Objectivism and Supporting Government


nickcoons

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I'm posting because I've browsed through here a bit and find that there appear to be some bright people in these forums, and I have a question that I've had difficulty locating a satisfactory answer to. Specifically, the question is about the contradiction between the non-aggression principle ("No man may initiate the use of physical force against another"), and the support of government (which Rand defined as an institution that claims a monopoly on the use of retaliatory force). That is, any group of people that claim a monopoly (and intend to enforce that monopoly) must do so through the initiation of force. Roy Childs Jr. explained it well in his Open Letter to Ayn Rand:

http://www.isil.org/ayn-rand/childs-open-letter.html

My question involves specifically the logical contradiction in this position, not the argument from apocalypse justifications for holding a contradictory position (i.e. without a government, there would be chaos!).

I look forward to some illuminating responses.. thank you!

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Nick,

Welcome to OL.

You will find several takes on this issue that you find so confusing. You're not alone in your confusion, either. We all end up there at some time or another.

Here's my take.

The Law of Identity trumps NOIF since it is more foundational in metaphysical terms.

Specifically, I am applying the Law of Identity to human nature. Man is not just rational. There is also the "animal" genus to the "rational" differentia in Rand's definition.

Part of human nature involves feelings of power over others. This is not only observed, it is also being borne out by neuroscience and scientific testing. It's in our brains--the animal part. So power is a temptation that comes from within, not something that just happens by accident to this individual or that. It's not something that you say, "Oh, I just don't want to be that way," and it all goes away. You have to choose to not act on certain feelings, like murderous rage, for instance, or desire for revenge, or the vanity of feeling so superior you can decide whether someone lives or dies. This, to me, is one of the glories of ethics. It gives you a code to make that choice according to a rational standard.

But no one can erase the innate power-seeking part of human nature and no one can make your rational choices for you. This is a dilemma that society and government solve for groups.

The dictator's existence is one solution. He holds the final power, not you. Your subconscious innate power-seeker understands that enough for you to either forgo your power over him and get your own power over others from serving him, or getting rid of him in order to take over. I'm leaving out ethics--i.e., rational volition--right here, since I am discussing one specific unbridled subconscious drive.

For freedom-lovers, who prioritize rational volition over innate drives, government exists morally to delimit the effects of power's temptation, not as an expression of its moral preeminence. So you remove total power from the reach any one man, get general social acceptance for ultimate power to be assigned to a document (like a Constitution), and slice and dice power up through (1) explicit guarantees of individual rights, and (2) checks and balances.

There are people who disagree with me, but that's the way I see it.

I'm not just a totally isolated individual blob stuck on a gigantic ball spinning through time and space. I'm an individual human being with a specific nature shared by other members of my species. I have rational volition, but I also have subconscious drives, just like all other reasonably healthy humans. Society and government set rules on how we can come to terms with these parts of our nature within a group setting. And, yes, both government and society can change (or be changed if people--including me--decide to change them).

I agree (with a few of quibbles) with Thomas Paine in Common Sense:

Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness; the former promotes our happiness positively by uniting our affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other creates distinctions. The first is a patron, the last a punisher.

Society in every state is a blessing, but government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil...

Michael

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Thanks for the response. Let me see if I understand what you're saying.

So there is no principle that requires government, it's just that the Objectivist support of government is simply seen as the most pragmatic method of ensuring individual rights, is that right?

It would seem that any claim we make about man needs to be applied universally. So if man has an animalistic side that desires power over other people, then it would seem that making it easier for men to use that power over others by putting together a government would be the exact opposite of what we'd want, no?

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Nick,

I'm a pretty unorthodox Objectivist and I'm open about my free-market-anarchist sympathies (even if my practical political stance is one of Hayekian Minarchy).

The standard-issue Objectivist argument against Rothbard-style free-market-anarchy is principally epistemological/methodological.

The argument goes as follows: Rothbardians tend to be epistemic rationalists (observe that Mises was a fully-fledged neo-Kantian rationalist in epistemology and whilst Rothbard wasn't an epistemic rationalist, he was a methodological rationalist and this has a tendency to spill-over into fully-fledged epistemic rationalism). Rationalism is indifferent to context; it is a form of intrinsicism. In the case of free-market anarchy, advocates of free-market anarchy drop context and apply the NIOF principle in a deductive fashion, ignoring that the NIOF principle emerges within the context of a previously-established monopoly over the legitimate use of force with NIOF being a principle about the correct situations within which force can be used. Basically, NIOF pressuposes the State.

Now, I don't personally accept this argument (I think the NIOF principle emerges because every individual has the capacity to initiate force against others. Thus, the NIOF principle emerges from any context where people interact with each other. NIOF doesn't presuppose the State, it presupposes society. Society is not the State), but that's the standard argument used by most Objectivists to reject Free Market Anarchism.

I do, however, think that "Free Market Anarchists tend to be rationalists" is an appropriate criticism; I've seen FMA's use highly rationalistic arguments on several occasions. That said, I have learned things from the Free Market Anarchists and I respect the contributions they make to libertarian theory. For instance, one of the most beautiful things I have ever read was "The Myth of Man The Killer" by Eric S. Raymond (a Free Market Anarchist) which touches on one of the things that Michael brings up; the fact that evolution has unfortunately left pack-animal drives (drives towards social dominance/social submissiveness) in some of our psyches to various degrees... Link: http://catb.org/~esr/writings/killer-myth.html

Edited by studiodekadent
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So there is no principle that requires government, it's just that the Objectivist support of government is simply seen as the most pragmatic method of ensuring individual rights, is that right?

Nick,

That is not right.

I don't speak for "Objectivism" (whoever that is :) ), but I have no doubt Rand would emphatically disagree with you on this point, also.

But before proceeding, a small comment. Here on OL, I try to encourage each person to speak for himself/herself rather than speak in the name of some movement or other. This seriously cuts down on preachiness and leads to individual critical thinking--which is where philosophy has the greatest long-term use and effect. So I only speak for myself.

Back to the point. All knowledge in the Objectivst theory of concept formation is hierarchical. (This is explicitly stated in the literature.) Metaphysics is more fundamental than Politics (I'm speaking of the philosophical divisions here and this is also in the literature). Simply put, you have to exist before you can be a human in society. You can't do it the other way around--be a human in society before you exist. You can't even be an individual human before you exist.

In that sense, the Law of Identity is more fundamental than NIOF. (Didn't I say that already? How on earth is that pragmatic?)

Notice that NOIF, when used as the be-all and end-all justification of rights, derives only from one portion of human nature--the benefits of potential action unimpeded by other humans. But the proponents pretend that it derives from the whole shebang. It doesn't, though. Humans are more complicated than the delightfully quirky term Robert Bidinotto coined for this view: premises with feet.

I'll put it in even simpler terms--ones that I have often mentioned to anarchocapitalists. Non-pragmatic terms, in fact.

If someday bullying were miraculously eliminated from human nature, I would become an ancap myself. Until such time, it is far better to slice and dice power so that no bully ever gets his nasty paws on massive power. As for the bully's rights, I am not sympathetic to any right he may claim to bully others. In fact, so long as bullies exist, we need a form of protection against them.

Crack the bully nut in human nature and I believe we can have society on earth without formal government.

But observing that humans constantly bully each other when they can get away with it isn't pragmatism. It is identifying reality. (I.e., Law of Identity.)

Michael

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That is not right.

I don't speak for "Objectivism" (whoever that is :) ), but I have no doubt Rand would emphatically disagree with you on this point, also.

But before proceeding, a small comment. Here on OL, I try to encourage each person to speak for himself/herself rather than speak in the name of some movement or other. This seriously cuts down on preachiness and leads to individual critical thinking--which is where philosophy has the greatest long-term use and effect. So I only speak for myself.

Of course, I understand. If Rand were alive, I'd try to ask her what the Objectivist position is on this.

I've talked to quite a few Objectivists, and have gotten about as many different answers as people I've spoken with. So far, none of them satisfying, but I press on.

Back to the point. All knowledge in the Objectivst theory of concept formation is hierarchical. (This is explicitly stated in the literature.) Metaphysics is more fundamental than Politics (I'm speaking of the philosophical divisions here and this is also in the literature). Simply put, you have to exist before you can be a human in society. You can't do it the other way around--be a human in society before you exist. You can't even be an individual human before you exist.

Sure, I don't have any disagreement with that.

In that sense, the Law of Identity is more fundamental than NIOF. (Didn't I say that already? How on earth is that pragmatic?)

I think you may have misunderstood my meaning. I'll clarify the "pragmatic" claim further down, since it's more relevant to what you said there.

In terms of the Law of Identity being more fundamental than NIOF, I would assume by that that you mean that the Law of Identity is axiomatic whereas the NIOF is derived. I would certainly agree with that. However, where I think we may have a disagreement is that you seem to be saying that a more fundamental principle trumps a less fundamental one. I would not agree with that. If something is true, then it is true. It is not in conflict with something else that is true.

Notice that NOIF, when used as the be-all and end-all justification of rights, derives only from one portion of human nature--the benefits of potential action unimpeded by other humans. But the proponents pretend that it derives from the whole shebang. It doesn't, though. Humans are more complicated than the delightfully quirky term Robert Bidinotto coined for this view: premises with feet.

I'll put it in even simpler terms--ones that I have often mentioned to anarchocapitalists. Non-pragmatic terms, in fact.

If someday bullying were miraculously eliminated from human nature, I would become an ancap myself. Until such time, it is far better to slice and dice power so that no bully ever gets his nasty paws on massive power.

This is where the pragmatic approach comes in. When you start using terms like "benefit" (such that one position provides a preferable outcome to another) or "better" (in regards how to handle power distribution), that is inherently pragmatic. I'm not saying there's anything wrong with that, I'm just identifying it for what it is.

If I say that the initiation of force is immoral that is a principled statement. If I say that the best way to protect people from the initiation of force is to make sure that everyone is freely able to obtain arms, that is a pragmatic statement.

As for the bully's rights, I am not sympathetic to any right he may claim to bully others.

Nor am I. Do you think I am?

In fact, so long as bullies exist, we need a form of protection against them.

Crack the bully nut in human nature and I believe we can have society on earth without formal government.

But observing that humans constantly bully each other when they can get away with it isn't pragmatism. It is identifying reality. (I.e., Law of Identity.)

That bullies exist is an identification of reality, I agree. However, "that protection must come in the form of a government" is not an identification of reality, it is an opinion, a pragmatic prescription for action. And because it's an opinion that conflicts with NIOF, I'm still confused as to how Objectivists can support it.

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Thanks for the response. Here are my thoughts.

Now, I don't personally accept this argument (I think the NIOF principle emerges because every individual has the capacity to initiate force against others. Thus, the NIOF principle emerges from any context where people interact with each other. NIOF doesn't presuppose the State, it presupposes society. Society is not the State), but that's the standard argument used by most Objectivists to reject Free Market Anarchism.

I don't find that argument particularly satisfying either.

Objective morality implicitly to all people, everywhere, and at all times. It cannot logically be moral for one person to do something, and immoral for another person to do the exact same thing. That is, if it's moral for a government agent to forcefully take 40% of my income, then it is also moral for me to forcefully take 40% of his income. The NIOF principle is derivable as a pattern when giving moral claims the universality test.

So whether a state exists or not, I have the right to not have force initiated against me. Since the state must implicitly break that principle (and even worse if it's under the guise of protecting the rights of individuals), I've always found the Objectivist explanation for the state an ex post facto justification, since the state must first initiate force for it to be considered a state, thereby nullifying its very intent.

You brought up rationalism, so I'd like to ask a question about that as well. I've been accused a few times recently of being a rationalist. Never having heard that as an accusation before (I thought being rational was a good thing :-) ), I did some research on it and from what I've found it appears that a rationalist is someone who makes an argument purely through reason without reference to empiricism. Is that right? If so, I still don't see an issue with that, depending on the argument.

For instance, I can confidently make the claim "absolute truth is valid", because its opposite (and only alternative) is "absolute truth is invalid", which is self-contradictory. I don't need empirical evidence to prove this claim. I almost get the impression that calling someone a rationalist is like making the Ellsworth Toohey "reason is limited" argument, which isn't very compelling because it too is self-contradictory.

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Objective morality implicitly to all people, everywhere, and at all times. It cannot logically be moral for one person to do something, and immoral for another person to do the exact same thing. That is, if it's moral for a government agent to forcefully take 40% of my income, then it is also moral for me to forcefully take 40% of his income. The NIOF principle is derivable as a pattern when giving moral claims the universality test.

So whether a state exists or not, I have the right to not have force initiated against me. Since the state must implicitly break that principle (and even worse if it's under the guise of protecting the rights of individuals), I've always found the Objectivist explanation for the state an ex post facto justification, since the state must first initiate force for it to be considered a state, thereby nullifying its very intent.

I am surprised that no one has identified the essential explanation, though MSK came close.

The government is an agency that holds a monopoly on retaliatory force. Nothing in Objectivism allows a coercive government. Ayn Rand suggested non-coercive modes of income for a morally just state. She also suggested - and only suggested; did not argue consistently - that even the ownership of handguns would be prohibited, as the only purpose of such an instrument is to take a human life. The police have a right to lethal weapons; no one else does. What then, of the fact that criminals will be armed and honest people will not? My reply is that in a Objectivist society, police protection would be far more efficient than it is now. The details have not been - and perhaps cannot be - worked out. As Hayek pointed out on banking, we cannot know all the forms it will take once it is liberated from government. Similarly, we can only outline the general consequences of a government based on protecting your right not to be coerced.

The non-initiation of force prohibits not force, but its initiation. That applies to the government which is an agency of retaliatory force.

A government based on an Objective ethics does not preclude people from adjudicating, arbitrating, negotiating, or mediating among themselves or from creating businesses that sell these services. Right now, here and now, if you read any formal contract you have for credit card, automobile, home or perhaps even your computer, you will see that it specifies arbitration. But the government courts are always yours by right. We have security guards today. (Also, we have locks, gates, doors, cameras, etc.) What these competing companies do not have is the right to shoot it out on behalf of their clients - nor are they disposed to do so. I assure you that guards from competing companies get along a lot better than cops from adjoining jurisdictions. If the largely unlikely happens and two security guards engage in (or are on the verge of) aggression, it is the police who are the final retaliatory (preventive) force.

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You brought up rationalism, so I'd like to ask a question about that as well. I've been accused a few times recently of being a rationalist. Never having heard that as an accusation before (I thought being rational was a good thing :-) ), I did some research on it and from what I've found it appears that a rationalist is someone who makes an argument purely through reason without reference to empiricism. Is that right?

Sort of, but not exactly. I should also add that your use of the term "reason" is incorrect; you're using "reason" as a synonym for "deductive reasoning." Reason is not exclusively deductive (indeed, your implicit characterization of reason as exclusively deductive is rationalistic).

A rationalist is someone that argues the ultimate source of knowledge is logical deduction from a priori first principles.

Now, not all logical deduction is rationalism. I am making a distinction between epistemological rationalism and methodological rationalism. Austrian economics is methodologically rationalist (i.e. uses logical deduction from first principles), but most actual Austrian economists are epistemological empiricists because they defend their first principles on the basis of empirical evidence (Menger, Weiser, Bohm-Bawerk and Hayek were all empirical foundationalists).

An argument that makes a logical deduction from an empirical fact is not epistemologically rationalist.

However, if someone comes along and starts claiming that "Proposition A" is known independently of and prior to experience (and/or that our senses cannot grasp it), then starts making deductions from that proposition and applying the deductions to any situation without any respect to context, they are being epistemologically rationalist.

Descartes and Spinoza were rationalists (disclaimer: Spinoza had some good things about him too). So is Kant (he accepted a priori abstract knowledge and argued our abstract knowledge was formed more or less deductively).

If so, I still don't see an issue with that, depending on the argument.

For instance, I can confidently make the claim "absolute truth is valid", because its opposite (and only alternative) is "absolute truth is invalid", which is self-contradictory. I don't need empirical evidence to prove this claim.

Tautologies are indeed true, but rather trite, don't you think?

Irrespective, lets look at a point; where does the concept "truth" come from?

I'd argue that these concepts have empirical origins. At birth we don't have any abstract concepts in our heads; in this respect (although probably not other respects) humans are tabula rasa. So, how do we originate concepts like "truth" in the first place? I'd say its because whilst everything we physically sense is real, sometimes our inner speculations and propositions (and those we hear from others) don't always match the evidence of our senses.

Thus, the concept "truth" (or really concepts like "correct" and "incorrect") originate at the empirical level.

Objectivism does argue that you can apply correctly-formed abstractions in a deductive fashion. If it didn't, Objectivists wouldn't support Austrian economics (and speaking as an economist I can assure you that Objectivism completely accepts the Menger/Weiser/Bohm-Bawerk/Hayek-style empirical foundationalist logical deduction).

I almost get the impression that calling someone a rationalist is like making the Ellsworth Toohey "reason is limited" argument, which isn't very compelling because it too is self-contradictory.

I think you're conflating a lot of different positions here.

"Reason is limited" can mean a lot of things. It can simply mean "we are not omniscient" on one hand (something Objectivism accepts, because yes, we aren't omniscient), and on the other hand it can mean "there are sources of truth other than reason" (which Objectivism rejects).

Yes, reason is limited. By that, I mean reason is FINITE. It, like everything else in reality, has a specific nature (A is A) and because it is what it is and no more, it must be definite and hence finite (limited). Reason, since it is (in the Objectivist view) based on integrating empirical evidence into abstract concepts, is bound by context (a position Hayek accepted and detailed thoroughly). Reason, since it must be employed by choice, is not automatic. Reason, whilst a faculty, needs to be operated in a specific way (how to properly perform abstraction, etc etc), and thus can be used effectively or ineffectively. This is why people can so frequently make honest errors of knowledge; even perfectly reasonable people can also come to different conclusions depending on the evidence presented to them.

So, yes, in that way, reason is "limited."

But this is clearly not the same thing as either skepticism or the social-constructivist kinds of rationalism favored by Marxists, Postmodernists and so many other descendents of the German Idealists.

Also, you bring up Ellsworth Toohey, but Toohey was a political totalitarian. A fact you might want to consider is that every single nonreligious totalitarian ideology is epistemologically rationalist (I will concede, these ideologies never believe that reason is avaliable to all people... they tend to argue most people's consciousness is warped ('false consciousness' and similar arguments)). Marxism and Fascism both sprang from German Idealism (although yes, not all the German Idealists, nor their followers, are totalitarians). And even religious totalitarianism is methodologically rationalist (taking their holy texts as first principles and then performing deductions from there). The Hayek/Popper case for the links between rationalism and totalitarianism needs to be answered.

When was the last time that a dictatorship has been established in the name of epistemic modesty, empiricism and aversion to drawing hasty conclusions?

I'm not accusing you of totalitarianism, but rationalism and freedom haven't often been on best of terms.

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Yes, reason is limited. By that, I mean reason is FINITE.

Infinite logical chains can be supported deductively by way of arithmetic induction. That is why we can prove theorems which hold for all integers (an infinite set). Also reason (i.e. the reason of Georg Cantor) produced the theory of transfinite numbers. It had to be cleaned up a bit and restricted to prevent contradictions, but there it is and there it stands.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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However, where I think we may have a disagreement is that you seem to be saying that a more fundamental principle trumps a less fundamental one. I would not agree with that.

Nick,

Nor would I in the sense you are saying--i.e., that the two principles are unrelated.

It's funny that you got close, too. You talked about the less fundamental one being derived. This is correct.

When I talk about a less fundamental principle, it automatically implies the incorporation of the more fundamental one as its hierarchical foundation. In the current case, NIOF doesn't make any sense without the Law of Identity. Or do you think it does?

Since the rest of your argument took it from there, I'll stop here.

Michael

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Everyone,

Plenty of good stuff, here, though I'm out of my depth with some.

A simple question to check my understanding:

Isn't a limited government limited in action,(as well as size) by an objective Constitution?

IOW, it is merely an agent of the people, acting where they choose not to act - or should not act.

"To make social existence possible to men, by protecting the benefits and combating the evils which men can cause to one another."

and,

"A private individual may do anything except that which is legally forbidden; a government official may do nothing except that which is legally permitted."

[AR: The Nature of Government]

The initiation of force monopoly is then simply (to this reductionist) the right to individual self defense, consensually passed on to government - with restrictions and conditions of use. i.e., IOF has been 'borrowed' from the citizens?

With the over-lying principle of setting man free from men.

Surely?

Tony

Edited by whYNOT
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I am surprised that no one has identified the essential explanation, though MSK came close.

The government is an agency that holds a monopoly on retaliatory force. Nothing in Objectivism allows a coercive government.

But this is the contradiction inherent in Rand's definition of government that I asked about in my original post. "Monopoly" implies coercion, because a monopoly must be coercively enforced if it is required that it remain a monopoly. That is, force must be initiated against anyone that tries to compete with the monopoly. If competition is allowed, then it's no longer a monopoly, and the contradiction falls away.

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I am surprised that no one has identified the essential explanation, though MSK came close.

The government is an agency that holds a monopoly on retaliatory force. Nothing in Objectivism allows a coercive government.

But this is the contradiction inherent in Rand's definition of government that I asked about in my original post. "Monopoly" implies coercion, because a monopoly must be coercively enforced if it is required that it remain a monopoly. That is, force must be initiated against anyone that tries to compete with the monopoly. If competition is allowed, then it's no longer a monopoly, and the contradiction falls away.

Nick:

With all due respect, your definition of monopoly is incorrect.

In economics, a monopoly (from Greek monos / μονος (alone or single) + polein / πωλειν (to sell)) exists when a specific individual or an enterprise has sufficient control over a particular product or service to determine significantly the terms on which other individuals shall have access to it. (This is in contrast to a monopsony which relates to a single entity's control over a market to purchase a good or service, and contrasted with oligopoly where a few entities exert considerable influence over an industry)[1][clarification needed] Monopolies are thus characterized by a lack of economic competition to produce the good or service and a lack of viable substitute goods.[2] The verb "monopolise" refers to the process by which a firm gains persistently greater market share than what is expected under perfect competition.

It does not necessarily imply or require "government force."

Adam

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I am surprised that no one has identified the essential explanation, though MSK came close.

The government is an agency that holds a monopoly on retaliatory force. Nothing in Objectivism allows a coercive government.

But this is the contradiction inherent in Rand's definition of government that I asked about in my original post. "Monopoly" implies coercion, because a monopoly must be coercively enforced if it is required that it remain a monopoly. That is, force must be initiated against anyone that tries to compete with the monopoly. If competition is allowed, then it's no longer a monopoly, and the contradiction falls away.

Nick:

With all due respect, your definition of monopoly is incorrect.

In economics, a monopoly (from Greek monos / μονος (alone or single) + polein / πωλειν (to sell)) exists when a specific individual or an enterprise has sufficient control over a particular product or service to determine significantly the terms on which other individuals shall have access to it. (This is in contrast to a monopsony which relates to a single entity's control over a market to purchase a good or service, and contrasted with oligopoly where a few entities exert considerable influence over an industry)[1][clarification needed] Monopolies are thus characterized by a lack of economic competition to produce the good or service and a lack of viable substitute goods.[2] The verb "monopolise" refers to the process by which a firm gains persistently greater market share than what is expected under perfect competition.

It does not necessarily imply or require "government force."

Adam

In the context of the modern use of the term "monopoly" you are correct.

However, when the word was first coined it DID refer to the situation of a State-backed monopoly.

That said, I think its fair to differentiate between "legally-enforced monopoly" and "contestable monopoly."

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I am surprised that no one has identified the essential explanation, though MSK came close.

The government is an agency that holds a monopoly on retaliatory force. Nothing in Objectivism allows a coercive government.

Michael,

I treated this as implied since I was using the term NIOF, which deals specifically with initiation of force.

But the real 800 pound gorilla in Rand's position is the following statement (in "The Nature of Government"):

The source of the government's authority is "the consent of the governed." This means that the government is not the ruler, but the servant or agent of the citizens; it means that the government as such has no rights except the rights delegated to it by the citizens for a specific purpose.

There is only one basic principle to which an individual must consent if he wishes to live in a free, civilized society: the principle of renouncing the use of physical force and delegating to the government his right of physical self-defense, for the purpose of an orderly, objective, legally defined enforcement.

To channel Lysander Spooner, I don't recall ever consenting to or delegating anything of the sort. I presume I am "an individual." And if I didn't delegate that part of my life, who did?

Either "to delegate" means to do so by exercising volition, or I don't know what it means. Can you be forced to delegate something? Can someone delegate something for you by a proxy you did not assign?

These are obvious questions--and good ones--if you use the limited vision of human nature implied by NIOF.

But if you use a more complete view, it's easy to see that no child chooses its parents--and it must obey them. This is metaphysical, not just political. Weakness, dependence and lack of understanding are inherent in the child's nature.

Likewise, we do not choose the country we are born in. Nor do we choose the government in power at the time. Nor do we choose the fact that power is an inherent part of human nature.

And even more fundamental, we do not choose what is real and what is not real, i.e., what is objective. We can only choose our perception of it--and only partially choose that since much of it is automatic. The main part we cannot choose is the universality of objectivity. What is objective for me has to be objective for you and vice-versa, by the very nature of being objective. If we disagree, the end result will be that one of us (or both) will have to learn what is correct. This is not opinion.

And this means a charter document can be based on objective rules--ones that are objectively valid for both you and me--as per Rand's prescription (from "The Nature of Government"):

If physical force is to be barred from social relationships, men need an institution charged with the task of protecting their rights under an objective code of rules.

This is the task of a government—of a proper government—its basic task, its only moral justification and the reason why men do need a government.

A government is the means of placing the retaliatory use of physical force under objective control—i.e., under objectively defined laws.

This establishes the fact that even if we do not agree to a charter document, it still can be objective.

But, can it bind us? I say it can, although I will be at odds with Rand (as she often ignores the non-rational side of man, or at least implies that it is not fundamental). Here view is based on delegating this authority.

In my view, such authority derives directly from human nature--that we are not given the power of choice, neither physically nor mentally, over these things at birth. But under an objectively formed government based on rights, a person has the choice to later opt out and move elsewhere. (This is usually not permitted in a dictatorship.) In other words, nature demands you to be in a condition not chosen by you when you are born, but it does not demand that you stay in that situation, especially as you get older.

In essence, by not moving outside the USA as you get older, you tacitly agree to the government's authority. Maybe not in theory, but you certainly do in practice.

In short, I see our need to have a government (or some kind of "leader-follower" social order) emerge from the animal part of human nature. The constraints we put on government come from the rational part of human nature. I do not think it is possible to eliminate either part of human nature--both will exist whether we want them to or not. So government it is--at least until human nature changes. This question is not whether to have a social order based on power (i.e., government) or some other form or coexistence. We're going to have the power-flavored one whether we like it or not, whether we agree or not. The real question is what kind of government to have.

I believe that Rand would not find my reasoning flawed, even though I also believe she would grind her teeth at the idea of making formal philosophical room for man's irrational side. She even hinted at this with the quote below. Frankly, it has been a long time since I have read "The Nature of Government" and, on rereading it now, I was pleasantly surprised at how much of a fan she was of the concept of checks and balances.

In mankind's history, the understanding of the government's proper function is a very recent achievement: it is only two hundred years old and it dates from the Founding Fathers of the American Revolution. Not only did they identify the nature and the needs of a free society, but they devised the means to translate it into practice. A free society—like any other human product—cannot be achieved by random means, by mere wishing or by the leaders' "good intentions." A complex legal system, based on objectively valid principles, is required to make a society free and to keep it free—a system that does not depend on the motives, the moral character or the intentions of any given official, a system that leaves no opportunity, no legal loophole for the development of tyranny.

The American system of checks and balances was just such an achievement.

In short, she is saying that power is an inherent component of the human being and it needs outside restraints, not just the volition of the individual. I'm speaking in metaphysical terms here, not political. If this fact did not exist, if this were not the reality of human nature, than there would be no need for "just such an achievement" as "the American system of checks and balances."

Michael

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But this is the contradiction inherent in Rand's definition of government that I asked about in my original post. "Monopoly" implies coercion, because a monopoly must be coercively enforced if it is required that it remain a monopoly. That is, force must be initiated against anyone that tries to compete with the monopoly. If competition is allowed, then it's no longer a monopoly, and the contradiction falls away.

Nick,

According to Rand, you are making an equivalence between politics and economics here. Thus the contradiction is yours, not hers (that is, if you are thinking in conceptual terms--i.e., hierarchical--according to the Objectivist system of concept formation). See the following quote from "The Nature of Government":

A recent variant of anarchistic theory, which is befuddling some of the younger advocates of freedom, is a weird absurdity called "competing governments." Accepting the basic premise of the modern statists—who see no difference between the functions of government and the functions of industry, between force and production, and who advocate government ownership of business—the proponents of "competing governments" take the other side of the same coin and declare that since competition is so beneficial to business, it should also be applied to government. Instead of a single, monopolistic government, they declare, there should be a number of different governments in the same geographical area, competing for the allegiance of individual citizens, with every citizen free to "shop" and to patronize whatever government he chooses.

Remember that forcible restraint of men is the only service a government has to offer. Ask yourself what a competition in forcible restraint would have to mean.

She was actually harsher than saying the contradiction is yours. She continued:

One cannot call this theory a contradiction in terms, since it is obviously devoid of any understanding of the terms "competition" and "government." Nor can one call it a floating abstraction, since it is devoid of any contact with or reference to reality and cannot be concretized at all, not even roughly or approximately.

Agree or disagree, that's one thing. But Rand did not contradict herself on this point.

Michael

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That said, I think its fair to differentiate between "legally-enforced monopoly" and "contestable monopoly."

Agreed.

As an aside, especially here on OL, it is so very important to define your terms because it saves a lot of wasteful argument. One of the key lessons that I learned, taught all my students and have employed with friends and enemies is defining terms.

Ayn is a classic example of the importance of definitions of terms. Her use and definition of "selfishness" is not the common usage which is pejorative in nature.

I always make it clear when I explain her idea of the virtue of selfishness, otherwise, you literally see the wall come down in the persons eyes as you advocate selfishness as a virtue. The selective retention, and selective distortion, that exists in the public communication of that term are challenges for any communicator of her ideas.

Adam

Edited by Selene
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This is a very interesting discussion so far, but I'd like to try to keep to the original point as much as possible.

I understand the various ways that the term "monopoly" is used in economics, so let me clarify. I am referring to the sort that is backed up by force.

In order to simplify this, I'll take my argument one step at a time using the Socratic method, and then I might be better able to find out where my flaw is.

So the first question is -- Is it moral for people who call themselves "government" to initiate the use of force against others?

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So the first question is -- Is it moral for people who call themselves "government" to initiate the use of force against others?

Nick,

Which "people who call themselves 'government'" and for what purpose?

You get these questions when you discuss principles instead of rules.

In fact, I never use that form of asking, "Is xxxx moral?" Nowadays, whenever there is an Objectivist context and people ask this, more often than not they are asking for someone to give them a rule. (There's even a Dear Abby kind of thing going on now where people who call themselves Objectivists are answering question like, "Is it moral for doctors to prescribe placebos?")

Principles deal with identification--which always involves context to be correct. You gotta use your brain.

Rules merely need obedience. You can turn your brain off with them.

In my case, I have always had trouble with rules--especially context-less rules--since I have always been authority challenged. :)

Michael

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Which "people who call themselves 'government'" and for what purpose?

I don't know that this would make a difference, so perhaps you can give me an example of when it would be moral for certain people, and when it would be immoral for others.

You get these questions when you discuss principles instead of rules.

In fact, I never use that form of asking, "Is xxxx moral?" Nowadays, whenever there is an Objectivist context and people ask this, more often than not they are asking for someone to give them a rule.

I know what I believe the answer is. I'm trying to determine whether or not you agree with that answer. Because if you don't, then I can't use it as a premise in an argument.

If I make the following argument:

- All cats are white.

- Sam is a cat.

- Therefore, Sam is white.

It's logically valid, but you are only bound to the conclusion if you first accept the premise. If I think you accept the premise, but you don't, then I'm spinning my wheels making the argument. That's what I'm trying to avoid here.

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If I make the following argument:

- All cats are white.

- Sam is a cat.

- Therefore, Sam is white.

It's logically valid, but you are only bound to the conclusion if you first accept the premise.

Nick,

Here's where context comes in.

How about adding it to the premises? Say, "all cats in this room are white," and "Sam, who is in this room, is a cat."

Now I am bound not only by logic, but by the context of my observation, which I can use to validate the premises.

Going back to your question, (Is it moral for people who call themselves "government" to initiate the use of force against others?), we can roundly say "yes" if we use a quirky context I got from John Hospers.

I think it's "moral" for the government to stage a boxing event, Both boxers initiate force against each other and it is conceivable that one would work for the government while the other would not.

But does "moral" mean anything of any importance in that construction? It sounds silly to me.

That's just one context. It's quirky, so it makes the point with clarity--i.e., you need context for principles. And there are oodles of contexts.

Michael

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That's just one context. It's quirky, so it makes the point with clarity--i.e., you need context for principles. And there are oodles of contexts.

Okay, I understand your point. So I'll modify my question as follows:

Is it moral for people who call themselves "government" to initiate the use of force against others when those others do not consent? This removes things like "boxing" from the context, since presumably boxers consent (and we would probably both agree that a boxing match where the boxers did not consent would be immoral).

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Nick,

More context. The trouble is saying "government" and lumping it all together, so a constitutional republic becomes equal to a bloody dictatorship.

Here's a case for you. Suppose, in a country that is governed by a constitutional republic, I buy 4 or 5 acres of land right next to a city and right near the water supply, power source, railway station, and largest public transportation system. Then suppose I build huge fences all around and reinforce them with barbed wire. Next, I start stockpiling bazookas, have a few tanks delivered, cases of hand grenades, and so on. People constantly see cement mixer trucks going in an out. And, everyday, people can hear military-like drills going on with a group of people who I recruit to live there. I could go on, but I think you get the picture.

Now, suppose every time someone comes to the door to ask questions, I, or one of my representatives, always say I am 100% for peace and love. I have no intention whatsoever to use the ordnance I am accumulating, nor deploy to people I am training. And if you don't believe me, just ask the others who live in the compound. They will say the same thing. Peace and love, baby. That's what we're about.

There's a moment when you say to me, "You can't do that anymore here." I say--in no uncertain terms--that I will not stop. So you come and make me--bringing armed units to use force against me if necessary.

That is one situation.

Here's another.

I live under a dictatorship. I want to have a reading club to study works that are on the government's censorship list of banned books--works like Atlas Shrugged or, say, The Satanic Verses, or even The Turner Diaries. So I set up a group and we meet in secret. A government agent from the secret police infiltrates us and, after a while, armed units eventually come for us. I'll leave the rest to your imagination.

There is a fundamental difference between these two situations--and it isn't based on initiating force. It's not even based on the threat of using force.

It's based more on balance within context than on blind adherence to a contextless principle.

Some people in our neck of the woods see no difference in government activity in these two situations. They hold that the government is violating the individual rights and freedom of the people within those two groups.

I see a huge difference. The boundaries between prevention and oppression can get a bit fuzzy, I admit, but that does not mean I will throw common sense right out the window in certain situations. I hold that prevention is a higher moral good than retaliation in those cases.

Michael

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Nick,

More context. The trouble is saying "government" and lumping it all together, so a constitutional republic becomes equal to a bloody dictatorship.

Here's a case for you. Suppose, in a country that is governed by a constitutional republic, I buy 4 or 5 acres of land right next to a city and right near the water supply, power source, railway station, and largest public transportation system. Then suppose I build huge fences all around and reinforce them with barbed wire. Next, I start stockpiling bazookas, have a few tanks delivered, cases of hand grenades, and so on. People constantly see cement mixer trucks going in an out. And, everyday, people can hear military-like drills going on with a group of people who I recruit to live there. I could go on, but I think you get the picture.

Now, suppose every time someone comes to the door to ask questions, I, or one of my representatives, always say I am 100% for peace and love. I have no intention whatsoever to use the ordnance I am accumulating, nor deploy to people I am training. And if you don't believe me, just ask the others who live in the compound. They will say the same thing. Peace and love, baby. That's what we're about.

There's a moment when you say to me, "You can't do that anymore here." I say--in no uncertain terms--that I will not stop. So you come and make me--bringing armed units to use force against me if necessary.

That is one situation.

Here's another.

I live under a dictatorship. I want to have a reading club to study works that are on the government's censorship list of banned books--works like Atlas Shrugged or, say, The Satanic Verses, or even The Turner Diaries. So I set up a group and we meet in secret. A government agent from the secret police infiltrates us and, after a while, armed units eventually come for us. I'll leave the rest to your imagination.

There is a fundamental difference between these two situations--and it isn't based on initiating force. It's not even based on the threat of using force.

It's based more on balance within context than on blind adherence to a contextless principle.

Some people in our neck of the woods see no difference in government activity in these two situations. They hold that the government is violating the individual rights and freedom of the people within those two groups.

I see a huge difference. The boundaries between prevention and oppression can get a bit fuzzy, I admit, but that does not mean I will throw common sense right out the window in certain situations. I hold that prevention is a higher moral good than retaliation in those cases.

Michael

I think what Michael is trying to say here, Nick, is that principles are inconvenient things, because they keep leading you to conclusions you don't want to reach. It's better to rely on "common sense," i.e., whatever seems right and reasonable to you for whatever reason it happens to seem right and reasonable. That way, you can have your cake and eat it, too.

Helpfully,

JR

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