My Interview With Adam Smith


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Mandeville's critics disagreed. Although they agreed (for various reasons) that benevolent actions are conducive to our happiness, they maintained that this benefit will come about only if we are truly motivated by a concern for others. If, say, we help a friend not because we are truly concerned about his welfare but only because we want him to feel obligated or grateful to us (so-called "selfish" motives), then we will not feel the satisfaction that comes with true benevolence.

These philosophers typically distinguished between "selfish" and "social" passions, and they regarded both categories as essential to happiness. Unlike Mandeville (and Hobbes), however, they did not think that all "social" passions can be reduced to "selfish" passions.

Ghs

Addendum: It should be noted that the controversy I outlined above was concerned with moral psychology, not with normative ethics per se. The "science of man" that David Hume mentioned in the introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature was based, first and foremost, on knowledge of human nature. Again and again we find British moralists insisting that we cannot ascertain what man should do until we first learn the basic principles of his nature, which will tell us what he can do. Hence the seemingly endless discussions in this literature about the various passions of human beings.

All this relates to Hume's infamous comment (in the Treatise) that reason is, and ought to be, a slave of the passions. This exaggerated rhetorical flourish by a young Hume is not as "evil" as some O'ists make it out to be -- but this is a topic for another discusson. 8-)

Well, Rand sure missed the human nature boat. I think that just maybe after observing it all around her under tremendous stress in the Soviet Union it was natural enough to concentrate on the ought to be of it all, but this is sheer speculation.

--Brant

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Well, Rand sure missed the human nature boat. I think that just maybe after observing it all around her under tremendous stress in the Soviet Union it was natural enough to concentrate on the ought to be of it all, but this is sheer speculation.

--Brant

I wouldn't say this.

In some of her writings -- Toohey's "speech" to Keating in The Fountainhead being a notable example (and one of the best things she ever wrote on the subject, imho) -- Rand suggests that altruism is basically a scam, i.e., a moral theory, impossible to practice consistently, that has been advocated by people who wish to control or rule over others. I think this is very realistic. 18th century moral philosophers would call this a "selfish" motive for advocating altruism.

My gripe with Rand is not that she was wrong in any fundamental sense, but that she paid insufficient attention to the social side of human nature. In a way this isn't even a criticism. Rand didn't seem especially interested in what can broadly be described as social psychology, and there is no particular reason why she should have been. What I find annoying is when the Orthos discourage young Randians from supplementing Rand's valid insights with the insights of earlier philosophers, such as Adam Smith, by misrepresenting their views as "altruistic" in Rand's sense of the word.

Any Randian who approaches the writings of Smith (or any of his contemporaries) with this outlandish preconception is not likely to read him sympathetically. And if you don't read a philosopher sympathetically -- if instead you read with the intention of spotting those points where he was supposedly wrong, in an effort to reinforce your preconceptions -- then you will never learn anything from him.

It seems to be an obsession with Orthos to insist that no philosopher before Rand understood or appreciated the morality of self-interest. This obsession is motivated by the desire to elevate Rand to the status of a philosophic demigod who was absolutely original in every point about ethics that she ever made.

Ghs

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Hence the seemingly endless discussions in this literature about the various passions of human beings. All this relates to Hume's infamous comment (in the Treatise) that reason is, and ought to be, a slave of the passions. This exaggerated rhetorical flourish by a young Hume is not as "evil" as some O'ists make it out to be -- but this is a topic for another discussion. 8-) Ghs

I want to elaborate on this issue a bit.....

Although many of Hume's fellow Scots criticized the Treatise -- no one liked his epistemology, and they disliked his treatment of justice as an "artificial" rather than a "natural" virtue (a misleading distinction that Hume dropped from his later writings) -- many were in the same "moral sense" school of thought that Hume defended. This school, which is often traced to Shaftesbury's influential Characteristics (1711; a terrific book in many ways), was developed into a systematic approach by Francis Hutcheson, who was Adam's Smith's favorite teacher at Glasgow University and who had many American admirers, such as Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Franklin. (There is some controversy about whether Adam Smith was a moral sense philosopher. I don't think he was.)

To understand the viewpoint of moral sense philosophers, including Hume, we need to distinguish two meanings of "rational." In one sense "rational" can mean consistent with reason, and in another sense it can mean the product of reason.

Like John Locke, who maintained that we will act only if we are dissatisfied with our present condition and desire a more satisfactory state of affairs, the moral sense philosophers believed that we are motivated to act by a desire (or passion), not by reason per se. But this doesn't mean that reason plays no role in our actions or that our actions are somehow nonrational or irrational. Far from it.

Consider the feeling of hunger. This feeling is how we experience the body's need for food, and it is what motivates us to eat. We don't first think "I need food" and then experience hunger as a product of our reasoning. Rather, we first experience the feeling and then use reason to ascertain the best way to satisfy our hunger.

Similarly, moral sense philosophers believed that we have analogous social passions (i.e., desires) that are not the product of reason per se, though they are entirely consistent with reason. The most important of these is "sociability." They believed that our desire for social interaction is a natural desire, i.e., an aspect of human nature, not something that we reason ourselves into. We do not desire to interact because we first reason that social interaction would serve our self-interest. Rather, after we experience the desire to interact, we use reason to determine the most beneficial means of doing so.

This is what Hume was getting at, more or less, when he called reason a "slave" of the passions. This was a hyperbolic expression of the same point that had been made previously by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and others adherents of moral sense theory. Hume didn't deny that reason plays a crucial role in determining which passions we should act upon, or in what manner. Rather, he was making the point that we won't reason about which course of action to take unless we first have a desire to take that action. If we are indifferent to a goal, if we have no desire for it at all, then we will never use reason to determine how we should go about achieving that goal.

These philosophers were often criticizing Thomas Hobbes, according to whom all of our social relationships are ultimately the result of self-interested calculations. This had significant political implications, owing to Hobbes's argument that humans in a state of nature would be in a perpetual "war of every man against every man." Moral sense philosophers, in contrast, maintained that even in a state of nature people would naturally seek the companionship of other people.

This all-too-brief summary doesn't even touch on the meaning of the "moral sense." which is a complex issue in its own right. I don't agree with moral sense theory, but it does raise some interesting points, especially in its comparison of our moral responses to our aesthetic responses. This was a major theme of the moral sense school. These philosophers argued that our fundamental aesthetic responses are not the product of reason, e.g., that we don't first evaluate (or otherwise reason about) a beautiful sunset and only then find it pleasing. Rather, our aesthetic response to a beautiful sunset is natural, and only after experiencing pleasure from a sunset do we later use reason to explain why we responded as we did.

Our fundamental moral responses were explained along similar lines by moral sense philosophers, which is why they sometimes referrred to the moral beauty of virtue or to a lovely action. We admire and respond to such moral beauty, even if the person or action in question has nothing to do with our self-interest. (Historical figures, whose past actions cannot possibly affect our self-interest, were often cited to support this point. We admire the virtues of historical characters, even though they have no relationship to our self-interest.)

In referring to a moral "sense," these philosophers were thinking of so-called secondary sense qualities, such as smell. Just as odors do not exist "out there," independently of how we perceive reality, so it was argued that morality does not exist "out there," independently of human beings. (This was a rejection of the moral "rationalism" of Samuel Clarke and others who argued that moral relationships reflect eternally existing metaphysical relationships.) Rather, just as we experience the "beautiful" as a natural aspect of our human nature, so we experience the distinction between good and evil as a natural aspect of our human nature. Children, for example, grasp this distinction long before they are able to reason about ethics.

To use the overworked modern expression, moral sense philosophers maintained that our "sense" of right and wrong -- not all the particulars, mind you, but the basic distinction itself -- is "hardwired" into our systems. Although consistent with reason, it is not the product of reason.

Ghs

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Well, Rand sure missed the human nature boat. I think that just maybe after observing it all around her under tremendous stress in the Soviet Union it was natural enough to concentrate on the ought to be of it all, but this is sheer speculation.

--Brant

I wouldn't say this.

In some of her writings -- Toohey's "speech" to Keating in The Fountainhead being a notable example (and one of the best things she ever wrote on the subject, imho) -- Rand suggests that altruism is basically a scam, i.e., a moral theory, impossible to practice consistently, that has been advocated by people who wish to control or rule over others. I think this is very realistic. 18th century moral philosophers would call this a "selfish" motive for advocating altruism.

My gripe with Rand is not that she was wrong in any fundamental sense, but that she paid insufficient attention to the social side of human nature. In a way this isn't even a criticism. Rand didn't seem especially interested in what can broadly be described as social psychology, and there is no particular reason why she should have been. What I find annoying is when the Orthos discourage young Randians from supplementing Rand's valid insights with the insights of earlier philosophers, such as Adam Smith, by misrepresenting their views as "altruistic" in Rand's sense of the word.

Any Randian who approaches the writings of Smith (or any of his contemporaries) with this outlandish preconception is not likely to read him sympathetically. And if you don't read a philosopher sympathetically -- if instead you read with the intention of spotting those points where he was supposedly wrong, in an effort to reinforce your preconceptions -- then you will never learn anything from him.

It seems to be an obsession with Orthos to insist that no philosopher before Rand understood or appreciated the morality of self-interest. This obsession is motivated by the desire to elevate Rand to the status of a philosophic demigod who was absolutely original in every point about ethics that she ever made.

Ghs

I agree with you and don't think I've been contradicted except I didn't say as I might have that she got the basics right.

Toohey's speech to Keating is literarily derived from the speech of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov. I think it's the greatest speech in world literature, insofar as I might be an authority on that, which I admit is quite weak. Dosty also set it up brilliantly with a flick of his literary wrist.

--Brant

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Toohey's speech to Keating is literarily derived from the speech of the Grand Inquisitor in The Brothers Karamazov. I think it's the greatest speech in world literature, insofar as I might be an authority on that, which I admit is quite weak. Dosty also set it up brilliantly with a flick of his literary wrist. --Brant

Did Rand ever acknowledge or discuss this derivation? Or is this another one of your heretical opinions? 8-)

Ghs

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The following passage by the Scottish (or Scotch-Irish) philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1694-1746) exemplifies why I am fascinated by many of the writings of the Scottish Enlightenment. This passage (from An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, 1726 ) is part of Hutcheson's discussion of "the beautiful" in general, which he here applies to the pleasure we experience from the intellectual beauty inherent in certain kinds of knowledge. Hutcheson, who regards our perceptions of uniformity in variety as the foundation of our aesthetic responses, then proceeds to apply his analysis to how we respond aesthetically, via a "moral sense," to certain kinds of human actions and to those mental dispositions known as "virtues."

I neither endorse nor reject Hutcheson's reasoning here, largely because I have not given sufficient thought to the matter he discusses. I post this for its inherent interest, with this question in mind: What sort of mind does it take to come up with this kind of theory in the first place? An exceptional one, at the very least.

Section III

Of the Beauty of Theorems

I. The Beauty of Theorems, or universal Truths demonstrated, deserves a distinct Consideration, being of a Nature pretty different from the former kinds of Beauty; and yet there is none in which we shall see such an amazing Variety with Uniformity: and hence arises a very great Pleasure distinct from Prospects of any further Advantage.

II. For in one Theorem we may find included, with the most exact Agreement, an infinite Multitude of particular Truths; nay, often an Infinity of Infinites: so that altho the Necessity of forming abstract Ideas, and universal Theorems, arises perhaps from the Limitation of our Minds, which cannot admit an infinite Multitude of singular Ideas or Judgments at once, yet this Power gives us an Evidence of the Largeness of the human Capacity above our Imagination. Thus for instance, the 47th Proposition of the first Book of Euclid’s Elements contains an infinite Multitude of Truths, concerning the infinite possible Sizes of right-angled Triangles, as you make the Area greater or less; and in each of these Sizes you may find an infinite Multitude of dissimilar Triangles, as you vary the Proportion of the Base to the Perpendicular; all which Infinitys of Infinites agree in the general Theorem. In Algebraick, and Fluxional Calculations, we shall still find a greater Variety of particular Truths included in general Theorems; not only in general Equations applicable to all Kinds of Quantity, but in more particular Investigations of Areas and Tangents: In which one Manner of Operation shall discover Theorems applicable to infinite Orders or Species of Curves, to the infinite Sizes of each Species, and to the infinite Points of the infinite Individuals of each Size.

III. That we may the better discern this Agreement, or Unity of an Infinity of Objects, in the general Theorem, to be the Foundation of the Beauty or Pleasure attending their Discovery, let us compare our Satisfaction in such Discoverys, with the uneasy state of Mind in which we are, when we can only measure Lines, or Surfaces, by a Scale, or are making Experiments which we can reduce to no general Canon, but only heaping up a Multitude of particular incoherent Observations. Now each of these Trials discovers a new Truth, but with no Pleasure or Beauty, notwithstanding the Variety, till we can discover some sort of Unity, or reduce them to some general Canon.

IV. Again, let us take a Metaphysical Axiom, such as this, Every Whole is greater than its Part; and we shall find no Beauty in the Contemplation. For tho this Proposition contains many Infinitys of particular Truths; yet the Unity is inconsiderable, since they all agree only in a vague, undetermin’d Conception of Whole and Part, and in an indefinite Excess of the former above the latter, which is sometimes great and sometimes small. So, should we hear that the Cylinder is greater than the inscrib’d Sphere, and this again greater than the Cone of the same Altitude and Diameter with the Base, we shall find no pleasure in this Knowledge of a general Relation of greater and less, without any precise Difference or Proportion. But when we see the universal exact Agreement of all possible Sizes of such Systems of Solids, that they preserve to each other the constant Ratio of 3, 2, 1; how beautiful is the Theorem, and how are we ravish’d with its first Discovery!....

For the complete text, see:

http://oll.libertyfu...=html&Itemid=27

Ghs

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Much of the beauty of theorems described by Hutcheson comes from math. As I was reading what he said about some theorems being beautiful and others not, I thought of the distinction between very obvious and very not obvious or subtle. This article on mathematical beauty agrees. "Some mathematicians see beauty in mathematical results that establish connections between two areas of mathematics that at first sight appear to be totally unrelated." A whole being greater than any of its parts is so obvious. That any triangle inscribed in a semicircle, one leg being the diameter, is necessarily a right triangle is far from obvious (proof).

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Much of the beauty of theorems described by Hutcheson comes from math. As I was reading what he said about some theorems being beautiful and others not, I thought of the distinction between very obvious and very not obvious or subtle. This article on mathematical beauty agrees. "Some mathematicians see beauty in mathematical results that establish connections between two areas of mathematics that at first sight appear to be totally unrelated." A whole being greater than any of its parts is so obvious. That any triangle inscribed in a semicircle, one leg being the diameter, is necessarily a right triangle is far from obvious (proof).

Thanks for the link. Good article, but maybe Hutcheson should have been mentioned somewhere. 8-)

Ghs

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It is also interesting to note that Butler's comment that man "derives nothing from [helping others] except the pleasure of seeing it" seems to restate the visibility principle, which Branden offered as an explanation as to why men derive such enormous pleasure from friendship.

Yes, there is a lot of discussion in the British moralists, including Smith, about what NB called "the visibility principle." Back in the 1980s, when I wrote 4 scripts (around 180 ms pages) for Knowledge Products on the Wealth of Nations, I devoted much of the first two scripts to the Scottish Enlightenment. As part of that account, I spent some time discussing one of the great achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment, namely, the Encyclopedia Britannica, first published in 1771 by "a Society of Gentlemen in Scotland." I quoted this passage from the unsigned article on Moral Philosophy that I especially liked (and still do).

Men, like certain musical Instruments, are set to each other, so that the Vibrations or Notes excited in one, raise correspondent Notes and Vibrations in the others. The Impulses of Pleasure or Pain, Joy or Sorrow, made on one Mind, are by an instantaneous Sympathy of Nature, communicated in some degree to all; especially when Hearts are (as an humane Writer expresses it) in Unison of Kindness; the Joy that vibrates in one, communicates to the other also. We may add, that tho’ Joy thus imparted swells the Harmony, yet Grief vibrated to the Heart of a Friend, and rebounding from thence in sympathetic Notes, melts as it were, and almost dies away. All the Passions, but especially those of the social kind, are contagious; and when the Passions of one Man mingle with those of another, they increase and multiply prodigiously. There is a most moving Eloquence in the human Countenance, Air, Voice, and Gesture, wonderfully expressive of the most latent Feelings and Passions of the Soul, which darts them, like a subtle Flame, into the Hearts of others, and raises correspondent Feelings there: Friendship, Love, Good-humour, Joy, spread through every Feature, and particularly shoot from the Eyes their softer and fiercer Fires with an irresistible Energy. And in like manner, the opposite Passions of Hatred, Enmity, Ill-humour, Melancholy, diffuse a sullen and saddening Air over the Face, and flashing from Eye to Eye, kindle a Train of similar Passions. By these and other admirable Pieces of Machinery, Men are formed for Society and the delightful Interchange of friendly Sentiments and Duties, to increase the Happiness of others by Participation, and their own by Rebound, and to diminish, by dividing, the common Stock of their Misery..

Ghs

That really is quite a remarkable quotation.

. . .[The] Vibrations or Notes excited in one, raise correspondent Notes and Vibrations in the others. . . the Joy that vibrates in one, communicates to the other also. . . Grief vibrated to the Heart of a Friend, and rebounding from thence in sympathetic Notes. . . the opposite Passions of Hatred, Enmity, Ill-humour, Melancholy, diffuse a sullen and saddening Air over the Face, and flashing from Eye to Eye, kindle a Train of similar Passions. By these and other admirable Pieces of Machinery, Men are formed for Society and the delightful Interchange of friendly Sentiments and Duties, to increase the Happiness of others by Participation, and their own by Rebound, and to diminish, by dividing, the common Stock of their Misery. . .

Fordyce's metaphor relies on emotions and sounds rather than the visual point of view, but the essence of the psychological function described is the same. Emotional Rebounding is used in a way comparable to mirroring in Branden’s terminology. It’s “The Rebound Principle,” reincarnated centuries later—along with Branden’s theoretical elaboration--as “The Visibility Principle.”

Fascinating.

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It is also interesting to note that Butler's comment that man "derives nothing from [helping others] except the pleasure of seeing it" seems to restate the visibility principle, which Branden offered as an explanation as to why men derive such enormous pleasure from friendship.

Yes, there is a lot of discussion in the British moralists, including Smith, about what NB called "the visibility principle." Back in the 1980s, when I wrote 4 scripts (around 180 ms pages) for Knowledge Products on the Wealth of Nations, I devoted much of the first two scripts to the Scottish Enlightenment. As part of that account, I spent some time discussing one of the great achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment, namely, the Encyclopedia Britannica, first published in 1771 by "a Society of Gentlemen in Scotland." I quoted this passage from the unsigned article on Moral Philosophy that I especially liked (and still do).

Men, like certain musical Instruments, are set to each other, so that the Vibrations or Notes excited in one, raise correspondent Notes and Vibrations in the others. The Impulses of Pleasure or Pain, Joy or Sorrow, made on one Mind, are by an instantaneous Sympathy of Nature, communicated in some degree to all; especially when Hearts are (as an humane Writer expresses it) in Unison of Kindness; the Joy that vibrates in one, communicates to the other also. We may add, that tho’ Joy thus imparted swells the Harmony, yet Grief vibrated to the Heart of a Friend, and rebounding from thence in sympathetic Notes, melts as it were, and almost dies away. All the Passions, but especially those of the social kind, are contagious; and when the Passions of one Man mingle with those of another, they increase and multiply prodigiously. There is a most moving Eloquence in the human Countenance, Air, Voice, and Gesture, wonderfully expressive of the most latent Feelings and Passions of the Soul, which darts them, like a subtle Flame, into the Hearts of others, and raises correspondent Feelings there: Friendship, Love, Good-humour, Joy, spread through every Feature, and particularly shoot from the Eyes their softer and fiercer Fires with an irresistible Energy. And in like manner, the opposite Passions of Hatred, Enmity, Ill-humour, Melancholy, diffuse a sullen and saddening Air over the Face, and flashing from Eye to Eye, kindle a Train of similar Passions. By these and other admirable Pieces of Machinery, Men are formed for Society and the delightful Interchange of friendly Sentiments and Duties, to increase the Happiness of others by Participation, and their own by Rebound, and to diminish, by dividing, the common Stock of their Misery..

Ghs

That really is quite a remarkable quotation.

Yeah, I thought you might appreciate it. What makes the passage even more remarkable is the fact that it was included in an Encyclopedia Britannica article well into the 19th century.

Ghs

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It is also interesting to note that Butler's comment that man "derives nothing from [helping others] except the pleasure of seeing it" seems to restate the visibility principle, which Branden offered as an explanation as to why men derive such enormous pleasure from friendship.

Yes, there is a lot of discussion in the British moralists, including Smith, about what NB called "the visibility principle." Back in the 1980s, when I wrote 4 scripts (around 180 ms pages) for Knowledge Products on the Wealth of Nations, I devoted much of the first two scripts to the Scottish Enlightenment. As part of that account, I spent some time discussing one of the great achievements of the Scottish Enlightenment, namely, the Encyclopedia Britannica, first published in 1771 by "a Society of Gentlemen in Scotland." I quoted this passage from the unsigned article on Moral Philosophy that I especially liked (and still do).

Men, like certain musical Instruments, are set to each other, so that the Vibrations or Notes excited in one, raise correspondent Notes and Vibrations in the others. The Impulses of Pleasure or Pain, Joy or Sorrow, made on one Mind, are by an instantaneous Sympathy of Nature, communicated in some degree to all; especially when Hearts are (as an humane Writer expresses it) in Unison of Kindness; the Joy that vibrates in one, communicates to the other also. We may add, that tho’ Joy thus imparted swells the Harmony, yet Grief vibrated to the Heart of a Friend, and rebounding from thence in sympathetic Notes, melts as it were, and almost dies away. All the Passions, but especially those of the social kind, are contagious; and when the Passions of one Man mingle with those of another, they increase and multiply prodigiously. There is a most moving Eloquence in the human Countenance, Air, Voice, and Gesture, wonderfully expressive of the most latent Feelings and Passions of the Soul, which darts them, like a subtle Flame, into the Hearts of others, and raises correspondent Feelings there: Friendship, Love, Good-humour, Joy, spread through every Feature, and particularly shoot from the Eyes their softer and fiercer Fires with an irresistible Energy. And in like manner, the opposite Passions of Hatred, Enmity, Ill-humour, Melancholy, diffuse a sullen and saddening Air over the Face, and flashing from Eye to Eye, kindle a Train of similar Passions. By these and other admirable Pieces of Machinery, Men are formed for Society and the delightful Interchange of friendly Sentiments and Duties, to increase the Happiness of others by Participation, and their own by Rebound, and to diminish, by dividing, the common Stock of their Misery..

Ghs

That really is quite a remarkable quotation.

Yeah, I thought you might appreciate it. What makes the passage even more remarkable is the fact that it was included in an Encyclopedia Britannica article well into the 19th century.

Ghs

I own the 11th ed. Is it there? It's a hundred years old.

--Brant

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Dennis,

Here is a passage by Francis Hutcheson that is similar to the remarks by Fordyce that we have been discussing. Although Fordyce was not the clone of Hutcheson that he was sometimes said to be, he did follow Hutcheson closely on this issue. And Hutcheson, in turn, gives primary credit to Shaftesbury, in his Characteristics.

The following passage is from an inaugural lecture, On the Natural Sociability of Mankind, that Hutcheson delivered in 1730, after being elected Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. I will not discuss the broader context of his remarks here, since they stand on their own, regardless of whether one agrees with Hutcheson's objection (aimed mainly at Hobbes and Pufendorf) to the claim that our desire for social interaction is motivated purely by self-interested considerations, in the sense of the external advantages that social life can provide.

Furthermore, by some wonderful sympathy of nature, there are few or no pleasures, even physical pleasures, which are not augmented by association with others. There is no happy or cheerful frame of mind which does not demand to be shared and spread among others. Certainly, there is scarcely anything (and I could omit “scarcely”) agreeable, joyful, happy, cheerful, or delightful, which does not boil up and bubble over from the human heart, and long to be poured out among others. Nor is there anything more cheering for a man than to share his happiness with others. And therefore, though they claim that it is his own pleasure or advantage that each man seeks, yet such is the nature of certain pleasures, including the greatest of them, and of most of our desires, that they prompt us to seek social life by themselves almost without any reasoning; and by themselves they make the duties of social life agreeable and delightful. All these things the ancients seem to have discerned, nor does the illustrious Richard Cumberland altogether neglect them. But they have been most eloquently celebrated by the illustrious Earl of Shaftesbury, noble both by his family and by his genius, however correctly he has been criticized by theologians in other matters. And I see nothing which can be said to the contrary.

For the complete text, see:

http://oll.libertyfu...=html&Itemid=27

Ghs

Addendum: The Earl of Shafesbury referred to above is the Third Earl of Shafesbury. His grandfather, the First Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper), hired John Locke as his personal physician, after Locke had performed a remarkable operation that saved his life. This Lord Shafesbury, recognizing Locke's brilliance, then played the role of patron, which provided Locke with the money and leisure needed to write his great philosophical works.

Locke was also a tutor to -- guess who? -- the First Earl's grandson, the young fellow who later became the Third Earl of Shafesbury and who wrote Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times-- one of the most influential books of the 18th century.

Characteristics -- which is actually a collection of writings -- is an absolutely fascinating book. Where else will you find an extended explanation (in the 18th century) of why we should speak aloud to ourselves, in a type of self-dialogue, as a means of working out and clarifying our ideas? Or a justification of ridicule and humor as proper methods of criticizing other people? Or an argument to the effect that the suppression of free speech tends to generate an especially crude brand of humor in society?

I first became familiar with Shaftesbury decades ago, as a result of my interest in freethought. Writing in the early 1700s, he was among the first to argue that atheists can be as moral -- and in many cases even more moral -- than Christians. This was a very radical position at the time, one that even John Locke disageed with. Some previous philosophers had hinted at this notion, but Shaftesbury, to my knowledge, was the first to defend it in any detail.

A wonderful 3-volume edition of Characteristics, edited by the neo-Objectivist Doug Den Uyl, is available from Liberty Fund for $42. This is the softcover edition. The hardcover is more, obviously. See:

http://catalog.liber...uemart&Itemid=1

Ghs

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Yeah, I thought you might appreciate it. What makes the passage even more remarkable is the fact that it was included in an Encyclopedia Britannica article well into the 19th century.

I own the 11th ed. Is it there? It's a hundred years old.

--Brant

Nope, that is way too late.

As I said before, Fordyce's article in the Encyclopedia Britannica is nothing more or less than a reprint of a book by Fordyce, The Elements of Moral Philosophy (1754) which can be read here:

http://oll.libertyfu...#chapter_66517]

The article really is that long. I have a facsimile reprint of the first edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica, and I did a quick comparison of the article with the book. I noticed a few differences, but they are relatively minor. The passage I quoted earlier from Fordyce appears both in his book and in the article.

Ghs

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The emphasis on introspective psychology, as illustrated in several of my earlier posts on this thread, is one reason why I prefer the Scottish Enlightenment over the French Enlightenment.

John Locke, whose epistemology was a dominant force on Enlightenment thinkers, identified two primary sources of human knowledge: sensation (or what we would call perception), and reflection (or what we would call introspection). The Scots investigated both sources, as evidenced by their intense interest in Newtonian science and psychology. Many French thinkers, in contrast, followed the course set by the "sensationalism" of Condillac, according to which only our perceptions of the external world can yield authentic knowledge. Internal phenomena are nothing more than vague impressions, so to speak, of our external sensations.

The latter approach eventually led to the "positivism" of Auguste Comte -- the Randian villain (deservedly so) who coined the words altruism and sociology. Comte explicitly rejected psychology as an authentic science, claiming that it relies on introspection and therefore appeals to subjective claims that can never be empirically verified.

My historical sketch, though a bit oversimplified (as all such sketches must be), is essentially accurate. And this is why we can still read the Scots with profit, whereas a good deal of the French and French-inspired literature on psychology strikes us as superficial, indeed, as downright silly at times.

Ghs

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George,

Will you answer Dennis's point? I would be interested in seeing what you have to say in response to it. I think libertarians tend to view rights as some abstract concept they have little knowledge of grasping. I am sure this is not indicative of you, of course. However, in terms of libertarian anarchists I think many view consistency as the reason why they are anarchists rather than morality. Hence, anarchists treat rights as intrinsic values rather than moral principles derived from reality.

George,

You make a lot of excellent observations here. And I certainly agree with the essence of your argument—if I understand you correctly—that the similarities between what you describe as Smith’s viewpoint and Rand’s viewpoint are much more important than the differences.

However, If you (or anyone else) think I summarized Rand’s position incorrectly, I would be very interested to know how. Obviously I will have to disagree with you on this point until and unless someone can show me where I am wrong.

Rights, of course, are a political concept, and are derived from ethical principles. Rand would say that rights, as a social principle, are a precondition of capitalism, but not a moral justification of capitalism. The notion that rights are a moral primary will, it seems, forever remain a major point of contention between libertarians and Objectivists—and the main reason (along with anarchism) that she was so critical of libertarianism as a political theory.

What more do I want? A stronger appreciation of the vital importance of philosophy and ethics to the defense of capitalism on the part of more libertarians.

And more discussions of this important issue that reflect the mutual respect of this one. My profound thanks to you for that.

Dennis

Edited by Mike Renzulli
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George,

Will you answer Dennis's point? I would be interested in seeing what you have to say in response to it. I think libertarians tend to view rights as some abstract concept they have little knowledge of grasping. I am sure this is not indicative of you, of course. However, in terms of libertarian anarchists I think many view consistency as the reason why they are anarchists rather than morality. Hence, anarchists treat rights as intrinsic values rather than moral principles derived from reality.

George,

You make a lot of excellent observations here. And I certainly agree with the essence of your argument—if I understand you correctly—that the similarities between what you describe as Smith’s viewpoint and Rand’s viewpoint are much more important than the differences.

However, If you (or anyone else) think I summarized Rand’s position incorrectly, I would be very interested to know how. Obviously I will have to disagree with you on this point until and unless someone can show me where I am wrong.

Rights, of course, are a political concept, and are derived from ethical principles. Rand would say that rights, as a social principle, are a precondition of capitalism, but not a moral justification of capitalism. The notion that rights are a moral primary will, it seems, forever remain a major point of contention between libertarians and Objectivists—and the main reason (along with anarchism) that she was so critical of libertarianism as a political theory.

What more do I want? A stronger appreciation of the vital importance of philosophy and ethics to the defense of capitalism on the part of more libertarians.

And more discussions of this important issue that reflect the mutual respect of this one. My profound thanks to you for that.

Dennis

I didn't address those comments by Dennis because he seriously misrepresents what "libertarians" believe, and I am very reluctant to give a refresher course on Libertarianism 101. This would only aggravate Dennis -- and me.

Suffice it to say that libertarians do not believe that rights are a "moral primary." During my 45 years in the libertarian movement, I have never met so much as one libertarian who believes any such thing. On the contrary, many libertarians hail from an O'ist background, and they agree (in essence) with Rand's justification of rights.

As for the moral foundation of capitalism, all that fundamentally matters is that people respect individual rights. It doesn't matter why they respect individual rights, so long as they actually respect them in fact. This is all that capitalism needs to function.

Of course, O'ists may argue that individual rights will not be respected for very long without a proper moral foundation, as provided by Rand. This might be true, but, even if it is, it is a different issue. To posit an essential foundation for capitalism (i.e., a widespread respect for individual rights) is not the same as to predict what might happen to that foundation in the absence of other conditions.

If America were populated by a vast majority of fundamentalist Christians who agreed, point by point, with Rand's conception of rights, and who sincerely respected those rights, then you would have capitalism as surely as you would in an America dominated by O'ists. The difference (to adapt the point made by Adam Smith) is that I would not find a society dominated by fundies a good place to live in other respects. Not every important value is tied to "capitalism" in some manner. A free society can have good values or it can have bad values, rational values or irrational values, in regard to issues unrelated to capitalism per se.

As for Adam Smith, again and again he defended the moral worth of self-interested actions. Just because he also thought that benevolent actions will make society a better place to live than purely self-interested actions, as understood in the narrow sense of pursuing economic gains, has no relevance to his defense of the free market and private property (The word "capitalism" was not in use during Smith's day.)

As for your observation about libertarian anarchists, I don't know what it means to say that we are more interested in consistency than in morality. As a good Neo-O'ist, I was under the impression that consistency is an essential aspect of morality.

Ghs

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Well, shit....Now that I have gotten sidetracked on the issue of libertarianism, I might as well say a few more things before I call it a night. I'm tired, and I'm going to write this very quickly, so don't expect a masterpiece.

The American Heritage Dictionary defines "libertarian" as "One who advocates maximizing individual rights and minimizing the role of the state." This definition includes Rand and O'ists as surely as does any other species of libertarians.

As commonly used today, "libertarian" is merely a synonym for "classical liberal." Both names signify political positions, without specifying the reasons (moral, economic, etc.) why libertarians or classical liberals uphold those political positions. These reasons are omitted from the definition of "libertarian" because they are not relevant to the classification. But to omit a characteristic from a definition does not mean that the characteristic is nonexistent. It only means that the characteristic is not essential to the meaning of the concept. All libertarians who believe in rights have reasons for their belief, and so do not regard rights as a moral primary.

The great classical liberal historian Lord Acton defined a (classical) liberal as a person for whom individual freedom is the "polar star" in political matters. As a Catholic, Acton obviously didn't believe that freedom, or the political sphere generally, is a moral primary. In emphasizing the political sphere, Acton was making the point that, for liberals, freedom is the highest political value, not the highest moral value. Modern libertarians, including O'ists, believe exactly the same thing. This is the conceptual common denominator that makes all of them libertarians.

F..A. Hayek, in The Constitution of Liberty, discusses the problem of labels. As a European living in the early 20th century, he was able to call himself a "liberal" without generating much misunderstanding or confusion. Hayek loved this label, owing to its grand history and its etymological derivation from the Latin word for "liberty." But as the century wore on, the label "liberal" became increasingly associated with the "new liberalism" of the late 19th century, especially in America, so in calling oneself a "liberal," one was likely to be taken as a "welfare state liberal" of the modern type.

After reluctantly concluding that "liberal" would no longer serve as an adequate description of his political beliefs, Hayek considered the label "libertarian," which has the same etymological roots as "liberal." Hayek expressed his dislike of this label in aesthetic terms. He thought "libertarian" sounded like an artificial construct, and he thought it was a rather ugly word.

(I don't know if Hayek was aware of this fact, but only a few decades in the 19th century separated the origins of "liberal" and "libertarian," when these were used specifically as political labels. The word "libertarian," when used to signify an advocate of free will, goes back at least to the 18th century. And "liberal" had been used for centuries to convey the nonpolitical meanings of magnanimous, tolerant, open-minded, etc.)

Hayek then discusses the word "whig" (of all things), and concludes that "whig" or "old whig" might be the best label overall.

Many classical liberals discussed the problem of political labels. Thomas Jefferson, for example, once explained that he viewed the labels Whig and Tory as historical archetypes, not as the names of two political parties in England. Whigs were those who defended individual freedom, whereas Tories defended absolutism. Years after writing the Declaration of Independence, Jefferson said that it was intended to be "an expression of the American mind," and that most Americans were Whigs, i.e., that most Americans agreed with the principles expressed in the Declaration. . Too bad some O'ist wasn't around then to tell Jefferson: "I'm not a Whig! I'm an Objectivist!" This would have confused Jefferson as much as it confuses me. 8-)

Anyway, use whatever political label you like -- whig, classical liberal, libertarian, or whatever; it really doesn't matter so long as you understand that we are talking about a political label, not a general philosophical label. There are various subcategories within libertarianism. There are natural right libertarians, there are utilitarian libertarians, there are Stirnerite libertarians, there are Christian libertarians, and there are O'ist libertarians.

This is a very simple point, and, for the life of me, I cannot understand why so many O'ists seem unable to grasp it. What is their problem with genera and species? If someone were to say "Ayn Rand was a human being," would some O'ist indignantly reply: "Ayn Rand was not a human being! Ayn Rand was an Objectivist!"

Never say never, I suppose. 8-)

Ghs

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Dennis,

Here is a passage by Francis Hutcheson that is similar to the remarks by Fordyce that we have been discussing. Although Fordyce was not the clone of Hutcheson that he was sometimes said to be, he did follow Hutcheson closely on this issue. And Hutcheson, in turn, gives primary credit to Shaftesbury, in his Characteristics.

The following passage is from an inaugural lecture, On the Natural Sociability of Mankind, that Hutcheson delivered in 1730, after being elected Professor of Moral Philosophy at the University of Glasgow. I will not discuss the broader context of his remarks here, since they stand on their own, regardless of whether one agrees with Hutcheson's objection (aimed mainly at Hobbes and Pufendorf) to the claim that our desire for social interaction is motivated purely by self-interested considerations, in the sense of the external advantages that social life can provide.

Furthermore, by some wonderful sympathy of nature, there are few or no pleasures, even physical pleasures, which are not augmented by association with others. There is no happy or cheerful frame of mind which does not demand to be shared and spread among others. Certainly, there is scarcely anything (and I could omit “scarcely”) agreeable, joyful, happy, cheerful, or delightful, which does not boil up and bubble over from the human heart, and long to be poured out among others. Nor is there anything more cheering for a man than to share his happiness with others. And therefore, though they claim that it is his own pleasure or advantage that each man seeks, yet such is the nature of certain pleasures, including the greatest of them, and of most of our desires, that they prompt us to seek social life by themselves almost without any reasoning; and by themselves they make the duties of social life agreeable and delightful. All these things the ancients seem to have discerned, nor does the illustrious Richard Cumberland altogether neglect them. But they have been most eloquently celebrated by the illustrious Earl of Shaftesbury, noble both by his family and by his genius, however correctly he has been criticized by theologians in other matters. And I see nothing which can be said to the contrary.

For the complete text, see:

http://oll.libertyfu...=html&Itemid=27

Ghs

Addendum: The Earl of Shafesbury referred above is the Third Earl of Shafesbury. His grandfather, the First Earl of Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper) hired John Locke as his personal physician, after Locke had performed a remarkable operation that saved his life. This Lord Shafesbury, recognizing Locke's brilliance, then played the role of patron, which provided Locke with the money and leisure needed to write his great philosophical works.

Locke was also a tutor to -- guess who? -- the First Earl's grandson, the young fellow who later became the Third Earl of Shafesbury and who wrote Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times-- one of the most influential books of the 18th century.

Characteristics -- which is actually a collection of writings -- is an absolutely fascinating book. Where else will you find an extended explanation (in the 18th century) of why we should speak aloud to ourselves, in a type of self-dialogue, as a means of working out and clarifying our ideas? Or a justification of ridicule and humor as proper methods of criticizing other people? Or an argument to the effect that the suppression of free speech tends to generate an especially crude brand of humor in society?

I first became familiar with Shaftesbury decades ago, as a result of my interest in freethought. Writing in the early 1700s, he was among the first to argue that atheists can be as moral -- and in many cases even more moral -- than Christians. This was a very radical position at the time, one that even John Locke disageed with. Some previous philosophers had hinted at this notion, but Shaftesbury, to my knowledge, was the first to defend it in any detail.

A wonderful 3-volume edition of Characteristics, edited by the neo-Objectivist Doug Den Uyl, is available from Liberty Fund for $42. This is the softcover edition. The hardcover is more, obviously. See:

http://catalog.liber...uemart&Itemid=1

Ghs

George,

Hutcheson seems to be arguing several things in his inaugural oration: that it is inherent in our nature that we value human companionship with those who share our values as an end in itself, and not for the sake of any secondary profit or gain; that we don’t socialize primarily for the sake of safety and security; that our conscience should be the "ruling principle" over our baser instincts; and that we don’t need government to make us civilized, because this comes naturally to human beings.

I certainly see your point about the concern here being largely psychological rather than moral. He is seeking to understand “those parts of the human mind which make us sociable.” The following passage strongly suggests the visibility issue, mainly because he frequently refers to images and ideas "put before the senses":

Such is the structure of the human mind, that when certain images (species) of things come before it, certain affections arise under the sole guidance of nature, without any art or deliberation, indeed without any previous command of the will. For just as a desire for private pleasure or advantage, a desire which is usually attributed to self-love, asserts itself as soon as a prospect of getting it arises, in the same way when images of other men and their fortune come to our attention, they excite public and unselfish feelings, even though there is no prospect of private advantage. For example, when the idea of a sentient nature tortured with serious pain is put before the mind, it excites commiseration and a simple desire to take away the pain. In the same way, the idea of a fortunate, happy, cheerful nature equally excites shared and social joy; and the continuance of that state is desired for itself. Nor is this concern for the condition of others only seen when they are present and before our external senses (in which case perhaps powerful reactions or emotions are visible) but whenever, in a quiet moment, we call up an image of others by reading histories or the narratives of travelers, or even when from the stories of drama we receive a certain image of human nature, even in the remotest nations or centuries where no advantage of our own is involved, with what heartfelt concern do we follow the fortunes of entire countries or honorable individuals?

Hiutcheson seems to agree with the Earl of Shaftesbury that in the perfection of the state of nature, the human motives of self-interest and social interest work in harmony. And to disagree with Locke on the matter of there being parts of our nature which are innate (although I doubt if Locke would have disagreed about this sort of innate attribute):

There are many natural abilities in every species of thing, many senses and appetites in animals, and many devices of nature which are not apparent from the start. . .

Where else will you find an extended explanation (in the 18th century) of why we should speak aloud to ourselves, in a type of self-dialogue, as a means of working out and clarifying our ideas?

Self-talk therapy actually is explicitly advocated by many therapists today, which helps to explain why, contrary to popular assumption. homeless people are actually much more sane than the general population. :laugh:

Edited by Dennis Hardin
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Thoughts while waiting for the plumber to arrive. . .(I'm already aggravated, so what the hell.)

I didn't address those comments by Dennis because he seriously misrepresents what "libertarians" believe, and I am very reluctant to give a refresher course on Libertarianism 101. This would only aggravate Dennis -- and me.

Suffice it to say that libertarians do not believe that rights are a "moral primary." During my 45 years in the libertarian movement, I have never met so much as one libertarian who believes any such thing. On the contrary, many libertarians hail from an O'ist background, and they agree (in essence) with Rand's justification of rights.

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy and I are apparently victims of the same delusion:

Libertarianism can be understood as a basic moral principle or as a derivative one. It might, for example, be advocated as a basic natural rights doctrine. Alternatively, it might be defended on the basis of rule consequentialism or teleology or rule contractarianism. Instrumental derivations of libertarianism appeal to considerations such as human limitations (e.g., of knowledge and motivation), incentive effects, administrative costs, the intrinsic value of liberty for the good life, etc. This entry will not address arguments for libertarian principles on the basis of other moral principles. Instead, it will simply address the plausibility of libertarian principles in their own right.

Walter Block explains the foundations of libertarianism this way:

The non-aggression axiom is the lynchpin of the philosophy of libertarianism.. .

If the non-aggression axiom is the basic building block of libertarianism, private property rights based on (Lockean and Rothbardian) homesteading principles are the foundation.. .

(Later in the article, Block insists that the “justified use of aggression” is not in any way a “moral” issue, which of course is absurd. He apparently uses the term morality in a quasi-religious sense—i.e., sinfulness)

Non-aggression principle - wikipedia

The non-aggression principle (also called the non-aggression axiom, the anti-coercion principle, the zero aggression principle, the non-initiation of force, or NAP, for short) is an ethical stance which asserts that "aggression" is inherently illegitimate. "Aggression" is defined as the "initiation" of physical force against persons or property, the threat of such, or fraud upon persons or their property. In contrast to pacifism, the non-aggression principle does not preclude violent self-defense. The principle is a moral stance.

Principle of Non-aggression (from Mises Wiki)

The non-aggression principle (also called the non-aggression axiom, or the anti-coercion or zero aggression principle or non-initiation of force) is an ethical stance which asserts that "aggression" is inherently illegitimate. "Aggression" is defined as the "initiation" of physical force against persons or property, the threat of such, or fraud upon persons or their property. In contrast to pacifism, the non-aggression principle does not preclude violent self-defense. The principle is al deontological (or rule-based) ethical stance.

As for the moral foundation of capitalism, all that fundamentally matters is that people respect individual rights. It doesn't matter why they respect individual rights, so long as they actually respect them in fact. This is all that capitalism needs to function.

This is the real issue, of course. Separating “what capitalism needs to function” from the question of what philosophical ideas stand in the way of making capitalism a reality is the crucial mistake being made by libertarians when they assert the non-aggression principle as an “inherent” or intrinsic principle or "axiom."

Until and unless libertarians begin to openly emphasize the real moral foundation of capitalism—reason and egoism—and to "aggressively" oppose the ideas of altruism and mysticism that undercut its foundation, liberty will never see the light of day.

Edited by Dennis Hardin
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Dennis,

Two brief comments for now.

First, nothing in the Stanford Encyclopedia contradicts what I said.

Second, Walter Block's views are extremely eccentric, even in a community of eccentrics. They are by no means representative of libertarians generally. Even Rothbard didn't agree with them. I find some of Block's views virtually incoherent, and I have had a few arguments with him over the years at conferences. You may as well quote some Christian libertarian who claims that all rights derive from God, and then attribute this view to every libertarian. One argument is as misleading and unfair as the other.

Rothbard sometimes referred to rights as an "axiom" of libertarianism, but by this he didn't mean the ultimate moral foundation. Rather, by "axiom" he meant what Francis Bacon meant by the term "middle axiom," i.e., a principle that constitutes the foundation of a certain discipline or enterprise, but which stands midway between that discipline or enterprise and more basic principles.

To sum up: I'm a libertarian by anyone's standard. So do you think that I regard rights as a "moral primary"? I obviously don't, and most libertarians agree with me. So what does all this mean? That I am not really a libertarian, because I don't subscribe to a fictitious doctrine that you attribute to them?

Ghs

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Thoughts while waiting for the

As for the moral foundation of capitalism, all that fundamentally matters is that people respect individual rights. It doesn't matter why they respect individual rights, so long as they actually respect them in fact. This is all that capitalism needs to function.
This is the real issue, of course. Separating “what capitalism needs to function” from the question of what philosophical ideas stand in the way of making capitalism a reality is the crucial mistake being made by libertarians when they assert the non-aggression principle as an “inherent” or intrinsic principle or "axiom." Until and unless libertarians begin to openly emphasize the real moral foundation of capitalism—reason and egoism—and to "aggressively" oppose the ideas of altruism and mysticism that undercut its foundation, liberty will never see the light of day.

You are now talking about the philosophical reforms that you believe are needed before capitalism will become a reality. This issue is distinct from the moral foundation of capitalism per se.

If you get enough people to believe in individual rights and to respect those rights, for whatever reason, then capitalism will eventually emerge. The free market is indifferent to motives and reasons. If an altruist invests millions of dollars in a business because he believes it will help the poor, his investment will have the same economic effects as the same investment by a Randian egoist who cares only about profit.

You even list "mysticism" as something that must be overcome before capitalism can take root and flourish. So what is your point here? -- that atheism is also an indispensable part of the foundation for capitalism? This is getting very weird.

Rights establish the moral and legal boundaries of social interaction. They are the necessary and sufficient conditions of a free society (though not necessarily a good society in other respects). If a Christian fundamentalist believes that all rights ultimately come from God, does this mean that he will be less likely than a Randian egoist to respect rights? Of course not. If anything, the fear of hell provides a stronger motivation to respect rights than many rational factors.

I think your argument reduces to this: that an irrational philosophy can never provide sufficient security for a rational political/economic system. In other words, premises will out.

This is a popular argument among O'ists (even if it is not the basic argument you are making here), but it has a number of serious flaws. I may discuss these later.

Ghs

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If Newton can be history's greatest scientist whilst indulging in heavy-handed God-fearing mysticism then an altruist can be a capitalist, but he'd best make a profit. The problem is when the rational is not separated from the irrational, and people are very good at doing that generally and when they aren't others tend to avoid them unless like-minded.

--Brant

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George,

Hutcheson seems to be arguing several things in his inaugural oration: that it is inherent in our nature that we value human companionship with those who share our values as an end in itself, and not for the sake of any secondary profit or gain; that we don’t socialize primarily for the sake of safety and security; that our conscience should be the "ruling principle" over our baser instincts; and that we don’t need government to make us civilized, because this comes naturally to human beings.

I certainly see your point about the concern here being largely psychological rather than moral. He is seeking to understand “those parts of the human mind which make us sociable....”

Dennis,

I appreciate the time and effort you have taken to learn more about Hutcheson and the "moral sense" school generally. I think your observations are on the mark, and I will have more to say about them later. For now, I want to explain my own attitude about these matters.

I have been somewhat familiar with the "moral sense" school for a long time, since it is routinely covered in many histories of ethics. But most of the secondary accounts were superficial and made the moral sense school seem a little wacko, by my standards. I read a lot of Smith and Hume, of course, and I even read some Hutcheson, but I focused almost entirely on his political theory. It has only been during the past year or so, after I purchased four of Hutcheson's books from Liberty Fund, that I became interested enough in moral sense theory to read his writings on this topic. And I have developed a much different attitude about the moral sense school as a result.

As I'm sure you have learned, one needn't agree with the technical aspects of the moral sense school to appreciate many of its insights about social psychology. I now regret that I didn't undertake a serious study of this approach years ago rather than allow my prejudices (acquired mainly from secondary sources) to overrule my curiosity. I should have known better, for the simple reason that people I respect, such as Thomas Jefferson and a young Herbert Spencer (in Social Statics), accepted the moral sense approach. I used to counsel students that, when they find a philosophy defended by people they respect and agree with on many issues, they should take the philosophy in question seriously rather than dismiss it out of hand. Unfortunately, it took many years before I followed my own advice.

Ghs

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George,

I cannot thank you enough for all the many ways you have enriched my understanding of numerous historical and philosophical topics over the years I have known you. It is a debt I can never repay.

I recall vividly a point you made about the importance of persistence in one of your Principles of Reasoning lectures. I have never forgotten it. So remember that, when I disagree with you, it's because you taught me well. I am not being stubborn and obtuse. I am trying to understand your point of view and why it seems to conflict with mine.

The current issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies has an article by Walter Block entitled “Ayn Rand, Religion and Libertarianism,” in which he maintains that “there is nothing incompatible between libertarianism and religious belief and practice.” Much of what he says relates directly to our latest exchange.

I will have more to say on this. There simply are not enough hours in the day. And I often have a hard time getting myself to understand that some of those hours are supposed to be devoted to sleep. Unfortunately, my 63 year old body has a rather unpleasant way of reminding me the next day.

To be continued.. . if your patience and my health can hold out long enough.

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