Ayn Rand and Altruism


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There is a controversy (not resolved) over whether Comte's later (1848) Positive Politics was a further development, or a retreat from, the system he had earlier presented in the Positive Philosophy (1830), John Stuart Mill claimed that the latter volumes "betrayed the rationalist objectives of his earlier work, and elevated imagination, emotion, and 'social sentiment' above reason." Turning positivism from a philosophical system into a secular religion of humanity, mimicking Catholic instutions, priests, secular saints, etc. (see the Introduction to Auguste Comte: Early Political Writings, edited and translated by H. S. Jones (1998:Cambridge University Press).

The long-accepted version of doubt whether Comte derived much, if anything, from Kant or Hegel, was blown apart by the discovery of papers indicating that he at least had (despite his denials in the Positive Philosophy!) read notes and "passages" from Kant's, writings (see p. 278, below). Although the great bulk of his earlier presentation was derivative (a polite word for stealing) from his time as the secretary to Comte Henri Saint-Simon, he apparently had read much of Kant and Hegel. Their influence on the development of Comte's thought is discussed (pp.289-302) in Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, Volume I, by Mary Pickering (1993, Cambridge University Press).

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There is a controversy (not resolved) over whether Comte's later (1848) Positive Politics was a further development, or a retreat from, the system he had earlier presented in the Positive Philosophy (1830), John Stuart Mill claimed that the latter volumes "betrayed the rationalist objectives of his earlier work, and elevated imagination, emotion, and 'social sentiment' above reason." Turning positivism from a philosophical system into a secular religion of humanity, mimicking Catholic institutions, priests, secular saints, etc. (see the Introduction to Auguste Comte: Early Political Writings, edited and translated by H. S. Jones (1998:Cambridge University Press).

The long-accepted version of doubt whether Comte derived much, if anything, from Kant or Hegel, was blown apart by the discovery of papers indicating that he at least had (despite his denials in the Positive Philosophy!) read notes and "passages" from Kant's, writings (see p. 278, below). Although the great bulk of his earlier presentation was derivative (a polite word for stealing) from his time as the secretary to Comte Henri Saint-Simon, he apparently had read much of Kant and Hegel. Their influence on the development of Comte's thought is discussed (pp.289-302) in Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, Volume I, by Mary Pickering (1993, Cambridge University Press).

Comte read many philosophers -- such reading was necessary to develop his elaborate theory of intellectual progress -- so it doesn't surprise me that he read Kant. But I see no significant traces of Kant's ethics in Comte; on the contrary, they differ in several fundamental respects.

It was Comte's practice to find something useful in many modern philosophers, because he needed to see in them a progression from the theological to the metaphysical stage of intellectual progress -- the latter having been superseded, in turn, by the positive (i.e., scientific) stage of knowledge. But Kant was the sort of metaphysician that Comte repudiated, and Kant's ethics exhibited the individualism of the Reformation and Enlightenment that Comte despised and to which he attributed the anarchical tendencies of the modern world, which (according to Comte) had culminated in the disasters of the French Revolution. Comte looked to the "unity" of medieval Europe and Catholic philosophers, not to Kant and other moderns. It is significant that the Catholic theocrat and reactionary Joseph de Maistre made it on Comte's calendar of saints.

Kant, it should be noted, was not an "altruist." He rejected both egoism and altruism as incompatible with his deontological system of ethics.

Ghs

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There is a controversy (not resolved) over whether Comte's later (1848) Positive Politics was a further development, or a retreat from, the system he had earlier presented in the Positive Philosophy (1830), John Stuart Mill claimed that the latter volumes "betrayed the rationalist objectives of his earlier work, and elevated imagination, emotion, and 'social sentiment' above reason." Turning positivism from a philosophical system into a secular religion of humanity, mimicking Catholic institutions, priests, secular saints, etc. (see the Introduction to Auguste Comte: Early Political Writings, edited and translated by H. S. Jones (1998:Cambridge University Press).

The long-accepted version of doubt whether Comte derived much, if anything, from Kant or Hegel, was blown apart by the discovery of papers indicating that he at least had (despite his denials in the Positive Philosophy!) read notes and "passages" from Kant's, writings (see p. 278, below). Although the great bulk of his earlier presentation was derivative (a polite word for stealing) from his time as the secretary to Comte Henri Saint-Simon, he apparently had read much of Kant and Hegel. Their influence on the development of Comte's thought is discussed (pp.289-302) in Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, Volume I, by Mary Pickering (1993, Cambridge University Press).

Comte read many philosophers -- such reading was necessary to develop his elaborate theory of intellectual progress -- so it doesn't surprise me that he read Kant. But I see no significant traces of Kant's ethics in Comte; on the contrary, they differ in several fundamental respects.

It was Comte's practice to find something useful in many modern philosophers, because he needed to see in them a progression from the theological to the metaphysical stage of intellectual progress -- the latter having been superseded, in turn, by the positive (i.e., scientific) stage of knowledge. But Kant was the sort of metaphysician that Comte repudiated, and Kant's ethics exhibited the individualism of the Reformation and Enlightenment that Comte despised and to which he attributed the anarchical tendencies of the modern world, which (according to Comte) had culminated in the disasters of the French Revolution. Comte looked to the "unity" of medieval Europe and Catholic philosophers, not to Kant and other moderns. It is significant that the Catholic theocrat and reactionary Joseph de Maistre made it on Comte's calendar of saints.

Kant, it should be noted, was not an "altruist." He rejected both egoism and altruism as incompatible with his deontological system of ethics.

Ghs

Hmm,....I'm not sure how to reply here. If I quote the relevant passages from Pickering's book on Comte, where she illustrates how much Comte borrowed from Kant and also where he differed (it seems much of his knowedge of Kant was derived second-hand from translations from the German to the French,of some - but not all - of Kant's books and from summaries of works not yet fully translated), I might run into a copyright violation. I would have to copy about 10 to 20 pages on the Kant-Comte relationship.

Anyway, Pickering shows that Comte had an intense interest in German philosophers, especially Kant and Hegel. Although Pickering documents Comte's enthusiasm, she also shows where he either misunderstood or misinterpreted some of Kant's concepts, probably because he did not have access to all of Kant's works.

Nevertheless, she does illustrate many similarities in their philosophies, particularly in metaphysics, epistemology, and theory of history. "It is therefore not surprising that Comte considered Kant one of his principal predescessors - in fact the last 'eminent thinker' who had preceded him. He called him the 'greatest modern metaphysician,' the one 'closest to the positive philosophy,' and he gave him a highly prominent place in his Positivist Calendar."(p.296).

However, in a section on "The significance of Comte's encounter with German Philosophy," Pickering states that he was using German philosophy, on a pick-and-choose basis, in order to confirm his own philosophy. He was not interested in learning new concepts, only in those areas where they agreed with him. "This strategy explains why Comte claimed Herder, Kant, and Hegel as his antecedents and incorporated them into his Positivist Calendar."(p.302).

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There is a controversy (not resolved) over whether Comte's later (1848) Positive Politics was a further development, or a retreat from, the system he had earlier presented in the Positive Philosophy (1830), John Stuart Mill claimed that the latter volumes "betrayed the rationalist objectives of his earlier work, and elevated imagination, emotion, and 'social sentiment' above reason." Turning positivism from a philosophical system into a secular religion of humanity, mimicking Catholic institutions, priests, secular saints, etc. (see the Introduction to Auguste Comte: Early Political Writings, edited and translated by H. S. Jones (1998:Cambridge University Press).

The long-accepted version of doubt whether Comte derived much, if anything, from Kant or Hegel, was blown apart by the discovery of papers indicating that he at least had (despite his denials in the Positive Philosophy!) read notes and "passages" from Kant's, writings (see p. 278, below). Although the great bulk of his earlier presentation was derivative (a polite word for stealing) from his time as the secretary to Comte Henri Saint-Simon, he apparently had read much of Kant and Hegel. Their influence on the development of Comte's thought is discussed (pp.289-302) in Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, Volume I, by Mary Pickering (1993, Cambridge University Press).

Comte read many philosophers -- such reading was necessary to develop his elaborate theory of intellectual progress -- so it doesn't surprise me that he read Kant. But I see no significant traces of Kant's ethics in Comte; on the contrary, they differ in several fundamental respects.

It was Comte's practice to find something useful in many modern philosophers, because he needed to see in them a progression from the theological to the metaphysical stage of intellectual progress -- the latter having been superseded, in turn, by the positive (i.e., scientific) stage of knowledge. But Kant was the sort of metaphysician that Comte repudiated, and Kant's ethics exhibited the individualism of the Reformation and Enlightenment that Comte despised and to which he attributed the anarchical tendencies of the modern world, which (according to Comte) had culminated in the disasters of the French Revolution. Comte looked to the "unity" of medieval Europe and Catholic philosophers, not to Kant and other moderns. It is significant that the Catholic theocrat and reactionary Joseph de Maistre made it on Comte's calendar of saints.

Kant, it should be noted, was not an "altruist." He rejected both egoism and altruism as incompatible with his deontological system of ethics.

Ghs

Hmm,....I'm not sure how to reply here. If I quote the relevant passages from Pickering's book on Comte, where she illustrates how much Comte borrowed from Kant and also where he differed (it seems much of his knowledge of Kant was derived second-hand from translations from the German to the French,of some - but not all - of Kant's books and from summaries of works not yet fully translated), I might run into a copyright violation. I would have to copy about 10 to 20 pages on the Kant-Comte relationship.

Anyway, Pickering shows that Comte had an intense interest in German philosophers, especially Kant and Hegel. Although Pickering documents Comte's enthusiasm, she also shows where he either misunderstood or misinterpreted some of Kant's concepts, probably because he did not have access to all of Kant's works.

Nevertheless, she does illustrate many similarities in their philosophies, particularly in metaphysics, epistemology, and theory of history. "It is therefore not surprising that Comte considered Kant one of his principal predecessors - in fact the last 'eminent thinker' who had preceded him. He called him the 'greatest modern metaphysician,' the one 'closest to the positive philosophy,' and he gave him a highly prominent place in his Positivist Calendar."(p.296).

However, in a section on "The significance of Comte's encounter with German Philosophy," Pickering states that he was using German philosophy, on a pick-and-choose basis, in order to confirm his own philosophy. He was not interested in learning new concepts, only in those areas where they agreed with him. "This strategy explains why Comte claimed Herder, Kant, and Hegel as his antecedents and incorporated them into his Positivist Calendar."(p.302).

Comte used many philosophers and theologians on a pick-and-choose basis. In his General View of Positivism, for example, he refers to "the great Aristotle" and develops Aristotle's theory that the family, not the individual, is the "constituent element of the body politic." He also refers to the "great de Maistre" and to "my illustrious predecessor Condorcet." He also cites Caesar, St. Paul, and Charlemagne as "illustrious predecessors of Positivism."

All this is typical Comte, but it is no more justified to call him a Kantian than to call him an Aristotelian. He praised a wide variety of thinkers as forces for progress in their historical context, but whose ideas eventually proved inadequate for future progress. This is why he could praise medieval Catholicism for the "greatest advance ever yet made in the theory of social order," while rejecting Catholicism itself. Comte wanted to show how the various advances in intellectual development over the centuries, despite their flaws, culminated in and were perfected by his Positivism.

Ghs

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A significant chuck of Mary Pickering's discussion of Comte and German philosophy (some pages are omitted from the preview) can be found here.

What Pickering basically shows is that Comte was an extremely eclectic thinker, and I have no problem with this. In one case she explains how the young Comte developed his basic ideas about historicism independently of Kant, but later, after reading Kant's work on universal history, praised him for doing a better job. Historicism -- i.e., the claim that human history follows inexorable laws of development -- was a fairly common theory during the Enlightenment, especially among the philosophers of progress, such as Condorcet.

Ghs

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One respect that Kant's and Comte's ethics are similar is that self-interest is not moral.

The issue is not that simple. For Kant, self-interest per se is nonmoral but not necessarily immoral. The same is true of altruistic acts because, for Kant, the morality of an act is determined not by its intended beneficiary, be that oneself or others, but by its conformity to a rational standard of value (the categorical imperative). For Kant, we should take a given action because it is the rational thing to do, not because it will benefit us or someone else.

For Comte, in contrast, self-interested acts (or most of them) are immoral, because they contradict the ultimate standard of moral value, i.e., to live for others. This sort of thinking was incompatible with Kant's approach to ethics, as were other features of Comte's ethics that conflicted with Kant's stress on the moral autonomy of every individual, as expressed in the celebrated second formulation of the categorical imperative, according to which we should treat other people as ends in themselves and not merely as means to our ends. Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," which was the linchpin of his conception of a free society (Kant was essentially a classic liberal), is something that Comte rejected outright. Individuals, for Comte, are not moral ends in themselves. Far from it.

Ghs

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I used "not moral" in post 11 to mean either amoral or immoral. Yes, Kant's and Comte's ethics differed in detail like Ghs says, but they are similar very abstractly.

I'm afraid I don't follow you. It could also be said that Kant's ethics and Rand's ethics are also "similar very abstractly." For example, Rand agreed with Kant that the intended beneficiary of an action, whether oneself or others, is not a proper criterion of moral value. They agreed that ethics must be based on a rational standard of value, and that moral judgments are a type of rational judgment. They agreed that individuals are morally autonomous agents who have rights in virtue of their nature as rational beings. They agreed that reason cannot function properly under the threat of coercion, and that to force a person to take an action is to strip that action of the moral value it might otherwise have. Etc., etc.

A significant different between Kant and Rand is that Kant believed that a rational standard of moral value should apply to all conceivable rational beings, not merely to humans. Kant regarded self-interested actions as a matter of prudence rather than ethics, because he didn't think that the actions needed to achieve personal happiness could be sufficiently generalized to qualify as universal principles that would apply to all rational beings. Although we can specify prudential maxims that are useful for individuals in their pursuit of happiness, the particular contexts of individuals vary too much for us to formulate universal principles applicable to all rational beings. For Kant, universality is the fundamental characteristic of a valid moral principle.

The ethical differences between Kant and Comte were fundamental, not merely a matter of detail. Comte's insistence that feelings should take precedence over reason in an ideal society ran contrary to everything that Kant stood for. This is just one example.

Ghs

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Maybe Ghs didn't follow me because I edited post 13, adding "Both opposed egoism." while he was responding. I believe that helps explain Ayn Rand's vehement opposition to both Kant's and Comte's ethics.

So far as I can tell, Rand didn't understand Kant's ethics. The fact that she repeatedly called Kant an "altruist" displays a fundamental lack of understanding. Kant never opposed "egoism" in the sense that he regarded the pursuit of self-interest as a bad thing.

Moreover, we cannot establish relevant similarities between philosophers by highlighting something they both objected to. Nietzsche opposed altruism. So did Stirner. So did the American anarchist Benjamin Tucker. That does not mean that Rand had significant similarities to Nietzsche, Stirner, and Tucker.

Ghs

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One respect that Kant's and Comte's ethics are similar is that self-interest is not moral.

The issue is not that simple. For Kant, self-interest per se is nonmoral but not necessarily immoral. The same is true of altruistic acts because, for Kant, the morality of an act is determined not by its intended beneficiary, be that oneself or others, but by its conformity to a rational standard of value (the categorical imperative). For Kant, we should take a given action because it is the rational thing to do, not because it will benefit us or someone else.

For Comte, in contrast, self-interested acts (or most of them) are immoral, because they contradict the ultimate standard of moral value, i.e., to live for others. This sort of thinking was incompatible with Kant's approach to ethics, as were other features of Comte's ethics that conflicted with Kant's stress on the moral autonomy of every individual, as expressed in the celebrated second formulation of the categorical imperative, according to which we should treat other people as ends in themselves and not merely as means to our ends. Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," which was the linchpin of his conception of a free society (Kant was essentially a classic liberal), is something that Comte rejected outright. Individuals, for Comte, are not moral ends in themselves. Far from it.

Ghs

One respect that Kant's and Comte's ethics are similar is that self-interest is not moral.

The issue is not that simple. For Kant, self-interest per se is nonmoral but not necessarily immoral. The same is true of altruistic acts because, for Kant, the morality of an act is determined not by its intended beneficiary, be that oneself or others, but by its conformity to a rational standard of value (the categorical imperative). For Kant, we should take a given action because it is the rational thing to do, not because it will benefit us or someone else.

For Comte, in contrast, self-interested acts (or most of them) are immoral, because they contradict the ultimate standard of moral value, i.e., to live for others. This sort of thinking was incompatible with Kant's approach to ethics, as were other features of Comte's ethics that conflicted with Kant's stress on the moral autonomy of every individual, as expressed in the celebrated second formulation of the categorical imperative, according to which we should treat other people as ends in themselves and not merely as means to our ends. Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," which was the linchpin of his conception of a free society (Kant was essentially a classic liberal), is something that Comte rejected outright. Individuals, for Comte, are not moral ends in themselves. Far from it.

Ghs

Well, where's the "evil"?

Rand was something of a Kantian, albeit essentially an improvement?

--Brant

Kant: Cat. Imp.

Rand: Selfishness

Conservative: God

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One respect that Kant's and Comte's ethics are similar is that self-interest is not moral.

The issue is not that simple. For Kant, self-interest per se is nonmoral but not necessarily immoral. The same is true of altruistic acts because, for Kant, the morality of an act is determined not by its intended beneficiary, be that oneself or others, but by its conformity to a rational standard of value (the categorical imperative). For Kant, we should take a given action because it is the rational thing to do, not because it will benefit us or someone else.

For Comte, in contrast, self-interested acts (or most of them) are immoral, because they contradict the ultimate standard of moral value, i.e., to live for others. This sort of thinking was incompatible with Kant's approach to ethics, as were other features of Comte's ethics that conflicted with Kant's stress on the moral autonomy of every individual, as expressed in the celebrated second formulation of the categorical imperative, according to which we should treat other people as ends in themselves and not merely as means to our ends. Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," which was the linchpin of his conception of a free society (Kant was essentially a classic liberal), is something that Comte rejected outright. Individuals, for Comte, are not moral ends in themselves. Far from it.

Ghs

One respect that Kant's and Comte's ethics are similar is that self-interest is not moral.

The issue is not that simple. For Kant, self-interest per se is nonmoral but not necessarily immoral. The same is true of altruistic acts because, for Kant, the morality of an act is determined not by its intended beneficiary, be that oneself or others, but by its conformity to a rational standard of value (the categorical imperative). For Kant, we should take a given action because it is the rational thing to do, not because it will benefit us or someone else.

For Comte, in contrast, self-interested acts (or most of them) are immoral, because they contradict the ultimate standard of moral value, i.e., to live for others. This sort of thinking was incompatible with Kant's approach to ethics, as were other features of Comte's ethics that conflicted with Kant's stress on the moral autonomy of every individual, as expressed in the celebrated second formulation of the categorical imperative, according to which we should treat other people as ends in themselves and not merely as means to our ends. Kant's "Kingdom of Ends," which was the linchpin of his conception of a free society (Kant was essentially a classic liberal), is something that Comte rejected outright. Individuals, for Comte, are not moral ends in themselves. Far from it.

Ghs

Well, where's the "evil"?

Rand was something of a Kantian, albeit essentially an improvement?

--Brant

Kant: Cat. Imp.

Rand: Selfishness

Conservative: God

Considered in terms of individual rights and freedom, Kant was one of the good guys. Even aspects of his epistemology, when employed by Max Weber, Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek, and other members of the "interpretive" (or "German" or "subjectivist") school of sociology proved highly productive in the social sciences, especially economics, and even in history. Kant's methodological individualism was an important antidote to the social holism that was very popular during the 19th century, as we see in figures like Comte, Hegel, and Marx. There is a reason why Lenin and other Marxists condemned Kant in terms almost as severe as Rand's condemnation.

Rand was not a Kantian, especially if we consider the differences in her metaethics and that of Kant. To oversimplify a bit, Rand located the source of value in life, whereas Kant located it in reason. Nevertheless, they reached similar conclusions in political theory. Both argued, for example, that force may legitimately be used only in the defense of individual rights, Both favored a limited government, though Kant's expansive notion of "consent" permitted his government to do some things to which Rand would have objected. Rand, in contrast, didn't discuss the notion of consent (as in "government by consent") in any detail, so it is difficult to say how she would have dealt with some traditional problems in political theory.

Individual freedom can be defended in various ways, and different approaches, even if they are not all equally valid, can yield valuable insights into the value of freedom. Rand's basic error, in my opinion, was her insistence that there can only be one right way to defend freedom.

Kant was a major figure of the Enlightenment, and he exhibited both the strengths and weaknesses of that individualistic, pro-reason tradition. Comte, in contrast, was a major opponent of the Enlightenment. Like Saint-Simon before him, Comte had a nostalgic view of the Middle Ages, praising its holistic conception of social order and seeking to rehabilitate its conception of social "unity."

Kant, in contrast, believed that individuals should be free to pursue their own goals according to their own judgments, provided they respect the equal rights of other individuals to do the same. Kant presented a very clear formulation of what Spencer later called "the law of equal freedom." He believed that a social order will arise spontaneously, as people interact voluntarily with other people, so all a government need do is enforce the rules of justice, as embodied in individual rights. That makes Kant a good guy in my book, whatever his errors may have been.

Ghs

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Maybe it would have helped Rand if she had done more reading of Kant's works rather than rely on someone's interpretation of what Kant meant.

IThe same can be said of Comte.

At a certain point in Comte's development of his system, I believe it was after he had completed his six-volume doorstop, The Positive Philosophy, and before he completed his more bizarre Positive Polity, he decided that reading or considering others' works which may have conflicted with his own system was a waste of time. Thereafter, he practised what he called "cerebral hygiene," and ignored any views which may have conflicted with his own.

Paradoxically, Rand also stopped reading her critics (or, at least, not admitting that she had read them) after the publication of Atlas Shrugged.

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George,

Excellent presentation (in #2) of Comte vs. Rand on egoism and altruism.

In Comte's writings, the word personnalité has a bad connotation, pointing to private concerns and selfishness. He would have found the psychology of personality doubly appalling as a field of study.

Robert Campbell

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Maybe it would have helped Rand if she had done more reading of Kant's works rather than rely on someone's interpretation of what Kant meant.

The same can be said for Peikoff.

The arch-advocate of "duty" is Immanuel Kant; he went so much farther than other theorists that they seem innocently benevolent by comparison. "Duty," he holds, is the only standard of virtue; but virtue is not its own reward: if a reward is involved, it is no longer virtue. The only moral motivation, he holds, is devotion to duty for duty's sake; only an action motivated exclusively by such devotion is a moral action (i.e., an action performed without any concern for "inclination" [desire] or self-interest).

"It is a duty to preserve one's life, and moreover everyone has a direct inclination to do so. But for that reason the often anxious care which most men take of it has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim of doing so has no moral import. They preserve their lives according to duty, but not from duty. But if adversities and hopeless sorrow completely take away the relish for life, if an unfortunate man, strong in soul, is indignant rather than despondent or dejected over his fate and wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it and from neither inclination nor fear but from duty—then his maxim has a moral import." (Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. R. P. Wolff, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, pp. 16-17.) ("Causality Versus Duty", The Objectivist, July 1970)

"Duty" is not a synonym for "virtue." "Duty," Ayn Rand writes, means "the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest."(52) Such an approach means the severing of ethics both from reason and from values. When a man acts to achieve his values, said Kant, he is amoral; he is outside the field of ethics. To deserve moral credit, in this view, a man must do his duty without reference to any personal goal or to any future effects on his own life and happiness. He must do his duty as an act of pure selflessness, simply because it is his duty. Kant calls this "acting from duty."

By its nature, a duty ethics defaults on the task of ethics. Since it detaches virtues from values, it offers man no guidance in the job of living. The crucial problems of human existence, the daily decisions men must make in regard to goals such as work, love, friendship, freedom, happiness—all this, for the intrinsicist, is beside the point. Ethics, he believes, defines man's obligations to the supernatural; it transcends what the vulgar call "real life." (OPAR, 245-6).

No, for Kant duty was not "obedience to some higher authority" or the supernatural. It was to the dictates of Kant's notion of "pure reason" in the realm of ethics They are correct that Kant tried to divorce ethics from personal interests/inclinations/happiness, and even the interests/inclinations/happiness of other people.

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Maybe it would have helped Rand if she had done more reading of Kant's works rather than rely on someone's interpretation of what Kant meant.

The same can be said for Peikoff.

The arch-advocate of "duty" is Immanuel Kant; he went so much farther than other theorists that they seem innocently benevolent by comparison. "Duty," he holds, is the only standard of virtue; but virtue is not its own reward: if a reward is involved, it is no longer virtue. The only moral motivation, he holds, is devotion to duty for duty's sake; only an action motivated exclusively by such devotion is a moral action (i.e., an action performed without any concern for "inclination" [desire] or self-interest).

"It is a duty to preserve one's life, and moreover everyone has a direct inclination to do so. But for that reason the often anxious care which most men take of it has no intrinsic worth, and the maxim of doing so has no moral import. They preserve their lives according to duty, but not from duty. But if adversities and hopeless sorrow completely take away the relish for life, if an unfortunate man, strong in soul, is indignant rather than despondent or dejected over his fate and wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it and from neither inclination nor fear but from duty—then his maxim has a moral import." (Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. R. P. Wolff, New York, Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, pp. 16-17.) ("Causality Versus Duty", The Objectivist, July 1970)

"Duty" is not a synonym for "virtue." "Duty," Ayn Rand writes, means "the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest."(52) Such an approach means the severing of ethics both from reason and from values. When a man acts to achieve his values, said Kant, he is amoral; he is outside the field of ethics. To deserve moral credit, in this view, a man must do his duty without reference to any personal goal or to any future effects on his own life and happiness. He must do his duty as an act of pure selflessness, simply because it is his duty. Kant calls this "acting from duty."

By its nature, a duty ethics defaults on the task of ethics. Since it detaches virtues from values, it offers man no guidance in the job of living. The crucial problems of human existence, the daily decisions men must make in regard to goals such as work, love, friendship, freedom, happiness—all this, for the intrinsicist, is beside the point. Ethics, he believes, defines man's obligations to the supernatural; it transcends what the vulgar call "real life." (OPAR, 245-6).

No, for Kant duty was not "obedience to some higher authority" or the supernatural. It was to the dictates of Kant's notion of "pure reason" in the realm of ethics They are correct that Kant tried to divorce ethics from personal interests/inclinations/happiness, and even the interests/inclinations/happiness of other people.

Kant's basic position may be put as follows: An action has moral value only if one does it as a matter of principle, i.e., because it is the rational thing to do. Only in this way does a person follow the dictates of pure reason without allowing personal feelings, whether for oneself or for others, to interfere with one's rational judgment.

Of course, Kant did not object to actions motivated by self-interest. Such actions might even be called "good," but the goodness involved here is prudential, not moral. Morally good actions must be universalizable for all rational beings (including nonhuman rational beings, potentially), and Kant did not believe that such universal principles could be based on the desires, impulses, or interests of individuals, which are highly variable. Only the impartial principles of reason -- as universally applied, regardless of individual motives and goals -- can possibly provide the foundation for a rational ethics. Any other standard would be too variable and insecure.

Ghs

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