Why Existence is not a Predicate


BaalChatzaf

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I was not rebutting anyone. I was explaining in some detail why existence is not a predicate.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Okay. So whoever said that existence is a predicate?

Ghs

Ba'al,

Re the whole "Existence exists" debate: Instead of getting 'lost in predication' :wink:, thus missing the forest for the trees, the "Keep it Simple" approach is better: For Rand simply meant that all that exists does in fact exist. She may not have phrased it very well, but that's the philosophical message she wanted to convey.

So it illustrates a philosophical position that opposes all skepticism that would question the reality of existence.

If we agree that Existence = All that exists,

then:

"Existence exists" can be translated as "All that exists, exists." , i.e. it is claimed that it 'really' exists.

So in the statement "All that exists, exists"/ "Existence exists" in Objectivist terminology, the tautological use of the term 'exist' serves as an emphatic reinforcement by the speaker to stress a point considered as essential.

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According to your reasoning, to say that anything exists is to treat "existence" as a predicate. Suppose we say "Cows exist." Does this mean that we regard existence as an attribute of cows? Of course not. Suppose we say "Physicists exist." Does this mean that we regard existence as an attribute of physicists? Of course not. And so on indefinitely.
There exists x such that x is a cow. Is that serious enough for you? "Exists" is used as as quantifier, not a predicate. I have already demonstrated by the rendering of exists as a -predicate- e, leads to the absurdity for all x, e(x). My pet unicorn does not have the property or attribute of existence. Neither that my right arm (I have both arms). There exists x, such that x is my right arm. But my right arm does not have the attribute (qua predicate) of existence. Ba'al Chatzaf

Rand agreed with you that existence is not a predicate. So what are you bitching about?

Ghs

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Correct. Existents exist, but a phrase like "Existence exists" makes no sense. It's as absurd as saying "Hunger hungers" or "Love loves".

She made the same mistake with "Consciousness is conscious" btw. It's like saying "Thirst is thirsty."

Ba'al,

Re the whole "Existence exists" debate, instead of getting 'lost in predication' :wink:, thus missing in the forest for the trees, the "Keep it Simple" approach is better: For Rand simply meant that all that exists does in fact exist. She may not have phrased it very well, but that's the philosophical message she wanted to convey.

So it illustrates a philosophical position that opposes all skepticism that would question the reality of existence.

If we agree that Existence = All that exists,

then:

"Existence exists" can be translated as "All that exists, exists." , i.e. it is claimed that it 'really' exists.

So in the statement "All that exists, exists"/ "Existence exists" in Objectivist terminology, the tautological use of the term 'exist' serves as an emphatic reinforcement by the speaker to stress a point considered as essential.

Your understanding of Objectivism has much improved. Kudos!

Catch up, Ba'al. :smile:

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I was not rebutting anyone. I was explaining in some detail why existence is not a predicate. Ba'al Chatzaf
Okay. So whoever said that existence is a predicate? Ghs
Ba'al, Re the whole "Existence exists" debate, instead of getting 'lost in predication' :wink:, thus missing in the forest for the trees, the "Keep it Simple" approach is better: For Rand simply meant that all that exists does in fact exist. She may not have phrased it very well, but that's the philosophical message she wanted to convey. So it illustrates a philosophical position that opposes all skepticism that would question the reality of existence. If we agree that Existence = All that exists, then: "Existence exists" can be translated as "All that exists, exists." , i.e. it is claimed that it 'really' exists. So in the statement "All that exists, exists"/ "Existence exists" in Objectivist terminology, the tautological use of the term 'exist' serves as an emphatic reinforcement by the speaker to stress a point considered as essential.

By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists." Rather, by using her tautological formulation she wished to stress the fact that "existence" is an axiomatic concept, i.e., an "irreducible primary." Rand was making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one (as your reformulation would suggest).

Ghs

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By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists." Rather, by using her tautological formulation she wished to stress the fact that "existence" is a an axiomatic concept, i.e., an "irreducible primary." Rand was making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one (as your reformulation would suggest).

Can't there be more than one intended meaning? Note the following sentence in parentheses:

The first thing to say about that which is is simply: it is. As Parmenides in ancient Greece formulated the principle: what is, is. Or, in Ayn Rand's words: existence exists. ("Existence" here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)
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By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists." Rather, by using her tautological formulation she wished to stress the fact that "existence" is a an axiomatic concept, i.e., an "irreducible primary." Rand was making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one (as your reformulation would suggest).
Can't there be more than one intended meaning? Note the following sentence in parentheses:
The first thing to say about that which is is simply: it is. As Parmenides in ancient Greece formulated the principle: what is, is. Or, in Ayn Rand's words: existence exists. ("Existence" here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)

The concept "existence" certainly has metaphysical implications; Rand expressly says this in her discussion of axiomatic concepts. But she also says that the specific formulation "Existence exists" is intended to stress the axiomatic status of the concept "existence." This is not achieved by saying "All that exists, exists." Even metaphysical skeptics and solipsists would agree with this facile statement.

Ghs

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I was not rebutting anyone. I was explaining in some detail why existence is not a predicate. Ba'al Chatzaf
Okay. So whoever said that existence is a predicate? Ghs
Ba'al, Re the whole "Existence exists" debate, instead of getting 'lost in predication' :wink:, thus missing in the forest for the trees, the "Keep it Simple" approach is better: For Rand simply meant that all that exists does in fact exist. She may not have phrased it very well, but that's the philosophical message she wanted to convey. So it illustrates a philosophical position that opposes all skepticism that would question the reality of existence. If we agree that Existence = All that exists, then: "Existence exists" can be translated as "All that exists, exists." , i.e. it is claimed that it 'really' exists. So in the statement "All that exists, exists"/ "Existence exists" in Objectivist terminology, the tautological use of the term 'exist' serves as an emphatic reinforcement by the speaker to stress a point considered as essential.
By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists." Rather, by using her tautological formulation she wished to stress the fact that "existence" is a an axiomatic concept, i.e., an "irreducible primary." Rand was making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one (as your reformulation would suggest). Ghs

Essential clarification that solves it for me.

I think the error is made by the occasional lax usage of 'A = A', rather than the totally different 'A is A'.

Would "Existence is an Existent" be correct? it seems so.

(As for "she may not have phrased it very well" - Xray, there is one thing I have learned about Rand, and that is nobody can phrase it better. Agree with her, or not. Every time I've thought she was ambiguous (hah!), I have found it has been my thinking at fault, not hers.)

Tony

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What Aristotle and Aquinas said about predicating existence was VASTLY different than what Hume/Kant and the moderns said about it. The A's were merely pointing out that you can't say: "Plato is existence," in the same way that you can say, "Plato is bald." Plato can't be either baldness or existence, but he ~can~ be a ~thing~ that is bald and he ~can~ be a ~thing~ that is existent.

So, Plato ~can~ be a bald person, and Plato ~can~ be an existent person (instead of a fictive person like Hercules or a no-longer-existent person like Thales, etc.). I.e., you ~can~ say: "Plato is existent," which means: "Plato is an existent person," or: "...existent entity," or whatever.

We might be more comfortable saying something like: "Plato is a person who exists," or: "...really exists," etc., but the point is that existence ~can~ be predicated just as ~baldness~ can, so long as you are predicating a Plato's ~being~ existent or ~being~ bald. You just can't say that Plato ~is~ existence, any more than you can say that he is baldness. Only that: "Plato is an existent," and "Plato is a baldy."

Roger,

I read through your post again in the hope that I could pinpoint our specific areas of disagreement. I think the basic problem is with the ambiguity in the term "predicate."

Yes, we can "predicate" the existence of X, but this simply means that we affirm (or assert or declare) the existence of X. It does not mean that we regard existence as a metaphysical predicate (or attribute or characteristic) of X.

I have explained the passage in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics in which he explains why existence (or "being") is not an attribute. Aquinas presents a more difficult case, given his claim that existence is the essence, or essential characteristic, of God. Aquinas goes on to explain that we cannot fully understand what this means, since, from our limited human perspective, we always distinguish between thatness and whatness, i.e., between the fact that X exists and what X is.

Thus, Aquinas appears to agree with Aristotle's argument that existence is not a predicate; indeed, he regards this distinction as essential to human understanding. But Aquinas goes on to argue that this fundamental distinction does not apply to God, which makes him unknowable.

I discuss this issue in two of my books: In ATCAG, pp. 62 ff (section titled "God, Being, and Existence"); and in Why Atheism? pp. 155 ff. As I point out in the latter discussion, Aquinas's claim that we cannot grasp what it means to say that God's essence is existence was the key to his rejection of Anselm's Ontological Argument. I also make an original point in this section, namely, that Anselm's Ontological Argument is not an a priori argument at all, and that Aquinas was well aware of this fact. Since I have the text on my hard drive, I will post it here:

From Why Atheism? pp. 155-157

The Ontological Argument is commonly said to be an a priori proof, because it supposedly appeals to reason independently of experience. Unlike the First Cause Argument, the Design Argument, and other a posteriori proofs which begin with empirical premises (observations about causation, order, etc.), we are told that the Ontological Argument begins with nothing more than the concept of God; and then, through an analysis of this concept, it progresses to the conclusion that God must necessarily exist.

Although this traditional classification may apply to some versions of the Ontological Argument, it does not apply to Anselm’s original version. As we have seen, Anselm begins not with the mere concept of God but with the concept of God as it exists as an object of understanding in the human mind. Anselm asserts that the concept of God exists even in the mind of the atheist who denies the existence of God, and it is this assertion that enables him to conclude that the existence of God cannot be denied without self-contradiction. This is clearly an empirical assertion, since it depends on the truth of a psychological observation about human consciousness.

Do we possess the idea of God as a perfect being? Do we understand what it means to identify God’s essence with his existence? Whatever the other problems with Anselm’s argument may be (and they are legion), his argument cannot even get off the ground unless we answer "yes" to these factual questions. Hence, contrary to the standard interpretation, Anselm’s argument is based on an empirical premise, on an alleged fact about our idea of God.

This point was recognized by Thomas Aquinas, who penned a brief but incisive critique of the Ontological Argument in the thirteenth century. Aquinas considers this argument under the question of whether the existence of God is self-evident. A proposition is self-evident when a predicate is included within the meaning of its subject.. Consider the proposition "Man is an animal." This is self-evidently true (provided we understand the meaning of both terms), because the predicate "animal" is included within our definition of "man."

Is "God exists" a self-evident proposition? Aquinas maintains that this question may be interpreted in two ways. A proposition may be absolutely or contextually self-evident. A proposition, though self-evident in itself, will not be contextually self-evident to those who do not understand the meaning of the relevant concepts. And this is what we find with the proposition "God exists." God’s essence is identical to his existence, so if we could understand what God is, we would also know that God exists without further deliberation. But the nature of God cannot be grasped by the human intellect, so the existence of God is not contextually self-evident to human beings.

The validity of the Ontological Argument does not hinge on the theoretical issue of whether a full understanding of God’s nature would carry within itself a knowledge of his existence, for this follows automatically from the statement that God’s essence is existence. The key question is factual, not theoretical. Can our limited intellect truly grasp what it means to say that God’s essence is existence? No, says Aquinas, so we cannot base a demonstration for the existence of God on nothing more than an analysis of God’s nature.

We thus see that Aquinas criticizes Anselm by attacking the empirical premise from which his argument proceeds. Given our inability to understand the nature of God, atheism cannot be summarily dismissed as an incoherent position. That there exists a being than which nothing greater can be conceived is precisely "what is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist." If the atheist fails to understand the true nature of God, this stems from a defect of the human intellect and so is true of everyone, theist and atheist alike. And if the existence of God seems self-evident to many people, this is because they have believed in God for many years: "as a result, what the mind is steeped in from childhood it clings to very firmly, as something known naturally and self-evidently."

Ghs

 

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The only references I could find where Ayn Rand herself explicitly endorses Parmenides were in Ayn Rand's Marginalia, edited by the (now somewhat infamous) Robert Mayhew. Both references were in her comments on An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis by John Hospers.

Hospers: “Would there still be propositions even if there were no human beings? In the second sense, yes; there would still be possible states-of-affairs, even if there were no world at all. “(67)

Rand: “Good God Almighty! There would be "possible states-of-affairs" in a zero? In a total vacuum? (This is where Parmenides is needed.) . . .”

Ayn Rand’s Marginalia, p. 70

A few pages later, Rand mentions Parmenides again. Note: Emphasis shown is the same as in the original text.

. . If we do not know the cause of the sun’s movement, then we are logically entitled to claim that the cause is a sun-god (or green cheese) – and such a claim acquires the status of the "logically possible." (Here is where Parmenides is needed again: "that which is not, is not – and cannot be or be thought about." The unknown is, epistemologically, a zero; a zero leads to nothing and entitles us to nothing. A zero cannot be the cause of a non-zero, of an existent; if we do not know that "A" is impossible, this does not grant any epistemological validity whatever to the hypothesis that "A" is possible.)

Ayn Rand’s Marginalia, p. 77

Very interesting. Thanks.

Ghs

George, just a clarification on the second Rand marginalia quote that Dennis provided: the context is a passage on the nature of possibility from pp. 96-97 of Hosper's first edition of Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Just before the quoted material, Rand is saying that, "in the same passage," Hospers takes the unknown "as the license to unlimited invention, to the 'playing it deuces wild.' If we do not know whether the law of gravitation applies to other universes (which, in itself, is nonsense), this gives us license to claim anything as possible. This is the epistemology of a savage (and of a mystic)."

So, the material Dennis quoted was not an expression of her view of what we are "logically entitled to claim," but of what she said was the implication of Hospers' view.

I wonder if she was attributing this savage-mystic epistemology to Hospers while she was still associating with him, or only after their unpleasant break-up in the early 1960s. She did say in a letter dated March 31, 1961 that she disagreed with most of the content of his book, so perhaps these marginal comments are from that period.

REB

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The only references I could find where Ayn Rand herself explicitly endorses Parmenides were in Ayn Rand's Marginalia, edited by the (now somewhat infamous) Robert Mayhew. Both references were in her comments on An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis by John Hospers.
Hospers: “Would there still be propositions even if there were no human beings? In the second sense, yes; there would still be possible states-of-affairs, even if there were no world at all. “(67) Rand: “Good God Almighty! There would be "possible states-of-affairs" in a zero? In a total vacuum? (This is where Parmenides is needed.) . . .” Ayn Rand’s Marginalia, p. 70
A few pages later, Rand mentions Parmenides again. Note: Emphasis shown is the same as in the original text.
. . If we do not know the cause of the sun’s movement, then we are logically entitled to claim that the cause is a sun-god (or green cheese) – and such a claim acquires the status of the "logically possible." (Here is where Parmenides is needed again: "that which is not, is not – and cannot be or be thought about." The unknown is, epistemologically, a zero; a zero leads to nothing and entitles us to nothing. A zero cannot be the cause of a non-zero, of an existent; if we do not know that "A" is impossible, this does not grant any epistemological validity whatever to the hypothesis that "A" is possible.) Ayn Rand’s Marginalia, p. 77
Very interesting. Thanks. Ghs
George, just a clarification on the second Rand marginalia quote that Dennis provided: the context is a passage on the nature of possibility from pp. 96-97 of Hosper's first edition of Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Just before the quoted material, Rand is saying that, "in the same passage," Hospers takes the unknown "as the license to unlimited invention, to the 'playing it deuces wild.' If we do not know whether the law of gravitation applies to other universes (which, in itself, is nonsense), this gives us license to claim anything as possible. This is the epistemology of a savage (and of a mystic)." So, the material Dennis quoted was not an expression of her view of what we are "logically entitled to claim," but of what she said was the implication of Hospers' view. I wonder if she was attributing this savage-mystic epistemology to Hospers while she was still associating with him, or only after their unpleasant break-up in the early 1960s. She did say in a letter dated March 31, 1961 that she disagreed with most of the content of his book, so perhaps these marginal comments are from that period. REB

Roger,

Thanks for the explanation.

I had my disagreements with John Hospers over the years (we even debated once), but I somehow never thought of him as having the epistemology of a savage mystic -- or should that be mystical savage? :cool:

Ghs

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By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists."

But can't "Existence" be defined as 'All that exists'?

The concept "existence" certainly has metaphysical implications; Rand expressly says this in her discussion of axiomatic concepts. But she also says that the specific formulation "Existence exists" is intended to stress the axiomatic status of the concept "existence." This is not achieved by saying "All that exists, exists." Even metaphysical skeptics and solipsists would agree with this facile statement.

How precisely does the formulation "Existence exists" achieve to stress the axiomatic status of the concept existence?

Edited by Xray
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The concept "existence" certainly has metaphysical implications; Rand expressly says this in her discussion of axiomatic concepts. But she also says that the specific formulation "Existence exists" is intended to stress the axiomatic status of the concept "existence." This is not achieved by saying "All that exists, exists." Even metaphysical skeptics and solipsists would agree with this facile statement.
But can't "existence" be defined as 'all that exists'? And how precisely does the formulation "Existence exists" achieve to stress the axiomatic status of the concept existence?

Yes, "existence" can be used to mean "all that exists," but that isn't what Rand primarily had in mind in this context.

Rand describes "existence exists" as a "special underscoring" of man's need to make explicit the axiomatic conceptual status of "existence," which might otherwise remain implicit. What wording would you have suggested? "Existence is existence" would not do the trick, since, like "A is A," this would indicate identity. Rand might have said, over and over again, "Existence is an axiomatic concept," but this would not have suited her flair for the dramatic.

I think "Existence exists" serves Rand's purpose very well. People who understand what she meant by the phrase are unlikely ever to read it again without thinking about "existence" as an axiomatic concept. Rand wanted the phrase to serve as a "reminder," and so it does.

Ghs

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By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists." Rather, by using her tautological formulation she wished to stress the fact that "existence" is a an axiomatic concept, i.e., an "irreducible primary." Rand was making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one (as your reformulation would suggest).
Can't there be more than one intended meaning? Note the following sentence in parentheses:
The first thing to say about that which is is simply: it is. As Parmenides in ancient Greece formulated the principle: what is, is. Or, in Ayn Rand's words: existence exists. ("Existence" here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)

The concept "existence" certainly has metaphysical implications; Rand expressly says this in her discussion of axiomatic concepts. But she also says that the specific formulation "Existence exists" is intended to stress the axiomatic status of the concept "existence." This is not achieved by saying "All that exists, exists." Even metaphysical skeptics and solipsists would agree with this facile statement.

Ghs

There seems to be some confusion here, George. Merlin is correct, and Xray is correct, and Peikoff is correct. So, calling "All that exists, exists" a "facile statement" is not just dismissive of Merlin, Xray, and Peikoff, but of Rand as well. Checkout p. 59 of Rand's ITOE, where she says [underscoring added]:

The concept "existence" does not indicate what existents it subsumes: it merely underscores the primary fact that they exist. The concept "identity" does not indicate the particular natures of the existents it subsumes: it merely underscores the primary fact that they are what they are. The concept "consciousness" does not indicate what existents one is conscious of: it merely underscores the primary fact that one is conscious. This underscoring of primary facts is one of the crucial epistemological functions of axiomatic concepts. It is also the reason why they can be translated into a statement only in the form of a repetition (as a base and a reminder): Existence exists--Consciousness is conscious--A is A. (This converts axiomatic concepts into formal axioms. That special underscoring, which is of no concern to animals, is a matter of life or death for man...

As Rand said in the epistemology workshop (1969-1971), "...the concept 'existence,' at least the way I use it, is in a certain way close to the concept of 'universe'--all that which exists." (p. 241 ITOE) She also points out on p. 56 of ITOE that the units of the concept "existence" are everything that exists, did exist, or will exist. So, in saying "Existence exists," Rand is indeed saying: "All that which exists, exists."

I prefer to express it with a copula: "All that which exists is an existent." Even though existence is not a property, it is certainly predicable of things. (I ~do~ think it's an error to say "All that which exists = an existent. But substituting the copula "is" fixes it perfectly well.)

And there is a ~reason~ for this repetition, whether you say "exists" or "is an existent." As Rand said, you are ~underscoring a basic fact~: that everything that exists ~really does exist~. It ~is~ of "life and death" importance to underscore this metaphysical fact, when there is no shortage of philosophers trying to convince you that existence is the product of consciousness, rather than simply the object of consciousness -- i.e., that the world of our experience is just a "dream," an "illusion," "mere appearance," etc. -- in other words, to convince you that the reigning principle of the world is Primacy of Consciousness, in any of its multifarious forms.

REB

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So Rand got a two for one? Anyway, since existence does not does not exist we aren't dealing with a contradiction here. Also, all that exists are existents, not the singular, but now we're getting all out semantical. "That exists, exists," is a weak axiomatic expression if one at all.

--Brant

everything Rand said in the philosophical workshop is what Peikoff said she said

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By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists." Rather, by using her tautological formulation she wished to stress the fact that "existence" is a an axiomatic concept, i.e., an "irreducible primary." Rand was making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one (as your reformulation would suggest).
Can't there be more than one intended meaning? Note the following sentence in parentheses:
The first thing to say about that which is is simply: it is. As Parmenides in ancient Greece formulated the principle: what is, is. Or, in Ayn Rand's words: existence exists. ("Existence" here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)
The concept "existence" certainly has metaphysical implications; Rand expressly says this in her discussion of axiomatic concepts. But she also says that the specific formulation "Existence exists" is intended to stress the axiomatic status of the concept "existence." This is not achieved by saying "All that exists, exists." Even metaphysical skeptics and solipsists would agree with this facile statement. Ghs
There seems to be some confusion here, George. Merlin is correct, and Xray is correct, and Peikoff is correct. So, calling "All that exists, exists" a "facile statement" is not just dismissive of Merlin, Xray, and Peikoff, but of Rand as well. Checkout p. 59 of Rand's ITOE, where she says [underscoring added]:
The concept "existence" does not indicate what existents it subsumes: it merely underscores the primary fact that they exist. The concept "identity" does not indicate the particular natures of the existents it subsumes: it merely underscores the primary fact that they are what they are. The concept "consciousness" does not indicate what existents one is conscious of: it merely underscores the primary fact that one is conscious. This underscoring of primary facts is one of the crucial epistemological functions of axiomatic concepts. It is also the reason why they can be translated into a statement only in the form of a repetition (as a base and a reminder): Existence exists--Consciousness is conscious--A is A. (This converts axiomatic concepts into formal axioms. That special underscoring, which is of no concern to animals, is a matter of life or death for man...
As Rand said in the epistemology workshop (1969-1971), "...the concept 'existence,' at least the way I use it, is in a certain way close to the concept of 'universe'--all that which exists." (p. 241 ITOE) She also points out on p. 56 of ITOE that the units of the concept "existence" are everything that exists, did exist, or will exist. So, in saying "Existence exists," Rand is indeed saying: "All that which exists, exists." I prefer to express it with a copula: "All that which exists is an existent." Even though existence is not a property, it is certainly predicable of things. (I ~do~ think it's an error to say "All that which exists = an existent. But substituting the copula "is" fixes it perfectly well.) And there is a ~reason~ for this repetition, whether you say "exists" or "is an existent." As Rand said, you are ~underscoring a basic fact~: that everything that exists ~really does exist~. It ~is~ of "life and death" importance to underscore this metaphysical fact, when there is no shortage of philosophers trying to convince you that existence is the product of consciousness, rather than simply the object of consciousness -- i.e., that the world of our experience is just a "dream," an "illusion," "mere appearance," etc. -- in other words, to convince you that the reigning principle of the world is Primacy of Consciousness, in any of its multifarious forms. REB

I called the statement "All that exists, exists" facile because it does not positively affirm that anything exists. It merely says that if something exists, then it exists -- and this is not at all what Rand meant by "Existence exists." To my knowledge, Rand never used the expression "All that exists, exists," and I cannot imagine that she ever would have seriously considered it. She was far too careful in her use of words.

In the chapter "Axiomatic Concepts," Rand says that the concept "existence" subsumes "every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist." This is the metaphysical aspect that I acknowledged previously. But this is not the primary focus of her discussion of axiomatic concepts. She is not merely affirming that the universe exists; if this were her primary point, precious few philosophers would disagree with her, and she would not have included her discussion of "Existence exists" in a chapter on axiomatic concepts. Here is just one passage among many that makes her point:

Axiomatic concepts are the constants of man's consciousness, the cognitive integrators that identify and thus protect its continuity. They identify explicitly the omission of psychological time measurements, which is implicit in all other concepts.

When Rand speaks of "underscoring" a primary fact, she is not merely referring to the truism that everything that exists really does exist. (Do we really need a "reminder" of this?) As indicated in the following passage, what Rand wished to underscore was the axiomatic status of the concept existence.

This gives us a lead to another special aspect of axiomatic concepts: although they designate a fundamental metaphysical fact, axiomatic concepts are the products of an epistemological need—the need of a volitional, conceptual consciousness which is capable of error and doubt....It is only man's consciousness, a consciousness capable of conceptual errors, that needs a special identification of the directly given, to embrace and delimit the entire field of its awareness—to delimit it from the void of unreality to which conceptual errors can lead. Axiomatic concepts are epistemological guidelines. They sum up the essence of all human cognition: something exists of which I am conscious; I must discover its identity.

Again, I am not denying that there is a metaphysical aspect to "Existence exists." But -- and also again -- there is a reason why Rand included her discussion of "Existence exists" in a chapter titled "Axiomatic Concepts," and why she devotes most of her discussion to the cognitive role of axiomatic concepts.

Ghs

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By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists." Rather, by using her tautological formulation she wished to stress the fact that "existence" is a an axiomatic concept, i.e., an "irreducible primary." Rand was making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one (as your reformulation would suggest).
Can't there be more than one intended meaning? Note the following sentence in parentheses:
The first thing to say about that which is is simply: it is. As Parmenides in ancient Greece formulated the principle: what is, is. Or, in Ayn Rand's words: existence exists. ("Existence" here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)

The concept "existence" certainly has metaphysical implications; Rand expressly says this in her discussion of axiomatic concepts. But she also says that the specific formulation "Existence exists" is intended to stress the axiomatic status of the concept "existence." This is not achieved by saying "All that exists, exists." Even metaphysical skeptics and solipsists would agree with this facile statement.

Ghs

There seems to be some confusion here, George. Merlin is correct, and Xray is correct, and Peikoff is correct. So, calling "All that exists, exists" a "facile statement" is not just dismissive of Merlin, Xray, and Peikoff, but of Rand as well. Checkout p. 59 of Rand's ITOE, where she says [underscoring added]:

The concept "existence" does not indicate what existents it subsumes: it merely underscores the primary fact that they exist. The concept "identity" does not indicate the particular natures of the existents it subsumes: it merely underscores the primary fact that they are what they are. The concept "consciousness" does not indicate what existents one is conscious of: it merely underscores the primary fact that one is conscious. This underscoring of primary facts is one of the crucial epistemological functions of axiomatic concepts. It is also the reason why they can be translated into a statement only in the form of a repetition (as a base and a reminder): Existence exists--Consciousness is conscious--A is A. (This converts axiomatic concepts into formal axioms. That special underscoring, which is of no concern to animals, is a matter of life or death for man...

One more point of clarification about the above quote and axiomatic concepts vs. axioms. Rand's characterization of the ~axiomatic concepts~ as referring to or underscoring facts is awry. It is the ~axioms~ that refer to and underscore those facts.

Note from the above quote of Rand that all of the "primary facts" that are "underscored" by the axioms are stated as ~propositions~: the fact that they exist, the fact that they are what they are, the fact that consciousness is consciousness.

Concepts do ~not~ refer to facts. They refer to ~existents~. "Existence" or "Identity" does not "underscore" a fact any more than "horse" or "brown" does. They all just refer to ~existents~. (Rand: "Existence and Identity are not attributes of existents. They are the existents." ITOE, p. 56. That is, as she states on the same page, as concepts, their ~units~ are the existents.)

What underscores facts are ~propositions~. And they do so by stating them as an instance of the Law of Identity.

This is clear in the case of a subject-predicate proposition. It underscores the fact that a given thing, a number of things, or all things ~are~ all the things they are, including some one or more of the specific things they are. As Peikoff (under Rand's close supervision) said in "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," on p. 100 of ITOE, "Every truth about a given existent(s) reduces, in basic pattern to: 'X is: one or more of the things which it is." I.e., every true statement is "an instance of the Law of Identity." (ibid.)

But it's just as clear that an existence proposition underscores the fact that some one thing, many things, or all things that exist ~are~ things that ~really do exist~ (as opposed to being figments of the imagination or formerly existing things, etc.). So, it's not surprising that existence propositions can be rewritten as subject-predicate propositions. They may not be as terse and pretty as when they're written with no material after the existence-verb, but the restatement with an "is" verb in between makes it clear that even existence propositions are specific forms of the Law of Identity: a thing is itself.

So, applying Peikoff's/Rand's insight about true propositions and the Law of Identity, along with my point about existence propositions, it follows that even Rand's axioms reduce to an instance of the Law of Identity.

The Existence axiom reduces to: "All the things that exist ARE things that exist." The Existence axiom underscores the fact that (at least some of) what exists is not the product of some being's consciousness.

The Consciousness axiom is just a terse form of saying: "Consciousness is an active state of being aware of reality" (as against: an act of creating reality). The Consciousness axiom underscores the fact that (at least some of) what exists is not dependent for its existence upon consciousness.

The Identity axiom is the crucial axiom. It has been expressed as: A thing is itself, and as: A thing is what it is. Both of these perspectives on identity are vital to getting propositional form and truth right. (1) A thing is not one of its ~characteristics~. It is ~itself~. And (2) a thing is not ~one~ of its characteristics. It is ~all~ of its characteristics, ~everything it is~, as a ~unity~. Together: a thing can't literally be any one of its characteristics, just itself, i.e., all of its characteristics as a unity.

So, when any ~one~ of its characteristics is highlighted in a proposition, a thing can only be said to be itself by making sure the characteristic does not appear alone in the predicate--e.g., "Man is a rational animal." "Man" and "rational" do not point to the same thing. "Man" and "a rational animal" ~do~ point to the same thing. The thing pointed to by "man" is also one of the things pointed to by "a rational animal." ("Man is rational" thus must be taken more fully as meaning: "Man is a rational animal" or: "...a rational being." Most logic texts in fact coach students to make this kind of modification, so that the subject and predicate are in the same category, and the relationship between the referents of the subject and the predicate is as clear and explicit as possible.)

What epistemologically underscores ALL facts, including the MOST BASIC facts, is the Law of Identity, as expressed (or expressible) in a true subject-predicate proposition. Even if whatever concepts you ~plug into~ the Law of Identity refer to some existent or another -- or even to ALL existents, in the case of the axiomatic concepts -- those concepts do not underscore ANY fact UNTIL AND UNLESS they are conjoined with ~what they are~ in a ~true proposition~, stated (or statable) in a specific form of the Law of Identity.

REB

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Roger,

I will reply in more detail to your last post later on. For now, consider this passage from "Axiomatic Concepts."

This underscoring of primary facts is one of the crucial epistemological functions of axiomatic concepts. It is also the reason why they can be translated into a statement only in the form of a repetition (as a base and a reminder): Existence exists—Consciousness is conscious—A is A. (This converts axiomatic concepts into formal axioms.)

Rand expressly says that "Existence exists" is the translation (or conversion) of the axiomatic concept "existence" into a formal axiomatic statement, or proposition.

Ghs

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By "Existence exists," Rand did not mean that "All that exists, exists." Rather, by using her tautological formulation she wished to stress the fact that "existence" is a an axiomatic concept, i.e., an "irreducible primary." Rand was making an epistemological point, not a metaphysical one (as your reformulation would suggest).
Can't there be more than one intended meaning? Note the following sentence in parentheses:
The first thing to say about that which is is simply: it is. As Parmenides in ancient Greece formulated the principle: what is, is. Or, in Ayn Rand's words: existence exists. ("Existence" here is a collective noun, denoting the sum of existents.) This axiom does not tell us anything about the nature of existents; it merely underscores the fact that they exist. (OPAR, p. 4)
The concept "existence" certainly has metaphysical implications; Rand expressly says this in her discussion of axiomatic concepts. But she also says that the specific formulation "Existence exists" is intended to stress the axiomatic status of the concept "existence." This is not achieved by saying "All that exists, exists." Even metaphysical skeptics and solipsists would agree with this facile statement. Ghs
There seems to be some confusion here, George. Merlin is correct, and Xray is correct, and Peikoff is correct. So, calling "All that exists, exists" a "facile statement" is not just dismissive of Merlin, Xray, and Peikoff, but of Rand as well. Checkout p. 59 of Rand's ITOE, where she says [underscoring added]:
The concept "existence" does not indicate what existents it subsumes: it merely underscores the primary fact that they exist. The concept "identity" does not indicate the particular natures of the existents it subsumes: it merely underscores the primary fact that they are what they are. The concept "consciousness" does not indicate what existents one is conscious of: it merely underscores the primary fact that one is conscious. This underscoring of primary facts is one of the crucial epistemological functions of axiomatic concepts. It is also the reason why they can be translated into a statement only in the form of a repetition (as a base and a reminder): Existence exists--Consciousness is conscious--A is A. (This converts axiomatic concepts into formal axioms. That special underscoring, which is of no concern to animals, is a matter of life or death for man...
As Rand said in the epistemology workshop (1969-1971), "...the concept 'existence,' at least the way I use it, is in a certain way close to the concept of 'universe'--all that which exists." (p. 241 ITOE) She also points out on p. 56 of ITOE that the units of the concept "existence" are everything that exists, did exist, or will exist. So, in saying "Existence exists," Rand is indeed saying: "All that which exists, exists." I prefer to express it with a copula: "All that which exists is an existent." Even though existence is not a property, it is certainly predicable of things. (I ~do~ think it's an error to say "All that which exists = an existent. But substituting the copula "is" fixes it perfectly well.) And there is a ~reason~ for this repetition, whether you say "exists" or "is an existent." As Rand said, you are ~underscoring a basic fact~: that everything that exists ~really does exist~. It ~is~ of "life and death" importance to underscore this metaphysical fact, when there is no shortage of philosophers trying to convince you that existence is the product of consciousness, rather than simply the object of consciousness -- i.e., that the world of our experience is just a "dream," an "illusion," "mere appearance," etc. -- in other words, to convince you that the reigning principle of the world is Primacy of Consciousness, in any of its multifarious forms. REB

I called the statement "All that exists, exists" facile because it does not positively affirm that anything exists. It merely says that if something exists, then it exists -- and this is not at all what Rand meant by "Existence exists." To my knowledge, Rand never used the expression "All that exists, exists," and I cannot imagine that she ever would have seriously considered it. She was far too careful in her use of words.

George, you're correct that Rand never used just that formulation. But she ~did~ say that "existence" means "all that which exists." (ITOE, p. 241) It follows that "existence exists" means: "all that which exists exists." As for this being a non-affirmation of existence, a mere "if-then," statement, I disagree.

This is sounding perilously close to the modern interpretation of universal "All" propositions as not having existential import (while particular "Some" propositions do). "All men are mortal." How is this any less of an affirmation of existence than "Men are mortal" or "Some men are mortal"? It's not. Neither is "All men exist" any less of an affirmation of existence than "Men exist" or "Some men exist." It's not. Neither is "All that which exists, exists" any less of an affirmation of existence than "That which exists, exists" or "Existence exists" or "Some of that which exists, exists."

I think it's important not to give in to the modernistic conditioning of hearing "if-then" and non-affirmation of existence, whenever the word "all" is used. (Hi, Ba'al!)

Further: Rand was also very careful in ~Leonard Peikoff's~ choice of words, and in lecture 2 of his 1976 lecture series on Objectivism, which Rand fully, unreservedly endorsed, he said:

In any act of perceiving reality, these three—always remember, the three are: existence, consciousness, identity—these three are facts which are directly evident and inescapable. They are self-evident axioms.

And:

All that philosophy does is to give a general or abstract statement of the facts which are self-evident in each sense-perception.

And:

Philosophy merely states this in universal terms: whatever exists, exists. Whatever exists is something, it’s what it is. And in whatever form you are aware, you are aware, you possess the faculty of consciousness. So that these three philosophic axioms are merely abstract statements of self-evident facts, available to and confirmable by direct unmediated sense-perception.

Again, look at the above underscored words and phrases. Peikoff has clearly identified that it is ~propositions~, i.e., axioms, that are the statements of basic, self-evident facts. And he explicitly says that these self-evident facts are ~axioms~, not axiomatic concepts. He repeatedly speaks of the ~axioms~ of Existence, Identity, and Consciousness, and he repeatedly expresses them in propositional form. You think that Rand wouldn't have sounded the alarm bell if he had misspoken himself on this matter in her present??

Further: Peikoff was confident enough that this material was correct and/or that it had passed Rand's muster, that he repeated the verbiage 15 years later in OPAR (p. 8): "What philosophy does is to give an abstract statement of such self-evident facts. Philosophy states these facts in universal form. Whatever exists, exists. Whatever exists is what it is. In whatever form one is aware, one is aware." (If Rand had flinched at the underscored proposition the first time around, you can bet it would NOT have appeared in OPAR!)

In the chapter "Axiomatic Concepts," Rand says that the concept "existence" subsumes "every entity, attribute, action, event or phenomenon (including consciousness) that exists, has ever existed or will ever exist." This is the metaphysical aspect that I acknowledged previously. But this is not the primary focus of her discussion of axiomatic concepts. She is not merely affirming that the universe exists; if this were her primary point, precious few philosophers would disagree with her, and she would not have included her discussion of "Existence exists" in a chapter on axiomatic concepts.

But George, Rand wasn't writing for philosophers! She explicitly stated in the foreword to the first edition of ITOE (p. 1) that "these articles...are offered here for the guidance of philosophy students." She might have secretly hoped that some philosophers would read her book and agree with her on the Primacy of Existence, and on the fact that existence is the object, not the subject/creation of consciousness. But it was for the next generation that she regularly aimed her essays. Especially by the mid-1960s, she thought that philosophers in general, like conservatives, were beyond salvation -- and that just the young were salvagable.

[....]When Rand speaks of "underscoring" a primary fact, she is not merely referring to the truism that everything that exists really does exist. (Do we really need a "reminder" of this?)

Speaking for myself, no, of course not! But Rand is not speaking to me, nor to giants of the intellect such as yourself, George! <g> She is trying to provide an antidote, primarily for students I'd suppose, to all the variants of Primacy of Consciousness that are routinely foisted on them in Philosophy 101, trying to convince them that they are just a brain in a vat, or that the world is mere appearance, etc. So, yes -- many, many folks need this reminder, whether you or I do or not. :-)

As indicated in the following passage, what Rand wished to underscore was the axiomatic status of the concept existence.
This gives us a lead to another special aspect of axiomatic concepts: although they designate a fundamental metaphysical fact, axiomatic concepts are the products of an epistemologicalneed—the need of a volitional, conceptual consciousness which is capable of error and doubt....It is only man's consciousness, a consciousness capable of conceptual errors, that needs a special identification of the directly given, to embrace and delimit the entire field of its awareness—to delimit it from the void of unreality to which conceptual errors can lead. Axiomatic concepts are epistemological guidelines. They sum up the essence of all human cognition: something exists of which I am conscious; I must discover its identity.

I rest my case, George! (See below.) It is ~axioms~ that "sum up the essence of all human cognition." Rand states this summing up ~as a ~proposition~! The axiomatic concepts do not sum up ~anything~ about cognition, except ~existents~. (Existence and Identity "are" the existents.) They are the ~building blocks~ of the ~propositional~ summing up of the essence of cognition, i.e., the underscoring of basic facts, which Rand so eloquently states in propositional form in the above quote.

So, no, Rand was NOT wanting to "underscore the axiomatic status of the concept 'existence.'" She explicitly said she wanted to underscore the FACT of existence, i.e., the fact that things exist. This indicates the role of a ~proposition~, not just a concept.

Again, I am not denying that there is a metaphysical aspect to "Existence exists." But -- and also again -- there is a reason why Rand included her discussion of "Existence exists" in a chapter titled "Axiomatic Concepts," and why she devotes most of her discussion to the cognitive role of axiomatic concepts.

George, ITOE is first and foremost a book ~introducing~ her epistemology by presenting her theory of ~concepts~. What little she ~does~ say about propositions is not always correct, in part because she cedes ~too much~ of a cognitive role to concepts. Concepts point to existents. Propositions point to facts. In Chapter 6 of ITOE, she mistakenly ascribed the propositional role to concepts.

It is a disheartening fact that there is ~still~ no rigorous, full-fledged theory of propositions in the Objectivist epistemology. But it is not a denigration of Rand's treatment of axiomatic concepts to say that she misattributed some of our cognitive contact with reality to the conceptual, rather than propositional, level.

Personally, I think she was in too much of a rush to publish her theory of concepts, and she didn't get it all worked out correctly. But enough of it is right, along with Peikoff's "Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," to provide leads in the right direction. I tried to sketch out some of that in my previous post.

As for why Rand discussed the axioms in her chapter on axiomatic concepts, the reason is that they are ~propositions~, and propositions are ~integrations of concepts~ for the purpose of ~stating facts~. And as she indicated, but did not explicitly acknowledge, in the passage you quoted, it is ~propositions~ that underscore the basic facts of "Existence," "Identity," and "Consciousness" -- the facts that existents are things that do exist, things are what they are, and consciousness is (primarily) aware of (not generative of) things that exist.

REB

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So Rand got a two for one? Anyway, since existence does not does not exist we aren't dealing with a contradiction here. Also, all that exists are existents, not the singular, but now we're getting all out semantical. "That exists, exists," is a weak axiomatic expression if one at all.

--Brant

everything Rand said in the philosophical workshop is what Peikoff said she said

When I read OPAR, I get the feeling that Peikoff sometimes did not understand, or at least did not fully appreciate, some of Rand's philosophical points.

One thing that I have always admired about Rand is how she typically packs a lot of thought into very concise statements. This is one thing that makes her philosophical writings so worthy of close and repeated study. With Peikoff, on the other hand, what you see is what you get.

I am in a metaphorical mood, so I will put it this way: Rand's philosophical writings are the tip of an iceberg, whereas Peikoff's philosophical writings -- and I am thinking here of the work he did after Rand's death -- are... well...uh....maybe I should stop here. 8-)

Ghs

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Ayn Rand being bisected, disected and trisected in a manner that would do any Talmudist proud.

I believe I have seen The Elephant.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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So Rand got a two for one? Anyway, since existence does not does not exist we aren't dealing with a contradiction here. Also, all that exists are existents, not the singular, but now we're getting all out semantical. "That exists, exists," is a weak axiomatic expression if one at all.

--Brant

everything Rand said in the philosophical workshop is what Peikoff said she said

When I read OPAR, I get the feeling that Peikoff sometimes did not understand, or at least did not fully appreciate, some of Rand's philosophical points.

One thing that I have always admired about Rand is how she typically packs a lot of thought into very concise statements. This is one thing that makes her philosophical writings so worthy of close and repeated study. With Peikoff, on the other hand, what you see is what you get.

I am in a metaphorical mood, so I will put it this way: Rand's philosophical writings are the tip of an iceberg, whereas Peikoff's philosophical writings -- and I am thinking here of the work he did after Rand's death -- are... well...uh....maybe I should stop here. 8-)

Ghs

George, say what you like about Peikoff's post-Randian writings, but she wasn't always correct, and he wasn't always wrong. (Yeah, yeah, I know: a stopped clock...twice a day...etc.)

More importantly: anything that was transferred verbatim to OPAR from his 1976 lectures that Rand monitored like a hawk is pretty reliably Rand-certified. I haven't quoted any Peikoffisms in my posts to this thread that are not of that nature.

REB

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So Rand got a two for one? Anyway, since existence does not does not exist we aren't dealing with a contradiction here. Also, all that exists are existents, not the singular, but now we're getting all out semantical. "That exists, exists," is a weak axiomatic expression if one at all. --Brant everything Rand said in the philosophical workshop is what Peikoff said she said
When I read OPAR, I get the feeling that Peikoff sometimes did not understand, or at least did not fully appreciate, some of Rand's philosophical points. One thing that I have always admired about Rand is how she typically packs a lot of thought into very concise statements. This is one thing that makes her philosophical writings so worthy of close and repeated study. With Peikoff, on the other hand, what you see is what you get. I am in a metaphorical mood, so I will put it this way: Rand's philosophical writings are the tip of an iceberg, whereas Peikoff's philosophical writings -- and I am thinking here of the work he did after Rand's death -- are... well...uh....maybe I should stop here. 8-) Ghs
George, say what you like about Peikoff's post-Randian writings, but she wasn't always correct, and he wasn't always wrong. (Yeah, yeah, I know: a stopped clock...twice a day...etc.) More importantly: anything that was transferred verbatim to OPAR from his 1976 lectures that Rand monitored like a hawk is pretty reliably Rand-certified. I haven't quoted any Peikoffisms in my posts to this thread that are not of that nature. REB

I think Peikoff is a very competent philosopher. I have thought this ever since I read his doctoral dissertation during my college years. But the guy who wrote that dissertation is not the same guy who later become Rand's lackey.

Given the writing style of "The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy," I have little doubt that it is essentially Rand's work. Years ago, back in the 1970s, Nathaniel Branden told me that the monograph was written with Rand peering over Peikoff's shoulder.

Ghs

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Ayn Rand being bisected, disected and trisected in a manner that would do any Talmudist proud.

I believe I have seen The Elephant.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I'm surprised you still have mirrors in your house! :-)

REB

I don't get the joke.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Ayn Rand being bisected, disected and trisected in a manner that would do any Talmudist proud.

I believe I have seen The Elephant.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Etienne Gilson once observed that philosophy always buries its undertakers. You will never see the elephant so long as you remain buried six-feet underground.

Ghs

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