Trying to elucidate Rand's attributes


Kallikanzarid

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whYNOT, I don't see how what you've said is relevant to what you've quoted, or this discussion in general. And I assure you, your characterization of skepticism is dead wrong.

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Michael Stuart Kelly, on 23 Apr 2013 - 04:02, said:

sigh...

From ITOE, Chapter 6 - "Axiomatic Concepts":

Rand said:

The first and primary axiomatic concepts are "existence," "identity" (which is a corollary of "existence") and "consciousness." One can study what exists and how consciousness functions; but one cannot analyze (or "prove") existence as such, or consciousness as such. These are irreducible primaries. (An attempt to "prove" them is self-contradictory: it is an attempt to "prove" existence by means of nonexistence, and consciousness by means of unconsciousness.)

I don't know how you translate "first and primary" into ONLY, but there it is.

Michael Stuart Kelly, on 23 Apr 2013 - 05:20, said:

Andrew,

Rather than present terms other than the big three that are axiomatic concepts in Objectivism, terms that Rand did not explicitly designate as axiomatic concepts, and explain why they are axiomatic concepts (like, say, "existent"), I tried to find an explicit statement by Rand designating one. And I did find such a statement. (There are probably more, but I stopped looking after I found this one.)

It's in the workshop portion of ITOE (p. 252):

Ayn Rand said:

The notion of "self" is an axiomatic concept; it's implicit in the concept of "consciousness"; it can't be separated from it.

It would be an interesting project to hammer together Rand's criteria for axiomatic concepts and come up with a list of some of those that follow the first three.

Michael

(EDIT: On a personal note, if there is that little guy in your brain freaking out, going, "Oh my God, I'm wrong, I'm wrong! How can that be? There has to be some mistake! I have to find something that shows...! I don't know...! How can I possibly face this and survive? Woe is me! Woe is me!" and blah blah blah, just shoot him. Go ahead. Shoot him. Shoot him dead. :smile:

You are way more valuable than what he wants. That's from me and I'm sure many around here feel the same about you.

I listened to that little sucker for years and he is the No. 1 reason that held me back when I should have known better. It's OK to get shit wrong at times. I still do and I probably will until I die, But that little sucker always tries to rise like Lazarus. Then I have to shoot him again. It took years, but at least I'm starting to get some pleasure out of it. :smile:.)

MSK,

Alright, you got me. Mea Culpa.

That said, we both know Rand wasn't always consistent with using terminology. For instance, she often conflated "altruism" (which she typically uses in a Comtean sense) with "selflessness" (which I think is a broader category... "live for others" is altruism, "live for god" is selfless but it isn't Comtean altruism specifically).

With respect to the issue of axioms, it still seems clear from the quote that even if Rand may have been using axiom more broadly, she does regard the "big three" as a more fundamental "tier" of axioms... the irreducible primaries.

The first and primary axiomatic concepts are "existence," "identity" (which is a corollary of "existence") and "consciousness." One can study what exists and how consciousness functions; but one cannot analyze (or "prove") existence as such, or consciousness as such. These are irreducible primaries.

So, even if I might be technically incorrect about Rand's use of the term "axiom," she DID regard the "big three" as an higher tier of axiom.

I do, however, think we need to be careful with use of "axiom" as a term. I've ran into several instances where the meaning of the term has gotten confused (I covered this is my masters thesis since Objectivist Metaphysical Axioms =/= Austrian Axioms =/= Axiom-As-Defined-In-Dopfer-Potts).

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studiodekadent, since you've showed up, I'd like to continue our discussion of free will vs. determinism, even though it's off topic here. I think I've found exactly the kind of argument that captures my problem with Randian free will. From Ayer's Language, Truth, and Logic:

"We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express - that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. If, on the other hand, the putative proposition is of such character that the assumption of its truth, or falsehood, is consistent with any assumption whatsoever concerning the nature of his future experience, then, as far as he is concerned, it is, if not a tautology, a mere pseudo-proposition [lacking any literal significance]."

Since there is no prediction to be made from either determinism or free will hypotheses, it's only fair to consider them pseudo-propositions in this sense.

Alexei,

By the same token, that quote renders determinism a pseudo-proposition as well!

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K.

Your response shows exactly the difficulty I mentioned.

For instance, you are looking at identity as a separate thing, not one facet of a whole. (It's weird to say Rand's thinking is holistic, but in terms of fundamentals, it is very similar. She even calls identity a corollary of existence.)

I don't like to use analogies for arguments, but here is one of the best I have been able to come up with that is really clear. Think of the fundamental axioms like facets of a gemstone. You can look at a facet (say identity), discuss it, show its limits, flatness, etc., but you cannot remove it from the stone.

And you, yourself are part of that stone.

So long as you are looking for identity as a stand-alone idea, you will continue to not find value in the "handwaving," nor understand why so many other intelligent people do.

I'm going to say something very heretical for formal Objectivists, but what the hell. Let's throw the monkey-wrench in the works and get everybody pissed off. :smile:

This is how I understand it. Existence for Rand replaces God. It's kinda like the Objectivist God. Existence is everywhere for all times. Literally. There is no "every" nor "where" nor "all" nor "times" without existence for Rand. And it created us humans. We sprang from it as it poured us out (metaphorically speaking), over time, of course. The axiomatic concepts are some of the features of that God.

You don't worship that God and it doesn't have a personality, but so many characteristics are so similar with the Gods of the main religions, somebody has to say it. There are even "miracles," if you count the sporadic unexplained stuff that goes on. (There is just a claim that we will eventually understand it--but religions also claim that.)

And morality? The foundation for Rand's moral system is existence, looked at through the lenses of metaphysics and epistemology (and inferring human nature in there somewhere). Just like religions derive their ethics from God. Notice that Rand is always talking about "the given" with man.

Who gave it?

Existence, of course. Even though that is everything and a single thing at the same time. We merely singularize the abstraction of existence as a metaphor, but we also mean the plural.

This is where that picture of a circle is useful to illustrate the process. Let.s call one point existence--the single, and another point, existence--the everything. If you use a straight line and put them at the extremes, they go to different places. But if you make one the start-point and the other the end-point on a circle during the same measurement, they are the same point.

Just like existence is a single gemstone with facets in my other metaphor.

And how's this for being similar to a God idea?: Nature to be commanded must be obeyed.

Rand constantly said and wrote that. What could be more God-like in concept?

Also, I don't see this big picture view any differently for science. That really ticks off some scientific-leaning folks, but there it is. (The word God gives some of them heartburn. :smile: )The only thing I see different between the Big Bang and Creation, for instance, is the storyline, not the miracle. On that point, it all sprang from nothing. And I like stories, so I appreciate both qua stories, but not qua knowledge.

In terms of factual knowledge, they are both speculations at best. (But great stories. :smile: )

As Terence McKenna once said--and I paraphrase because I'm too lazy to look it up right now--science says give us one free miracle and we will explain the rest.

btw - I didn't talk about Ayer or placeholders or that stuff because it might be useful for comparing with Rand after we agree on what she means, but it is not too useful for explaining Rand's perspective per se.

Also, you might be surprised to learn that I disagree with some parts of her theory of concepts, starting with her claim that proper names are not concepts, but merely labels. This is another discussion, but I think she went a little too hog-wild with algebraic thinking and missed some really obvious stuff I personally claim can be concepts (like sensory mapping and narrative, for just two examples).

Even Nathaniel Branden has criticized her use of reason to mean something a lot narrower than it is and he was there bopping this stuff around with her when she first came up with it. But this is another discussion--a long one I have only started with myself. In fact, there's a lot I am still working out. (Not to debunk Rand. Far from it, I'm building on the parts I do agree with. My ultimate goal is to understand stuff correctly, not prove anyone right or wrong. And I find Rand's ideas to be an excellent starting point.)

Right now the idea is to understand Rand's system correctly and not fall into the trap of misrepresenting it because we see it as something it is not, then debunk that misrepresentation. And believe me, I've gotten a lot wrong over the years trying to keep to this simple goal. But I've also absorbed a lot. I've found that getting it wrong and correcting it is often the best way to learn it.

May I suggest using the principle of charity when analyzing her ideas?

Michael

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whYNOT, I don't see how what you've said is relevant to what you've quoted, or this discussion in general. And I assure you, your characterization of skepticism is dead wrong.

Skepticism, as philosophy, isn't skepticism as methodology. Check out the Wiki definitions.

Of course we all practise the methodology, day by day. My "characterization" of it as philosophy is a brief rendition of Rand's which I happen to thoroughly agree with, in (where else) 'The Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology'.

If you're not keen to read it, your choice, but you cannot expect that all your inquiries here will be satisfied otherwise.

One more excerpt:

"The assault on man's conceptual faculty has been accelerating since Kant, widening the breach between man's mind and reality.

To reclaim the power of philosophy, one must grasp the reason why man needs epistemology. Since man is neither infallible nor omniscient, he has to discover a valid method of cognition: WHAT do I know?- and HOW do I know it?

It is the task of epistemology to provide the answer to the "How?" - which then enables the special sciences to provide the answer to the "What?"

In the history of philosophy, epistemological theories have consisted predominantly of attempts to escape one or other of these two questions - by means of skepticism or mysticism.

The motive of all the attacks on man's rational faculty, is a single basic premise: the desire to exempt consciousness from the law of identity"

"Men have been taught either that knowledge is impossible (skepticism) or that it is available without effort (mysticism).

These two appear to be antagonists, but are, in fact, two variants of the same fraudulent coin: the attempt...to assert the primacy

of consciousness over existence.

"Philosophically, the mystic is usually an exponent of the intrinsic (revealed) school of epistemology; the skeptic is usually an advocate of epistemological subjectivism. [...]

"The skeptic is a disillusioned intrinsicist who, having failed to find automatic supernatural guidance, seeks a substitute in the collective subjectivism of others."

[Consciousness and Identity, AR]

=============

There are few one-line answers, since everything integrates with everything else in the O'ist method. If it doesn't seem relevant, it's because it all has a larger context, in breadth and hierarchy.

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Michael, Nothing heretical about it! In my frame, anyhow. Dig deep enough into and behind Rand's words (as you do), and an almost holy reverence for existence emerges.
Also, one could swing your statement around and consider that God 'replaces' (or equates) existence, for the religious. It is why I think I've have always had a stronger affinity for many religious individuals, than I've had for - can I call them - 'skeptic-atheists'? It's their reverence, ultimately, for God/Life. For the 'reverent atheist', there exists existence, which is always going to be his final arbiter, guide and home.
Your story-narrative, and reality, totally intersect here.

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studiodekadent,

> By the same token, that quote renders determinism a pseudo-proposition as well!

Yes!

whYNOT, Rand's characterization of skepticism as philosophy is dead wrong. For example, Hume is considered one of the most prominent skeptics, yet he is also an empiricist, his theory of knowledge is far from what you claim it to be.

> The assault on man's conceptual faculty has been accelerating since Kant, widening the breach between man's mind and reality.

Again, dead wrong. In fact, some aspects of Kant's epistemological/metaphysical views are remarkably similar to Rand's.

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Alright, you got me.

Andrew,

And you think I want that?

What the hell am I going to do with you?

:smile:

Michael

Don't look a gift horse in the mouth.

--Brant

take him out back and beat him up--pay per view, too (that's capitalism!)

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studiodekadent,

> By the same token, that quote renders determinism a pseudo-proposition as well!

Yes!

Okay, so why continue to discuss it, if you consider it meaningless?
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studiodekadent, you started it :smile:

Actually, YOU started it by coming into that thread on Reddit and throwing insults. Yes, you apologized for the crudeness, but you're still the person that started it.

Although if you're a determinist then saying either of us "started" it seems a bit strained.

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studiodekadent, but you're the one who started about free will. I went on to try and dismantle your arguments, so for that purpose I adopted the stance of determinism. While all fundamental physical laws are deterministic, and thus suggest that reality is deterministic, I don't think we're justified in assuming that physical laws are the laws that govern "reality in itself". As far as observations are concerned (and thus, for all practical purposes), yes, determinism in between measurements is highly likely. But extending this to a metaphysical claim is beyond human grasp, if it's at all meaningful. This is especially true considering how sensitive unstable systems are to initial conditions. We can always say that non-determinism is hiding in the (-n)th order of magnitude and it will still influence the behavior of these systems in a significant way. But since our expectations of future observations are not affected by choosing determinism or non-determinism, the point is ultimately moot.

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In the context of this thread I was arguing that attributes are epistemologic , not metaphysic. And that is why I do not think the phrase 'ideas related to reality' adds any clarity in this context.

Do you think epistemology is not connected to ideas related to reality?

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Xray responded to jaw ache:

Do you think epistemology is not connected to ideas related to reality?

end quote

Well, if reality REALLY consists of the heavens and the earth, and someplace bad where people and mad, biting dogs go, then we can call epistemology: theo-epistemology and see the connection. If you want proof, I suggest holding your breathe until you pass out and see a tunnel with a light at the end, and your dead relatives and friends beckoning you forward.

“Go to the light, Luke!”

Obiwan Kinobi

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Xray

As to use of the term metaphysical , would existential be less squishy, or does it connote different schools of philosophy?

The association of 'existential' with the philosophical movement 'existentialism' might indeed cause confusion.

Interesting that Rand originally wanted to call her philosophy "exstentialism", but then decided against it since the term existentialism was already 'taken' by Sartre, Camus & Co.

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In the context of this thread I was arguing that attributes are epistemologic , not metaphysic. And that is why I do not think the phrase 'ideas related to reality' adds any clarity in this context.

Do you think epistemology is not connected to ideas related to reality?

I think epistemology is synonymous with 'ideas related to reality'. My point about word choice was to clarify my response to the OP, which I take to illistrate a view that sees attributes as metaphysical entities, where as I see them as mental constructs. Hardeness is a concept that descibes a property of rocks and rock like materials. A rock's identity is what it is(A is A), when a conceptual consciousness considers an aspect of the rock's identity and forms the concept hardness , hardness refers to that aspect of the physical object under consideration. So you can pile up a bunch of rocks, but you will never trip over a pile of hardness :)

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In fact, some aspects of Kant's epistemological/metaphysical views are remarkably similar to Rand's.

Could you provide some examples and elaborate? TIA.

I haven't read Kant's works yet, so I'm going by Wikipedia and what others have told me.

Like Rand, Kant didn't like the skepticism of Hume, and he tried to address it in Critique of Pure Reason. "It always remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason that the existence of things outside us ... should have to be assumed merely on faith, and that if it occurs to anyone to doubt it, we should be unable to answer him with a satisfactory proof."

More interesting are Kant's views on substance: "Kant drops the empirical psychology [of Hume] and makes it a matter of a priori psychology, that only by employing certain categories could we have experience as of a physical world. It is only by understanding the world as possessing enduring spatio-temporal objects, which enter into causal relations with each other (that is, it is only by applying the categories of substance and causation) that we can have intelligible experience. Substances—that is, a framework of stable, enduring objects—are essential, but the source of this necessity lies not how the world is in itself, but in the framework which we are obliged to impose." (SEP, as quoted in the second link). Rand's crude attempts at introducing "identity" into her axioms seem like an attempt to do a similar thing: claim that substance is not altogether inaccessible to human mind or senses.

Now, so far I side with Hume. I just can't make sense of substance, it seems like something fictional and not necessary for reasoning about our observations and making predictions. But I find it amusing that Rand, despite chastising Kant left and right, agrees with him on fundamentals. I imagine, there *are* a lot of differences between them, but they shouldn't be overplayed.

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In the realm of ethics Kant believed that humans should not be treated as means, but as ends. How does this differ from Rand?

Ba'al Chatzaf

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This is how I understand induction and deduction... correct me if I'm wrong.

Induction is necessary for us to believe anything; we have to at least take some things at face value.

Deduction (logic) is how we bridge the gap between two instances of induction: using the more basic level of induction to check the more complex.

Reductionism is when we intentionally create starting points (our more basic instances of induction) that are so primary that they are either very unlikely, or impossible (axioms), to be wrong.

Deduction creates the context for what we induce. Our ability to deduce effectively depends largely on our starting points ("Check your premises.")

Without deduction--the process of comparing two or more instances of induction--we have no way of interpreting the information we induce. Meaning is relative (good/bad doesn't exist without better/worse).

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This is how I understand induction and deduction... correct me if I'm wrong.

Induction is necessary for us to believe anything; we have to at least take some things at face value.

Deduction (logic) is how we bridge the gap between two instances of induction: using the more basic level of induction to check the more complex.

Reductionism is when we intentionally create starting points (our more basic instances of induction) that are so primary that they are either very unlikely, or impossible (axioms), to be wrong.

Deduction creates the context for what we induce. Our ability to deduce effectively depends largely on our starting points ("Check your premises.")

Without deduction--the process of comparing two or more instances of induction--we have no way of interpreting the information we induce. Meaning is relative (good/bad doesn't exist without better/worse).

Essentially correct. Theories and hypotheses do not leap off from unorganized piles of fact, the way that frogs leap off of lilly pads. We need a combination of induction, abduction and deduction to make sense of the world.

Learning by trial and error is a mode of induction. Without it we could not learn to walk or ride our bikes.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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