buried. Have you ever driven though an “economically depressed area? Crumbling buildings. Abandoned farmhouses hidden by vines and trees. Missile silos out in the badlands, never to be explored, unless by urban or suburban spelunkers.

Imagine the most awesome thing we can still see after a thousand years. What makes us wonder, “What in the heck is inside that?” The answer is of course, “the Pyramids,” but that scale and effort might not be needed. And we would not want to attract looters for gold. They might destroy the knowledge stored within. Would we even want to put modern commodities in it for looters? Or would the looters also be seekers of knowledge as were the Brits in Egypt?

We would want some sort of monument that could not be burned, rusted away, toppled (as at Easter Island), buried by natural forces, or beg to be looted. It would need to have pictographs that would not fade quickly which explain what is inside. It should have multiple layers so that if one group of humans gets to the top layer, another group of humans in another hundred years could dig deeper and find an equal trove of knowledge.

Any ideas? I know there are seed depositories in several locations, in case of crop catastrophe.

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