Parsing Existence


Guyau

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How do you know that there is no such thing as an "actual difference"? If differences are "manufactured" in our nervous system unconnected to "the object", then you have no basis for claiming anything about "actual difference". Unless you claim you have some means of cognition that most of us don't.

I said there's no such thing, if you say there is then YOU have to substantiate it.

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How do you know that there is no such thing as an "actual difference"? If differences are "manufactured" in our nervous system unconnected to "the object", then you have no basis for claiming anything about "actual difference". Unless you claim you have some means of cognition that most of us don't.

I said there's no such thing, if you say there is then YOU have to substantiate it.

The fact that you threw a negative into your statement doesn't mean you aren't claiming knowledge. You have to substantiate also. The fact that you don't know merely means that, not that you know the contrary. That is your claim here: knowledge out of ignorance.

--Brant

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Well, since Merlin didn't answer I will. There is no such thing as an "actual difference" . Differences are manufactured in our nervous system and when people have similar abstractions we attribute the characteristics to "the object".

The differences we perceive between things can be grounded on real differences in objects that exist independent of our wishes or they can be due to conditions within ourselves. It is difficult, sometimes, to separate one from the other. If -everything- is appearence or perception, then you have the case made by George Berkeley that the only reality is the contents of our minds and the Mind of God.

I am of the opinon that only singular things exist. Everything is different one thing from another. The similarities we perceive, I opine, are generated by the abstraction mechanisms produced by our brain and nervous system. Since the scale at which we perceive is crude (compared to Planck length and Planck time), even when assisted by fancy instruments, the similarities we see result from our inability to differentiate truly distinct objects. If we were able to acheive the ultimate degree of precision consient with the real world we would perceive all the differences we now do not perceive. Any basis for similarity would then become conventional (geared to specific purposes) and even arbitrary. To put it differently, our ability to discriminate (and thus see differences) is dependent on the scale at which we observe and the capabilities of our neural systems and instruments. Difference then becomes, difference in the reading of instruments or differences perceived, as opposed to the differences Out There. When we don't perceive differences we assume indentity or similarity. Our grasp of the true underlying causes of things is strictly bandwidth limited. Which is why our scientific theories, however virtuous they are, are also incomplete. They miss Stuff.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Well, since Merlin didn't answer I will. There is no such thing as an "actual difference" . Differences are manufactured in our nervous system and when people have similar abstractions we attribute the characteristics to "the object".

The differences we perceive between things can be grounded on real differences in objects that exist independent of our wishes or they can be due to conditions within ourselves. It is difficult, sometimes, to separate one from the other. If -everything- is appearence or perception, then you have the case made by George Berkeley that the only reality is the contents of our minds and the Mind of God.

I am of the opinon that only singular things exist. Everything is different one thing from another. The similarities we perceive, I opine, are generated by the abstraction mechanisms produced by our brain and nervous system. Since the scale at which we perceive is crude (compared to Planck length and Planck time), even when assisted by fancy instruments, the similarities we see result from our inability to differentiate truly distinct objects. If we were able to acheive the ultimate degree of precision consient with the real world we would perceive all the differences we now do not perceive. Any basis for similarity would then become conventional (geared to specific purposes) and even arbitrary. To put it differently, our ability to discriminate (and thus see differences) is dependent on the scale at which we observe and the capabilities of our neural systems and instruments. Difference then becomes, difference in the reading of instruments or differences perceived, as opposed to the differences Out There. When we don't perceive differences we assume indentity or similarity. Our grasp of the true underlying causes of things is strictly bandwidth limited. Which is why our scientific theories, however virtuous they are, are also incomplete. They miss Stuff.

Ba'al Chatzaf

In that case, might we posit that the way we understand things is geared to survival value and that the stuff we don't have is of more limited value that we struggle to obtain on the premise that it too might have survival value? Common sense can kill us even though in most cases it will keep us alive and going.

--Brant

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Please provide a citation where Rand did consider undefined terms.

Bob,

Rand did not use this terminology, but she did discuss what this means. Here are three ideas that Rand critics have a ball with:

Context

Ostensive definition

Implicit concept

Look these up with both Rand and her critics and you will find oodles of stuff about undefined terms in the meaning you mean.

Although the following quote is not exactly spot on your request, it is in the ball park. I mention it because I happened to have it handy researching something else. ITOE, 2nd., p. 46:

In this issue, an ignorant adult is in the same position as a child or adolescent. He has to act within the scope of such knowledge as he possesses and of his correspondingly primitive conceptual definitions. When he moves into a wider field of action and thought, when new evidence confronts him, he has to expand his definitions according to the evidence, if they are to be objectively valid.

The implication is that this can extend back to preverbal knowledge (such as in an infant).

To my knowledge, Rand never wrote about idioglossia (see the movie Nell for a good easy and cheesy example). All the invented terms such a person uses are not formally defined, although if one examined the terms from the viewpoint of the speaker, I would bet many of them (all except unique names for single existents) would fall easily into Rand's system of concept formation (CDD and a distinguishing characteristic).

Michael

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I am of the opinon that only singular things exist. Everything is different one thing from another. The similarities we perceive, I opine, are generated by the abstraction mechanisms produced by our brain and nervous system. Since the scale at which we perceive is crude (compared to Planck length and Planck time), even when assisted by fancy instruments, the similarities we see result from our inability to differentiate truly distinct objects. If we were able to acheive the ultimate degree of precision consient with the real world we would perceive all the differences we now do not perceive. Any basis for similarity would then become conventional (geared to specific purposes) and even arbitrary. To put it differently, our ability to discriminate (and thus see differences) is dependent on the scale at which we observe and the capabilities of our neural systems and instruments. Difference then becomes, difference in the reading of instruments or differences perceived, as opposed to the differences Out There. When we don't perceive differences we assume indentity or similarity. Our grasp of the true underlying causes of things is strictly bandwidth limited. Which is why our scientific theories, however virtuous they are, are also incomplete. They miss Stuff.

Similarly, we know from science that "reality" is in a constant state of change, at microscopic levels. What we sense as "properties" are merely abstractions produced by our nervous systems, a kind of invariance under transformation of external stimuli to neural stimuli. Scientists go about their business by carefully recording and measuring their abstractions and comparing them to other scientists. They build theories (higher order abstractions) and other scientists can start with these and recreate the lower order abstractions independently and so we begin to get a kind of "objectivity" which really amounts to invariance of abstractions by many individuals.

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Similarly, we know from science that "reality" is in a constant state of change, at microscopic levels. What we sense as "properties" are merely abstractions produced by our nervous systems, a kind of invariance under transformation of external stimuli to neural stimuli. Scientists go about their business by carefully recording and measuring their abstractions and comparing them to other scientists. They build theories (higher order abstractions) and other scientists can start with these and recreate the lower order abstractions independently and so we begin to get a kind of "objectivity" which really amounts to invariance of abstractions by many individuals.

Well put. The objectivity of science (particularly physics) consists of the invariants and the symmetries. The construction of the invariants under transformations embedded in our theories is a mental operation constrained (of course) by the actual nature of the underlying objects Out There. If there were no intellects in the cosmos, there would be no symmetries and there would be no invarients. On the other hand, what the invariants and the symmetries are is determined in part by the nature of the underlying objects and processes.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Sorry folks,

An entity is not an abstraction. There is top-down organization in the universe, not just in our heads. We can abstract it because it exists.

Michael

The invariants that we can indentify are as much a product of the way we observe as they are of the object observed. It takes two things to get an observation.

1. Interaction of physical systems and energy exchange

2. An intellect that can register and process the interaction

The invariant quantities and symmetries of physics are partly Out There and partly In Here.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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The invariant quantities and symmetries of physics are partly Out There and partly In Here.

Bob,

I not only agree with this, I claim that the way we organize invariant quantities and symmetries into mental symbols correctly reflects Out There because In Here, since we are part of the same reality, we obey the same natural laws as Out There.

Michael

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An entity is not an abstraction. There is top-down organization in the universe, not just in our heads. We can abstract it because it exists.

I will admit that "reality" has some structure - at least it seems a reasonable assumption, BUT, we can only learn of this structure through our perceptions - which are always incomplete. In science there is a cycle - we produce a theory which allows us to compare some experimental results with some calculated ones. If there is some discrepancy we know the structure is incorrect and we modify it until it works. At no point do we ever know the "true" structure, we only ever have a working structure. As time goes on new data, which becomes available do to extra-neural devices, will invariably make a working theory not work anymore. These extra-neural devices, like telescopes etc., increase the amount of structure we perceive but it is still, and always will be, incomplete.

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The invariants that we can indentify are as much a product of the way we observe as they are of the object observed. It takes two things to get an observation.

1. Interaction of physical systems and energy exchange

2. An intellect that can register and process the interaction

The invariant quantities and symmetries of physics are partly Out There and partly In Here.

What's the difference between "an intellect" and "a mind" -- which you've said (numerous times) elsewhere describes a non-existent like "ghost," "spirit," "soul"?

Ellen

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I will admit that "reality" has some structure - at least it seems a reasonable assumption, BUT, we can only learn of this structure through our perceptions - which are always incomplete.

How, within your framework, can you know our perceptions "are always incomplete"?

Ellen

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Sorry folks,

An entity is not an abstraction. There is top-down organization in the universe, not just in our heads. We can abstract it because it exists.

I claim that the way we organize invariant quantities and symmetries into mental symbols correctly reflects Out There because In Here, since we are part of the same reality, we obey the same natural laws as Out There.

"As above, so below": the old theory -- and in some modern variants, still the basic theory -- of astrology. Oh, good; glad to see Objectivism a la Michael has so long-standing a lineage. Nothing new under the sun.

Ellen

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I recommend a book which has much about what has been discussed on this thread and Universals and Measurement. It is Friedrich Hayek's The Sensory Order. Amazon link.

The following two paragraphs are excerpts.

1.42. There exists, therefore, no one-to-one correspondence between the kinds of things (or the physical properties) of the different physical stimuli and the dimensions in which they can vary, on the one hand, and the different kinds of sensory qualities which they produce and their various dimensions, on the other. The manner in which the different physical stimuli can vary and the different physical dimensions in which they are arranged have no exact counterpart in the manner in which the sensory qualities can be arranged. This is the central fact to which we have referred when we insisted that the two orders, the physical order of the stimuli and the phenomenal or mental order of the sensory qualities, are different.

1.48. .... Some events in the physical order, such as electrical currents which we can only infer, will have no corresponding events in the phenomenal order; and some events in the phenomenal order, such as images or illusions that are not produced by physical stimuli, will have no counterpart in the physical order. While there will thus be some degree of correspondence between the individual events which occur in the two orders, it will be but a very imperfect correspondence.

While I could not find Hayek saying so with a brief search, it can likely be gleaned from this work that explanation of the physical order is far more quantitative than that of the sensory order, and that explanation of the sensory order is far more qualitative than quantitative.

Btw, in the preface Hayek thanks his friend Karl Popper for reading and commenting on earlier drafts of the book.

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Thanks much for the quotes from Hayek, Merlin (as well as for your contributions in general on these threads, and for other material you've linked -- e.g., your RoR post on "representation" and your material on "measurement" in relation to Rand's theories).

Hayek was influenced by Bergson on quantity/quality. Although Bergson got "élan vital" wrong (although in a much more intelligent way than some of the other "vitalists"), I think there's a lot in his work which is still very relevant to current issues.

I wonder if Rand ever read The Sensory Order. She was quite negative against Hayek, for reasons I'm unclear about, but I wonder how extensive an acquaintance she had with his work.

Ellen

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Edited by Ellen Stuttle
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The invariants that we can indentify are as much a product of the way we observe as they are of the object observed. It takes two things to get an observation.

1. Interaction of physical systems and energy exchange

2. An intellect that can register and process the interaction

The invariant quantities and symmetries of physics are partly Out There and partly In Here.

What's the difference between "an intellect" and "a mind" -- which you've said (numerous times) elsewhere describes a non-existent like "ghost," "spirit," "soul"?

Ellen

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Intellect = the processes the brain does to integrate input with data currently stored. Intellect is a process, not an object.

There is no such stand alone substance or object as Mind. No one has ever seen it or objectively recorded it. Mind is an epiphenomenon of neural activity in one's brain.

We can loosely speak of Mind as long as we do not reify it as an object or substance, as did Descartes.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Thanks much for the quotes from Hayek, Merlin (as well as for your contributions in general on these threads, and for other material you've linked -- e.g., your RoR post on "representation" and your material on "measurement" in relation to Rand's theories).

You're welcome.

I wonder if Rand ever read The Sensory Order. She was quite negative against Hayek, for reasons I'm unclear about, but I wonder how extensive an acquaintance she had with his work.

That's a good "wonder". I will make some guesses about her reasons.

1. Hayek argued that the basic problem with socialism is that it based on the false idea of "constructive rationalism," the belief that some men can rationally order society top-down via government. In doing so he argued against reason. It was an abuse of reason, but I suspect Rand did not approve of deprecating reason in any manner.

2. Hayek is known to have supported government-run welfare programs. Of course, it most likely was not near to the extent they exist today or that statists desire.

3. He was an economist who use the term subjective value.

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How, within your framework, can you know our perceptions "are always incomplete"?

For example, our eyes only register a small band of the electromagnetic spectrum, all of which can carry structural information. This is true of all of our senses - they only have limited ranges.

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