Another view of Leonard Peikoff


Paul Mawdsley

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In addition to Ellen's helpful posts on the genesis of Koestler's holonics, I should direct readers to a comparison table of Koestler/Wilber, from A Brief History of Holons by Mark Edwards, below.

-- incidentally, I found a rather chilling endorsement by Koestler for one of Sheldrake's books, The Hypothesis of A New Science of Life: Morphic Resonance.

[from the jacket, according to Amazon]

"An immensely challenging and stimulating hypothesis, which proposes an unorthodox approach to evolution." (Arthur Koestler, author of The Lotus and the Robot and The Ghost in the Machine )

holoncomparison1.jpgholoncomparison2.jpg

Edited by william.scherk
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Here is one by a Wilber fan: A Brief History of Holons by Mark Edwards.
In addition to Ellen's helpful posts on the genesis of Koestler's holonics, I should direct readers to a comparison table of Koestler/Wilber, from A Brief History of Holons by Mark Edwards (I tried to insert the table to OL, but the madmen stripped out the HTML).

William,

Awww. Now that hurts. That means you do not read my posts.

:)

EDIT: Incidentally, make sure you toggle the switch below to rich text editor.

txt-rtfswitchinposts.jpg

And make sure you scroll down to "Post Options" under the message field when you are making a post and choose "HTML ON."

That should allow you to insert pasted html tables, although sometimes it does some weird stuff.

Michael

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Here is one by a Wilber fan: A Brief History of Holons by Mark Edwards.
In addition to Ellen's helpful posts on the genesis of Koestler's holonics, I should direct readers to a comparison table of Koestler/Wilber, from A Brief History of Holons by Mark Edwards (I tried to insert the table to OL, but the madmen stripped out the HTML).

William,

Awww. Now that hurts. That means you do not read my posts.

No . . . it means I read your posts and your links -- and I even find interesting things in your links that illustrate and extend points made by other list members.

I will soldier on at inserting the table of comparisons, for those who don't follow my links and so will have not see the table yet.

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We sometimes regard an apple as causing our perceptual awareness of it, yet we also know that the apple reflects a group of light rays from it toward our sense organs, and the physical interaction of that light stream with our retinas causes our visual perception of the apple.

I don't think it makes sense to discuss apples reflecting lightwaves. What you mean is that the atoms or electrons reflect the lightwaves and it is our nervous system that manufactures the image in our visual cortex that we call 'an apple'.

And then how do we see that image? (Good luck. ;-))

Ellen

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We don't "see" the image, we manufacture it from the stimuli.

Ah, so we don't see (or "see") anything.

Ellen

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Whether or not my visualizations can be experienced by others (which we all know cannot) is not the issue. The issue is that visualizations, concepts, ideas, etc. do exist in our brains and as such should be considered 'concrete things'. Is it possible you mean you differentiate between words and what they represent?

Of course. Concepts (ideas, common nouns) and their referents.

--Brant

How can you include 'ideas' with 'common nouns'?? Words are one thing and ideas are something completely different, no? See, you are not differentiating between words and what they represent.

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Another thing that is not a holon is a ~human being~. You might think that human beings can be regarded as "parts" of a family or a society.

Actually, I don't understand why you left out biology. One human being is a member of a species. That species as a whole cannot be or do anything other than what it does. It has a specific identity. For instance, it cannot reproduce a dinosaur through a member. It cannot reproduce a rock. It only reproduces other human beings. I do not hold to the view that a human being is an independent being without any hierarchical connection whatsoever to existence, a singular blob floating around the universe, so to speak. As souls (egos or whatever you want to call the "I"), we are singular in the sense that we have individual volition. But as animals, all human beings have the same biological nature. That indicates a higher system biologically speaking than the individual, who is a whole within that whole. And even on an ego level, my spiritual construction has much more in common with other human beings than with birds, for instance, starting with a conceptual faculty—one that works in an identical manner to others. I definitely see some kind of system there.

[underscoring added by REB]

A species is not a whole. Not in the same sense that a cell is in relation to its component molecules, nor an organ in relation to its component cells, nor a living being in relation to its component organ systems. The latter are all ~integrated~ wholes. A species is just an ~aggregate~ of similar things all caused by the same original process -- sort of like Ford Focuses "as a whole."

A species does not have parts. It has individual ~members~. When we form our concept of the species "dog," the individual dogs are ~units~ of that concept -- things seen as belonging to the group of similar things, not as parts of the species. Unlike the physical integration of atoms into molecules, and cells into organs, and organ systems into organisms, there is no integration of individual human beings into the human species, except conceptually.

In a sense, we can think of all living beings (let alone all human beings) as being a part of the "Tree of Life," being the end result of a particular chain of evolutionary development from the original living organism (assuming it all started from a single one). But each living being ~individuates~, it pinches off from the "Tree of Life". So we are ~not~ analogous to twiglets or rootlets, which stay physically connected to the main tree. Metaphysically, we are ~not~ parts of Life, nor even parts of Humanity. Metaphysically, we are living wholes, individuals.

reb

P.S. -- Paul, ants and bees &c do not have the capability to act independently. They have evolved so that, even though they are discrete organisms, their built-in mode of survival is subservient action related to the group. Some humans, whether through choice or through very bad education and conditioning, are in virtually the same situation, which is part of the reason that collectivism has had even the limited success that it has.

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Ah, so we don't see (or "see") anything.

Ellen

You could say that, 'seeing something' is a very complicated process.

I grant that "'seeing something' is a very complicated process"; however, I think that you're propounding an untenable version of "representationalism." I'll leave you to look up the history of theories of perception; I shouldn't have yielded to the temptation to make a quip addressed to your post #186.

Ellen

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In addition to Ellen's helpful posts on the genesis of Koestler's holonics, I should direct readers to a comparison table of Koestler/Wilber, from A Brief History of Holons by Mark Edwards, below.

-- incidentally, I found a rather chilling endorsement by Koestler for one of Sheldrake's books, The Hypothesis of A New Science of Life: Morphic Resonance.

[from the jacket, according to Amazon]

"An immensely challenging and stimulating hypothesis, which proposes an unorthodox approach to evolution." (Arthur Koestler, author of The Lotus and the Robot and The Ghost in the Machine )

Why "rather chilling," William? I'm wondering if you think that anyone who could ever have seen something promising in Sheldrake's ideas has to have been an idiot, or something to that effect? People aren't omniscient; sometimes what might appear obvious in hindsight wasn't so at the time. There was a fair amount of interest in Sheldrake, as I vaguely recall, when he first started writing. The first edition of A New Science of Life was published in 1981.* I didn't read it; I don't know how much the book has been revised in subsequent editions, but the 1995 re-issue is at least the third revision. Sheldrake today is considered a far-out flake, according to things I hear said about him (I never have really found out what his pitch is). But even assuming the accuracy of the "flake" assessment, this doesn't necessarily mean that anyone "swift" should have seen the flakiness from the start.

Ellen

* Koestler died in 1983.

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Edited by Ellen Stuttle
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A species is not a whole. Not in the same sense that a cell is in relation to its component molecules, nor an organ in relation to its component cells, nor a living being in relation to its component organ systems. The latter are all ~integrated~ wholes. A species is just an ~aggregate~ of similar things all caused by the same original process -- sort of like Ford Focuses "as a whole."

A species does not have parts. It has individual ~members~. When we form our concept of the species "dog," the individual dogs are ~units~ of that concept -- things seen as belonging to the group of similar things, not as parts of the species. Unlike the physical integration of atoms into molecules, and cells into organs, and organ systems into organisms, there is no integration of individual human beings into the human species, except conceptually.

Roger,

So that means what? If an individual cell dies, the whole human being becomes disintegrated? I don't see that at all.

You claim that a species is only a conceptual integration, meaning it does not exist in reality? Is the fact that you and I talk the same language learned with the same kind of biological equipment simply a coincidence or a concept—and does not really exist? I find our similarities in this respect (which are identical in nature) to be pure reality. I do not observe that they exist only in our minds. I observe the concept "human species" has a very real referent, and it's all around me.

If you can show me how to extinguish the human species but leave an individual human being existing, I will start thinking that such integration is a conceptual analogy like society is. Until then, I hold that the individual human being is biologically subordinate to being a member of a species as an identity forming system. The human species determined everything characteristic-wise about the individual member from his/her very birth.

I believe Rand would call that "the given."

I see organization in the universe changing its form with members becoming more and more individuated as systems move from simple to more complex, but I do not see this destroying the systems. I see a pattern in this simple to complex progression. I am not convinced that this pattern breaks down when we get to human beings. On the contrary, I am perfectly happy to fit into reality as an individual member of the species I belong to.

I admit, there are some individuals who appear to want to strive to step outside the species altogether and become a freak of nature. :)

Michael

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I grant that "'seeing something' is a very complicated process"; however, I think that you're propounding an untenable version of "representationalism." I'll leave you to look up the history of theories of perception; I shouldn't have yielded to the temptation to make a quip addressed to your post #186.

I think it's very tenable. :D

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The Ghost in the Machine

by Arthur Koestler

... 1.3 Parts and wholes in an absolute sense do not exist in the domain of life. The concept of the holon is intended to reconcile the atomistic and holistic approaches.

Ellen,

(My bold in the quote.) I cannot think of anything more important to learning how to form concepts than this: learning how to reconcile the bottom up with the top down, the atomistic with the holistic, or whatever terms we want to use for this.

A holon is what I understand to be the referent of a concept, except concepts identify categories of holons and can be used to form abstract holonistic-like ideas in addition to identifying existing holons. Rand did not use this kind of language, talking instead about fundamental characteristics and measurement omission, but this is what I understand to be the essence of her theory of concepts. (She called it "thinking in entities" somewhere. I will have to find that quote.)

If Objectivist epistemology is ever to become widespread in the culture and not a fringe offshoot of Rand's novels or movement organizations (like TAS and ARI), I believe this is a direction writers will have to go in.

The existence of these two facts: (1) that "a system is made up of lesser systems, but is also part of a greater system" (top-down perspective) added to (2) "systems are repeatable as individual existents" (bottom-up perspective) as fundamental organizing principles of the universe doesn't hurt, either. :)

Michael

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A holon is what I understand to be the referent of a concept, except concepts identify categories of holons and can be used to form abstract holonistic-like ideas in addition to identifying existing holons.

Michael,

I'm sorry, but that makes no sense to me at all. Koestler is talking about functional organizations, not about the open-ended series of types of particulars (including all their characteristics currently known or yet-to-be-discovered) which AR thought of as being the referents of concepts. (I have to repeat from much earlier threads that I don't think that AR's theory of cognition is correct; nevertheless, she did have a specific meaning of "concept." That meaning was not what Koestler was referring to in coining the term "holon." A synonym for his meaning is "organic whole." He's talking about a functional unity, not about an instance of a type category.)

Ellen

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A holon is what I understand to be the referent of a concept, except concepts identify categories of holons and can be used to form abstract holonistic-like ideas in addition to identifying existing holons.

But how can a concept have a referent? Isn't having referents something only words can have?

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A holon is what I understand to be the referent of a concept, except concepts identify categories of holons and can be used to form abstract holonistic-like ideas in addition to identifying existing holons.

But how can a concept have a referent? Isn't having referents something only words can have?

I'm sorry, GS, but you've been around long enough to know what we are talking about. You're much too smart not to have learned anything here. I'm blocking you.

--Brant

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Koestler is talking about functional organizations, not about the open-ended series of types of particulars (including all their characteristics currently known or yet-to-be-discovered) which AR thought of as being the referents of concepts.

Ellen,

Try this idea out. Doesn't a holon include "all its characteristics currently known or yet-to-be-discovered"?

Add that to category and that's the essence of an Objectivist concept.

Michael

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But how can a concept have a referent? Isn't having referents something only words can have?

GS,

I suggest you consult any one of about 50 bazillion posts on threads you have participated in for the explanation of the difference between concept and word, and how referents relate to concepts. I don't feel like repeating something so elementary and so often explained. Please use the search function if you are confused, or you could read ITOE one day...

Michael

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Koestler is talking about functional organizations, not about the open-ended series of types of particulars (including all their characteristics currently known or yet-to-be-discovered) which AR thought of as being the referents of concepts.

Ellen,

Try this idea out. Doesn't a holon include "all its characteristics currently known or yet-to-be-discovered"?

Add that to category and that's the essence of an Objectivist concept.

Michael

"Holon" isn't an epistemological concept like "concept." It's a metaphysical concept, like "part" or "whole." Actually, it's "part/whole," since it refers to anything ~in reality~ that functions as both a part of something larger and as a whole with parts.

I'm with Ellen on this. A holon is not a species, nor an individual within a species. A species is not a whole. It is an aggregate, not an integrate. An individual is a thing, not a group of similar things. A species is not a thing, but a group of similar things. An individual is a ~member~ of a group, not a ~part~ of a group.

A part/whole does ~not~ "include all its characteristics currently known or yet-to-be-discovered" any more than the entity of which it is a part includes all ~its~ characteristics past, present, or future.

I do not include all my future characteristics, do you? If you do, then you must be a concept, huh! Heh. Me? I don't. I just include all my present characteristics.

Actually, individuals and holons and concepts are three very different things that you seem to be conflating here. Have fun.

REB

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I do not include all my future characteristics, do you?

Roger,

Does this mean that time is not part of what you are? You do not have a future? And in the future, you will no longer be Roger?

I personally will continue to be Michael, both in concept and in fact, irrespective of any future characteristics. That characteristic of staying the same person over time is a property I have right now and includes all future characteristics (and past ones, for that matter).

So to answer your question, yes I do include all my future characteristics. Qua existent.

I don't know how to exist in a timeless state.

Michael

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Koestler is talking about functional organizations, not about the open-ended series of types of particulars (including all their characteristics currently known or yet-to-be-discovered) which AR thought of as being the referents of concepts.

As a sidebar, I've always liked the way Rand managed to inveigle the yet-to-be-discovered into human knowledge....;-)

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Koestler is talking about functional organizations, not about the open-ended series of types of particulars (including all their characteristics currently known or yet-to-be-discovered) which AR thought of as being the referents of concepts.

As a sidebar, I've always liked the way Rand managed to inveigle the yet-to-be-discovered into human knowledge....;-)

She didn't. She merely said concepts were open-ended. In other words, concepts can expand in content, they admit new knowledge as it is discovered. I assume you were being sarcastic, Daniel. If so, you failed. If not, I apologise. Nicholas Dykes.

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I think it's very tenable. :D

I agree.

Dragonfly,

You and Ellen had a related discussion once before on OL, about sensory processes and the nature of perception. Ellen's quip reminded my of it. I recall following the conversation with great interest a year or so ago. Do you (or do you, Ellen) have any idea where that discussion took place? I would like to reread it.

Paul

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-- incidentally, I found a rather chilling endorsement by Koestler for one of Sheldrake's books, The Hypothesis of A New Science of Life: Morphic Resonance.

[from the jacket, according to Amazon]

"An immensely challenging and stimulating hypothesis, which proposes an unorthodox approach to evolution." (Arthur Koestler, author of The Lotus and the Robot and The Ghost in the Machine )

Why "rather chilling," William? I'm wondering if you think that anyone who could ever have seen something promising in Sheldrake's ideas has to have been an idiot, or something to that effect? People aren't omniscient; sometimes what might appear obvious in hindsight wasn't so at the time.

The book received a savaging, including in Nature where senior editor John Maddox rated it as "the best candidate for burning there has been for many years."

Maddox's censorious thunder continued: "Sheldrake's argument is an exercise in pseudo-science. Many readers will be left with the impression that Sheldrake has succeeded in finding a place for magic within scientific discussion — and this, indeed, may have been a part of the objective of writing such a book."

Koestler's blurb is not quite an endorsment, but maybe more a description: perhaps he saw a value in morphic resonance for the scientific community re: evolution theory. The scientific community did not take up the challenge, to date.

Koestler an idiot? I don't think so -- he had a grand and long career as public intellectual, but I do note that he tended to mysticism in his later works (even as early as 1972, with The Roots of Coincidence).

Since he gave a large bequest to found the Koestler Parapsychology Unit at the University of Edinburgh, I wonder if there was in Sheldrake's work an agreement that 'something is missing' in neo-Darwinian accounts of evolution.

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