atlashead

Sexual Ethics

223 posts in this topic

At times we have been discussing intuition on this thread and I found these old insights.

Peter

 

From: Michael Hardy To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Intuition Date: Sun, 20 May 2001 17:23:07 -0400 (EDT)

 

Mike Rael stated in his post of 5/17/01 that: >Rand herself was about as intuitive as they come.

 

John Kimball <kimball@ncia.net> objected (5/18): >The Random House College Dictionary defines intuition as the:  '1. direct perception of truth, fact, etc., independent of any  reasoning process; immediate apprehension ..'  This appears to fly in the face of  Rand's basic epistemology as I could not find  no reference to the concept of intuition in any of the major works by Rand. This seems to be an unwarranted assumption on the part of Mr. Rael. I would appreciate having the references that would justify this conclusion.

 

The word "intuition" appears to admit several definitions, one of which was endorsed by Leonard Peikoff in an article in the 1985 volume of _The_New_Scholasticism_, titled "Aristotle's Intuitive Induction."  Peikoff explained that the way in which we become aware of the truth of logical axioms cannot be by logical deduction   --- that would clearly be circular reasoning --- but is a rational cognitive process that involves coming to understand the concepts involved and what the proposition says, and that that process is

called "intuitive induction."

 

"Intuition" also means something like "emotional without feeling", which needs to be explained more long windedly less mysteriously to be understood.  Recall Peikoff in his 12-lecture basic course saying an emotion results from a super-rapid subconscious evaluation of something as good or bad.  At one point in that course he tersely mentioned that a similar super-rapid subconscious process could result in a conscious hunch, whose justification is not conscious.  That is also called "intuition."  Perhaps Mike Rael had that in mind. Mike Hardy

 

From: Jackie Goreham To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Re: My stay at the hospital...what happened

Date: Mon, 21 May 2001 14:23:52 -0700 (PDT) I would have to say that I agree that Objectivism and intuition do not mix, that there is some evidence that what Rand lived and what she wrote had a slight disconnect in this area.  After all, this was a woman who described love at first sight with her husband and also described it in her main characters (Roark and Francon and Taggart and Galt).  In fact it is kind of a running joke that objectivists just 'know' who each other are in a crowd by their 'way' of looking.

 

I think it is important, if somewhat difficult, to separate Objectivism the philosophical system from Rand, the woman.  The philosophy allows for no contradictions, but we know the person lived some.

 

As for the topic at hand, I know only one objectivist and that's my boyfriend. I have never met another in person.  If I were to make all people I know pass a philosophical test I would be a very lonely person indeed.  There is value to be found in relationships with people who think differently than I do. Jackie Goreham

 

From: Jeff Lindon To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 09:04:08 -0400 (EDT)

 

I agree with Kurt's distinction (5/19) between senses of "intuition", and have often thought that the term takes unfair abuse. Along the lines Kurt suggests, I think of an intuition (in its secularized sense) as a conscious awareness of pre-verbal subconscious processes. Depending on a person's psycho-epistemology, those processes will be predominantly rational or irrational. Granted that intuition is *not* a means of knowing, I do wonder whether it's a necessary stage one goes through (even if only briefly) when grappling with large, difficult problems.

 

Suppose that after thinking about a complex problem for a while, you can think of several different ways of proceeding, but you're not sure which is best. How do you decide -- not which is best, but which to *investigate* first? Well, your subconscious is munching on lots of things, and the only conscious awareness you have of those calculations is a "sense" or "feel". Let's say you sense that one approach to solving the problem will prove to be the best. If pressed on the issue, you may have a hard time giving concrete reasons for your sense, precisely because you don't understand the problem. But you have to decide how to proceed *somehow*, and the fact is that if you've cultivated a rational psycho-epistemology, your subconscious will generally do a good job in these kinds of "preliminary evaluations". Sometimes it takes the conscious mind a lot of (necessary) effort to see just *how* good our intuitions actually are.

 

Consider artistic creation as an example. Rand argued in her fiction writing lectures that it would be not only counterproductive but literally impossible for an artist *consciously* to justify each choice he makes while creating a work. The only workable method is to rely on your subconscious while writing and then *edit later* using your conscious judgment. Hopefully (and with practice, over time), your subconscious judgments come to embody your conscious principles fairly consistently. But the conscious mind is always the final arbiter. (My experience as a composer confirms the value of this method.)

 

(I would add here that I am not convinced that one could always verbalize *all* the reasons one had a particular intuition. Also, in my own experience, if my conscious mind contradicts my intuition, there is very often something that my conscious mind is missing. Again, that feeling does not constitute *proof* that the conscious mind is wrong, but if one knows that one has a predominantly rational psycho-epistemology, then such intuitions should set off warning bells.)

 

I reconcile Rand's attacks on intuition with the position she takes elsewhere by supposing that she would suggest a word other than "intuition" for what I have been describing. That makes the term a little bit like "faith", which I've discovered that many people use simply to mean "confidence". But whereas the alternative between "confidence" and "faith" is obvious, I can't think of a better alternative to "intuition" off-hand. Jeffrey Lindon

 

From: Matthew Ferrara To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration

Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 10:31:19 +0000 Just to weigh-in on the intuition-question:

 

I do not think that intuition is counter-Objectivism in any way; in fact, from what I can tell from Rand's

writings, she's not entirely counter-intuitive (in both meanings of that phrase): Note that some of her characters like Rearden and even Cherryl (Taggart's wife) take long journeys toward knowledge by identifying, clarifying, and reflecting upon a "peripheral sense" or what we could call "gut feeling" that something in their experience was not "quite right." They then proceed to investigate their surroundings and then come to clear, rational knowledge that the people around them are acting in an irrational manner, guided by their feelings. Many times in Atlas, Rand refers to a character's sensation of something on the "edge" of their cognition that is fleeting, but re- occurs often enough to induce them to further pursue clarification. In fact, in a sense, Rearden's character is this very journey from sense-perception of "something is wrong" to "explicit knowledge" that his premises were wrong.

 

I think it is too easy to simply "reject" intuition because it is often equated with feelings, which are also often "rejected" by Objectivist thinkers in an off- hand manner. Rather, I think that intuition has to be put in its proper position in the epistemological hierarchy. Many great scientific discoveries have come from what we would call an "intuitive" notion of an hypothesis or experiment, which led to the discovery of a result that then was clarified "backwards" so to speak to a more full, explicit knowledge. Thinkers like Suzanne Langer or Polanyi (The Tacit Dimension) have excellent discussions on this "metacommunicative"  or not-yet-expressed dimension of human thought.

 

It is important, from the standpoint of Objectivism, to make sure that intuition is not considered a "primary" tool to knowledge and not used as the sole basis to guide one's overall actions or life; but like emotions, intuition is a second-order activity of the rational mind.

 

It may help to start from a definition: I think intuition can be considered just like Rand's concept of emotions: Both are indicators or feedback-mechanisms (positive and negative) of one's thought processes. Intuitions are often "not-yet-clarified" or emerging recognitions of facts of reality. In some ways, they may be recognitions of fact that have happened faster than linguistic or fully-logical expression has occurred - although such description later emerges.

 

Intuition in this sense would not be the same as "revelation"  or mere "gut-impulse" that religious or psychologies of noumenal-worlds/minds would have us believe (always refreshing to bash Kant this early in the morning! grin!). And while it may not be a "rigorous" tool of knowledge like "pure logic" it still may play a valid function in cognition, so long as it remains a "stage" of knowledge and not the final or determining aspect of it. Good morning! Matthew Ferrara

 

From: Brian Gordon To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 09:07:16 -0700

 

All, Intuition is indeed a fascinating topic, as we all use it, yet it seems at first glance to run counter to objectivism. In fact, Nathaniel Branden has pointed out that sometimes one's intuition is correct while one's reason is not.

 

I think that intuition is an unconscious conclusion one has reached – the criteria and decision-making process are unconscious. This does not mean that some reasoning has not taken place, simply that one is unaware of it. I once took an excellent course entitled "The Skilled Facilitator's Workshop", in which the participants' goal was to learn to facilitate group meetings effectively and to improve the group's ability to function. This involved pointing out inappropriate behaviors, areas of conflict, and so on, and oftentimes I (and others) would pick up on things intuitively rather than explicitly. When I asked the instructor about this, his point was this: Whatever you have noticed intuitively, there is evidence for, and you must  bring that evidence into your consciousness. You cannot present your intuitive beliefs to anyone, because then they lack any facts to deal with. It was a great workshop! Very objectivist, now that I look back on it. Brian Gordon

 

From: Ming shan To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition Date: Thu, 24 May 2001 22:28:18

 

Merlin Jetton wrote (5/22):  > I wish to second Kurt Keefner's remarks (5/19) about "secular" intuition.

 

I wish to third them; I have not seen as much common sense brought to the discussion about intuition in a long time.  He definitely based his remarks on careful observation.  Indeed, this form of intuition is a requirement for being a skilled, or more skilled, mathematician. Here, of course, it is hardly a mere, mystical feeling. Consider the mathematician in search of a solution to a problem, which might be a path to a proof. By analogy, this intuition is the ability to see the glimpses of light down a possible path before the path is more fully lit through fuller exploration and work.

 

OK, that's great, but what about the mathematician who had it the most, in abundance, Srinivasa Ramanujan?  This guy filled notebook after notebook after notebook with incredibly complex and deep theorems and  formulae of Number Theory, but he rigorously proved not one of them.  He had a power of insight that is rare, even among mathematicians.  He could see clearly what the solution would be to something, and he did not need to prove it, because he already knew it was right.  Some mathematicians these days are busy going through his notebooks and rigorously proving the entries he put down;  so far, it's all panning out.  That's how good the guy was at this type of insight.

 

My point is this: surely R's power of insight does not really come from "reason."  The proof is that the man barely had a high schooler's understanding of trigonometry.

 

What we are calling intuition here strikes me as very much the same thing that Spinoza called "the third kind of knowledge."  But he said that it only arises from "the second kind," which is reason.  But if it only arises from it, then (1) it is surely different from it, and not the same thing, and (2) it is superior to reason. Mingshan

 

From: Mike Rael To: objectivism Subject: Re: OWL: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration

Date: Thu, 24 May 2001 08:48:52 -0700 (PDT)

Good morning yourself, Matthew:) I really appreciate the way you fleshed out my original post on this subject, though I doubt you had the intention of doing that :)  I don't have the energy or patience to check through Atlas, for example, to bolster up my position about intuition. I just know what I know.

 

I really have no criticism at all. You point out that Rand's characters use intuition (true). You mention that intuition is a stage of knowledge only (true). You say that intuition is part of the creative process (true). You infer that reason is the final arbiter of knowledge (true).

 

About my only disagreement is that intuition is not simply the unconscious filling-in of holes in logic that have been derived at super speed. Ain't nuthin' wrong with gut impulses, Matt. Sometimes, for whatever reason, gut impulses are right while our "rationally derived" reason is wrong! That's why some women going down the bridal path need to heed it when they get a strong inner feeling that they shouldn't be there--despite all the "logic" that insists they are in the right place! best always, Mike

 

From: James H Cunningham To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition Date: Fri, 25 May 2001 23:42:28 -0400 Ming Shan wrote (5/24): "[the 'third kind of knowledge' - intuition, as in the case of Srinivasa Ramanujan] is superior to reason."

 

And how?

 

Surely I could not begin to understand - let alone create - such intricate mathematical theorems without relying on a conscious reasoning process; indeed, to decide what I shall eat for dinner takes enough thought on its

own, and I have not enough leisure for those high pursuits.  Are you saying that Ramanujan's intuition is superior to my reason, when I cannot even decide my diet without some mental plodding-out?

 

When I was a child I was forced to put two and two together - when I eat food that tastes bad, I dislike putting it my mouth; and when I dislike putting something in my mouth I should not eat it - but now it is intuitive that I not eat food that I dislike; still I went through conscious reasoning at some point, so I should hardly think that my intuition is contrary to and higher than reason.  It is simply something that followed.

 

And why is what you describe above intuition, in the non-reasoning sense? Ramanujan was equipped with a mind more able to grasp complex truths than mine or yours, and quickly; that he needed think less does not mean that he needed not _think_ at all; why not consider that his 'reasoning ability' was sufficiently inborn that no real effort was required to prove to himself that he _was_ correct?  It is not necessary for me to 'think' to add simple sums, and I am rarely asked to prove my answers afterward; why is it so much to think that a man of a much greater mind can handle greater thoughts, without striking the call of superiority to reason?

 

Anyone who theorizes must do so before proving any theories he puts forth. If Ramanujan had proven his own work, would you consider it less intuition and more reason?

James H Cunningham

 

From: Roger Bissell To: objectivism Subject: OWL: What is Intuition? Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2001 01:52:12 EDT

 

The recent discussion of the nature of intuition has been quite interesting, and I would like to suggest another way of looking at intuition in re thinking. As against the idea some suggest that intuition is relatively more unconscious and thinking relative more conscious, I think it's more helpful to see them both as different kinds of conscious cognitive processes. In support of this, here are some ideas I have gleaned recently from a non-Objectivist thinker, along with some personality-type-related thoughts stimulated by his ideas...

 

Howard Margolis in PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION (U. of Chicago Press, 1987) claimed that cognitive activity tends to be either a combination of broad focus with loose "scan control," which he labeled "intuitive" -- or a combination of narrow focus with tight "scan control," which he labeled "analytical," which is reasonably synonymous with "thinking." Since induction would seem as though it should work better in the former case (intuitive preference), while deduction would seem as though it should work better in the latter (thinking preference). I find this approach very persuasive.

 

However, I want to suggest another way of looking at it. I think that what Margolis is describing as "intuition" by loose focus, broad scan control is actually ~extraverted~ intuition (intuition directed toward the "outer world," which is the kind of intuition that is used by introverted thinkers, who are not nearly so analytical as their extraverted thinking brethren (and sistern...?). And the form of intuition used by extraverted thinkers may not even be recognized as such by them -- focused as they are on assessing the external world and how it can be changed, improved, corrected, etc. – but their intuition almost surely has a tighter focus and narrower scan control (since internal or "introverted" and thus not ranging around in the environment, but instead in their own internal store of ideas) than the kind used by introverted thinkers. In compensation, though, the thinking of TJs (extraverted thinkers) is easier to apply in flexible, broad fashion to assessing and planning things in the world than the thinking of TPs (introverted thinkers).

 

In other words, I think Margolis' model is somewhat oversimplified, but helpful in aiming us in the right direction. His suggestion that a stronger preference for intuition would make one's thinking relatively fuzzier is an interesting hypothesis, but the type results I have seen do not bear this out. My wife has a stronger intuitive preference than thinking, but she is a very precise thinker--and I have a stronger preference for thinking than for intuition, but I am a much fuzzier thinker than her. So go figure! Perhaps we are the exception to the rule, but I think the answer lies elsewhere. I am very precise and focused in my inductive, model-building process, but this is not usually regarded as thinking, but rather intuition. My wife is very precise and focused in her deductive, analytical process, but her strong inner vision, being more in the "tacit" dimension, is overlooked by those who see only her logical thinking process.

 

I encourage others to read Margolis' work, but discussion of the above is welcome, in any case. Best regards, Roger Bissell (INTP)

 

From: Jackie Goreham To: objectivism Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2001 13:16:58 -0700 (PDT) Mike, I don't know to whom you are referring, but eliminating emotion is Vulcan, not Objectivist.  I repeat that if there is a disconnect between your emotions and your thoughts then you have made an error somewhere. There should be no disconnect. Emotions tell us nothing other than that we are having an emotion.  We must use reason to identify its cause. It might be a tip off that something is wrong, sure, why not.  Like a symptom... But our emotions are not "right" or "wrong" really.  It's just that they either do or do not fit the context.  They are only right or wrong based on our thoughts: reason. Jackie Goreham

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
11 minutes ago, Peter said:

 

 

The word "intuition" appears to admit several definitions, one of which was endorsed by Leonard Peikoff in an article in the 1985 volume of _The_New_Scholasticism_, titled "Aristotle's Intuitive Induction."  Peikoff explained that the way in which we become aware of the truth of logical axioms cannot be by logical deduction   --- that would clearly be circular reasoning --- but is a rational cognitive process that involves coming to understand the concepts involved and what the proposition says, and that that process is

called "intuitive induction."

 

"Intuition" also means something like "emotional without feeling", which needs to be explained more long windedly less mysteriously to be understood.  Recall Peikoff in his 12-lecture basic course saying an emotion results from a super-rapid subconscious evaluation of something as good or bad.  At one point in that course he tersely mentioned that a similar super-rapid subconscious process could result in a conscious hunch, whose justification is not conscious.  That is also called "intuition."  Perhaps Mike Rael had that in mind. Mike Hardy

 is correct while one's reason is not.

 

In short,  a polite  term  for guessing.....

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
19 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

In short,  a polite  term  for guessing.....

Guessing can work if you're willing to risk some hurt.

--Brant

just leave yourself an exit

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
1 hour ago, Brant Gaede said:

Guessing can work if you're willing to risk some hurt.

--Brant

just leave yourself an exit

 

1 hour ago, Brant Gaede said:

Guessing can work if you're willing to risk some hurt.

--Brant

just leave yourself an exit

That is exactly right!   In order to find out true things in the world we have to stick our intellectual necks  out.  That  is exactly the current position of the physical sciences.   It turns out physics cannot be bases one hundred percent  on corroborated observable facts.  We must postulate unseen causes to account for that which is seen.  Back in the day,  physicists aligned with Ernst Mach  in insisted that physics be based only on what could be overtly observed. This he and coworkers like Oswald rejected the existence of atoms and molecules  as mere ad hoc hypothesis  or  as  computational  aids.  This situation persisted until  Einstein  (yes, that Einstein!)  published his paper on Brownian Motion and in that paper established very strongly the existence of atoms and molecules.  That was in 1905!  That is how long (from the time of Demokritus and Leukipus)  it took to finally nail down atoms and molecules.

In order to be right,  one must risk being wrong.

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Ba’al wrote: It turns out physics cannot be bases one hundred percent on corroborated observable facts. end quote

Step into my time machine and go back to 1800. They are having an open debate at the European Scientific Society. Tell them . . . no convince them . . . they are wrong about so many wrongfully known *facts*. Could you do it?

Peter

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
3 hours ago, Peter said:

Ba’al wrote: It turns out physics cannot be bases one hundred percent on corroborated observable facts. end quote

Step into my time machine and go back to 1800. They are having an open debate at the European Scientific Society. Tell them . . . no convince them . . . they are wrong about so many wrongfully known *facts*. Could you do it?

Peter

not a chance.  The smartest physicists in the world had to be dragged kicking and screaming to accept quantum theory.  Quantum theory was accepted finally because classical physics failed completely to explain light, electricity and magnetism.  Also classical thermodynamics failed to explain the heat capacity of very cold gases. 

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
On ‎5‎/‎9‎/‎2017 at 4:13 PM, Wolf DeVoon said:

One of the most peculiar things I've ever heard, for several reasons. An hourly laborer obliged to support Dominique the chatelaine? -- or later when Roark can't rub two cents together as a struggling architect destined to infamy and penury with the Stoddard Temple disaster?

Teenage Francisco obligated to teenage Dagny?

Yes, teenage Francisco was obligated to Dagney; but that was his second wrong, his first: he violated the principle of physical force against Dagny.  She owned him.  The second is that he chose his life purpose based on "electrical engineers".  He said he would sell to them; did he consider that they may not want to buy his products?

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
5 minutes ago, atlashead said:

he violated the principle of physical force against Dagny

Uh, have you had any experience with women?

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
20 hours ago, Wolf DeVoon said:

Uh, have you had any experience with women?

I'm going to change the subject: Justice is destroying someone who has violated you so they cannot violate another innocent.

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
3 hours ago, atlashead said:

I'm going to change the subject: Justice is destroying someone who has violated you so they cannot violate another innocent.

Not even close. That's what a vigilante might do, or maybe a lynch mob. You certainly are upset about something.

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Atlashead is too young for his brain.

So am I but I'm much older and there's too much in the rear-view mirror.

--Brant

hard to ignore

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Justice is the natural consequence of your actions to you. That's morality.

Justice is what the law does to you because of what you did--supposedly.

Injustice is what happens to you for what you didn't do.

Greg doesn't know or think injustice.

It's a comfort.

--Brant

verbal alcohol

 

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
6 minutes ago, Brant Gaede said:

Injustice is what happens to you for what you didn't do.

Not sure there is such a thing as injustice, because the opposite of justice is mercy.

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
12 minutes ago, Wolf DeVoon said:

Not sure there is such a thing as injustice, because the opposite of justice is mercy.

That's an alternative, not the opposite.

--Brant

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
25 minutes ago, Brant Gaede said:

That's an alternative, not the opposite.

--Brant

Okay, for educational purposes (mine) what's the opposite of mercy?

 

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
12 hours ago, Wolf DeVoon said:

Okay, for educational purposes (mine) what's the opposite of mercy?

 

Ignoring the situation and the needy person.

--Brant

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
4 hours ago, Brant Gaede said:

Ignoring the situation and the needy person.

--Brant

That is more like lack of concern which is akin to indifference.  

I would have said the opposite of mercy is deliberate cruelty.  It takes  hard work to become Ming, the Merciless. 

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
3 hours ago, BaalChatzaf said:

I would have said the opposite of mercy is deliberate cruelty.  It takes  hard work to become Ming, the Merciless. 

That sounds like a spectrum, with exact justice somewhere in the middle. Sigh.

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
7 hours ago, Brant Gaede said:

[the opposite of mercy is] ignoring the situation and the needy person.

--Brant

So, uh, the opposite of justice is ignoring the situation, too? Not quarreling with you, exploring important terms.

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
2 hours ago, Wolf DeVoon said:

So, uh, the opposite of justice is ignoring the situation, too? Not quarreling with you, exploring important terms.

Are you talking about mercy in a legal context?

We can chase these terms around all day and all night. Let's not use one item to chase another.

BTW, the answer to your question can be "yes." But that's established by context. Mercy too.

--Brant

sometimes this and sometimes that

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
4 minutes ago, Brant Gaede said:

Are you talking about mercy in a legal context?

Uh, no. I don't think it's possible in any legal system I know of, or it shouldn't be.

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
12 minutes ago, Wolf DeVoon said:

Uh, no. I don't think it's possible in any legal system I know of, or it shouldn't be.

Judicial discretion?

--Brant

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites
36 minutes ago, Brant Gaede said:

Judicial discretion?

--Brant

You mean in criminal sentencing, maybe? - usually not. There are sentencing guidelines, recommendation of probation office, prosecutor. I suppose the modern penal model could be called merciful, with relatively mild punishments compared to previous centuries, 8th Amendment limit on cruelty and a quite a lot of case law to protect prisoner rights. But there is no standard or plausible range of "mercy" that a judge could give as a reason, for instance to excuse a convicted defendant. Sometimes people are released when they're terminally ill, sent home to die.

I think mercy, cruelty, and revenge pertain exclusively to willful private evil, whereas justice is due process, fair trial, presumption of innocence, in the context of equity or common law, or perhaps in the future an explicit constitutional definition (wink).

I'd like to get Atlashead back in this discussion. The way I read him, he thinks that "justice" is unilateral, summary, private vengeance:

Quote

Justice is destroying someone who has violated you so they cannot violate another innocent.

 

0

Share this post


Link to post
Share on other sites

Create an account or sign in to comment

You need to be a member in order to leave a comment

Create an account

Sign up for a new account in our community. It's easy!


Register a new account

Sign in

Already have an account? Sign in here.


Sign In Now