Relativity vs Identity

[tjohnson]

Let us examine the Law of Identity, A=A. Let us suppose that we say 'the river is the river'. What does it mean?

1. The word 'river' is the word 'river' - yes it's true but not of much use, this is the logical application

2. The word 'river' is the object river - I think we can agree this is not true

3. The object river is the object river - Is this what you mean?

[BaalChatzaf]

Let us examine the Law of Identity, A=A. Let us suppose that we say 'the river is the river'. What does it mean?

1. The word 'river' is the word 'river' - yes it's true but not of much use, this is the logical application

2. The word 'river' is the object river - I think we can agree this is not true

3. The object river is the object river - Is this what you mean?

It means (for instance) that a river is not an ice cream cone. I prefer the non-contradiction axiom. Nothing is what it is not.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

It means (for instance) that a river is not an ice cream cone. I prefer the non-contradiction axiom. Nothing is what it is not.

Ba'al Chatzaf

And a wave is not a particle, right?

[Selene]

A wave is a disturbance that propagates through space and time, usually with transference of energy.

A wave is any of the basic units of matter and energy (as a molecule, atom, proton, electron, or photon)

Therefore, the answer would be yes the wave is not a particle.

A particle seems to be included in the definition of wave whereas a wave does not "fit", in my mind, "into" a particle. Now there might be more minute waves within a particular particle, but the answer to your question is still yes.

Are you comfortable with Venn diagrams as a tool to build and test arguments?

Adam

[BaalChatzaf]

A wave is a disturbance that propagates through space and time, usually with transference of energy.

A wave is any of the basic units of matter and energy (as a molecule, atom, proton, electron, or photon)

Therefore, the answer would be yes the wave is not a particle.

A particle seems to be included in the definition of wave whereas a wave does not "fit", in my mind, "into" a particle. Now there might be more minute waves within a particular particle, but the answer to your question is still yes.

Are you comfortable with Venn diagrams as a tool to build and test arguments?

Adam

If you superimpose (by addition) enough waves of differing frequency you get a spatially localized "spike". That resembles a particle. In the limit the sum of waves over all frequencies becomes the delta function.

A wave is any distribution of mass or energy in both space and time which satisfies one of a class of partial differential equations, referred to as "wave equations" in the literature. Waves were originally suggested by the periodic motion of large bodies of water powered by the surface winds. That is why physicists originally sought a visco-elastic medium for light "waves", that medium being the aether. It does not exist, but there is a reason why it was thought to exist.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited February 26, 2009 by BaalChatzaf

[tjohnson]

Unfortunately, what we call electrons, for example, sometimes act like waves and other times act like particles. This means that the distinction between particles and waves appears as a human perceptual artifact.

[BaalChatzaf]

Unfortunately, what we call electrons, for example, sometimes act like waves and other times act like particles. This means that the distinction between particles and waves appears as a human perceptual artifact.

What is unfortunate about that?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

If this is wrong, could you clarify in more precise language what you believe to be responsible for the forms of things we behold in our smudging manner and somehow appear to identify?

Yes I can explain. Objects exist as a result of the interaction between our nervous system and the stimuli acting upon it. The nervous system integrates or abstracts from the the stimuli to produce what we refer to as objects.

[tjohnson]

Unfortunately, what we call electrons, for example, sometimes act like waves and other times act like particles. This means that the distinction between particles and waves appears as a human perceptual artifact.

What is unfortunate about that?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Sorry, my response was not to your post, it was to Selene's.

[Selene]

That did not answer the spirit of his question and you know it G.S.

So give it another try please.

Adam

[BaalChatzaf]

Unfortunately, what we call electrons, for example, sometimes act like waves and other times act like particles. This means that the distinction between particles and waves appears as a human perceptual artifact.

What is unfortunate about that?

If we could measure down to Planck Length we would probably find that electrons are not really point charges, but highly localized fields. Wave-Particle duality is a function of the crudeness of our measurements and the limitations of our mathematical ability.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited February 26, 2009 by BaalChatzaf

[Robert_Bumbalough]

Unfortunately, what we call electrons, for example, sometimes act like waves and other times act like particles. This means that the distinction between particles and waves appears as a human perceptual artifact.

What is unfortunate about that?

If we could measure down to Planck Length we would probably find that electrons are not really point charges, but highly localized fields. Wave-Particle duality is a function of the crudeness of our measurements and the limitations of our mathematical ability.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Greetings Friends: In 1997 Travis Norsen penned Berkeley and Quantum Mechanics (Copyright © 1997) His very informative essay addresses the distortion posted by Mr general semanticist. Norsen points out how Physics by QM has adopted idealism as its control belief. The fact is that measurements have a physical casual effect on tiny particles.

Norsen wrote (and I'm only quoting a brief fair use passage) that:

There does exist a realist explanation and interpretation of the result. Because the measurement process is an interaction between the particle-to-be-measured and some sort of measuring device, it makes sense that the measurement should disrupt the state of the particle in some way. This is just an application of the fact that a measurement necesarily takes place via some physical agency. In shining light on the particle to discover its location, for example, the light itself imparts some (generally unknown and unpredictable) momentum to the particle. Similarly, the physical process involved in measuring the momentum of a particle will generally displace the particle in some unknown and unpredictable way. The particle exists in some particular state which, because of the nature of the measurement process, cannot be known to us precisely. Seen in this light, the uncertainty relation is understood to be a natural outcome of the physical identity of the measurement process itself, and not a failure of the particle to actually possess definite properties. Under this interpretation, our knowledge is limited, but the facts of reality remain, independently of the state of our knowledge.

Mr general semanticist is also ignoring that which I posted in post #18 last night. I bears repeating.

Denis describes how de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) theory explains quantum phenomena without resort to indeterminism. .... The following newer work supports Denis' assertions. Time in relativistic and nonrelativistic quantum mechanics by H. Nikolic

To Summarize:

Measurement effects account for some or all uncertainty.

de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) theory explains quantum phenomena without resort to indeterminism

Consequently there is no justification for adopting idealism as Norsen explained.

Cheers and Best Regards

[Robert_Bumbalough]

If this is wrong, could you clarify in more precise language what you believe to be responsible for the forms of things we behold in our smudging manner and somehow appear to identify?

Yes I can explain. Objects exist as a result of the interaction between our nervous system and the stimuli acting upon it. The nervous system integrates or abstracts from the the stimuli to produce what we refer to as objects.

Thank you Mr. general semanticist for that concise summary. Strongly suspecting you've answered the following question before, I wish to assure you, I'm not trying to be disrespectful despite the possible appearance as such due to simplistic issues involved.

First a definition: I'm using the concept of all that is as existence. This is the broadest of concepts encompassing all that is or occurs including all mass, matter, energy, actions, fields, potentials, space, and duration.

My question is what is the origin of existence, if "Objects exist as a result of the interaction between our nervous system and the stimuli acting upon it." then wouldn't it be the case that there would have been no existence prior to the evolution of our species or some species of organic beings with a central nervous system and a brain that was capable of awareness of existence? Was there no existence prior to evolution of life capable of conscious awareness?

Thank you for taking time to read my scribblings.

Best Regards and Wishes

[tjohnson]

First a definition: I'm using the concept of all that is as existence. This is the broadest of concepts encompassing all that is or occurs including all mass, matter, energy, actions, fields, potentials, space, and duration.

My question is what is the origin of existence, if "Objects exist as a result of the interaction between our nervous system and the stimuli acting upon it." then wouldn't it be the case that there would have been no existence prior to the evolution of our species or some species of organic beings with a central nervous system and a brain that was capable of awareness of existence? Was there no existence prior to evolution of life capable of conscious awareness?

Thank you for taking time to read my scribblings.

Best Regards and Wishes

I think it is reasonable to assume that the stimuli would have existed before the evolution of the nervous system, but there is a huge difference between stimuli and objects.

[Selene]

Really is it like non stimuli oral sex or intercourse?

[Robert_Bumbalough]

Good Evening Friends: It is my hope all are well, living long, prospering and deservedly so.

Today I googled up a recently published paper that clarifies Bell's Theorem. Written by A D Boozer of the Department of Physics at California Institute of Technology. His paper is intended to clarify the issues of hidden variables, Bell's Theorem, and nonlocality. Boozer notes that QM theories can be constructed that are deterministic and use local hidden variables. Here is the link to the paper published in the European Journal of Physics. (Users must register for free access.)

Hidden variable theories and quantum

nonlocality

Boozer concludes with:

We have clarified the meaning and implications of Bell’s theorem by showing how it applies

to a simple model system, and by constructing three example hidden variable theories. The

discussion should help illustrate two important points that are often misunderstood. First,

Bell’s theorem does not rule out all hidden variable theories; rather, it imposes a constraint on

the types of hidden variable theories that can be constructed. Second, Bell’s theorem does not

even rule out local hidden variable theories unless it is supplemented with additional physical

principles; as we have seen, it is logically possible to construct local hidden variable theories

that do agree with quantum mechanics. We described one such local hidden variable theory in

section 8, and noted that this type of theory is usually ruled out on the grounds that it requires

advanced action.

Boozers result shows that an irrational faith in quantum indeterminacy and nonlocality used to inform a commitment to idealism or nominalism is unwarranted and unjustified. Deterministic local hidden variable theory that makes the same predictions as standard QM are possible as is confirmed by de Broglie-Bohm (dBB) theory.

[Robert_Bumbalough]

I think it is reasonable to assume that the stimuli would have existed before the evolution of the nervous system, but there is a huge difference between stimuli and objects.

Mr general semanticist could you elaborate on this by describing the concepts you here mentioned? Could you also describe the concepts of existence, identity, consciousness as well? Thanks.

Best and Good

RB

[Robert_Bumbalough]

Unfortunately, what we call electrons, for example, sometimes act like waves and other times act like particles. This means that the distinction between particles and waves appears as a human perceptual artifact.

Hello GS: Sir one interesting thing about double slit experiments is that if the procedure is done in a sealed room without an observer or a recording device connected to the detectors stationed on the slits, then the interference pattern still breaks down. This indicates the phenomena is not a "a human perceptual artifact". Only measurement need be present without conscious observation to bring about the effect. (This is a very strong argument against the existence of an omniscient god, btw. Such a being would necessarily have to know δX and δP. The breakdown of the interference pattern when the detectors are turned on is positive proof god is not there.)

Also interesting is Oxford Physicist Joy Christian who has demonstrated a disproof of Bell's Theorem. If Christian's work withstands critique, as it appears to be doing, then it is very possible to construct a deterministic local variable theory that makes the same predictions as standard QM.

Christian wrote:

Contrary to the received wisdom, Bell’s theorem is not a threat to local realism. Neither is it a curb on determinism. The counterexample constructed in the provides a fully deterministic, common cause explanation of the EPR-Bohm correlations. In fact, it is hard to imagine a more simple common cause than the one on which the counterexample is based—namely, the intrinsic freedom of choice in the initial orientation of the orthogonal directions in the Euclidean space. In the present paper we have further consolidated the conclusions of by demonstrating that the exact, locally causal model for the EPR-Bohm correlations constructed therein satisfies at least eight essential requirements, arising from either the predictions of quantum mechanics or the premises of Bell’s theorem. These requirements, as listed in the Introduction, include the locality condition of Bell, and hence by respecting them our model fully endorses the view that the quantum mechanical description of reality is incomplete. Moreover, since this view is reinforced by three different local realistic derivations of the violations of the CHSH inequality, and since all three of them agree with the corresponding predictions of quantum mechanics in quantitatively precise manner, the statistical interpretation of the entangled singlet state becomes the most natural interpretation of this state, as anticipated by Einstein. It is therefore hoped that—strengthened by the results of the present paper—the counterexample of would rejuvenate the search for a unified, locally causal basis for the whole of physics, as envisaged by Einstein.

This means that Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen are vindicated and QM is not a complete model of reality provided Christian's work stands.

Here is a link to Gideon Reich's blog where he discusses in detail the history of this controversy.

Link to Armchair Intellectual Blog

[Robert_Bumbalough]

I found the following interesting linked article by Victor Stenger on the Skeptical Inquirer site.

Quantum Quackery

Dr. Stenger wrote:

Quantum mechanics, the centerpiece of modern physics, is misinterpreted as implying that the human mind controls reality and that the universe is one connected whole that cannot be understood by the usual reduction to parts.

However, no compelling argument or evidence requires that quantum mechanics plays a central role in human consciousness or provides instantaneous, holistic connections across the universe. Modern physics, including quantum mechanics, remains completely materialistic and reductionistic while being consistent with all scientific observations.

The apparent holistic, nonlocal behavior of quantum phenomena, as exemplified by a particle's appearing to be in two places at once, can be understood without discarding the commonsense notion of particles following definite paths in space and time or requiring that signals travel faster than the speed of light.

No superluminal motion or signalling has ever been observed, in agreement with the limit set by the theory of relativity. Furthermore, interpretations of quantum effects need not so uproot classical physics, or common sense, as to render them inoperable on all scales-especially the macroscopic scale on which humans function. Newtonian physics, which successfully describes virtually all macroscopic phenomena, follows smoothly as the many-particle limit of quantum mechanics. And common sense continues to apply on the human scale.

[tjohnson]

Unfortunately, what we call electrons, for example, sometimes act like waves and other times act like particles. This means that the distinction between particles and waves appears as a human perceptual artifact.

Hello GS: Sir one interesting thing about double slit experiments is that if the procedure is done in a sealed room without an observer or a recording device connected to the detectors stationed on the slits, then the interference pattern still breaks down. This indicates the phenomena is not a "a human perceptual artifact". Only measurement need be present without conscious observation to bring about the effect.

You are quite right, I apologize. I did not mean to say perceptual artifact. What I meant was more like an epistemological artifact. In other words it is our choice if we wish to focus on the wave-like or particle-like characteristics of this phenomena and it is pointless to argue if it is a wave or a particle.

[tjohnson]

Mr general semanticist could you elaborate on this by describing the concepts you here mentioned? Could you also describe the concepts of existence, identity, consciousness as well? Thanks.

Best and Good

RB

I base my views on those of Alfred Korzybski and his theory of consciousness of abstracting as illustrated in the structural differential which you can find here. This is an excellent site devoted to general semantics.

[BaalChatzaf]

Also interesting is Oxford Physicist Joy Christian who has demonstrated a disproof of Bell's Theorem. If Christian's work withstands critique, as it appears to be doing, then it is very possible to construct a deterministic local variable theory that makes the same predictions as standard QM.

Bell's inequality is proved by relatively elementary mathematics. It is rock solid as mathematical proofs go. He has definitely shown that if reality is local a certain set of inequalities of correlation for the outputs of double delayed measurements on entangled photons must hold. Experiment has show they do not hold. Ergo reality is non-local. There are no local hidden variables which can reproduce the actual measured correlations. Quantum theory predicts the failure of the inequalities and the measurements bear the predictions out. In so proving, Bell revealed a subtle error made by von Neuman in his important book "Grunlagen des Quantum Mechanik". Einstein's assertion of locality is just plain wrong.

The proof is rock solid. The experiments use less than one hundred percent efficient detectors, but with improving technology the double delayed entanglement correlation measurements falsify the inequalities proved by Bell (and later modified some by Bohm).

Quantum theory is on the mark and has not been falsified by any entanglement based experiment.

The Philosophers may long and lust for hidden causative factors, but they long in vain.

By the way, the finite and constant velocity of light is not a common sense notion. Common sense and unaided observation do not reveal the finite and constant speed of light. The finite speed of light in free space was first observed by Roemer in the mid 1600s and all subsequent experiments have shown light to have a constant speed in vacuo which is measured to five decimal places of precision.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

I think it is reasonable to assume that the stimuli would have existed before the evolution of the nervous system, but there is a huge difference between stimuli and objects.

Mr general semanticist could you elaborate on this by describing the concepts you here mentioned? Could you also describe the concepts of existence, identity, consciousness as well? Thanks.

Best and Good

RB

Perhaps this may help.

Scientifically it is known that the submicroscopic levels are not "perceptible" or "perceptual." We do not and cannot "perceive" the "electron," but we observe actually the results of the eventual "electronic processes." That is, we observe the "effects" and assume the "causes." In other words, as explained before, our submicroscopic knowledge is hypothetical in character. The world behaves as if its mechanisms were such as our highest abstractions lead us to believe, and we will continue to invent theories with their appropriate terminologies to account for the intrinsic mechanisms of the world we live in, ourselves included. We read into nature our own latest highest abstractions, thus completing the inherent circularity of human knowledge, without which our understanding of nature is impossible.

[BaalChatzaf]

I base my views on those of Alfred Korzybski and his theory of consciousness of abstracting as illustrated in the structural differential which you can find here. This is an excellent site devoted to general semantics.

The Count learned what he learned in the Dark Ages of Neurophysiology. He was a total strange to CAT scan, MRI and PET scan. He knew nothing of the celluar chemistry and biology of the nervous system. Anything he said on the matter must be taken con grano salas.

More has been learned of how the human neurosytem works in the last forty years than in the previous twenty five hundred years.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited February 27, 2009 by BaalChatzaf

[tjohnson]

The Count learned what he learned in the Dark Ages of Neurophysiology. He was a total strange to CAT scan, MRI and PET scan. He knew nothing of the celluar chemistry and biology of the nervous system. Anything he said on the matter must be taken con grano salas.

More has been learned of how the human neurosytem works in the last forty years than in the previous twenty five hundred years.

Ba'al Chatzaf

It's bewildering why you continue to criticize Korzybski's work in neurophysiology when he didn't do any neurophysiology. Sigh...